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PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

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## CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

## AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART II.

4

Foreign Office, December, 1840.



PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

No.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

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PART II.

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*Foreign Office, December, 1840.*

CORRESPONDENCE

THE EASTERN QUESTION

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PART II.

THE EASTERN QUESTION

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## CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

## THE AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

## PART II.

## No. 1.

*Memorandum of a communication to be made to the French Ambassador in London,  
by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  
(Communicated to M. Guizot, July 17.)*

*Foreign Office, 15 Juillet, 1840.*

LE Gouvernement Français a reçu dans tout le cours des négociations qui commencèrent l'automne de l'année passée les preuves les plus répétées, les plus manifestes, et les plus incontestables, non seulement du désir des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'arriver à une entente avec le Gouvernement Français sur les arrangements nécessaires pour effectuer la pacification du Levant; mais aussi de la grande importance que ces Cours n'ont jamais cessé d'attacher à l'effet moral que produiraient l'union et le concours des Cinq Puissances dans une affaire d'un intérêt si grave et si intimement liée au maintien de la paix Européenne. Les Quatre Cours ont vu avec le plus profond regret que tous leurs efforts pour atteindre leur but ont été infructueux; et malgré que, tout dernièrement, elles aient proposé à la France de s'associer avec elles pour faire exécuter un arrangement entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, fondé sur des idées qui avaient été émises vers la fin de l'année dernière par l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres, cependant le Gouvernement Français n'a pas cru pouvoir prendre part à cet arrangement, et a fait dépendre son concours avec les autres Puissances de conditions que ces Puissances ont jugées incompatibles avec le maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et avec le repos futur de l'Europe.

Dans cet état de choses les Quatre Cours n'avaient d'autre choix que d'abandonner aux chances de l'avenir les grandes affaires qu'elles avaient prises l'engagement d'arranger, et ainsi de constater leur impuissance, et de livrer la paix Européenne à des dangers toujours croissans; ou bien de prendre la résolution de marcher en avant sans la co-opération de la France, et d'amener au moyen de leurs efforts réunis une solution des complications du Levant, conforme aux engagements que les Quatre Cours ont contractés envers le Sultan, et propre à assurer la Paix future.

Placées entre ces deux choix, et pénétrées de l'urgence d'une décision immédiate, et en rapport avec les graves intérêts qui s'y trouvent engagés, les Quatre Cours ont cru de leur devoir d'opter pour la dernière de ces deux alternatives; et elles viennent par conséquent de conclure avec le Sultan une Convention destinée à résoudre d'une manière satisfaisante les complications actuellement existantes dans le Levant.

Les Quatre Cours en signant cette Convention, n'ont pu ne pas sentir le plus vif regret de se trouver ainsi momentanément séparées de la France, dans une affaire essentiellement Européenne; mais ce regret se trouve diminué par



[illegible][illegible]

Si le Gouvernement Français pouvait de cette manière contribuer efficacement à mettre les termes aux complications du travail et Gouvernement acquiescent au nouveau titre de reconnaissance et à l'estime de tous ces amis de la Paix.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 18, 1840

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 89, of yesterday's date, I have to inform your Excellency that it is very desirable that no time should be lost by the Austrian Government in sending to their Admiral in the Mediterranean, orders to unite his squadron with the British squadron under the command of Sir Robert Stopford, in order that the two may co-operate in the manner, and for the purposes, specified in the Convention and Protocol of yesterday's date. Your Excellency will also state to the Austrian Government, that as the arrangements between the Four Powers and the Porte now stand, the share to be taken by Austria in the measures to be employed for carrying the stipulated arrangement into execution is not quite in proportion to the power and importance of Austria, as compared with some of the other Contracting Parties.

Great Britain has a large squadron in the Mediterranean, which is to be applied to the purposes of the Alliance; Russia holds a considerable force in the Black Sea, and her co-operation is to be confined to the employment of a few frigates and sloops.

It is far from the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in pointing out this circumstance, to appear in any degree to undervalue the immense importance of the association of Austria with the other Powers in these measures, the moral effect of that association cannot be overrated, and will exercise, no doubt, a deciding influence upon the result of the present negotiations. Her Majesty's Government to be true to the engagements which have been contracted.

...not to herself, increase very usefully to the  
her contribution to the common object

The Sultan is greatly in distress for money. might not the Austrian Government, either as a gift or as a loan, furnish the Sultan with some pecuniary means to meet the present emergency? the Syrians, who are anxious to expel the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, want arms and ammunition, could not the Austrian Government furnish from their military stores some thousand

The advantage of thus supplying skill and science to undisciplined troops has been strongly exemplified by the services rendered to the forces of the Queen of Spain by the Artillery and Engineer officers whom the British Government attached to these forces.

Again, it is known that the troops of Mehmet Ali in Syria have large arrears of pay due to them, a point which is well known to the British. It is of importance to suppose that if the Sultan could order to those troops immediate payment of these arrears, many of them would, in the present state of things, be induced to return at once to their allegiance to the Sultan and to abstain from serving Mehmet Ali. Mehmet Ali could not, of course, command them to do this with the means of making good such collection accepted by the Egyptian troops.

It is true, however, and not of an deny, if they are to be made to be  
upper ex-act nox poal, the ver the ex-act nox poal the ex-act nox poal  
Austrian Government, at the date, as we as to a never be the ex-act nox poal

(Signed) I am, &c,  
PALMERSTON.

(No. 14, Secret and Confidential)

448

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1840*

1 TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of a Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, and of a separate Act thereunto annexed, and of two Protocols all of which were yesterday signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte. I inclose also a copy of a Memorandum which I have prepared for a communication to be made by me to M. Guizot the French Ambassador at the Court of St. James, by the Governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, as the basis for the language to be held by them to the Government of France.

I also inclose a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, signifying to their Lordships the Queen's commands to the instructions to be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford with reference to the inclosed documents.

I have to instruct you to consider this communication as secret and confidential, until you hear from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that the Russian Government has agreed to the proposed Convention. At the same time, you are to inform the British Government that the British Government is aware of the proposed Convention and that the British Government is aware of the proposed Convention.

Nevertheless, you are at liberty to use your discretion as to making known  
 tentatively whether or not Mr. \_\_\_\_\_, not Ali, the general fact that  
 \_\_\_\_\_ with the Sultan for the title  
 \_\_\_\_\_ foreign and Mehmet Ali, if you should  
 \_\_\_\_\_ that such an intimation would usefully prepare Mehmet Ali for  
 \_\_\_\_\_, and would not give him a premature warning which might be  
 advantageous to him, with a view to organizing means of resistance.  
 If you should think it advisable to \_\_\_\_\_

If you should think it advisable to give any intimation to Mehmet Ali, you should not do so, except in concert with, and with the concurrence of, your colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, but in that case you should suggest to Mehmet Ali, but not in such a manner as to give offence, that when Four Great Powers enter into such engagements with a Fifth, they must necessarily have made up their minds to carry fully into execution the stipulated arrangements. That no reasonable man can doubt that the Four Powers and the Sultan



have the requisite means for accomplishing their object, and that, consequently, any attempt at resistance on the part of Mehemet Ali could only be injurious to himself and his family.

You will treat the French Consul General as the Agent of a Power which for special reasons belonging to its domestic policy, has been unable to join the other Four Powers in the engagements made with the Sultan, but which is not hostile to the views of the Four Powers, and which has formally declared its intention to offer no opposition to the measures which the Four Powers may think it right to adopt.

I am &c  
Signed PALMERSTON

No. 4

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 18, 1840

YOU will see by the inclosures in my despatch No. 15, that Her Majesty's Government has entered into a Convention with Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, for the purpose of circumscribing the power of Mehemet Ali within limits compatible with the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire.

Mehemet Ali must necessarily feel, when he learns that fact, that successful resistance on his part is impossible; and that any attempt at it would only lead to losing the advantages which the Sultan and his Allies are willing to offer.

The only chance of success which Mehemet Ali could have, would be from the assistance of France; but France will not help him. France would, indeed, oppose a hostile coalition with the Five Powers above-mentioned, if those Powers were to threaten to invade France, to insult her honour, or to attack her Possessions; but France will not go to war with the other Great Powers of Europe in order to help Mehemet Ali, nor has she the means of doing so.

France has, it is true, a fleet of fifteen sail of the line in the Mediterranean, and she might soon add three more to that number, but that is nearly the whole amount of her available fleet: and she could not send to sea a much greater force, if she were to go to war with the Four Powers. Great Britain, on the other hand, could, in case of war, send to sea a fleet which would sweep the Ocean.

France has now 60,000 men in Algeria, and in order to supply reinforcements to fill up casualties in that army, she must maintain a large force at home especially as a counterpoise to the French troops. How, in this state of things, could France wantonly engage in war with the Great Military Powers of the Continent?

It is true, however, that in the event of war, France would soon be relieved from any embarrassment arising out of her occupation of Algeria, because loss of that possession would be the first effect of a naval war. For if a British fleet were only to cut off the communication between France and Algeria, fever and the Moors would soon dispose of the French troops in Africa.

It is certain, therefore, that France will take no active part in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the French Government have repeatedly told us so. France will wait—will lie by; and if Mehemet Ali should be able to resist the Allies for any length of time, she will then offer herself as a mediator. But it will be the business of the Four Powers so to press Mehemet Ali, as not to give France such an opportunity.

You will see that orders have been given to the British fleet to act at once by cutting off the communication between Syria and Egypt, and by helping the Syrians. If Mehemet Ali should complain of this, and of its being done without notice, you will remind him civilly, that we are the Allies of the Sultan, and have a right to help the faithful subjects of the Sultan in maintaining their allegiance, and to assist the Sultan against those of his subjects who are in revolt against him, as Mehemet Ali is; and that Mehemet Ali, not being an independent Sovereign with whom the Four Powers have any political relations, those Powers are not bound to give him any notice of their intended proceedings.

If Mehemet Ali should threaten to use any personal violence towards yourself, or towards the British subjects and property in Egypt, or to interrupt the passage of our Indian mails, either going or coming, you will request him seriously to consider whether he can have anything to gain by insulting and annoying a Great and formidable Power like England, and thus converting that which is now a measure of general European policy into a special and direct quarrel between England and Great Britain. It must be easy enough to see which of the two is likely to have the worst of it in such a collision.

The best course which Mehemet Ali can pursue, even if he means to resist instead of submitting, is to be as civil as he can to the Allied Powers, and not to compel them to resent insults offered to themselves, as well as to assist in maintaining the rights of the Sultan.

You will see that your personal situation is essential to the honour and dignity of your country, you will of course embark; but it is desirable that you should stay as long as you properly can do so, in order to be an organ of communication with the Pasha.

You will assure Mehemet Ali that the British Government is not guided, in the course which it is pursuing, by any ill will to him, but solely by paramount considerations of European policy; and, indeed, the terms which are to be offered to him, are the best proof that we do not wish to destroy him, or to press upon him more heavily than is necessary for the accomplishment of the great political objects in view. But he should clearly comprehend that these offers are like the Sibylline books: and that the longer he holds off, the less he will ultimately get.

I am, &c,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 5.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Consul Werry.\*

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 18, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint you that engagements have been entered into between the Governments of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte, for the purpose of effecting a pacification of the Levant; and that in pursuance of those engagements, the naval forces of Great Britain and Austria will afford support and assistance to the Syrian subjects of the Porte, in their endeavours to relieve themselves from the rule of Mehemet Ali, in order to return to their allegiance to the Sultan.

Sir Robert Stopford has accordingly received orders from Her Majesty's Government, in pursuance of which Her Majesty's squadron will immediately appear on the coast of Syria; and I have to instruct you to place yourself in communication with Sir Robert Stopford, or the Commanding Officer of any of Her Majesty's ships in your neighbourhood, and to afford to them every information you can give them which may be useful to them for the service in which they are engaged; and you will, moreover, attend to any directions Sir Robert Stopford may, from time to time, find occasion to give to you.

You will cause it to be generally known, that Her Majesty and the Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have entered into engagements with the Sultan to re-establish the dominion of His Highness in Syria; and you will facilitate, as far as you may be able to do so with safety, any communication between the Syrians and Her Majesty's naval Commanders.

I am, &c,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

\* The same despatch was addressed on the same day to Mr. Consul Moore and Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.



No. 6.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

No. 105.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that arrangements will be made for placing at Sir Robert Stopford's disposal, from Her Majesty's stores at Malta, 5,000 stand of arms, and a due proportion of ammunition; and that Sir Robert Stopford will be instructed to supply these arms and ammunition to the Syrians who are in resistance to the troops of Mehemet Ali, if he should find that such a supply would be useful towards obtaining the results contemplated by the Convention of London. I also have to acquaint your Excellency with an account of the arms and ammunition which he may thus distribute, and of the parties to whom he may distribute them.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Turkish Government, that Her Majesty's Government have taken this step without waiting to be sure that the Turkish Government will repay the value of these arms and ammunition; but that Her Majesty's Government can have no doubt that the Porte will do so, when its present difficulties are over; and that the charge for these arms and ammunition will be at the rates which will hereafter be communicated to you.

Your Excellency will obtain from the Porte a written assurance of repayment.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 7

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

No. 108.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 21, 1840.

I ENCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a secret despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls at Aleppo, Beyrout, and Damascus, conveying to them instructions for their conduct with reference to the engagements contracted between the Four Powers and the Porte in the Convention of July 15.

I have, at the same time, to acquaint your Excellency, that arrangements will be made for embarking on board the squadron under the orders of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, a small detachment of Artillery, with a proportion of Sappers and Miners, and two or three Officers of Engineers, to be employed on any service in which Sir Robert Stopford may require them to act in conjunction with the marines of his squadron.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 19)*

No. 19

My Lord,

Paris, July 17, 1840.

I HAD a long confidential conversation this morning on the subject of Eastern Affairs, with M. Thiers. He began by observing that he was aware that reports had reached your Lordship, of endeavours made by the French Government to annihilate the negotiations at London, by promoting a direct

negotiation between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. This, he said, he had never done; and that his instructions had been strictly confined to recommending to both parties peace and concessions. I asked him the object of M. Prier's mission to Egypt?

He said that M. Prier was sent to the Pasha to tell him that if he offered to restore the Turkish fleet, he must do so in a serious and *bona fide* manner; and that, at the least, he must concede Adana, the Holy Cities, and Candia to the Porte. "This," said M. Thiers, "I think we can get from Mehemet Ali, though with difficulty, and the language I hold to him in favour of submission, is as strong as it can be, without forfeiting that influence which I hope to make useful to the interests of peace. In short," said he, "to you I speak in his favour, but to himself I argue in favour of Turkey."

He then went over the question of what might be gained or lost by attempting to wrest Syria from the Viceroy; but as little was here said which your Excellency would not have known, I did not repeat it. He observed, however, to observe, that he heard some project was being now canvassed in London between the Four Powers.

If, said he, England takes this course, it will certainly not be a case of immediate hostilities; but it is impossible to say what may ultimately occur. It is impossible to say what will be the result. It will certainly produce her Navy and Army; and a state of irritation will be produced, which, sooner or later, will end in one of those wars which convulse Europe.

He then read me a despatch which he had just received from Damascus, from which it would appear that the insurrection in Syria is put down.

In answer to his observations I told him that it was too much the interest of both countries to maintain their present friendly relations, for me to believe that either would easily forego such an advantage; but calling to mind what had occurred last year, and the support of which the French Government had then, in conjunction with the other Governments, assured the Sultan, I could hardly conceive how it would now be possible to avoid doing something in favour of Turkey, if she called upon those by whom such promises had been volunteered, to fulfil them. That as to differences as to the extent of what should be done, there would always be differences between States the most amicably disposed towards each other; but that still, I was quite sure it would give the sincerest concern to Her Majesty's Government to find that, in this or any other matter, its views were at variance with those of France. I then asked him what had been the result of the negotiations of last year by General Sebastiani? This he objected to, he did not seem willing, indeed, to admit that the Pasha should yield more than Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 9

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 22)*

(No. 22)

My Lord,

Paris, July 20, 1840.

I ASKED M. Thiers, in a friendly manner, this morning, whether the account given me by M. Deagès, in my despatch No. 21, with respect to the French fleet that has sailed for Tunis, was complete. "No," he said, "it is not the time, my friend, to ask or to give explanations. Have you any particular news from London?" I said "No." "Do not, then, mention in Paris what I tell you; but the alliance between England and France is at an end. M. Guizot has received the official intelligence, that an agreement has been come to by the Four Powers, to which we have not even been asked to adhere. This, however, does not much signify, it is merely an affair of form, it is of the *fond* of this matter that I complain more seriously. I cannot understand an alliance on small questions, and a difference on great ones. Should England separate from us on the Eastern Question, such a separation will be a general one. France will, as I have already said, isolate herself she is confident in



her strength, and the more so as the Government has on this subject the whole population of France behind it. Should an occasion, therefore, arise on which the dignity or the interests of my country call upon me to act, I will do so without fear and with decision. I regret it deeply; but I cannot but see in the state of affairs, as now announced to me, eventualities which may disturb the peace of Europe."

I said that, as I had no information upon the subject on which he was speaking, I could say nothing positive upon it. But I was quite sure that, apart from the policy which my Government might think it necessary to adopt, there was only one desire to communicate and to pursue that policy in the manner least likely to offend the dignity, and best calculated to conciliate the feelings, of the French Government; and that it was not for a great country like France to have the jealousy or susceptibility of a smaller Power; and I added, that I was, moreover, certain that M. Thiers' abilities would enable him to look beyond the present moment, and to perceive that, even if an important difference between the two countries should now unhappily arise, there were too many other circumstances which would prevent the French Government from adopting any course which would change a temporary disagreement into a permanent quarrel.

I thought it better, however, under all circumstances, not to protract the conversation, more especially as M. Thiers' first expressions are always to be considered as subject to revision. But it is my duty to add, that I know no man who would engage in any war which he thought would add to his popularity or consolidate his power.

The King of the French, however, will do all in his power, no doubt, to prevent the dangers which might arise from this disposition.

I have, &c.  
Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 10.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 21, 1840.

WITH reference to that passage of the Memorandum delivered by me to M. Guizot on the 17th instant, of which a copy is herewith transmitted to you, in which mention is made of a plan founded upon ideas suggested by the French Ambassador at this Court, I have to state to you, for your information, that rather more than two months ago, Baron Neumann came to me and urged me to make, in concert with him, another attempt to persuade the Government of France to unite itself with the other Four Powers for carrying into execution some arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, compatible with the principles which Great Britain and Austria wish to maintain, and at the same time calculated to secure the continuance of peace in the Levant.

Baron Neumann observed, that as matters then stood, there was a wide difference between the plans recommended on these matters by England and France respectively. The English Government, he said, wished to restrict Mehemet Ali to the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt. The French Government wished to give to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of all Syria besides. Austria, he said, would be glad if she could in any way assist in bringing France and England to an agreement upon some middle term between these two extremes. The English Government had, indeed, at one time, proposed that there should be added to the Pashalik of Egypt, some of the lower part of Syria, bounded by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the bottom of Lake Tiberias, and thence along the Jordan and the Dead Sea, to the end of Gulf Akaba; but upon France declining to assent to such an arrangement, it was withdrawn by England.

Baron Neumann then proposed, that I should again to make such an offer, adding to it the fortress of Acre, and proposing that the boundary line should be drawn from the sea coast, somewhere north of Acre, to the northern end of Lake Tiberias, and thence along the line above

described; upon the understanding that this lower part of Syria should be held by Mehemet Ali only for his life, and not by hereditary tenure, because Austria never would consent to Mehemet Ali's holding any part whatever of Syria by an hereditary tenure.

Baron Neumann said, that such an arrangement would be very like the one which Count Sebastiani had more than once proposed to him and to Baron Brunnow, as well as to me; and that, consequently, there seemed to me a reasonable chance of its being agreed to by France. I said, that I would most willingly co-operate with him in making such a proposal to M. Guizot, because, however much I should regret that Mehemet Ali should retain possession of the fortress of Acre, nevertheless, if the Sultan should have occupation of Beyrout, and should thus have good means of communication by sea with the middle part of Syria, the occupation of the fortress of Acre would be a very formidable means of future aggression; and it might be worth while to make such a sacrifice in order to obtain unanimity among the Five Powers. Accordingly, Baron Neumann and I agreed that we would each make this proposal to M. Guizot. Baron Neumann made it the next day, and I the day after that.

M. Guizot heard my statement, and said he would report it to his Government, and ask for instructions, as he had none applicable to such a proposal. After a short time, Baron Brunnow, Baron Bülow, and Baron Neumann, spoke to me separately upon this matter, saying, that they had understood from M. Guizot that the French Government would not give an answer to Mehemet Ali upon this proposal before it could give an answer to the Sultan. They expressed extreme dissatisfaction at this saying, but they were ready and willing to negotiate with France, but that their instructions positively forbade them from negotiating with Mehemet Ali, or with any agent of his, because their Courts acknowledge him in no other capacity than that of subject of the Sultan, and in that character their Courts cannot negotiate with him. They said that this seemed to them to render any further negotiation with France on these matters impossible, because it turned out that it was not France but Mehemet Ali with whom the negotiation was to be carried on.

I told them that M. Guizot had said nothing to me about a reference to Alexandria, and that I thought it would be best that no notice should be taken of what he had said on that subject to them. That the French Government was then much occupied with Parliamentary business, and might naturally enough require some time to consider and make up its mind on our proposal; and that we were not called upon to report what I had said to the Sultan, or whom it might choose to consult. That if, by a communication with Alexandria, the French Government should be able to persuade Mehemet Ali to consent to our plan, so much the better; and if they failed and on that account refused to join us, we should only be where we were, with the advantage, however, of having made a very conciliatory proposal to France.

The three Ministers acquiesced; and I did not press M. Guizot for an answer, in order not to give him an opportunity of saying that he was waiting for a decision from Mehemet Ali. I did, after a lapse of time sufficient to have enabled the French Government to have sent to Alexandria, and to have had a reply from thence, M. Guizot brought me a private letter from M. Thiers, from whence he read a passage stating that the French Government was perfectly certain that Mehemet Ali would never agree to a proposal, not indeed to any arrangement that did not leave him in occupation of the whole of Syria, that force would, therefore, be necessary to compel him to consent to our plan; that France could not be a party to coercive measures against Mehemet Ali; and that, consequently, she could not unite herself with the other Three Powers to propose, and to carry into execution, the plan in question.

This answer proved that it was impossible for the Four Powers any longer to entertain the slightest hope of cooperation in the present Syrian question. While on the one hand their policy is founded upon the principle of maintaining the status quo, and on the other hand the engagement of the Collective Note, better terms than Mehemet Ali would be willing spontaneously to agree to, France has plainly avowed that her policy is founded upon the principle of requiring the Sultan to submit to such terms as Mehemet Ali may be willing spontaneously to accept.



But the question at issue had assumed also another character; for the question now was, whether France was or was not to become the dictator of Europe; whether the Four Powers should be free to follow their own views of their own common interests, by their own means; or whether they should be paralysed and spell-bound, not even by the veto of France, but merely by the want of her concurrence and co-operation.

It was obvious that if they thus yielded their own policy in passive submission to that of France, they would thereby have made a public and formal acknowledgment of the supremacy of France in European Affairs; and this must inevitably have led to very inconvenient consequences.

Among the results of such a course would certainly have been future disputes of a serious character with France; because it would have been possible but that the French Government, elated by the submission of the Four Powers to its will, would have been led upon other questions to take steps and to hold language which other Powers would have felt themselves wholly unable to brook.

Her Majesty's Government, and the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took all these matters into their serious and deliberate consideration, and the result was the decision announced in the Memorandum herewith enclosed.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 41

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 26.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1840.

ON Friday last I read and gave to M. Guizot the Memorandum of which I have sent you a copy in my No. 25, adding to it some further expressions of the great regret felt by Her Majesty's Government at having been obliged to separate in the affairs of the Levant from France, and of our confident hope that our separation would not be long, and would in no degree impair the good understanding between the two countries.

I have since had another conversation with M. Guizot, and I give you, for your information, the general substance of both.

M. Guizot said that he would send the Memorandum on Saturday to his colleagues, and that he was of course delay making any reply to it until he should receive instructions from Paris. But he said there were three passages in it, upon which he wished at once to make remarks, because he did not admit the assertions contained or implied in those passages.

The first passage was that in which I say that a plan of arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which had lately been proposed to France, was founded upon ideas suggested by the French Ambassador in London; and M. Guizot said, that if that passage meant to imply that the French Government had authorized Count Sebastiani to propose the plan therein alluded to, and if, therefore, the Memorandum intended to charge the French Government with inconsistency, in having at one time proposed a particular plan, and in having at another time rejected it, he must at once deny the justice of such an imputation. He said, the plan in question was proposed by Count Sebastiani, in his individual capacity, without instructions or authority from the French Government, and that no trace of it could be found in the Records of the French Embassy.

The plan in question was that which in my despatch, No. 44, of 28th September, 1839, I explain to you as having been proposed by Count Sebastiani; and it consisted in a proposal that Syria should be divided into two parts, by a line to be drawn east and west, somewhere about Beirout and Damascus, and that the part of Syria north of that line should immediately be restored to the Sultan, and that the portion south of that line should be retained by Mehemet Ali, in addition to the Pashalic of Egypt.

I said, that I was ready to admit that Count Sebastiani had stated that he proposed that plan without any specific instructions; and I added, that when I

made known to you that he had made such a proposal, you had informed me that it did not tally with the language and opinions, either of the King of the French, or of Marshal Soult, which, though in some material respects different from each other, were, nevertheless, both of them at variance with Count Sebastiani's plan.

But I showed M. Guizot my despatch of September last to you, in order to prove to him that the proposal was made in a more formal manner than merely as a scheme loosely thrown out by the Count in his individual capacity, inasmuch as Count Sebastiani had led me to infer, that if that plan were adopted by Her Majesty's Government, France would co-operate in coercive measures to enforce it; and I pointed out to M. Guizot, how I had remarked that it was inconsistent in France to be willing to use coercive measures for carrying into effect an imperfect arrangement, and yet to decline to employ them to carry into effect a complete one; and how Count Sebastiani had stated in reply, that if the French Government could show to the Chambers and to the public, that it had made the best terms possible for Mehemet Ali, it would be able to justify its participation in coercive measures, in order to carry those terms into effect.

But I said, that Count Sebastiani had, at later periods, more than once, again pressed this scheme upon me, and that he had urged it upon Baron Brunnov, and also upon Baron Neumann, who did not arrive here till the latter part of December.

I said, that it is impossible to separate the individual and the public character of an Ambassador, in the manner implied by M. Guizot's argument, especially when that Ambassador is speaking to a Secretary of State in an official interview, and in a conversation arising upon despatches which that Ambassador comes to communicate from his Court. And I added, that as it is well known that Count Sebastiani was in direct and confidential communication with the King of the French, the mere absence of any trace of such a proposal in the Public Records of the Embassy, does not afford a conclusive proof that the Count had no authority for making the suggestion.

I contended, moreover, that the words of the Memorandum give a perfectly accurate and correct impression of the suggestion, as suggested by the French Ambassador at London. But of course it would be open to the French Government to make any disclaimer it might please to make as to the conclusions to be drawn from the facts stated in the Memorandum.

The next passage was that which states that the French Government had declared that certain considerations rendered it impossible for that Government to take part in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

M. Guizot said, the word "impossible" was much too strong. That he had never so used it, and he did not think the French Government could have done so; that France did not choose to co-operate in measures of coercion to compel Mehemet Ali to evacuate the whole of Syria. But there were other objects for which, and certain cases in which, she had never said that she would not join in coercion. That, for instance, she had always declared that she would join in coercion to defend Constantinople, and to prevent Ibrahim from crossing the Taurus.

I said, that for a long time past we certainly had understood from the language held by the King of the French, and by his Ministers at Paris, not only to Her Majesty's Ambassador, but to the Ambassadors of other Powers, that in no case would, or could the French Government join in coercive measures to force Mehemet Ali to submit to any given arrangement; and that the fundamental principle of the French policy had therefore been, that France could be a party to no arrangement which Mehemet Ali would not agree to voluntarily, and without any coercion at all.

That, to employ force to defend Constantinople, and to prevent Ibrahim from crossing the Taurus was quite a different thing, and bore upon a different question. It has been the opinion of many, that France aims at dismembering the Turkish Empire, and at erecting a new and an Independent State, to consist of Egypt, Arabia, and Syria; but there is nothing inconsistent with that scheme in a declaration that France would not, for the present at least, permit the new Sovereign of that State to extend his territorial limits to the north of the Taurus. But, with respect to the readiness of France to join in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, with reference to countries south of the Taurus, and at present occupied by him, I reminded M. Guizot, that not long ago I had stated to him that our conviction is, that if the arrangement demanded by Mehemet



Ali, and supported by France, were to be carried into effect, and if Mehmet Ali were to be made hereditary Pasha of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, the certain consequence would be, that in a short time he would throw off all semblance of vassalage, and would declare himself independent; and I had asked M. Guizot what France would do in that case, and whether she would then unite herself with the other Powers to compel Mehmet Ali to return to his allegiance; and I observed, that the only answer which M. Guizot had given me was, "alors comme alors," an answer which certainly was not calculated to encourage the belief that even in the extreme case thus supposed by me, France would find it possible to join in coercive measures against Mehmet Ali.

In my second interview, I showed M. Guizot several passages in despatches from Earl Granville and from yourself, all tending to prove that the ~~usage~~ held by the French Government for several months past had been, that it was impossible for any French Government to take part in coercive measures against Mehmet Ali. And I further observed, that the very ground upon which the French Government had declined the last proposal made to it by Baron Neumann and myself was, that Mehmet Ali would never willingly consent to any division whatever of Syria; and that, as France would not be a party to the employment of coercion against him, she could not join to press upon him an arrangement which she knew beforehand, he would not agree to without coercion.

The third passage was, that which says that the French Government had declared, that in no case would France oppose the measures which the Four Powers might think necessary for the execution of the arrangement which they considered essential for the future peace of the Levant. He said this assertion was much too general, and had never been made by France. That on the contrary, if out of the measures adopted by the Four Powers, events were to arise which would essentially change the relative strength of the Powers of Europe; if, for instance, a Russian army were to enter Asia Minor, and to remain for any length of time in occupation thereof, in any such case, France would consider herself free to take such course as her interests or her honour might require.

I said, that this was quite understood; and the passage of the Memorandum which he alluded to, related only to those immediate measures of coercion which had often been discussed between the Five Powers, and the particular object of which would be to induce the Pasha to accept the reasonable offers of the Sultan, and thus to secure the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

I then again urged upon M. Guizot how desirable it would be that France should employ her influence with the Pasha, to persuade him at once to accept the liberal terms which were to be offered to him; and I said, that although France had been prevented by domestic considerations, from joining the other Four Powers, she might thus, by giving us her moral aid, contribute to the re-establishment of permanent peace in the Levant, as effectually as if she had been party to the Convention. I observed, that arguments of weight could not be wanting to be used with the Pasha, for that it might well be put to him, that when Four Great Powers, like England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, enter their minds to carry through, at all hazards, that which they have begun, and that the Pasha is too sagacious a man not to see that he has no strength whatever which could enable him to stand against the Four Powers and the Sultan.

M. Guizot then, after calculating that at least sixty days must elapse before an answer could be received here to the propositions which I explained to him were to be made by the Sultan to Mehmet Ali, asked me whether all measures of coercion would be delayed till then, or whether any such measures would be put in execution sooner.

I said, that in the present state of Syria it would be impossible for the Four Powers to wait for Mehmet Ali's reply; that large masses of the Sultan's army were now employed in the suppression of the tyranny of Mehmet Ali, and that it was impossible for the people, unaided, to be butchered by the tyrants; consequently, assistance and protection would at once be sent to the Syrians; and the French Government must not be surprised if, for that purpose, communication by sea were to be cut off between Syria and Egypt.

M. Guizot seemed unprepared for this statement, although having for some

days before been aware that the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers were in close communication with the Plenipotentiary of the Porte, he must have anticipated that some engagements were about to be entered into between them. He said, that such a proceeding on the part of the Four Powers, would oblige France to be in force, in great force, in the Levant.

I said, that of course the French Government must judge for itself on that matter; but I trusted he would allow me to express a hope that the French force would not be so placed as to render likely any collision between it and the British fleet. He said, of course care would be taken to guard against that. I then said, that I would beg further to hope that the French force would not be so placed as to encourage Mehmet Ali to resist; and M. Guizot equally assured me that the French Government could have no intention of doing anything of the kind.

M. Guizot said, that he much regretted that we had chosen so inopportune a moment to enter into our Convention, just at the time when Mehmet Ali and the Sultan were about to come to an amicable understanding by a direct negotiation between them. I said, that no accounts which we had lately received tended to show that any such direct arrangement was more likely than heretofore to be made; that, on the contrary, the Sultan still looked to the Powers who signed the Collective Note, for the fulfilment of the expectations of aid and support which that Note held out; and that only the other day the Turkish Ambassador, Chekib Effendi, had sent me a long Note, urging the same thing in the most pressing manner.

M. Guizot said, that it seemed to him a pity, and not worth while that we should incur the risk of bringing on all the serious consequences which he foresaw as possible results of our Convention, merely for the sake of restoring to the Sultan three or four miserable Pashalics in Syria. I said, that in the first place I felt convinced that the dangers which he alluded to would certainly flow from the French plan, and would, in all probability, be averted by ours; but that, as to the value of Syria, I must observe, that its value may perhaps be measured by the tenacity with which Mehmet Ali clings to it; and that, if Syria were not, as we allege, a military position which forms the key of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, Mehmet Ali might, perhaps, have been as willing to give it up, as he is to evacuate Arabia and Candia.

M. Guizot remarked, that false pride sometimes makes men cling to what they have, though it be of small value, or though its relinquishment would be for their good; and he instanced the case of Napoleon, who might have retained a large and powerful kingdom if he had accepted the offers of the Allies, but whose false pride would not allow him to give up his conquests. I said, that I could not admit the cases to be parallel, or that one was an example for the other; but that if it were so, the result of Napoleon's refusal might usefully be pointed out as alarming to Mehmet Ali.

M. Guizot said, in conclusion, that the British and French Governments unfortunately differ widely in opinion upon all these matters, and when differences of opinion upon future matters are thus irreconcilable, nothing but events can decide between the differing parties. That if events should prove that we are right, and if all these affairs shall be settled as we expect them to be, the French Government will be delighted to find its apprehensions unfounded. But that if, on the other hand, their view should turn out to be correct, and the future embarrassments and dangers which they foresee, should come to be realized, at least the responsibility of such a state of things will not rest with them. To this position, I, of course, entirely assented.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1840

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 22, of the 20th instant, in which you report that M. Thiers had stated to you that the alliance between England and France was at an end; and I have to express to you the entire approbation of Her Majesty's Government of the language you hold on that occasion. I have, however, to instruct you, on any future occasion on which M. Thiers may make the same observation, to remark to M. Thiers, that it is not England that has separated from France, but France that has separated from England; that the views and policy of England on these Turkish Affairs have always been the same, and have never varied; that for a long time we thought that France agreed with us; and that this opinion seemed to be borne out by the willingness of France to sign a Convention with England and Turkey in 1833, for the support of the Sultan against Mehemet Ali; and by the fact, that France was a party to the Collective Note of July, 1839.

If the French Government have since then changed their policy, or if in consequence of their not having at that time frankly explained their policy, we, for a long while, mistook it, the fault does not lie with the English Government, and the English Government must, in every case, express regret that there should be any difference of opinion between France and England upon practical questions.

Her Majesty's Government, however, feel persuaded that whatever temporary disappointment or displeasure the conclusion of the Convention between the Four Powers and Turkey may excite in the minds of the French Ministers, calm reflection will lead those Ministers to the conviction that there is nothing in the spirit or letter of that Convention which can be looked upon as hostile to France; and that, under the circumstances of the moment, the Four Powers could not do otherwise than conclude it.

With respect to M. Thiers' remark, that France was not even invited to accede to the Convention, I have to observe, that the Convention is only a formal record of the engagement of the Four Powers, to assist the Porte to carry certain arrangements into effect; that Her Majesty's Government have been busily labouring for the last eight or ten months to persuade the French Government to concur in those arrangements; and that after the recent and final refusal of that Government to do so, it would surely have been worse than useless to ask France to retract her recent refusal, and to sign a Convention to carry into execution a plan which she had, a week before, positively declined to concur in.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Report from the Russian Consul-General at Alexandria.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, July 32, 1840.)

(Extract)

Alexandrie, le 18 et 19 Juin, 1840.

TOUTS les rapports sur l'état actuel de la Syrie sont si effrayants et inspirent tant de terreur, que tout le monde pouvait s'attendre à l'éclat de la présente insurrection.

Emir Béchir demande du secours pour le peuple opprimé par les exactions de tout genre, mais cette demande est considérée comme faiblesse, et au lieu de satisfaire à la prière de l'ama, on détache dans le pays des Bédouins et des Albanais qui se livrent à des excès de tout genre, en détruisant les arbres fruitiers, en ruinant la culture de la terre, et des plantations de soie, et en entraînant de la manière la plus brutale tous les individus capables de porter les armes. Les vastes plaines et les vallées de Pekka et d'Eadracle sont depuis longtemps sans bras pour les cultiver; il n'y a plus ni hommes ni bestiaux; tout a été éloigné,

chassé et détruit. Les habitations paisibles des Maronites sont menacées du même sort; on demande d'abord des arrérages déjà acquittés, et puis les armes. Les Maronites s'opposent avec opiniâtreté à cette demande, et le Gouvernement déploie la rigueur accoutumée.

Voilà le commencement de la révolte des Maronites.

D'après d'autres nouvelles reçues par les commerçants d'ici, lesquelles cependant semblent exagérées, tous les peuples des montagnes de Gaza et d'Alep sont en pleine révolte; les insurgés ont occupé Beyrouth et Tripoli, et Solyman Pacha est tombé entre leurs mains.

Un voyageur Anglais, ancien ami de Méhémet Ali, lui écrit de Der-el-Kamar, que les choses en étaient venues au terme qu'on ne pouvait plus penser à les apaiser par la force des armes.

Méhémet Ali, se voyant ainsi contradictoirement manifeste et reconnaissant que la révolte des Maronites, qui, selon lui, ne possèdent que 4,000 fusils; il ajoute que les Druzes et les Nizariens sont prêts à se joindre à eux, et que Solyman Pacha se trouve avec cinq régiments d'infanterie entre Solim et Beyrouth.

En attendant, Méhémet Ali ne laisse approcher personne du bateau à vapeur "le Nil," afin de ne rien faire transpirer de ces nouvelles, et fait tous les préparatifs d'attaque.

Si la révolte est de si peu de conséquence que veut le faire accorder Méhémet Ali les moyens pour la supprimer sont exagérés. À quel son, un commandement de quinze frégates et vaisseaux de ligne avec 12,000 hommes, s'il ne s'agit que d'une échauffourée?

Mais si l'accord des peuples montagnards s'est effectivement réalisé, cette force n'est pas exagérée. Voilà ce que Méhémet Ali se dit bien; et c'est par cette raison qu'il cherche à composer avec les Maronites, par l'entremise d'Emir Béchir; qu'il annonce par ses espions sa réconciliation avec l'Emir; et pendant que ses généraux pressent les Maronites du côté de Saïda et Bahaké, il leur montre au pied du Mont Liban une force telle qu'ils n'ont jamais vue du haut de leurs montagnes.

Deux vaisseaux de ligne, quatre frégates, et une corvette, ont quitté le port ce matin; le reste suivra et sera sorti demain.

Incluse 1 in No. 13.

Report from the Russian Vice-Consul at Cairo.

(Extract)

Cairo, le 17 Juin, 1840.

IBRAHIM PACHA avait reçu l'ordre d'évacuer le Yémen, en y laissant seulement 1,000 hommes. Mais les garnisons, séparées en parties détachées. Les Arabes Bédouins s'étant aperçus de pareil mouvement rétrograde, se sont révoltés. Les Albanais ont battu Ibrahim Pacha qui ne pouvait faire face à la force supérieure. Sur cela ils eurent l'ordre de se concentrer avec le reste des troupes à Hodeïde, où un corps de 25,000 hommes de Bédouins parut aussitôt avec des intentions hostiles; cependant Ibrahim leur offrit 3,000 talléris pour détourner le danger, et ils acceptèrent la proposition de reculer. Arrivé à Muelch, Ibrahim Pacha reçut l'ordre de rebrousser chemin, sans qu'on sache jusqu'à présent la direction qu'il a prise ni la destination qu'il a reçue.

On assure que Kourchid Pacha est arrivé à Djidda où il s'arrête pour des affaires importantes. Amour Pacha est pacifique entre Mecca et Médine.

Les troupes de cavalerie au nombre d'environ 2,800 hommes, sont toutes commandées par le colonel de cavalerie de l'armée turque.

Il y a eu une petite affaire le 12 Juin. Solyman Pacha part de Solim pour Gaza. Les Arabes de Gaza se joignent à lui. Les troupes de cavalerie de l'armée turque se joignent à lui. Les troupes de cavalerie de l'armée turque se joignent à lui.

Les troupes de cavalerie de l'armée turque se joignent à lui. Les troupes de cavalerie de l'armée turque se joignent à lui.

Le Gouvernement a ordonné de détruire à Jérusalem et à Naplouse, toutes



les maisons qui pourraient servir de fortification aux rebelles; et ces ordres ont été exécutés. Il a défendu aussi tout transport de grains de Jaffa à Beyrouth.

Sur la rade de Jaffa un corsaire inconnu a dépouillé un bâtiment arrivé de Damiette chargé de riz, en tuant l'équipage.

No. 14.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 132.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 29, 1840.

I HAD the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of my letter to Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis, relating to the insurrection in Syria. I have received by the "Cyclops," the Admiral's reply, which I now inclose. Sir John asks me, "if, in the event of his having to proceed to the coast of Syria, I should consider it necessary that any ships should be left at the Dardanelles?" I answered, that I did not see any danger whatever from Russia at present, nor from any quarter excepting Mehemet Ali; and should he make any attempt to send his fleet here, Her Majesty's squadron, being off the coast of Syria, could counteract him; and if Ibrahim should advance with his troops to threaten the capital, the squadron could return here in time to protect it.

The Russians have sent the chief part of the troops previously stationed about Sevastopol, to carry on war in the Caucasus, and are therefore without proper means to make any attempt upon this place, had they any such intention, which I believe to be wholly out of the question.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure in No. 14

*Rear Admiral Sir John Louis to Viscount Ponsonby.*

*Her Majesty's Ship "Ganges,"  
Beika Bay, June 22, 1840.*

My Lord,

I HAD, yesterday, the honour to receive your Lordship's letter dated the 22nd instant, since which I have received a letter from Colonel Hodges, which appears to me to be of such importance that I have thought it right to send your Lordship a copy of it by the "Cyclops."

Immediately on the receipt of your Lordship's letter I dispatched the "Castor" frigate to Beyrouth, with directions to Captain Collier to communicate to Her Majesty's Consul, and to afford protection to British subjects and commerce at that place. As it appears, however, by Colonel Hodges' letter, that Mehemet Ali was sending a naval force in two divisions to the coast of Syria, it would not, perhaps, be advisable to separate this squadron of six sail of the line, by sending any more ships; but to proceed, if necessary, with the whole force to the coast of Syria. I have dispatched a steamer to Sir Robert Stopford, who has arrived at Malta, for instructions.

I had the honour to inform your Lordship, that I had received directions to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. I shall feel very much obliged to your Lordship, if you will do me the honour to inform me, if, in the event of my having to proceed to the coast of Syria, your Lordship would consider it necessary that any ships should be left off the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. LOUIS.

No. 15.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 29, 1840.

IT is very necessary, in the actual crisis, that I should have correct intelligence from Syria, and I have thought it my duty to send there Mr. Wood, the Dragoman, who is personally acquainted with many of the chief personages in the Lebanon. The expence will be small.

Mr. Wood went in the "Cyclops," and I have requested Sir John Louis to facilitate his arrival at his destination.

The Porte has done nothing, which I am sorry for; a little exertion now would defeat Mehemet Ali. It may be hoped that he will fall without the interference of anybody; but, at any rate, what has happened is enough to show the fallacy of the French reasoning, based upon the magnitude of his powers; whilst the conduct of Russia, and the employment of Russian troops in the Caucasus, shows the other part of French reasoning to be as unsound.

The Ottoman troops are in part on their way to Ismidt; but, like everything else, that measure proceeds slowly.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

No. 16

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 134.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 1, 1840.

HAVING received from Rechid Pasha, in answer to my arguments in support of the policy of the Ottoman Ministers with regard to Mehemet Ali, a formal assurance through the Dragoman, that the Sultan had declared he would not treat with the Pasha without the knowledge and concurrence of the Great Powers, I thought it would be useful to give a more official character to the matter, and I sent an official Note, of which I inclose a copy.

I have this day heard from Rechid Pasha, who thanks me for the Note, and promises that the Porte will act prudently and faithfully in this affair.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure in No. 16.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Rechid Pasha.*

Therapia, June 28, 1840.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., has always felt entire confidence in the good faith of the Sublime Porte in the performance of all its engagements; but being aware of the perseverance with which counsels are offered strenuously recommending the Sublime Porte to break its solemn engagement made with the August Allies of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, not to make any arrangement with the Pasha of Egypt without the knowledge and concurrence of those Allies, the Undersigned thinks it proper to express, in the most formal manner, to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the extreme satisfaction with which the Undersigned has just received from his Excellency the assurance that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan has renewed his declaration of his adherence to the engagement not to make any arrangement with the aforesaid Pasha, without the concurrence of His Imperial Majesty's August Allies.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSOMBY.



## No. 17.

*Memorandum given to Viscount Palmerston by M. Guizot, July 24, 1840.*

LA France a toujours désiré, dans l'affaire d'Orient, marcher d'accord avec la Grande Bretagne, l'Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie. Elle n'a jamais été mue dans sa conduite que par l'intérêt de la Paix. Elle n'a jamais jugé les propositions qui lui ont été faites, que d'un point de vue général, et jamais du point de vue de son intérêt particulier; car aucune Puissance n'est plus désintéressée qu'elle en Orient.

Jugeant de ce point de vue, elle a considéré comme mal conçus tous les projets qui avaient pour but d'arracher à Mehmet Ali par la force les armes, les portions de l'Empire Turc qu'il occupe actuellement. La France ne croit pas cela bon pour le Sultan, car on tendrait ainsi à lui donner ce qu'il ne pourrait ni administrer ni conserver. Elle ne le croit pas bon non plus pour la Turquie en général, et pour le maintien de l'équilibre Européen; car, on affaiblirait, sans profit pour le Suzerain, un vassal qui pourrait aider puissamment à la commune défense de l'Empire.

Toutefois, ce n'est là qu'une question de système sur laquelle il peut exister beaucoup d'avis divers. Mais la France s'est surtout prononcée contre tout projet dont l'adoption devait entraîner l'emploi de la force, parcequ'elle ne voyait pas distinctement les moyens dont les Cinq Puissances pourraient disposer. Ces moyens lui semblaient ou insuffisants, ou plus fâcheux que l'état de choses auquel on voulait porter remède.

Ce qu'elle pensait à ce sujet, la France le pense encore, et elle a quelques raisons de croire que cette opinion n'est pas exclusivement la sienne. Du reste, on ne lui a adressé, dans les dernières circonstances, aucune proposition positive sur laquelle elle eût à s'expliquer. Il ne faut donc pas imputer à des refus qu'elle n'a pas été en mesure de faire, la détermination que l'Angleterre lui communiqua, sans doute au nom des Quatre Puissances.

Mais au surplus, une fois qu'on se décide à agir, on ne peut pas faire naître cette manière de procéder à son égard, et la France ne croit pas que, dans ces circonstances, elle considère comme peu réfléchi, comme peu prudent, une conduite qui consisterait à prendre des résolutions sans moyen de les exécuter, ou à les exécuter par des moyens inutiles ou dangereux.

L'insurrection de quelques populations du Liban est sans doute l'occasion qui nous a pu servir pour y trouver les moyens d'exécution qui jusques là nous n'en avions pas montrés. Est-ce un moyen bien avouable, et surtout bien utile à l'Empire? On ne peut pas le nier. Mais on ne peut pas non plus le nier, car il est évident que l'insurrection a été excitée dans toutes les parties de l'Empire, et on y sème des discordes. On ne peut pas non plus le nier, car on a vu que les Quatre Puissances se sont réunies dans l'intérêt de la paix. Et ces puissances, qui ont été si unies, se sont-elles unies à la Porte après les succès contre le Vice-Roi?

Toutes ces questions, on ne les a certainement pas résolues. Mais si cette insurrection est comprimée, si le Vice-Roi est de nouveau possesseur assuré de la Syrie, si l'en est plus irrité, plus difficile à persuader, et qu'il réponde aux sommations par des refus positifs, quels sont les moyens des Quatre Puissances?

Assurément, après avoir employé une année à les chercher, on ne les aura pas découverts récemment; et on aura créé, soi-même, un nouveau danger, le plus grave de tous. Le Vice-Roi, excité par les moyens employés contre lui, le Vice-Roi que la France avait contribué à retenir, peut passer le Taurus et menacer de nouveau Constantinople.

Que feront encore les Quatre Puissances dans ce cas? Quelle sera la manière de pénétrer dans l'Empire pour y secourir le Sultan? La France pense qu'on a préparé là, pour l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman et pour la paix générale, un danger plus grave que celui dont les menaçait l'ambition du Vice-Roi.

Si toutes ces éventualités, conséquences de la conduite qu'on va tenir, n'ont pas été prévues, alors les Quatre Puissances se seraient engagées dans une voie bien obscure et bien périlleuse. Si, au contraire, elles ont été prévues, les moyens d'y faire face sont arrêtés, alors les Quatre Puissances en doivent la connaissance à l'Europe, et surtout à la France qui s'est toujours associée au but

commun, à la France dont encore aujourd'hui elles réclament le concours moral, dont elles invoquent l'influence à Alexandrie.

Le concours moral de la France dans une conduite commune était une obligation de sa part. Il n'en est plus une dans la nouvelle situation où semblent vouloir se placer les Puissances. La France ne peut plus être mue désormais que par ce qu'elle doit à la Paix, et ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même. La conduite qu'elle tiendra, dans les graves circonstances où les Quatre Puissances viennent de placer l'Europe, dépendra de la solution qui sera donnée à toutes les questions qu'elle vient d'indiquer. Elle aura toujours en vue la paix et le maintien de l'équilibre actuel entre les Etats de l'Europe. Tous ses moyens seront consacrés à ce double but.

## No. 18

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 112.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1840.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to urge the Turkish Government to send, without loss of time, to Syria, arms and ammunition for the use of the subjects of the Sultan who have risen against the authority of Mehmet Ali; and you will also recommend to the Porte, to offer to the troops under the orders of Ibrahim Pasha to pay up the arrears due to them by the Pasha, if they will declare for the Sultan.

Your Excellency will also urge the Porte to send at once 5,000 or 6,000 men to Cyprus, or to the coast of Syria direct, in order to co-operate with the Syrian insurgents.

It will be desirable that the Turkish officer in command of such a detachment, if sent, should be instructed to put himself in communication with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and to be guided in his operations by the suggestions of that officer.

Your Excellency will, of course, communicate to Sir Robert Stopford any arrangements which the Porte may make in compliance with the recommendations which you are now instructed to offer to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

## No. 19

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1840.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that copies of my correspondence with Her Majesty's Minister at Paris, of which copies are inclosed in my despatch to your Excellency, No. 111, have been transmitted to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, in order that Sir Robert Stopford may see the tone adopted by the French Government with reference to the present transaction, and that he may be upon his guard against any sudden movement of the French squadron, in consequence of any new development of the present transaction, and of the irritation which the French Government will naturally feel at finding itself placed in a separate and isolated position.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON



No. 20.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 115.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1840.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 105, I have to acquaint your Excellency that arrangements have been made for placing a further supply of 5,000 stand of arms, with ammunition and lead in proportion, at the disposal of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, to be distributed by him to the Syrians in the manner stated in my above-mentioned despatch.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 21

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 120.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1840.*

I HAVE to observe to your Excellency, that it appears, from the contents of the Paper communicated to me yesterday by the French Ambassador, and of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch, No. 118, that although the French Government professes to feel hurt that the Convention of the 15th instant was concluded between the Four Powers and the Porte, without any previous invitation to France to be a party thereto, yet there seems to be no intention on the part of France to oppose by force the measures which the Allies have resolved to execute, in order to accomplish the objects of that Convention; and there is, therefore, no likelihood that those friendly relations which at present so happily subsist between the Four Powers and France, will be interrupted by the operations which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed to undertake.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 22

*Lord Beaucote to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 94.)

My Lord,

*Vienna, July 14, 1840.*

I HAVE read to Prince Metternich your Lordship's despatch No. 70, containing observations upon his plan of proceeding between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt.

He objects to the terms "plan" and "proposition," as applied to the exposition he has made of his ideas upon the subject. He regards that which in London has been called a plan, as no more than the commencement of an investigation; and states his purpose to have been to lay a basis of discussion between the Four Powers, by which it might eventually be matured into a plan in which they could concur.

After this preliminary observation, the Prince admitted the justice of the rest of your Lordship's remarks, saying, he was well aware that the difficulties which should be put off now would recur at no distant period, but that it would be well they should do so under circumstances giving a right to appeal to the Powers, in consequence of the violation of engagements taken with their cognizance and assent, though not under their guarantee, to which he is decidedly averse. In proposing no more for the moment, he had yielded to his sense of

the difficulties of the situation, but if your Lordship is prepared with any feasible plan in which the Four Powers can concur, he is ready to adopt it in preference to his own ideas, and will engage this Government to take a share in its execution.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 23

*Lord Beaucote to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 97.)

My Lord,

*Vienna, July 17, 1840.*

THE intelligence brought by Baron Neumann's courier, of the 9th instant, has been received by Prince Metternich with much satisfaction. I had previously endeavoured in vain to induce him to send the Austrian squadron to join Admiral Louis on the coast of Syria, he always answering that he must wait for the plan from London. Upon my renewing the request this day, he at once consented to undertake to send a small squadron, with orders to Admiral Baudouin to join the British fleet with his small squadron, and act under the orders of the English Admiral. These were the Prince's words, I hope in the course of to-morrow to ascertain what order has been sent. The same messenger will take your Lordship's despatches to Lord Ponsonby.

Prince Metternich fully approves your Lordship's recommendation to the Turkish Government to send a small corps to Cyprus to be ready to act as occasion may require; but he would deprecate the committing it in active hostilities with the Egyptians, and recommends that it should be kept in reserve for the purposes indicated in your Lordship's letter of the 9th instant. He writes in this sense to Baron Sturmer; and at his request I have explained his views to Lord Ponsonby.

As this discussion naturally led to a consideration of the means to be employed against Mehmet Ali, I thought it desirable to ascertain, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the nature and extent of the assistance which may be expected from Austria. With this view, I represented, that, embarking in the affair, it would not do to fail, and was much disappointed at perceiving, in the reply, an attempt to put England forward as the Power chiefly concerned, and whose honour was more particularly involved in bringing the object to a successful issue. I pointed out that all the Powers would be equally interested; the Prince did not the less persist in putting England in the front as the Power by whom the burden is to be borne. Thus unsuccessful in obtaining his assent to a correct general view of the case, I tried what was to be obtained in detail. The defence of Constantinople is the single object to which Prince Metternich has hitherto professed to be willing to contribute with all the weight of this empire; and your Lordship may remember that on one occasion he offered to furnish 80,000 men, to serve for that object; this, therefore, was the point I selected whereon to try him. I represented, that although the danger was not imminent, yet if measures of coercion should begin, it was impossible to say what they might lead to; that he had already offered a considerable corps to defend Constantinople; that Austria was prepared to do so; that Russia having taken a similar engagement, held a corps constantly in readiness to move if called for; and that a similar preparation on the part of Austria would be no more than the circumstance required. The Prince's objection of the distance from the Hungarian frontier to Constantinople, and the difficulty of the operation, to which I replied, that a corps of 10,000 or 15,000 men was all that was wanted, and might be at hand. To this he answered by the same reasoning. I added, that the fit defence for Constantinople lay in a Russian military force and an English naval one; that Austria would undertake a defence of almost equal value to the Sultan, that of Bosnia and



and Albania against revolt excited by Mehmet Ali. That 50,000 men would be wanted for this, and that he had prepared them. I stated, in reply, that the presence of a Russian force alone at Constantinople was very undesirable for all parties, and chiefly for Austria; that in assigning this part to Russia, and taking the charge of Bosnia and Albania for himself, he was giving her the best morsel, and keeping the refuse for himself. His decision, however, was taken, nor could he be moved from it; and if he will not furnish a force to co-operate in the defence of Constantinople, still less will he do so for any other object. As for his assurances of securing Bosnia and Albania for the Sultan, I place little reliance upon them; and I am authorized in doing so by the fact which has come to my knowledge, that the military Governor of Croatia, the frontier province, who left this place for his Government a few days back, was unable before his departure to obtain any orders for his guidance.

If your Lordship should attach any value to the part which Prince Metternich has assigned to Austria, it would be well that you should endeavour to come to a clear understanding with him upon the subject, offering the assistance of your Government, and of the British Government, to assist him in his views.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 24

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 18, 1840.

PRINCE ESTERHAZY was present at my conversation of yesterday with Prince Metternich, and I, this morning, stated to him how little the attitude assigned to Austria appeared to me to be compatible either with her interest or her dignity. He did not contradict me, nor impugn the correctness of the impression I had received from Prince Metternich's language; but on informing him that I was about to transmit that impression to my Government, he represented that the Prince is liable to speak without adequate reflection, and that I owed it to him to make him acquainted with my intention, and ascertain whether his answers of yesterday were to be taken as conversations. In deference to this representation, and not because I wanted confirmation myself, I called this morning upon the Prince, who read to me his despatches to Constantinople, and appeared to wish to avoid any further communication. I succeeded, however, through many interruptions, in stating to him, that nothing we had as yet received from London had indicated the execution to be employed; that it was, however, impossible that we should not occupy the Powers' signatures of the Treaty; and that my Government would look to me for information as to the nature and extent of assistance to be expected from Austria; that this information, as I at present stood, could only be collected from his conversation of yesterday; and that I therefore wished to know, whether I had given an accurate version of it, in stating that Austria would contribute to the common cause, her four ships of war, and a supervision to be exercised over Bosnia and Albania, and nothing more, even in the extreme case of the Ottoman Empire being menaced with dissolution by an attack upon its capital. The Prince's answer contained at once a confirmation and an excuse. *Non sumus tropi huius.* To this I answered, that I was not come to renew the discussion of yesterday, but merely to ascertain whether my report of it had been correct,—a fact which it was of importance to my Government to know, as it would thereby be made clear that, in the prosecution of this enterprise, England must count upon her own exertions.

Here our conversation upon this subject ended; and unpromising as it is, it is not more so than I expected, and will be found in strict accordance with my previous reports to your Lordship. If it is inquired, what hope there is of changing this determination of Prince Metternich, I must answer that I fear

there is very little. It has not sprung from the Finance department, nor do I think there would be any insuperable objections from that side to a more active and more worthy of Austria. The determination has been taken by Prince Metternich himself. I know no one in this Government who is capable of interfering with a political decision springing from him, nor any way of overcoming his natural disposition to avoid acting when he has once taken refuge in that course.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

No. 25

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 102.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 18, 1840.

I CALLED this morning on Prince Metternich to ascertain whether the order to Admiral Baudouin had actually gone. It had not; it was on the point of being sent, but still there was a change; it was intended to Baron Stürmer, who, in the uncertainty of what might have passed on the coast of Syria, was to forward or retain it according to circumstances. While Prince Metternich was notifying this to me, a further project of change came across his mind, and he proposed to send it to Baron Stürmer, with orders to retain it until he, (Prince Metternich,) should have received notice from London of the contents of the order transmitted to the British Admiral in the Mediterranean. To this I replied, by recommending that Admiral Baudouin should be ordered at once to join the British squadron and act in concert with it.

After some discussion, the Prince consented, with the modification that the Austrian squadron should act in all things as the instrument of the Four Powers. In what shape the order will ultimately be sent is more than I can answer for, nor shall I have an opportunity of ascertaining, as the Prince leaves this early to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

No. 26

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 102.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 18, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which, at Prince Metternich's request, I have addressed to Lord Ponsonby.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

Inclosure in No. 26.

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

Vienna, July 18, 1840.

AT Prince Metternich's request I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that he writes to Baron Stürmer, recommending to him to impress upon all his communications with the Porte relative to the Turco-Egyptian Affair, the character of emanating from the Four Powers, and not that of springing from Austria alone. He hopes your Lordship will feel yourself at liberty to adopt the



same course, and as it seems to be in accordance with what is passing in London, I feel no difficulty in transmitting the expression of the Prince's wishes to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 27

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 32.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 24, 1840.

THE Messenger Holmes delivered to me this morning your Lordship's despatches to No. 28 inclusive.

With reference to my despatch No. 19, and to what I there said respecting the Syrian insurrection, I wish to observe that, although M. Thiers stated that the information which I then quoted as having been received from Damascus and which spoke of the insurrection as nearly quelled, is the last which has reached him from that quarter, I have reason to believe that intelligence of a different character has arrived from Smyrna, and that the movement in question appears to have assumed a serious character.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 28

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 27.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, July 21, 1840.

IN speaking of the policy and alliances of England, I told the King that we had no predilections; that we sought equally the friendship of all nations, existing in return the maintenance of Treaties and the preservation of peace; that peace was the object dearest to Her Majesty's heart; and that she hoped to find in His Majesty a sincere and powerful coadjutor. The King said that the Queen would not be deceived. He was, like Her Majesty, a friend of peace. In speaking of the Oriental Question, I found the King very anxious that the Porte should be supported in her rights by England and her Allies; but, at the same time, he appeared apprehensive that France might seek to turn our attention from the East by vexatious or hostile proceedings near the Rhine, should measures of coercion be adopted towards Mehmet Ali. I assured His Majesty that such a course on the part of the French Government was not to be supposed possible or probable for an instant; and he appeared to dismiss from his mind the

No. 29

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 28.)

My Lord,

Berlin, July 22, 1840.

I have received your Lordship's despatches to No. 28 inclusive, and your Lordship's despatch No. 29, in which you mention for the pacification of the Levant. I have also received from Baron Werther, who had received the same by the same courier, as well as a copy of the Memorandum sent to the French Government.

Baron Werther asked me, if I thought the French would remain quiet

during the execution of the Convention. I said, I had no doubt they would. The Emperor appeared to put his mind at ease. He requested me not to mention the Convention to any one, as he wished to be the first to speak to Count Bresson on the subject, who has always considered as impossible a Convention to which France was not a party.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 30

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 121.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 27, 1840.

WITH reference to that part of my despatch No. 112, by which your Excellency is instructed to urge the Porte to send 5,000 or 6,000 men to Cyprus, or direct to the coast of Syria, I have to instruct your Excellency further to urge the Porte, in the event of its agreeing to the above suggestion, to order the Turkish Officer who may be sent in command of such force, to be entirely and in every respect guided by the advice and opinion of Colonel Sir Charles Smith, of the Royal Engineers, who is appointed to command the British Artillery and Engineers embarked on board Sir Robert Stopford's squadron. The Turkish Officer should be enjoined to take no step whatever without Sir Charles Smith's approval and sanction; and to do everything that Sir Charles Smith recommends.

Your Excellency will apprise Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith of the orders to this effect which may be given to the Turkish Commander.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 31

*Mr. Russian Consul Bunly to M. de Boutéff.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, July 23.)*

M l'Envoyé,

Beyrouth, le 22<sup>e</sup> 1840.

UNE vaste insurrection vient d'éclater dans le Liban. Elle a été provoquée par l'ordre d'Ibrahim Pacha de désarmer les Maronites, nonobstant les remontrances adressées par le Vice-Roi et de la conscription générale qui s'opère en Egypte, les belliqueuses tribus de la montagne devaient voir dans l'obstination du Gouvernement à se saisir de leurs armes un projet de conscription militaire. Il y a trois ans, après le désarmement des montagnards, effectué avec autant de succès que de bonheur par Ibrahim Pacha, 7,000 fusils furent distribués aux Maronites, afin d'obtenir leur coopération dans l'affaire du Hyouran. Ces mêmes armes, le Gouvernement vient de les exiger impérieusement, il est à presumer qu'Ibrahim Pacha, encouragé par le succès, réclamerait pour le service militaire les mêmes hommes qui en avaient été porteurs.

Le 11 Mai, la ville de Beyrouth venant d'être entourée d'un cordon sanitaire, motivé par la peste de Damas. Les montagnards n'ont vu dans cette mesure oppressive qu'un commencement des représailles pour leur opposition à l'armement, d'autant plus que la peste n'avait pas encore pénétré dans le Liban. Reunis au nombre de quelques milliers d'individus dans les environs de la ville, ils ont rompu le cordon, désarmèrent les soldats tombés en leur pouvoir, et dévalisèrent les courriers du Gouvernement. Deux jours après, le Gouvernement de Beyrouth communiqua par une circulaire adressée aux divers Consuls de cette ville, un ordre de Soliman Pacha, portant que les habitants de la montagne en général s'étaient mis en révolte, l'exportation des comestibles était défendue sous peine de couler à fond les bâtimens qui la tenteraient sur les divers points de la côte. Cette décision connue, dès le lendemain, la ville fut bloquée par les montagnards; plusieurs attaques obstinées furent dirigées contre le poste fortifié de la quarantaine, qui ne doit jusqu'à ce jour son salut qu'au courage de



cinquante Albanais à la solde du Vice-Roi qui repousseront à plusieurs reprises les montagnards, car les troupes régulières ne se hasardent guère en-dehors des murs: et la canonnade journalière des châteaux de la ville et des bâtimens de guerre en station sur notre rade, ne fait aucun mal aux insurgés, favorisés par les accidens du terrain.

Tripoli, Saida, et les autres villes du littoral du Mont Liban, sont dans le même état; et cette levée de boucliers parait d'autant plus formidable que les montagnards s'abstiennent jusqu'à ce jour de tout acte de brigandage, se bornant à attaquer tout ce qui tient au Gouvernement, sans faire le moindre mal aux habitans.

Ils ont adressé il y a quelques jours une circulaire aux Consuls, dans laquelle ils déclarent de leur intention de respecter les Européens, et d'assurer libre passage aux provisions qui servent munies d'un *teskeré* du Consulat: car malgré l'absence de la ville, la cherté est devenue déjà excessive, et les communications avec les campagnes environnantes qui approvisionnent notre marche, et vu le grand nombre de familles qui se sont réfugiées dans la ville. Ils ont même restitué au Consulat Britannique les groupes d'une poste Anglaise de Damas, qui avait été dévalisée par méprise avec celles du Gouvernement. J'ai vu dans mes promenades aux environs de la ville, plusieurs centaines de ces hommes: ils m'ont paru très-déterminés et très-valans, tandis que les batteries de la ville canonnaient leurs compagnons sur d'autres points. D'ailleurs, ce n'est qu'un début: une fois que le Gouvernement se trouverait à même de tenter une expédition dans la montagne, nous devons nous attendre à toutes les horreurs d'une guerre civile, sur un théâtre vaste et défavorable surtout au rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique. Déjà les Albanais du Gouvernement se livrent au pillage dans les campagnes, et attaquent à main armée les propriétés mêmes dans leurs propriétés.

Solyman Pacha est également bloqué à Saida, et des détachemens envoyés par ce général pour conduire en ville des canots de rivière, ont été battus à plusieurs reprises. Solyman Pacha d'une part, et Cherif Pacha de Damas d'autre, ne cessent de se concerter avec le grand Prince de la montagne, Faour Bechir, sur les moyens propres à pacifier le pays. Ce Prince, ainsi que plusieurs membres de sa famille, protestent toujours de leur dévouement au Vice-Roi. La conduite équivoque d'Emir Bechir contribue jusqu'à présent à le rendre suspect au Gouvernement, et il risque de perdre toute son autorité dans le Liban. D'autres princes sont cause commune avec les insurregés, et n'y a pas jusqu'à ce jour de chef de l'insurrection, et toutes les décisions sont prises par délibérations communes et publiques. Ils ont déjà expédié plusieurs courriers au Haouran, à Naplouse, dans le Libanon, au-delà du Jourdain.

Sur tous les points connus par les dispositions hostiles des troupes du Gouvernement Egyptien, et capable de prendre les armes.

Le Pacha de Damas a assuré le Consul de France dans cette ville, qu'on ne montrât nulle part disposé à participer à la révolte, et que les insurregés mêmes ne demandent que l'amnistie pour rentrer dans l'obéissance. Mais il est certain que des troubles ont déjà éclaté au Haouran. Ibrahim Pacha doit craindre en outre les peuplades de la Mésopotamie qui paraissent disposées, il y a quelque temps, à envoyer contre lui une armée de 20,000 hommes. Comme la révolte des montagnards du Liban à Ibrahim Pacha en 1832 a entraîné la soumission de toute la Syrie, de même aujourd'hui leur révolte pourrait en exulser à tout jamais les Egyptiens, à moins qu'elle ne soit immédiatement suivie de concessions et des garanties pour l'avenir. Jusqu'à présent, ils ne paraissent pas avoir un but déterminé dans leur soulèvement, malgré la fermeté qu'ils ont observée, suivant les usages de la montagne, par un serment solennel d'union et de dévouement à la cause commune, jusqu'à la conquête de l'Egypte.

On a averti des insurregés de la mer, et de l'interdiction de l'exportation de marchandises. J'apprends également que l'on a reçu la veille des dépêches très-importantes de l'Emir Bechir. Nous sommes toutes les fois en communication avec lui.

Les insurregés ont engagé de quitter la ville, et les hommes n'en sont devenus que plus acharnés. Dans la soirée d'hier ils se sont avancés jusqu'aux murailles de la ville, ont impulsé et provoqué les

sentinelles du haut des remparts, et ne cessent pas de menacer la ville d'un instant à l'autre.

Ils sont formidables par leur nombre et leur courage, et les nombreux partisans qu'ils ont dans la ville même, tandis que les troupes du Gouvernement paraissent intimidées. Toutefois, il est peu probable qu'ils tentent un coup de main contre une ville entourée de murailles garnies de quelques pièces de canons, et dominée par des châteaux inexpugnables.

Un bâtiment de guerre Français vient d'arriver dans ce moment même, appelé par le Consul de France pour la sécurité du commerce.

Agréé, &c.

S. D. BASILEY

No. 32

Colonel Hedges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 29)

(No. 62)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 5, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your Lordship's consideration the expediency of stationing in this port, one or more of Her Majesty's ships of war for the protection of British subjects and property endangered by the popular excitement resulting from the present insurrection in Syria.

As it is probable that his Highness the Viceroy may proceed to the theatre of the pending struggle, and as it appears to me most important to follow closely an movement of his Highness, perhaps your Lordship will be pleased to second the above object, by causing the necessary orders to be given to any naval force dispatched to Alexandria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. LLOYD HEDGES.

No. 33

Colonel Hedges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 29)

(No. 63)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 5, 1840.

I had this morning the honour of an interview with his Highness Mehmet Ali Pacha.

The news the Viceroy has lately received, both from Constantinople and from Syria, has been of the most unfavourable character. In the latter case the existence of the Egyptian power becomes every day more critical and precarious.

Hitherto, I had never seen Mehmet Ali otherwise than collected and full of determination. He appeared now to have lost his former equanimity. His excitement amounted at moments to something akin to trepidation; his feverish and restless state here taken to his uneasy frame of mind.

The last accounts from Beyrout, of the 1st of July, assert that a general action would inevitably take place in a few days, between the Egyptian forces and the British fleet.

The fate of such a battle will perhaps decide that of Syria. As to the Pacha, I think it probable that his Highness will immediately proceed to the theatre of the present struggle.

Various expressions of Mehmet Ali, in our conversation of this morning, have convinced me, that he entertains fears of a British squadron appearing against him on the coast of Syria. Indeed, if the Pacha is to be coerced to the acceptance of certain terms, the present must be considered a golden opportunity. In venturing such an opinion, I only contemplate the condition and policy of the countries where I am acting officially, since Her Majesty's Government alone can properly estimate the intricate interests, the views, and the dispositions of other Cabinets parties to this complicated question.

I must not omit to notice that his Highness Mehmet Ali speaks thus



morning in a manner which leaves no little doubt that he will not accomplish his great purpose of the triumph of the new order by equivocation, to evade that meaning which every Agent of the Five Great Powers will affix to his recent declarations.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 34

*Mr. Bulmer to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received July 30.)

(No. 34.)

(Extract.)

Paris, July 27, 1840

I CALLED on M. Thiers yesterday, chiefly for the sake of ascertaining the truth as to the various reports abroad respecting the Affairs of Spain, and the manner in which the French Government viewed them; and I also expected, a variety of councils having recently taken place with regard to the Affairs of the East, that in the course of our conversation, such observations would be made as would be likely to give me a more accurate and complete view of the present temper of the French Government.

An observation that, when M. de la Hoderie had started, he had received instructions to hold himself in constant communication with Mr. Aston, and to act in concert with him, but that now France stood alone, led us necessarily to the recent Convention, which M. Thiers had felt upon him directly after he had been successful in terminating our differences with Naples, where he had certainly, for the sake of peace and his relations with us, favoured Great Britain at the expense of His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies.

I replied to this observation, that though I had too high an opinion of him to believe, for one moment, that he had acted otherwise throughout that affair, than with impartial justice, still I had been especially instructed to thank him, which I had done, and begged to do again, for the skill with which he had managed the negotiation in question, and for the friendly feeling he had manifested throughout it, and that he would be under a most erroneous impression, if he thought that Her Majesty's Government were not fully sensible to his services in that particular instance, and did not set a high value on his opinions and co-operation in all matters; but as there might be certain cases where France could not act otherwise than she did, so there might also be cases where the English Government would be obliged to do so, and I thought it was not right to say that he laid too great a stress on a partial act, and attributed to it too many

"How can I lay too great a stress on what has occurred?" said he, "England, separating from us, allies herself with Russia, by a Treaty from which we are excluded. It has not been thought worth while to ask us whether we would join in that Treaty or not. Do you know the spirit of France? Do you know what it is? And what is my situation? I, who have been the partisan of the English alliance, and who, for the last five months, have done everything in my power, by acting in the most cordial and open manner to maintain it? And for what do I wish to see the British fleet in the Port of Egypt? or have you any more serious object? Do you wish anything in that quarter of the world for yourselves?"

I said, that I was sure that if he took a calm view of all the circumstances of the case, they would not appear to him in the light in which he now viewed them. Had the British Government ever said one thing, and did they now do another? I could tell him all the circumstances of the case. When the rupture between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan took place last year, both Governments were acting together; both Governments held the same language here, and even their Ambassadors signed the same document at Constantinople; and what was the substance of that language as carried out in that document?—the language of support to the Sultan. In conformity with this language, we had also framed instructions to our Admiral in the Mediterranean, and so much did we think

the views of England and France coincided, that those instructions were sent here to be shown to the French Government, and, on being approved of, to be sent on.

The French Government had objected to part of the said instructions, and, consequently, they had been altered. But how objected! Merely as to their details, and not as to their general spirit; and I could especially speak on this subject, since I had begged Marshal Soult, on the first interview I ever had with him, to be perfectly explicit with the British Government, and to say precisely and without disguise, what his real feelings were with respect to Eastern Affairs, as the best means of preventing or checking in time any differences; and to this the Marshal somewhat testily replied, that the real feelings of his Government were what he had stated them: for the Sultan, and against Mehmet Ali; and that when I called attention to the Note which had just then been delivered to the Porte, and said that I supposed then I might take that Note as indicative of the general spirit of the French Government, he replied in the affirmative.

The language of the French Ambassador in London was also hostile to Mehemet Ali, and when differences arose between the two Governments, as to the extent of territory within which it would be advisable to confine the Pasha, he (that Ambassador) had proposed of his own accord a middle term.

Under such circumstances, was it not natural for our Government to enter into communication with the other Powers of Europe, to state to them its aims, and to discuss measures for the support of the Sultan, without imagining that they were thereby separating themselves from France? And when, at last, these Powers called on England to carry out her views, and Turkey also called on her to fulfil her promises, and France at the same time said decidedly she could take no part in any measures against Mehemet Ali, could we at once turn round to the other Governments, and excuse ourselves also by saying we had been mistaken in the ideas we had all along entertained? Could a great Government do this with a proper sense of its own dignity? But still it might yield something of its opinions; it might and ought to do all it could to prevent a separation between itself and a friendly Power; and what had the British Government done? Adopted, at the suggestion of a mediating Power (Austria), the very views proposed by the French Ambassador, as the means of reconciling the differences between France and England. That, undoubtedly, it might still be impossible for France to accede to these views, and her Ambassador might have spoken beyond his instructions; but still I could not help thinking that Mr. Thiers would see that the course pursued had not been an unfriendly one, and that the separation now existing had rather proceeded from France than England.

That with regard to asking France to join the present Treaty, I understood that it had been sometime since proposed to M Guizot, that M Guizot had refused to do so, and that consequently, France could not join in enforcing them. It might, therefore, be thought superfluous after this, to ask the French Government formally to consent to what it had just declared through its Ambassador it would not consent to, but that no disrespect, I well know, was intended by this.

Al: Where said, "it is a mere form, and I lay no stress upon it beyond that

I then continued to say, that personally to him our Government could only feel particularly anxious to be on good terms; that when he and we quarrelled for a few strips of land, more or less, to the Pasha, might not the same thing be repeated, and might I not say that he quarrelled with us for these policy reasons, and in regard to any serious object of conquest on our part in that quarter of the world, I was quite certain that it had never entered the brain of any statesman; that a great people was always suspected of ambition; that if there were some people might imagine that we coveted certain possessions, as in England it was thought that France coveted others, but that these were chimeras.

M. Thiers replied, that the cases were not the same: that he was ambitious, that he respected Ministers who were ambitious for their country, but that ambition should have reasonable bounds; that France might be ambitious in other parts of Africa, but that as to Egypt it was out of the question; whereas England might have points to desire in Syria for the sake of the communication with the East India, and that therefore the suspicions of the French people, though

possibly erroneous, were more justifiable. " Besides," said he, " the Government in England is not forced by public opinion to take part against the Pasha, whereas there is only one opinion in France in his favour, and consequently, I have not the same option as you have. However, the thing is done, the alliance with England is broken up, it is impossible to foresee the consequences, but we must meet them, be they what they may, we are embarking in a voyage with the horizon clouded by storms, and it is impossible for any man to see when or how they will burst."

I replied, that I could not help hoping that he viewed things too gloomily; that, undoubtedly, it was at the disposition of one great nation to consider its alliance broken with another; and it was also evident that that nation, equally confident in its own strength, would not, however desirous of keeping the friendship hitherto subsisting uninterrupted, force its good will upon a Power which rejected it; but that individuals might indulge their views and feelings, that attached as I was to the alliance with F. . . . . now occurred, I could not see the object . . . . . to be desired.

That we were going to attack no Power bordering on France, or with which France was in alliance, nor to engage in any long and desperate warfare which was almost certain to extend throughout the world; that we were going in the name of a Sovereign whom we had engaged to assist, to summon a man, great and powerful, and possessing considerable abilities, but a man born a pauper, in a low situation of life, to consent to be a prince with Egypt for a territory, and St. Joan d'Acre for its defence; that this man had no connexion with France, which, on the contrary, had declared for the Sovereign in question, and had only refused to join in furnishing those means of coercion which were to be employed; that the theatre of dispute was removed from France, and what might be considered especially French interests, and so far from the struggle seeming likely to be long, and thereby involving momentous considerations, it seemed almost certain, if we viewed the relative strength of the two parties, to be speedily terminated. Consequently, I could hardly see how any grave consequences were likely to result: that I admitted the feeling of irritation which seemed to be produced in France, to be in itself a great calamity, but that I hoped that this also would disappear when it was calmly considered that there was no other power to which we were bound to give aid, and that

...to Buenos Ayres. Your blockade there  
...country, but we have considered it always as an isolated fact, and not made it  
...the centre from which every other feeling was to part.

"We had a right to blockade Buenos Ayres," said M. Thiers; "Granted," I replied; "so have we to blockade Syria; but I speak of a fact at variance with the fact, and besides, while you formerly declared yourself the partisan of the Republic, we never declared ourselves the enemies of Rome; so that our position would be stronger than yours. Then there was Spain; now all the eyes of Europe were at one moment fixed on Spain; it was the theatre in which Cabinets laid their policy in order to display the principles which guided them. Here France differed from England; you lamented it, I know; but still there was a great and marked difference on Spanish affairs; yet we did not consider our alliance broken in consequence thereof, nor was it so." "Certainly," said M. Thiers, "I thought the French Government wrong with respect to Spain; but, after all, you had nothing to complain of on that subject, since you had already refused to interfere when we would have consented to it." Thus, I said, only proved that there had been constant differences on particular subjects without such differences interfering with our general friendly relations; but that, after all, I did not wish to convince him against his will; though I took advantage of my acquaintance with him to talk over matters coolly, and to bring all their bearings calmly before him; as, though his temper might be warm, I had every confidence in his judgment.

He admitted that he was rather impermissible than otherwise, but that he always wished to give facts their due weight, and that he was happy to converse upon them; that in the mean time, however, public opinion was likely to be deeply excited, that the Government of France must satisfy the  
its isolated position it was strong enough to protect the honour

of the country; that, consequently, measures of that kind (meaning armaments, I presume) will be necessary. That they were extensible and never without danger; but that it was impossible to foresee what might happen, and therefore useless to speculate upon it.

I said, there was one short road to a conclusion of this whole affair, namely, the acceptance by Mehemet Ali of the conditions that would be proposed to him. This would make all things easy, and be, since what was past was irremediable, the best solution of present difficulties. He said, he wished, for his part, that Mehemet Ali would accept such conditions, but that there was no chance of it; that it was true his (M. Thiers') accounts from Syria might be more favourable to the Pasha than the truth, or that our accounts might be less so; that it was impossible to say, but that his own opinion was, that Mehemet Ali would triumph over the insurgents, and not submit to the propositions intended to be made to him; that he hoped, however, he would not cross the Taurus, as, if he did, affairs would indeed wear a serious aspect.

I have thought your Lordship would be desirous to know all that takes place at this moment, and have, therefore, though at some length, endeavoured to give the substance of this conversation as accurately as possible.

No. 35.

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston—(Received July 30.)*

(Most Confidential)

My Lord,

*Pavia, July 27, 1940.*

I WAITED on the King of the French yesterday evening, in order to communicate to His Majesty the contents of your Lordship's despatch No. 17, by which I was instructed to communicate to His Majesty the deep and enlightened views and pacific policy of Her Majesty's Government of the enlightened views and pacific policy of His Majesty, and to say, how the Government of His Majesty's Government of France, for its successful mediation in the affairs of Naples, how to be Her Majesty's Government would be if the strong representations which Mr. Mundeville had been instructed to make to the Government of Buenos Ayres should induce that Government to accept the propositions which Her Majesty's Government understood that Admiral Macken was instructed to make.

The King of the French replied to me by saying, that he was exceedingly happy on all occasions when the views of the two Governments harmonized, and when they could exchange friendly expressions; that in those matters, as in all, he himself was for peace, and for cultivating friendly relations with England; and that as to Buenos Ayres, he had given such instructions to Admiral Blacque as would, he had no doubt, tend to place relations in the Plata once more on a friendly footing.

The Majesty then turned to Eastern affairs, and spoke with some emotion of the situation in which, he said, he found himself.

That to leave France alone, was to leave her in the most dangerous  
all around him; that it was impossible to describe the  
I be awakened, when it was generally known that England  
alliance with the other Four Powers, without even consulting  
the French Government as to whether it would join such alliance; and that it  
would be as useful as he should be able to to

that the facts were not  
England had not left France.  
of the Egyptian Question seemed to agree with  
of this agreement; and that while I deeply deplored that His  
Majesty had found it impossible to join in the measures which, from the com-



menacement of our interference in the affairs of the East, we had never ceased to advocate, or to adopt any of the modifications of those measures which we had been willing to assent to, in order to enjoy the benefit of his co-operation. I felt convinced that he would only see in our present course that of an independent nation, which, having done everything it could to induce another independent nation with which it was, and desired to be, on friendly terms, to act with it, was at last obliged to act alone, and here not in a manner which the French Government had otherwise disapproved of, than from the difficulties which accompanied the present state of things in France to put in the recent Memorandum. I would, if His Majesty allowed me, state what I understood to be the facts of the matter.

I then did state, that Her Majesty's Government had, some time since, asked M. Guizot whether the French Government would join in the offer which it was now intended to make to Mehmet Ali; that M. Guizot had referred the matter to the French Government; and even, as Her Majesty's Government had been given to believe, to Mehmet Ali himself; and that after waiting a considerable time for M. Guizot's answer, that gentleman had called on your Lordship with a private letter from M. Thiers stating that Mehmet Ali would never accept the conditions in question; and, consequently, that the French Government would not join in proposing or enforcing them; that, consequently, after this and the many *pourparlers* that had previously taken place on the same subject, to have made another more formal proposition to the French Government had probably seemed superfluous; and that it could only have been omitted for that reason, and certainly not for any which could be connected with any want of respect for His Majesty, or for the great nation of which he was the chief, and which no one for one moment dreamt, with all history to say the contrary, could be intimidated.

The King seemed very much surprised at what I stated with respect to M. Guizot, showing several times an inclination to interrupt me, and at last he said: "As to what you say, Mr. Bulwer, of the communication made to M. Guizot, it must be all a romance: I never heard a word of it; the whole thing has come upon me by surprise; but at the same time the only course that I think advantageous, and which I have all along pressed for, was, that the Five Powers should conjointly negotiate with Mehmet Ali, and get him to consent to the most favourable conditions that could be obtained for the Porte."

I said that I was sure His Majesty would find the facts to be such as I related them, with respect to M. Guizot; that in regard to treating directly with Mehmet Ali, all the Powers entertained strong objections to it, in consequence of his relative position to the Sultan; and I took the liberty of adding, that since what had now taken place was irremediable, and His Majesty saw the danger of the present situation, whether the best thing that could happen would not be the assent of Mehmet Ali to the conditions, which, after all, were very favourable, including, as they did, St. Jean d'Acre, which would be offered to

that thus the whole business would be brought to an amicable termination, and the affairs of the East cease to agitate Europe for some time to come.

His Majesty said, that he wished for his own part that Mehmet Ali would accept such conditions, but that he did not believe it; and that, as to negotiating directly with him, he understood that that, when we stopped the negotiations between the Pasha and the Porte, was what we had undertaken to do, as formerly at Konak; as all events, however, he had taken steps (though he wished me not to say this to M. Thiers) to prevent Mehmet Ali from passing the Taurus, and that he sincerely trusted he would not complicate affairs by doing so. "But the important point," said His Majesty, "is that the matter should be settled quickly; either that you succeed, or that you fail, and in that case abandon the undertaking, when affairs may yet be susceptible of a common arrangement. As the present state of things lasts long, it is impossible to say what may happen. I shall do my best, rest assured, to maintain the tranquillity of Europe, but I must arm; I cannot satisfy the nation without it. My arms however, will, I assure you, be quietly shouldered; nothing shall willingly induce me to wield them; still I may be placed in situations of which I cannot now determine the consequences. As long as I go on with my present Ministry, well and good, but supposing Thiers wishes to do something which would engage us in hostilities, and

which I consequently would wish to prevent, and he therefore gives in his resignation, how do you think I should stand before the country with a Ministry, Soult or Molé, and all the passions of the nation excited, and Thiers, at the head of a large parliamentary party, announcing to the people that he had abandoned power sooner than submit to the dishonour of France? What situation should I stand in, Mr. Bulwer, and what barriers should I have to oppose to such breakers as would be beating against my authority?"

I said, that it was doubtless impossible to foresee situations, or to prepare against all their consequences, but that I was quite sure that if any critical circumstances arose, His Majesty's wisdom would find the means for meeting them; and that all Europe, and my Government in particular, had confidence in that wisdom, guided, as it was, by a spirit of prudence and moderation. His Majesty concluded our conversation by observing, that he thought, and he could not help saying, that he hoped that we should shortly be convinced that the opinions he had always declared, as to the impossibility of coercing Mehmet Ali, were correct, and that then those relations would be renewed, which it gave him so much pain to see broken.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 36.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston — (Received July 30)

No. 35.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 27, 1840

I HAVE reason to believe that the Egyptian Convoy, having landed its troops, quitted the Syrian coast on the 4th, and that Captain Napier arrived there on the 7th.

The forces of Mehmet Ali, collected round the district of Mount Lebanon, are said to be between 20,000 and 30,000 men.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 37.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston — (Received July 30)

No. 36.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 27, 1840

I HAVE sent your Lordship by this courier the report of two conversations I have recently had, one with His Majesty the King of the French, and another with M. Thiers.

The state of public feeling in this capital is one of considerable agitation, the more so, as the facts of the case are perverted; and it is generally believed, or made to appear, that the Four Great Powers signed a Treaty against France, which revives the bitter recollections of 1814—15.

The Government has canvassed a variety of plans for taking what would be considered an imposing attitude, and at one time had the idea, which I understand is now abandoned, of drawing up and promulgating a kind of Programme, declaring under what circumstances France would consider it necessary to have recourse to arms. I believe, moreover, that M. Thiers has held rather strong language to the King, as to what it might become his duty to advise; and has talked in certain cases of resigning, unless his wishes were complied with. His organs of the press have also adopted the most decided tone, demanded an increase of the naval and military force, and that orders should be given to Admiral Lalonde to return, or to act. The *Constitutionnel* (M. Thiers' paper) of this morning says, "L'assistance de la France dans aucun cas ne peut manquer au Vice-Roi."

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It is possible that a great deal of the existing excitement is of a mere temporary nature, and founded upon an erroneous supposition of facts; and that also some attempt may be made to create alarm both in Austria and England. It is certain, however, that considerable armaments will take place; and the King will consent to them as a dangerous, but necessary, means of preserving peace, by satisfying his people with the dignity and security of their position. It is certain also, that M. Thiers, confounded in his recent system of policy will seek, by some course pleasing to the national vanity, to regain the credit he has lost, and in the mean time, as the Cabinet imagines that the Four Powers have been very much induced to adopt their present decisive measures from the assurances frequently given, that France would not interfere with them, a different language will, in all probability, be held, and threats, if only indistinctly, made, as to the course which events might induce this Government to pursue.

My idea of the real state of things is this.—That the armaments once made, the Government will rest the quiet spectator of events, giving all the encouragement that it can give, without open assistance, to the Pasha. If he does not yield (and France will not counsel him to yield) to our remonstrances, and that our efforts against his power in Syria fail, then M. Thiers will come forward and offer his assistance for settling the Eastern Question.

Should Mehmet Ali, on the contrary, seem likely to be overcome without aid, but capable of being maintained with it, and that there is time, this fact being ascertained, to afford such aid, in this case, as Mehmet's defeat and fall would be the disgrace and fall of the present Cabinet, they would very probably tender their resignations, or require the King to sanction active co-operation in the Pasha's favour. The King would resist, if he could, but his power would depend upon the state of public opinion, which many events may change in the mean time; if, however, that run high with the Ministers, he would be a coward placing himself in opposition to them and the army, and the military temper of the country would be war. To this, however, His Majesty would only assent at the last extremity, and the country only demand it from him in the highest state of exasperation.

Much therefore, will depend upon disabusing the public of the real nature of the recent Convention, and of the acts which preceded it. I am convinced that if the Memorandum, as it now stands, were published, more especially with the papers necessary for its explanation, it would have a most salutary effect. To the Ministry it may be the same thing whether the Convention is against France, or against Mehmet Ali, but to the country the difference would be most important, were it possible, to show, that we were entering into a confederacy for the purpose of humbling the French, but that the French have desisted from entering into a Convention which they were pressed to enter.

Could this be clearly known, much discontent doubtless would still prevail but a great part of the present excitement would subside, and without that excitement the various interests connected with the maintenance of tranquillity, almost every person in Paris has money in the funds, or in railroads, or speculations of a similar description, would make them put a check upon the desires of the more warlike and reckless portion of the community.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 38

*Vicount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer*

(No. 33.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 31, 1840

YOUR despatches to No. 37, inclusive, and one marked "Most Confidential," dated the 27th instant, have been received and laid before the

Her Majesty's Government highly approve of the language which you have held in your conversations with the King of the French and with M. Thiers, as reported in those despatches.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 39

*Vicount Ponsonby to Vicount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 138.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 8, 1840

I ENCLOSE copies of the communications made by the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Internuncio, and which his Excellency has been so good as to permit me to make use of.

From other intelligence as well as the above-mentioned, it is evident that the situation of Mehmet Ali is full of peril. The French, with perfect knowledge of all the facts contained in the inclosed papers, urged the Ottoman Ministers, on the 4th instant, to make an arrangement with Mehmet Ali, without the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, &c.

I will not, by this occasion, report the arguments made use of by the French. I will send a memorandum in three or four days.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39

*M. de Lamoignon to the Baron de Stumer*

Alexandrie, le 18 Juin, 1840

LA détermination de Mehmet Ali de restituer la flotte Ottomane, est attribuée par lui-même exclusivement à l'éloignement de Hussein Pacha, et beaucoup de gens semblent y ajouter foi. Mais tout fait croire au contraire qu'il faut en chercher le vrai motif dans les inquiétudes que lui donnent les troubles de la Syrie; le besoin qu'il a de faire sa paix avec le Sultan; la gêne que lui fait éprouver le séjour prolongé de cette flotte à Alexandrie, et les charges qu'elle lui impose.

Il est remarquable que, malgré cette détermination, les vaisseaux Ottomans qui ne sont pas partie de l'expédition de la Syrie continuent jusqu'à ce moment à rester à l'ancre, et qu'on ne fait rien pour les mettre en état de retourner à Constantinople, après, artillerie, munitions, biscuits, &c., tout est dans l'état de détresse du Pacha, et a besoin d'être réparé ou complété pour pouvoir être employé.

Les rapports sur l'état de la Syrie sont frémir. L'Emir Béchir demande qu'on vienne au secours d'un peuple accablé par les impôts, la corvée, les fournitures en nature et en numéraire; mais cette demande est taxée de faiblesse, et, au lieu d'y satisfaire, on répand dans le pays des Albanais et des Bédouins qui coupent les arbres fruitiers; qui détruisent les établissements où se cultivent les vers à soie; qui mettent le feu aux moissons, et qui enlèvent d'une manière brutale tous ceux qui sont en état de porter les armes. Ce serait s'exposer à être taxé d'exagération que de citer une à une les scènes atroces de ce genre qui se passent de se commettre. Les vastes plaines de la Cœle-Syrie, les vallons de l'Euphrate, et d'Esdralon, sont depuis longtemps sans bras pour les cultiver; hommes et bestiaux ont disparu, et les fermes sont désertes. On venait maintenant de menacer du même sort les habitations paisibles des Maronites. On leur demandait des arrérages dont on leur avait fait don et qui avait été rayés des registres des receveurs; et lorsque au lieu d'argent les malheureux habitants essayèrent de faire valoir leurs droits, on voulut qu'ils livraient leurs armes. Il s'en suivit alors de la part des Maronites, une résistance opiniâtre, et de la part du Gouvernement cette dureté qu'il est habitué à employer en pareil cas. Tel a été l'origine de la révolte des Maronites.



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de Son Altesse serait faite par Abbas Pacha, commandant l'expédition, à son arrivée au lieu de destination.

Avant d'arriver aux points des Consuls Impériaux susdits, de régler leur conduite d'après les usages de la nation à laquelle ils se rendent en demandant connaissance. Il sera également à propos d'envoyer une lettre au Pacha de Damas, pour lui faire connaître que les troupes de Son Altesse ne sont pas destinées à aller à Damas, mais à aller à Hama, pour y observer les troupes de l'armée de l'Empereur. Il sera également à propos d'envoyer une lettre au Pacha de Hama, pour lui faire connaître que les troupes de Son Altesse ne sont pas destinées à aller à Hama, mais à aller à Hama, pour y observer les troupes de l'armée de l'Empereur. Il sera également à propos d'envoyer une lettre au Pacha de Hama, pour lui faire connaître que les troupes de Son Altesse ne sont pas destinées à aller à Hama, mais à aller à Hama, pour y observer les troupes de l'armée de l'Empereur.

Méhémet Ali suppose que les insurgés, cernés ainsi de toute part, ne pourront pas échapper à leur sort. Les Drouzes et les Naplousiens étant leurs ennemis naturels, ils ne demandent pas mieux que de reprendre sur eux l'ancienne supériorité dont lui (Méhémet Ali) les avait affranchis dernièrement, en leur donnant des armes, au grand étonnement des Drouzes et des Musulmans, qui ne voulaient jamais accepter cette émancipation que comme une violation de leurs droits bien fondés.

Ce langage me fit entrevoir tout le danger que courent les Chrétiens du Mont Liban; un décret d'extermination totale de cette nation patriarcale ne pourrait être conçu dans des termes plus précis. J'en ai été profondément ému, et ne pouvais pas m'empêcher d'articuler quelques mots d'intercession pour nos coreligionnaires, d'autant plus que c'est la première fois qu'ils se trouvent en opposition avec le Gouvernement; qu'ils n'ont rien fait qui mérite une mesure si sévère, et que d'après ce que dit Son Altesse elle-même, le nombre des insurgés n'est que de 2,000 à 3,000, tandis que les Maronites, industrieux et paisibles, forment une population de 150,000 âmes; que ce serait contre l'usage de la guerre que d'assiéger toutes les demeures dont sont remplies les vallées du Mont Liban, et de détruire tout ce qui est susceptible de servir à la culture.

point de rendre les armes qu'ils ont refusés après une première et simple demande, et que, après tout cela, ce ne devrait être que les mutins que la rigueur des lois de guerre pourrait atteindre.

A toutes ces observations le Pacha me répondit comme suit: "Un malentendu est la cause de cette insurrection. Formant le Régiment en Egypte, j'avais," dit-il, "beaucoup des armes qui ont été déposées à St. Jean d'Acce. J'en remis à mon fils, et celui-ci se souvenant que j'avais envoyé il y a un an, quelques milliers d'armes à feu, dérivant des dépôts de St. Jean d'Acce, aux Maronites, crut devoir les leur redemander. C'est donc une erreur; mon intention n'était pas de désarmer les Chrétiens; mais ils n'ont pas voulu écouter les explications de mes Envoyés et de l'Emir Bechir; c'est leur faute. Maintenant ils menacent les villes, ils écrivent partout des lettres pour se faire un parti plus fort. Mais ne les craint pas, ils auront bientôt motif de se repentir de leur orgueil et de leur rébellion."

"D'après tout cela," lui dis-je, "il serait à désirer que votre Altesse usa de la clémence; comme Chrétien, j'ose l'en supplier; je suis sûr que mes collègues ne manqueront pas de vous adresser la même prière. Il paraît que ce ne sont que des égarés et en petit nombre; il n'y a pas eu d'excès; les soldats tombés en leur pouvoir ont été désarmés et renvoyés sans qu'aucun mal leur arriva, peut-être les intentions de votre Altesse ne leur ont pas été clairement exposées. Je sais qu'ils supposaient qu'il s'agissait de leur imposer de nouveaux impôts, et de faire une levée d'hommes, et que, lors des promesses faites à Habbryé, ils ont cru devoir repousser ces prétentions comme contraires à ce pacte."

"Non, non," répondit-il, "les Maronites n'ont pas été compris dans cet

arrangement—il regardait ceux du Haouran—et nommément, les habitants du Lédja.

Mais votre Altesse a de tant traité les Maronites sur le même pied que les Lédjans, et elle s'en était beaucoup plus occupée. Les Lédjans, au nom de votre Altesse, sont allés pour les désarmer et les faire rentrer dans leur devoir. J'espère même que le grand nombre de troupes que votre Altesse réunit à présent autour du Liban a plus pour but d'imposer aux insurgés que de les désarmer."

"Non," dit-il, "j'ai dit à Abbas Pacha de faire ce qui sera convenable avec les premiers villages qu'il trouvera sur son chemin; et que si les habitants des autres lui viennent au-devant, il doit leur pardonner."

Puis, se tournant vers moi, il me dit: "Je crains d'avoir dit trop de mal de ce que je voulais—de la modération,—et je m'en congédie. Alors il me dit que, cette expédition fera beaucoup de bruit en Europe, que chacun l'interprétera à sa manière, mais moi je me soucie fort peu de ce qu'on en dira. Je suis accoutumé de faire mes affaires selon mes inspirations, et j'y ai trouvé toujours mon compte. J'ai vécu ainsi, et ainsi je mourrai; on me pardonnera cela si l'on veut."

L'interprète ne m'a pas rendu cette dernière phrase, mais M. Babich, notre premier interprète, quoiqu'un peu éloigné du coin dans lequel j'étais tout seul avec le Vice-Roi, m'assure qu'ils ont été dits par Son Altesse, quoique sans la vivacité avec laquelle il lance ordinairement pareils propos.

Quoiqu'il en soit, je sais bien que Méhémet Ali n'osera pas braver l'opinion de la Chrétienté. L'extermination des Maronites mettrait ses amis d'Europe dans une fausse position, ils ne sauraient soutenir sa cause plus longtemps, et il en a un grand besoin, quoiqu'il feigne le contraire. Il a trop de bon sens pour ne pas sentir que, si on le traitait comme on le traite les chrétiens, on ne pourrait pas aussi brutalement mener à exécution qu'elles ont été conçues. Ce qui affaiblit un peu mes espérances, c'est l'homme qui est chargé du commandement de cette expédition, c'est Abbas Pacha, ennemi des Chrétiens, dont le caractère féroce, inexorable, est un mauvais présage de ce qui doit arriver dans la suite.

Il vient de s'embarquer à bord du bateau à vapeur "le Na," avec tous les chefs Albanais, et partira à l'instant pour sa destination. Les 3,200 soldats de la même race ont été placés à bord de deux vaisseaux Égyptiens et d'une frégate Ottomane.

On suppose que le tout sera réuni à Beyrouth et Tripoli vers le 30 du courant, et que le débarquement n'aura pas lieu avant le 3 Juillet.

A présent, l'Égypte est entièrement dépourvue de troupes régulières. Il n'y a qu'un régiment de Cavalerie et quelques canons qui soient disponibles. Les trois régiments du Régiment du Caïre et de Rosette, qui ont été embarqués pour la Syrie, ne présentent qu'un effectif de 2,700 hommes, et encore c'étaient des vieux invalides, pères de famille, artisans, marchands, &c.

Méhémet Ali fait par cette expédition bien plus preuve de son aveugle confiance en sa fortune que de sa prévoyance et d'élevation. Un ennemi hardi n'aurait qu'à faire une apparition, soit ici, soit sur les côtes de la Syrie, et l'œuvre de sa vie s'écroulerait sous ses yeux. L'opinion est, à l'exception des Européens à sa solde, généralement reçue, que dans un tel cas la Syrie se soulèverait comme un homme, et que l'Égypte ne pourrait fournir ni hommes ni argent pour éloigner un désastre de l'Armée d'Ibrahim.

Il y a une opinion qui mérite d'être mentionnée dans ce rapport, c'est que Méhémet Ali pourrait imaginer d'imposer par cet étalage de ses forces aux Puissances Chrétiennes, faisant voir qu'après tout ce qu'on a dit de l'épuisement de ses ressources, il a pu envoyer d'ici 15,000 hommes pour la Syrie.

Les deux régiments du Régiment d'Alexandrie ont prêté avant-hier serment de fidélité à Méhémet Ali, selon un vieux cérémonial. Ils auraient dû être de 7,000 hommes; à la revue qui a eu lieu à la date susdite, ils n'ont présenté qu'un effectif de 3,000 hommes tout au plus.

Aggréé, &c.,  
(Signé) A. LAURIN



No. 40.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 12, 1840.*

HIS Excellency Rechid Pasha informed me this day that Sami Bey has brought 1,000,000 of Turkish piastres as a present for the new-born daughter of the Sultan, that he also brought letters for the Valide Sultana and for some of the Ministers; and that in these letters Mehemet Ali confined himself to new protestations of fidelity and devotion to the Sultan; that it was only last night Sami Bey, in a conversation at which Ahmed Fethi Pasha was present, said, "Mehemet Ali intends to restore the Ottoman fleet; but he desires to send it to Constantinople under the command of Ahmed Fethi Pasha (the late Capudan Pasha) or under Said Bey." To this Rechid Pasha replied, "Ahmed Pasha has been guilty of treason of the deepest dye, and the Sublime Porte will never consent to his return to Constantinople; and as for the restoration of the fleet, it is a natural thing: Mehemet Ali himself has always spoken of restoring it to its legitimate master, and its restitution is considered by the Sublime Porte as a secondary affair."

Rechid observed on this part of the conversation, that he thought it proper to avoid attaching great importance to the restitution of the fleet, that he might not give a pretext for demanding concessions in return.

Samī Bey said that the Ex-Grand Vizier Husrev had often written to Mehemet Ali to demand the fleet. Rechid answered that it was true, but that it was at first, and when the death of Mahmood and the affair of Neaib had thrown the Porte into consternation. Rechid then asked, "Where is the fleet?" to which Sami Bey replied that he did not know.

Samī then said, "May there not be means for an arrangement between us, and why does not the Porte give a hint?" Rechid said, "The Porte has no arrangement to propose. The Sultan, a few days after he mounted the throne, offered to grant Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, and the Porte has nothing to add. If Mehemet Ali has reasonable propositions to make, let him make them; and if we find them acceptable, we will consult the Five Powers thereon, for the Great Powers having offered us their mediation, we accepted it; and we are bound to do nothing without their concurrence and consent. Sami Bey rejoined, that it was the Sublime Porte that had demanded the mediation, and he asked, "How can the Porte fail to see that the Great Powers regard only their own proper interests? how can it be believed that they incur such expense solely for the interest of the Porte?"

He had denied that it was solely for the interest of the Porte; and asserted, that the Great Powers acted in support of their own interests, which demanded the preservation of the independence of the Porte, and the integrity of the Empire, adding, that the cost the Great Powers now incurred was trifling compared with the immense expense, and the evils they would have to endure, if a civil war should break out; and that it was the Five Powers who had offered mediation, which was accepted to with pleasure by the Porte.

Samī observed that there had also been a question about the restoration of Adana and Candia, which ought to facilitate an arrangement.

Rechid replied, "Adana and Candia are countries where the Arabian language is not spoken, and you insist upon keeping all those countries where that language is spoken, which is to aim at the establishment of an Arab empire; that is declared to be the object of the Great Powers." Sami then said, "The Great Powers were far from being agreed on the question."

I observed, having been repeated again and again by both parties, that Mehemet Ali would restore the fleet, but he did not say when.

It is plain that Mehemet Ali has only repeated his old set phrases and promises, which are too glaringly insincere and false to deceive anybody; and it is impossible for him to hope for upon the secret protestations made with a view to have power over the

Sultan's mind. I think he will fail; I do not believe the Sultan will act in opposition to the opinion of his Ministers; and I think they are firm, because I am sure it is their interest to be so.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 41

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)*

(Private.)

Dear Palmerston,

*Therapia July 14, 1840*

I ENCLOSE a letter from Mr. Wood, dated Beyrout, July 8; I also inclose a private letter to me from Mr. Consul Moore, of July 8, which I think to be worthy of your perusal.

Yours, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 41

*Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby*

My Lord,

*Harbour of Beyrout, July 3, 1840*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship of our arrival off the Port of Beyrout this morning. I have not been able yet to land or to land any direct communication with the shore, nevertheless I see a number of about 15,000 Egyptian troops in the sea coast, protected by 500 Egyptian ships of war of different sizes. It appears (and the Arabs assure me of it) that the insurgents are in possession of the country in numbers sufficient to deter the Egyptians from attempting any movement against them. The work of destruction is, however, commenced; the houses and the plantations of the peasants about the town are in flames, and the whole plain is enveloped in smoke.

Her Majesty's frigate the "Castor" is at anchor here, but on account of the murder of an attendant of Count Lamont, under British protection, Captain Collier has interrupted a communication with the shore and the maritime authorities since he brought the frigate to anchor. I am sorry to hear that the French Consul has struck his flag and has placed the French vessels under the protection of the Sultan's fleet.

I hear also that some of the Egyptian men of war have been sent to the Turkish fleet, and that the Egyptian fleet of men of war, which attempted to sail off in that way, was stopped and destroyed at night, and now a dread of the Egyptians being about to hang down the bay.

An Egyptian man-of-war is also cruising off the coast and a transport is just arrived with troops. Still, it appears that the insurgents are no way intimidated, and are sufficiently strong to keep at bay the whole Egyptian fleet commanded by Abbas Pasha, a man of no great energy or talents, seconded, it is said, by Solyman Pasha.

Sir John Louis intends sending two ships of the line here; it is not improbable that the Turkish ships of war may be induced to attack the Egyptian fleet against the insurgents may be induced to attack the ships of our ships and place themselves under their protection. Perhaps the presence of the Admiral would be the means of preventing the Turkish ships from ever returning to Alexandria again.

I presume that Mr. Consul Moore will transmit to your Lordship a full list by the same conveyance, every circumstance connected with the insurrection, my arrival only this moment rendering it impossible for me to transmit any accurate information to your Lordship. Though I cannot say anything positive with regard to my proceedings, yet I have decided to avoid, if possible, landing at Beyrout, where I should be exposed to receive indignities, and perhaps

be prevented quitting the town hereafter under some frivolous pretence or other. I shall therefore beg Captain Collier to receive me on board for a night or two, when I hope to obtain sufficient information to enable me to forward the object of my visit to those parts—that of acquiring information respecting the insurrection, &c., &c., without exposing my life to no purpose.

Should my two Syrian friends intend taking Cyprus in their way hither, I should advise them to call at the British Consulate, where, perhaps, they may find letters that may be useful to them. Captain Austin proceeds to Alexandria, and will return to take my letters for your Lordship.

I cannot conclude, without paying a just tribute to his kind attention and civility to me, and the readiness he evinced, in every instance, to assist me in forwarding my views. Sir John Louis received me also with great courtesy, and directed Captain Austin to proceed to any part of Syria I wished to visit first, and to give me all the assistance in his power.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

P.S.—I understand that the Druses are armed with only sticks and stones, and that the Egyptians will endeavour to come to terms with them, seeing their incompetency to subdue them. It is also said that the Egyptian squadron is preparing to quit this port for Alexandria.

Inclosure 2 in No. 41.

Mr Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston

(Private)

My Lord,

Beirut, July 2, 1840

I HAVE barely time to transmit your Lordship to-day by the "Seri Perma," copy of my despatch to Viscount Palmerston of the 24th ultimo, and to inclose a letter received yesterday from Damascus.

Every day the troops march from the town to support the Albanians in their attacks upon the insurgents close to us, and as regularly come back repulsed.

Beirut being placed "en état de siège" by Solymen Pasha, it is impossible to obtain any correct accounts for the moment from the insurgent camp.

My post came from Damascus, saw at Merga, on the other side of Lebanon, under Osman Pasha's command, about 5,000 men, composed of Infantry, Artillery, and a small body of Cavalry.

We have accounts of two engagements near Zailé, betwixt the insurgents and Osman Pasha; according to these, in the first, Osman Pasha was defeated, in the second, he claims the advantage, but this news comes through Solymen Pasha.

My post came also saw in the insurgent camp five Egyptian deserters, who requested him to take charge of letters for their comrades here; afraid to refuse, he consented, but before he arrived in the town, he threw the letters into the hedge by the road-side.

From Tripoli 100 soldiers, with their chief, lately deserted, and were all well received at the insurgent camp.

M. Hourcade, the French Consul at Beirut, struck his flag on the 27th ultimo, in consequence of not being able to obtain satisfaction for an attempt at assassination on a French subject the day before.

Two days after, a native in the employ of the Vicomte de Lamont, who was placed at his own special request by the French Consul under British protection, (the rest the French subjects, from political motives, having been put under that of Sarhnia by M. Hourcade), was murdered in open day, near his master's house, by a Turkish sailor (a petty officer).

I immediately demanded of Solymen Pasha the execution of the assassin, whom I succeeded in arresting by the aid of my cawasses, supported by a body of soldiers given on my demand.

Solymen Pasha admits the justice of my demand for the immediate public execution of the assassin in my presence, but begs me to defer it, on account of the spirit of revolt which exists both in the fleet and Turkish army here.

Time does not admit, my Lord, of my going into the details of the atrocious murder, but my discussions with Solymen Pasha on the subject were of the most serious kind, proceeding to the length of my calling round me four armed cawasses for my personal protection, and that of the Vicomte de Lamont, who claimed it on the murder of his servant.

I was at the time of the discussion in the open square before the Governor's Serai, and surrounded by more than a thousand troops; and a personal quarrel betwixt Solymen Pasha and M. de Lamont was prevented by my throwing myself betwixt them, and telling his Excellency he must strike his antagonist through my body. The General immediately grew calm upon this, and, to do him justice, aided me to the utmost of his power in arresting the murderer; on this taking place, I obtained Solymen Pasha's word of honour for his execution in my presence the next day.

Abbas Pasha is here with fourteen sail of Turkish and Egyptian ships (one tw-decker Turkish, eight frigates Turkish). In all we have about 13,000 men—English, Turkish, and Egyptian—on board. On the 1st inst. a Turkish ship, a part of the crew of the Turkish ship, was sent to start for Constantinople, but were overboarded. The crew were tried for attempting to desert, and were found guilty, but owing to the spirit of revolt among the crew, and the execution of the crew was privately granted to the crew.

My discussion for the execution of the murderer of the British protected subject was with Solymen Pasha, who claims to be a most amiable person, but to preserve his post and receive the aid of the safety of the Fair port, he must execute the murderer.

Captain Collier was arrested on yesterday by Her Majesty's ship "Cerberus" supported by the "Hermion" and the "Hermion" and the "Hermion" by Solymen Pasha, I am content myself with a word of engagement to him the murderer subject to my demand for instant execution.

Another attempt at assassination by an Albanian on the Dragoman of the Greek Consul has this morning been made; the man is under arrest.

The Emir Bechir still clings to the Viceroy apparently, but his influence seems null.

It is said that three Sheiks, Ferri, Francis, and Mahmoud, have made overtures of conciliation, on the promise of an annual pension to each, of 30,000 piastres, and for their partisans the retention of their arms, and exemption from the conscription.

Her Majesty's steam-troop "Cyclops" has just come in whilst I am writing, but the commander has not yet called.

Houssein Pasha, the commander of the Turkish forces here, is suspected of playing a double game. It is to be remarked that both the assassins are Turks, and both the victims Frenchmen; his design may be suspected to be to enthrone Mehmet Ali with France. Add to the above circumstances, Houssein Pasha's insolent demeanour to the French Consul when satisfaction was demanded, and the surmise acquires at least probability. Houssein Pasha entered into no examination, but contented himself with insinuating that M. Renaud (the party assaulted) might have inflicted the wounds himself to produce an effect.

I beg leave to inclose the correspondence relative to M. de Lamont's claiming British protection, with copies of my demand to Solymen Pasha.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—Captain Austin has just called, and I am to see Mr. Wood as soon as possible.



(Private.)

St. Pétersbourg, ce 1<sup>er</sup> Juillet, 1840.

Voici, comme hier, tout ce que j'ai à vous dire, pour le moment. Avec des remerciements. Pour ce que vous avez dernièrement recommandé, les lettres ci-jointes, dont il m'a prié de le munir pour différents pays.

Mille et mille amitiés.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42

*M. de Tilioff to Count Nesselrode.*

M le Comte.

Constantinople, le 3<sup>e</sup> Juillet, 1840.

PAR son expédition du 18 Juin, M. de Boutéeff a déjà rendu compte à votre Excellence des premières explications obtenues auprès de Rachid Pacha, son Pacha de Saïd Bey à Constantinople et son lieutenant à Ierapoli se proposant d'accueillir les ouvertures éventuelles de ce délégué. Sorti de quarantaine à 24 heures de Ierapoli, il se présenta hier le 24 Juin et chez quelques uns des principaux dignitaires Ottomans; et il eut avec le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères deux conférences successives, sur le contenu desquelles ce dernier vient de nous offrir les notions qui, en résumé, portent ce

Réhid Pacha s'attache tout d'abord à recevoir Sami Bey avec beaucoup de distinction et de respect. Comme à son tour, pour lui de ses propositions sur les sept mille hommes et cent canots de Moudon. Il est arrivé vers le Sultan. Il déclara que le Pacha était décidé à restituer la flotte sans y rattacher la moindre condition, qu'il désirait uniquement connaître si une pareille marque de ses dispositions loyales, serait favorablement appréciée par Sa Hautesse ; et sur qu'elle daignerait fixer ses choix pour ramener au l'escadre ? Sami Bey ajouta que Moudon An avait à juste titre l'honneur à commettre cette tâche à un Capitaine Pacha, mais qu'il ne pouvait pas se flatter si on l'autorisait à la confier par exemple à Said Bey, l'un des fils caquets du Vice-Roi.

Le Ministre Ottoman répondit, qu'à l'exception de l'Ex-Grand Amiral, Seïm

Sans lui avoir dit que son projet était chargé d'art culer aucune préposi-  
tion, que son devoir serait l'entendre, et les autres de tenir la Porte. Ruchid s'en fit  
observer que déjà depuis quelques années Méhémet Ali travaillait à la résolution de Sa  
Hautesse de lui laisser l'hérédité de l'Egypte, s'il abandonnait immédiate-  
ment la Syrie avec les autres provinces. Sans établir de controverse sur cet  
objet, et de la part de Méhémet Ali, exposa sous un autre point de vue l'histo-  
rique, les sacrifices que la Syrie avait coûtés au Vice-Roi, et les difficultés que  
la Porte avait éprouvées de tout tenter à tirer un parti réel de cette possession ; il  
ajouta que pour se procurer les sommes nécessaires à l'entretien des défilés de Taurus et  
d'Adana, il concevrait encore jusqu'à un certain point, les avantages qui pour-  
raient en faire soulever le recouvrement. Puis, sans s'appesantir sur cet article,  
ni faire aucune mention de Candie, il exprima combien Méhémet Ali était  
d'avance disposé à se montrer coulant sur l'augmentation du tribut, et finit par  
dire, qu'au milieu des dispositions favorables qui semblaient animer les deux  
parties avec leur infatigable et ardeur ne serait pas difficile de parvenir si  
la Porte, pour échanger ses idées avec celles de Méhémet Ali, se décidait à  
nommer un Commissaire de confiance qui put se rendre simultanément avec  
lui à Alexandrie.

Cette insinuation fut péremptoirement repoussée par Réchid Pacha : il déclara à Sami Bey, que Sa Hautesse ayant déjà résolu de ne point procéder sans le concours efficace que lui avaient assuré les Grandes Puissances, l'envoi d'un intermédiaire à Alexandre ne saurait plus être ni convenable ni opportun. Sami Bey s'étendit longuement sur la lenteur des Cours Européennes dans cette affaire ; sur leur peu de sincérité réelle envers la Porte ; sur les intérêts divers qui les divisaient ensemble ; s'attachant à vouloir démontrer par cet exposé combien il serait préférable de régler par une entente isolée entre Musulmans, une cause qui concernait exclusivement les intérêts les plus chers de l'Islamisme.

Dans contester les points des divergences partielles qui pouvaient exister entre les Cabinets, Rechid Pacha objecta que néanmoins, leurs vues étaient absolument identiques en ce qui concernait le maintien de l'indépendance, de l'intégrité réelle de l'Empire, et la dignité du trône de Sa Hauteesse, qui, persuadée nommément de l'intérêt loyal et sincère que lui vouait l'Empereur Notre Auguste Maître, avait tout lieu de placer une confiance non moins intime dans les dispositions inébranlables de l'Autriche et de l'Angleterre.

Le Commissaire Égyptien, en s'abstenant d'abord une discussion plus détaillée, se résuma en exprimant l'espoir que son envoi dans cette capitale laisserait en tout état de cause une impression favorable dans l'esprit de Sa Hautesse et de ses Ministres ; il chercha à prouver que l'hésitation de Méhémet-Ali sur les questions territoriales, ne provenait d'aucune méfiance de sa part envers les dispositions de la Porte, et qu'elle avait sa source uniquement dans une crainte d'être débiteur pour avoir eu ses enfants à son service, et non d'être créancier de lui-même. Il se termina par une déclaration d'Alexandrie de tous les jours après qu'il eût été chargé et autorisé par le sultan à se rendre pour l'Égypte, et par un acte de reconnaissance adressé au Sultan.

[illegible]

Tel est le résumé des poisons connus : votre premier Drogman, sur

les résolutions notifiées à Sami Bey et sur le langage tenu de sa part. Il parait s'accorder entièrement avec le récit que le Comte Méhem fait des instructions dont il a été muni par le Pacha d'Égypte. Ce délégué doit passer quelques jours à Constantinople; il n'a pas encore consigné les cadeaux dont il est chargé, et il a la promesse d'obtenir avant son départ une audience auprès de Sa Hautesse. Ce n'est qu'après l'accomplissement de toutes ces formalités que nous pourrions apprendre au juste, s'il se réserve de mettre à profit la fin de son séjour à Constantinople pour avancer quelques nouvelles offres, et si la Porte de son côté demeurera fidèle jusqu'au bout à ses résolutions actuelles.

Nous ne pouvons qu'applaudir aux réponses données par l'organe de Réchid Pacha, et que féliciter la Porte sur sa persévérance à ne point se départir du système de s'en remettre à la bienveillante coopération des Grandes Puissances, pour amener une solution analogue à ses vœux comme à ses intérêts légitimes.

En terminant sa conversation à cet égard avec le Prince Hantchéri, laquelle n'en a pas été l'unique, le Ministre, après l'avoir prié de m'annoncer qu'il en avait fait des communications à Lord Ponsonby et à Lord Russell, a dit que son interprète n'avait pas à lui suggérer quelques avis personnels sur le parti que la Porte, dans l'intérêt de sa cause, pourrait tirer de la conjoncture du moment? Le Prince Hantchéri répondit avec infiniment d'à-propos, qu'il ne voyait pour sa part absolument rien à ajouter, ni à changer, à une marche aussi prudente et sage, et qu'il se contentait d'observer que le langage prudent actuel constituerait peut-être à communiquer sans retard à Cléah Effendi, les détails relatifs à la mission de Sami Bey et à l'accueil qui vient de lui être fait, en invitant l'Ambassadeur de Sa Hautesse à faire valoir aux yeux des Représentants réunis à Londres, la conduite ferme et correcte du Gouvernement Turc dans cette nouvelle circonstance, comme un motif de plus pour hâter le résultat des délibérations qui forment à sa juste titre l'objet de la plus vive attente de la Porte.

A la suite de l'arrivée du pyroscophe Anglais ré-expédié d'ici à Smyrne par Lord Ponsonby, deux vaisseaux de guerre et un bateau à vapeur Britanniques se sont détachés de l'escadre de l'Amiral Louis pour faire apparition sur les côtes de la Syrie sous les ordres du Capitaine Napier, le plus ancien des Commandants de ces vaisseaux. M. le Pacha a expédié de son côté en observation pour les parages de Beyrouth, le brick français "l'Argus," qui, jusqu'ici stationné devant Théraps, venait d'être relevé par la "Comète," navire de la même porte.

Je suis, &c,  
(Signé) TITOFF

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 42

#### Extract of Report from the Russian Consul at Beyrouth.

TOUS les yeux sont tournés du côté de l'Europe, et toutes les espérances reposent sur l'intervention des Grandes Puissances. Il n'y a aucun doute qu'à la première démonstration des Puissances contre le Vice-Roi, toute la Syrie se soulèverait contre le régime Égyptien; et des Turcs même, des employés du Gouvernement, m'ont fait cette observation confidentielle à Jaffa.

#### No. 43

#### Vicomte Palmerston to Earl Granville

No. 244.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 4, 1840.

YOUR Excellency's despatch of the 1st of August, inclosing the "Moniteur" of that day with the ordinances for raising an additional number of troops and seamen, has been received at this office.

This measure, wholly uncalled for as it is by any proceeding on the part of

the Four Powers, and utterly unnecessary to repel any threatened or imaginable attack upon France, can only be looked upon as a menace, and therefore as a gratuitous affront offered to the Four Powers by France.

But Her Majesty's Government do not intend to take any notice of it in any way whatever; and they do not mean either to ask the French Government for any explanation as to the purposes for which the additional five sail of the line are to be commissioned, and the 10,000 seamen are to be raised; nor to apply to Parliament for any further naval means, or for any vote of credit.

To do either the one or the other would be to give to this strange proceeding of the French Government an importance which it does not deserve. Her Majesty's Government will pursue their own course without regard to these armaments of France, and will act just as if nothing of the kind had happened.

The British fleet in the Mediterranean will be quite strong enough to do everything which it can be required to do in pursuance of the engagements of the Treaty of the 15th of July. The Government of France will be bound to be sufficient to secure it against molestation or insult from any squadron which the French Government think proper to send to the Levant, and if any proceeding of the French squadron should bring on a collision, which Her Majesty's Government trust the French Government will have the prudence and wisdom to avoid, Her Majesty's Government have no fear as to the result.

But it certainly must strike every impartial observer, that if France means to preserve peace, this armament, which is only a display of irritation, cannot tend to inspire that mutual cordiality which belongs to peace; and that, on the other hand, if the French Government mean to go to war, this armament is a poor measure of the resources with which they are prepared for entering upon the contest.

Her Majesty's Government, however, entertain the most confident hope and belief that the British Government will preserve peace, notwithstanding these hostile demonstrations; but if it were otherwise, it is always in the power of the Crown to order Parliament to supply the means which may be necessary in any case for protecting the interests and upholding the honour of the country.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

#### No. 44

#### Vicomte Palmerston to Mr. Blountfield.\*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 4, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to express to Count Nesselrode, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt that his Excellency has approved, and that the Emperor will ratify, the Convention and arrangements concluded at London on the 15th of July. Her Majesty's Government have also said to day, that the Emperor of Austria is equally determined to ratify; and the Prussian Government has announced its intention of following the example of the other Two Courts.

This is the more satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, because it is obvious that the extreme violence of the French papers, and the ordinances recently published in the "Moniteur," were intended, not only to alarm the commercial interest in this country, and through their means to act upon Her Majesty's Government, but also to prevent, if possible, the Governments of Austria and Prussia from ratifying the Convention of the 15th of July, and it is gratifying to find that neither of these objects have been attained.

With respect to the French ordinance for the equipment of five additional sail of the line, Her Majesty's Government do not intend to notice it in any manner, either by asking for explanation from the French Government, or by applying to Parliament for any further naval means in consequence thereof.

\* A similar despatch was addressed on the same day, to Lord Beaconsfield and Lord W. Russell, for communication to the Austrian and Prussian Governments.



The British fleet in the Mediterranean will shortly consist of fifteen sail of the line, with frigates and several strongly armed steamers. That force is quite sufficient for all the purposes for which its action can be required, in execution of the purposes of the Convention of July; and it is strong enough to be secure from insult or molestation from the French fleet, even if there existed, which Her Majesty's Government are perfectly sure there does not, the slightest intention on the part of the Government of France to offer to the British fleet molestation or insult.

You will urge Count Nesselrode to send off the ratification of the Treaty as soon as it is possible to do so; because the knowledge that the Russian ratification was gone, would induce the French Government to endeavour to reconcile itself to that which it would then consider an irreparable fact.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 45.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beesbrooke*

(No. 104)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1840.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to say to Prince Metternich, that Her Majesty's Government feel very deeply the great compliment which has been paid to Great Britain, by placing, not only an Austrian squadron, but also an Austrian Archduke, under the command of Sir Robert Stopford.

But this arrangement has even a greater value in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, as a political manifestation, and as an evidence to all the world, of the central union of Great Britain and Austria, in the important undertaking, in which, in conjunction with their other Allies, those Two Powers have embarked, and the presence of the young Archduke in the combined fleet, will of itself be as valuable as a large naval reinforcement.

It is moreover gratifying to the British Government, that the son of an illustrious Commander, whose name will stand prominent among those of the great captains of his age, should, in early life, afford to the British naval service, an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with his distinguished qualities, and of esteeming him as he deserves.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 46

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—Received August 4*

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 29, 1840.*

THE Prussian Government was fully impressed with the necessity of checking the career of Mehmet Ali. His dictatorial tone, his insolent language to the Five Powers, his reliance on French Journalists, his obvious intention to destroy the Porte, all bearing on the general policy of Europe, and menacing to disturb the quiescent state of things in Germany, caused uneasiness here. At the same time, the terror of France and democratic principles is so great, that the signature of the Convention caused greater alarm than the previous state of things. I thought at first that, like soldiers who, struck by panic, sacrifice their own General, they would sacrifice Baron Bülow; but reflection has made them more calm, and the union of the Four Powers has given them more courage. This timid policy on the part of the Prussian Government, is a remnant of that pursued by the late King, and will cease, I hope, as soon as His present Majesty takes in hand the reins of Government. At present, the King is more occupied in seeking information than in acting, and will not leave the line traced by his father before the mourning is over; consequently, the moment is not favourable

to obtain any active succour from Prussia in furtherance of the success of the Ottoman arms.

Yesterday I told Baron Werther, that England, Russia, and Austria, having consented to contribute means to bring about the object of the Convention, I thought that Prussia should come forward with money, or officers, or artillery; that the question was important, and that many years of peace would be secured by its success. He answered me drily, that Prussia would contribute nothing, nothing whatever; that he had desired Baron Bülow to state this distinctly last year to Her Majesty's Government; and that he saw no reason to change his decision. I told him, circumstances were changed, and the King was changed. He said, circumstances were the same, and the King would change none of the decisions of his father.

Notwithstanding this peremptory refusal on the part of Baron Werther, I will, if your Lordship authorizes me to do so, address a Note to Baron Werther to ask for officers, and have no doubt my request will be granted by the King. It would be useless to ask for money. Money would not be granted: it is contrary to the practice of the Prussian Government. The money sent to Don Carlos in Spain, came from the privy purse of the King and his sons.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 47

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell.*

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1840.*

WITH reference to that part of your Lordship's despatch, No. 30, of the 29th of July, in which you state that you have no doubt that the King of Prussia would grant officers for the assistance of the Sultan under the Convention of July 15, if you were authorized to apply for them: I have to state to your Lordship, that for the present it may be as well to let that matter rest.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 48

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—Received August 6.*

(Confidential)

My Lord,

*Paris, August 3, 1840.*

I PAID my respects on Saturday evening to the King and Royal Family at St. Cloud. His Majesty received me with more than his usual courtesy. He conversed with me for some time on the Treaty lately concluded between England and the other Great Powers, relative to the affairs of the East; on the change that this Treaty had effected in the relations between the British and French Governments; on the dangers to which he thought it exposed the general peace of Europe; and on the very embarrassing position in which he was himself placed.

Were I to repeat to your Lordship what was said by the King to me, and what I said to His Majesty, I should be obliged to give a repetition of Mr. Bulwer's confidential despatch of the 27th ultimo, in which he gives a full account of what passed between His Majesty and myself on the subject.

The King explained much of his views with regard to the Treaty, and to the position in which it placed the British and French Governments. He said that the French Government had been misled by the French Journalists, and that the French Government had been misled by the French Journalists, and that the French Government had been misled by the French Journalists. I am, &c.,  
the King said it was far from your Lordship's views on the subject of suspicion.

His Majesty, or any disregard of France, in not communicating to M. Guizot the Treaty until it had been signed. Declarations, I said, had been repeatedly and recently made by the French Government, that it could not co-operate in measures for compelling Mehemet Ali to consent to the arrangement which the other Four Great Powers deemed indispensable for the security and independence of the Turkish Empire; and to have communicated the Treaty previous to its signature, might have been considered as implying an expectation offensive to France, that the union of the Four Powers would operate a change in the views and intentions of the French Government which their arguments had failed to effect.

The King said that I must do him the justice to acknowledge, that ever since he ascended the throne, the policy of his Government had been most pacific, and that his efforts had always been directed to restraining the warlike impetuosity of the French people; but a King of France who, in these times, should set himself in opposition to the current of popular feeling, when it became strong and general, had little chance of retaining his Crown; whatever may be his wishes, he must give way to public opinion.

I said, that to this motive I attributed the publication of the ordinances for the augmentation of the army and navy, being unwilling to believe, that the French Government had really the intention of going to war with all the Powers of Europe, for the sake of maintaining Mehemet Ali's dominion in the northern district of Syria. The King, at the same time that he did not disclaim the motive I assigned for this display of military and naval preparation, said, that the isolated position of France, consequent upon the alliance lately formed between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, necessitated a military and naval establishment in France larger than was required when the alliance existed between France and England; but I might be assured of his earnest wish to maintain peace. His Minister, he believed, had the same wish, and he was inclined to think, had more power to check the warlike ardour of the country than any other person in the same position. If he was deceived in this expectation, it would then be for him to consider what determination he should have to take.

In regard to Syria, His Majesty expressed great doubts of the success of the intervention against Mehemet Ali, and feared it might end in the massacre and extermination of the Christian population, who had for so many ages contrived to exist in these mountains, notwithstanding the arbitrary and persecuting dominion of the Mahomedans.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 49.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

Paris, August 3, 1840.

I TRANSMITTED to your Lordship, by the post of Saturday, the "Moniteur," containing two Royal Ordinances for the levy of an additional number of troops, and the notification of another ordinance which had been given by the King for the augmentation of the navy.

The first two ordinances will probably be executed, and will give to the army an addition of nearly 100,000 men. The ordinance for the augmentation of the navy will not be so easily carried into effect. I am informed, that the King, and thirteen frigates, a d'assaut, and giving popularity to the Government, that this ordinance has been published.

Admiral Duperré was sent for to Paris, for the purpose of offering to him the chief command of all the naval forces of France in the Mediterranean, but

he has returned to his house in the country at some distance from Paris; and the tone of his conversation, I am told, has led those with whom he has conversed, to think that he considers his appointment as merely nominal.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 50.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 237)

My Lord,

Paris, August 3, 1840.

I HAD an interview on Saturday with the President of the Council. Our conversation related solely to the affairs of the East, and to the Convention lately signed by your Lordship with the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

M. Thiers began by saying, that after all the obloquy he had incurred in advocating an alliance between the French and British Governments, and after he had shown his disposition to act in entire concert with the English Government in all questions in which the interests of both countries were concerned, he could not but feel much mortified and hurt at the secret with which your Lordship had carried on a negotiation for an alliance with the other Powers of the Continent, to the exclusion of France; that his own personal feelings were wounded by the manner in which the English Government had separated itself from France, and contracted an alliance with other European Powers, was of far more serious importance. He said, that the whole French nation felt sensibly the affront; and that no Minister of France, be he who he might, could do otherwise than place the country in a position which would enable it to assert its dignity and its influence in the affairs of Europe.

I answered, that I was surprised that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government could have been so much misunderstood in France, and still more so, that he should have received the communication made by your Lordship to M. Guizot, as if it had apprized the French Government, that an alliance had been formed by England with the other European Powers against France, when, in fact, the object of the Treaty referred to in the communication, was merely to carry into effect certain conditions of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which the French Government had never stated were in themselves objectionable, but to the enforcing of which they had repeatedly declined to be a party.

The English Government, I said, had never ceased to declare its opinion, that the possession of all the Pashalics of Syria by Mehemet Ali was incompatible with the safety and independence of the Turkish Empire; it had laboured to engage the French Government to co-operate in measures calculated to obtain the restoration of a part of it, if not the whole, to the Sultan. The answer given to our representations on this Question was, that the French Government had no expectation that the Pasha of Egypt would make the required concession; that the French Government could not join in hostile measures against the Pasha; and that they doubted the efficacy of any means that could be adopted by England and the other Powers, to compel the Egyptians to evacuate Syria; but it never had been intimated by the French Government, that the adoption of measures of coercion by the other Powers would be resented by France. Desiring, therefore, as I had always been, for the alliance between England and France; and considering that alliance as the best security for the general peace of Europe, I could not but express both surprise and regret at the misinterpretation which had been given of the intentions of the English Government, and the consequent excitement raised in France. I trusted, however, that nothing would arise which could render doubtful the continuance of peace between the two countries; and I added, that I should be happy always to avoid myself of any circumstances which might occur, to re-establish the former friendly feeling and intimate relations which were mutually advantageous to both nations.

M. Thiers, upon my referring to the affairs of Spain, showed no inclination



to enter into any discussion respecting them, saying, that all interest in European affairs was now centered in the Eastern Question.

My conversation with M. Thiers, of which it is unnecessary to give your Lordship any further details, led me to the conclusion, that it is the intention of the French Government to assume an imposing attitude; to wait for events; and, according to the nature of these, to determine their future policy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 51.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 238.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 3, 1840.

I INCLOSE the "Moniteur" of this morning, containing two telegraphic despatches from Marseilles, announcing that steam vessels had arrived at Malta, on the 28th ultimo, from Beyrout, bringing intelligence that the insurrection in Syria was at an end.

Count Walewski has been sent on a mission to Alexandria. I have been assured, but I cannot answer for the truth of the information, that he is instructed to use every endeavour to prevent the advance of the Egyptian Army into Asia Minor.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 52.

*Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 9.)

(Extract.)

Damascus, June 23, 1840.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch No. 8, under the 23rd ultimo.

Your Lordship will have observed therefrom, the discontent which existed in the Emir Bechir's territories, and the measures proposed to resist the plans of the Egyptian Government, and the causes which occasioned the same, described to your Lordship in my despatches Nos. 3 and 4. Before that despatch can have reached your Lordship's hands, the insurrection will have been announced to your Lordship from another source. I abstain from entering into particulars respecting the events which have taken place in the mountains, all of which will have been narrated by Mr. Consul Moore, who is nearer the scene of action.

The Egyptian Government has, I hear, attempted to retract its steps, by abandoning the false and injudicious measures it had undertaken towards the population of Mount Lebanon, by offers of conciliation and conciliation; whether it has partially succeeded, or wholly failed in such negotiation through the Emir Bechir, or whether the Prince, his sons and adherents are faithful towards the Egyptian Government, or are overtly or tacitly participators in the insurrection, is not correctly known. I hear the Prince professes to be faithful to the Government, but it is not known whether he is sincere. It is reported, that the Prince's son, the Emir Hamud, is understood to be in communication with the Emir Bechir's influence; there is reason to think, they are all agreed together.

By the advices hitherto received from the mountains, it would appear, that the plans of the mountaineers are on a large scale, the vicinity of Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli, being occupied by them, and by the overt acts of insurrection having

been committed, that no successful result has been obtained by the Egyptian Government. It however continues to give out hopes of pacification, and that the Emir Bechir has succeeded in tranquillizing the population of his immediate district of Der-el-Kamar. It is reported that the Elders of Hasbeyra and Rasbeyra, who went to Bledidia to the Emir Bechir, to meet the Druse Emir Saashin, and his brother Emir Ahmad, of the Shaab family of the Emir Bechir, to welcome them to the command of the above towns, have been placed under arrest by the Prince, fearing the revolt of those places. This is indicative of the Prince being faithful to the Egyptian Government. It appears that the population of Mitten and Kasrovan, have refused the terms offered by the Egyptian Government, through the Emir Bechir's intervention: the former is now acting against Beyrout, and the latter on the Bechra.

The events which have occurred on this side of Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, connected with the rebellion of the Druses, and the seizure of a caravan by a body of Druses, composed of Christians, Druses, and Maronites, of a caravan of 4000, of a convoy of provisions sent from hence to the depot at Balbec, under the escort of a squadron of regular cavalry, in which the Government lost 200 camels laden, and the regulars had seven men killed, with some wounded and missing. A regiment of Cavalry is stationed at Balbec.

The Druse Emir Mahomed Shiehah, of the same origin and family as the Emir Bechir, who held a command in the Egyptian Army, and was on leave of absence at Hasbeyra, and was frequently summoned to join his regiment, has taken refuge in the Ledges. He is now at the head of a marauding party of about 200 men. The Shait Arabs are also committing depredations in the direction of the south of this district. The Mutakall insurgent, Emir Mahud, is also at the head of a force employed on the same predatory service to the north of this city; and both these bodies of marauders inflict considerable mischief on the villages and surrounding country.

Considerable excitement and anxiety exists in this city; but, for the present, it is tranquil, and the immediate adjacent country is tolerably quiet. But there is no knowing from one moment to another what may take place. The city is surrounded by insurrectionary elements. Should the efforts of the Government fail to produce a pacification, and the military measures concerted to act against the insurgents, be unsuccessful in the first attack, it will be a signal for revolt at Agloun, Hamaouran, and extend to Naplous and the whole country on the Balbec road, northwards, including the desert line. The discontented spirits in all directions, are waiting to see the issue of the first Egyptian attack on the Mount Lebanon insurgents. But, until the Egyptian military force is thus deeply compromised, there enters a feeling of jealousy on the part of the Mussulman population, towards the Christian mountaineers and to the Christians generally, which precludes or delays immediate verbal co-operation, distinct from the wary judgment which guides them, in not exposing themselves to any ground. Indeed, I am not without distrust that the same feeling exists of both populations from the Egyptian Government, ought, however, to dictate a different determination.

The military measures combining by the Egyptian Government against the insurgents, seem to be on a large scale. Five regiments of Infantry are announced to have left Aleppo on that service, besides a large body of Albanians from the Adana district; three regiments from Acre and a reinforcement from Egypt, are to form part of the army. I hear the mountains are to be penetrated simultaneously at four different points. The Government has ordered a large quantity of provisions, and a large body of regulars, has been sent to open and clear the road to Balbec, which is now in the hands of the insurgents, does not find itself quite at ease to protect it.

I have just learnt that the insurgents from Zahle amount to about 5000, under the command of Emir Mahmond, son of Prince Hail. The Emir Bechir's warlike son took possession of Balbec on the 20th, and the Egyptian depot of provisions; and it is said, arms and ammunition have fallen into their hands, all of which they are now removing to Zahle. The Egyptian regular Cavalry stationed at Balbec, has fallen back on Hama. It is said the Infantry arrived at that place from Aleppo, has been ordered to advance on Balbec; but, unless they take provisions with them, they will be much straitened, and cannot, I presume, maintain themselves at that point. It is reported, that the Prince

My Lord,

*Bryant, July 21, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the combined Egyptian, Turkish, and Albanian forces marched from Beyrout on the 13th instant, against the insurgents of Mount Lebanon.

During the encampment of these troops in the neighbourhood of Beyrouth, from the time of their landing from the Turkish fleet, their principal occupation was destruction and devastation; burning the mulberry plantations (the chief riches of the country), pillaging churches, and driving off the cattle of the peaceable inhabitants.

Their march up Lebanon was traced from Beyrut by smoking villages and convents, whilst the Albanians committed acts the most revolting and atrocious; robbery, violation of females, and murder of the Maronite clergy who fell in their way.

Captain Napier, of Her Majesty's ship "Powerful," addressed a letter of remonstrance to Abbas Pasha on the subject, expressive of his horror of such proceedings, and I cannot but think a good effect has been produced, as we have since, at least, not witnessed a recurrence of similar acts.

The insurrection has in this neighbourhood been quelled for the present; and the inhabitants of a number of villages have surrendered their arms to the Government.

From Tripoli, however, we have accounts of two days' data, which state that 4,000 insurgents surround that town, who keep the inhabitants in a constant state of terror. The British Government, however, deny the existence of

for throwing off the Egyptian yoke.

To the want of a leader, and consequently to unity of action, may in part be attributed the sudden breaking up of the insurrection, but bribery of the Sheikhs has mainly contributed to it. Another cause is, the too great confidence in, and respect for their chief, by the mountaineers, had him of this feeling existed, they might have secured the person of the Emir Bechir, or have destroyed him before he declared against them, as he has been several times in their power since the breaking out of the revolt.

The spirit of hatred to the Egyptian Government is undiminished; and were it not for the fact, however small, to appear, and supplies of ammunition furnished, the Egyptian Government would be again in arms.

1 subjugation of the insurgents still on foot, will be a work both of time and difficulty.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. MOORE

U.S. — The Turco-Egyptian Army is now at Hamana, about eight hours distant, on the Damascus road.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 64.)

My Lord

*Alexandria, July 7, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I have this morning seen Mehemet Ali. His Highness seemed mortified and amazed at hearing that Admiral Sir John Loring had despatched two line-of-battle ships to the Syrian coast. He said, "then I shall send four." I told him that this naval force was intended for the protection of British interests, to which he replied, "your ships frighten us, but there is none that sailed for that purpose; but," continuing the Pasha still was soon settled, for I have ordered Selyman Pasha to attack the coast, with a large force, this day or to-morrow, and that will

I am sorry that the Pasha that various rumors were about as to his having committed the crime in regard to sending back the Turkish slave women to Constantinople. He replied that he gave no new word that I would like to know. I would like to know that someone as a Secretary Pasha shall ask for me as I back the Secretary Pasha because I have the orders of the Sultan. I have the orders of the Pasha. I am sorry that this person who was concerned with the Pasha are not allowed to be with me and with our dispatch, I am sorry, my dear, that I shall not be allowed to attend Muras.

He then said he had just returned from the Turkish ships captured in the Red Sea, having disembarked the troops they had taken on board and returned to his port. The Egyptian vessels, he said, would remain on the Syrian coast.

I beg leave to submit to your Lordship, the infinite advantages that might be derived from the Sublime Porte making an official application to the Pasha, for the immediate restitution of the Turkish squadron, and that this application should be made direct from the Pasha, and not through any of the other authorities.

I must not omit to inform your Lordship, that the Pasha, in speaking of certain discussions which had arisen between Mr. Moore, our Consul at Beyrout, and his Excellency Solyman Pasha, respecting the punishment of a Turk who had assassinated an Arab under British protection, now assured me that he had himself given the proper orders, and that by this time the culprit must have been executed at Beyrout.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HUGHES

No. 55

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 65.)

My Lord

*Alexandria, July 10, 1840.*

IN reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 12, of the 2nd ultimo enclosing a copy of a ~~document~~ <sup>letter</sup> from His Excellency Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, I beg to observe, that I had no proofs of Russia carrying on intrigues with Mehemet Ali, what I before stated and now again beg to submit to your Lordship is, that the frequent and confidential communications between the Russian Consul-General and Mehemet Ali, attracted the notice, not only of myself, but likewise of some among my Colleagues.

Another striking feature of Count Medem's political conduct is, his having earned and acquired the substance and manner of my communications made to the Emperor, the Emperor's Council, the Emperor's Ministers, the Emperor's Highness Bey, and to the Pasha himself. Though I had often freely conversed with Count Medem on the subject of my remonstrances with the



Viceroy, he never, even by allusion, expressed to myself any reason or argument whatever, against the course I was directed to pursue.

Such conduct on the part of my Russian Colleague, in whom your Lordship had instructed me to confide, naturally excited my suspicions, and it must appear evident, that the covert censure of this gentleman, and his withholding all co-operation and countenance on the occasion of those communications made to his Highness Mehemet Ali, by the command of your Lordship, must have materially militated against the objects of Her Majesty's Government as regards this country.

I have before remarked to your Lordship, that politically Count Medem has placed himself quite alone and apart: he does not confide in any of his Colleagues; he does not consult any of them; he never takes a political step in conjunction with others, his objects and proceedings seem to be separated and distinct from those of other European Agents; they are shrouded in a species of mystery. His intercourse with the Pasha is intimate and very frequent: but the motives and subject of those conferences, remain, with few exceptions, utterly unknown. The conduct of Count Medem continues unchanged, even since the outbreak of the insurrection in Syria has rendered the power of the Pasha less secure and more easy to be assailed. He courts Mehemet Ali assiduously, and by every means in his power. He ever accompanies him in his rides and recreations. What counsels he may have given to Mehemet Ali respecting the affairs in Syria, I do not know, but he speaks in the most angry terms of some Europeans who have joined the Syrian insurgents: and has told me his opinion, that if taken by the Egyptians the Pasha will be perfectly justified in ordering their execution.

I cannot bring myself to believe that Count Medem acts otherwise than on his instructions; and from all I can observe and conjecture, I am induced to suspect, that his object is no other than to create in Egypt a Russian influence and ascendancy. But Russia is a Power far too clear-sighted to mistake the character of the Pasha, or to be ignorant that empty flattery and idle cajolery can have but small influence on a crafty old man of unostentatious habits and sound common-sense. Russia, then, can hardly be presumed to have entered on the policy which Count Medem pursues with the present Pasha, without being at the same time prepared to purchase a footing in Egypt by some solid and positive concessions or services rendered to the Viceroy.

It certainly does appear to me, that the object I have pointed out, has been to a great extent, the aim of both the Agents of France and Russia, who appear to have been out-bidding each other in personal attentions, and perhaps in secret propositions and advice to the Pasha. Hence has arisen a kind of rivalry sufficiently perceptible.

Latterly, the superior activity of Count Medem, seems to have given him some advantage over his French Colleague, who does not much disguise his dissatisfaction.

If the designs of Russia as regards this country, are identical with those of Great Britain, I do confess that I cannot comprehend why the Agent of that Power should lay himself open to misinterpretation, by an isolated and very equivocal line of action, instead of an open, straightforward, and intelligible policy.

It is simply my duty to report circumstances passing under my observation, and the consequent impressions I receive.

Those I submit for the consideration of your Lordship, by whom their importance and truth can best be estimated.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

P.S.—A circumstance which tends considerably to strengthen the suspicions expressed in the above despatch, has recently been related to me by M. de Laurin, General for Austria.

He informs me that speaking lately with the Russian Consul-General respecting the insurrection in Syria, Count Medem declared himself most hostile to the revolt, and did not disguise his lively sympathy with the cause of the Viceroy. M. de Laurin adds, that warmer language could not have been expected from the most hostile and notorious partisans of Mehemet Ali.

In speaking of the conduct of Count Medem, I beg leave to remark, that it

is not in the sense of complaint, and that my only object is to attract the attention of your Lordship to what is passing. Indeed, I should view with much pain, the removal, or even the censure of the Count.

My social intercourse with him is perfectly satisfactory. I conceive it also fortunate, that a Power whose policy is equivocal is represented here by an Agent of more experience, whose proceedings would probably prove less transparent and more dangerous.

Every reason to believe, that what I have formerly expressed to your Lordship respecting the Russian Consul-General is correct, is confirmed by his conduct. He is far from being a man of high rank or high position. He is, however, a man of high character, and his conduct is more than usually correct. He is, moreover, a man of high character, and his conduct is more than usually correct. He is, moreover, a man of high character, and his conduct is more than usually correct.

G. L. H.

No 56.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 67)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 10, 1840

YESTERDAY morning a French steam-vessel reached Alexandria from Toulon, and brought M. de Laurin, French Consul-General, to his Highness the Viceroy. He had left Paris on the evening of the 2nd instant, at which time another Agent was about to depart for the same destination.

M. de Laurin has already had two secret interviews with Mehemet Ali, but their object has not at all transpired. The French steam-vessel, which should have been ordered by the Consul-General to be detained at Toulon, has been ordered by the Consul-General to be detained at Toulon.

At about 10 o'clock A.M. of yesterday, the Egyptian steam-vessel "Generosa," entered the harbour from Port Said, and was immediately detained by the Egyptian authorities. This was speedily communicated to the Consul-General by a messenger from his Excellency Boghos Bey, containing the printed paper which I enclose with me. Letters from Captain Napier and the "Generosa" were also received.

In the evening of yesterday, the whole of the Turkish ships which were in Syria were seen returning to this port, in which they sailed on the 1st instant.

I am informed that when Captain Napier received orders to proceed from Vourla Bay to Beyrut, Admiral Lalonde immediately detached a steam-ship to the latter port, with information to the Egyptian Admiral, and a recommendation to hasten his return to Alexandria.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Mehemet Ali to Boghos Bey.

15 Djemaz-el-Fair 1266

LE Bateau en for "Florence" venant de Syrie est arrivé à Beyrut le 10 courant, Osman Pacha ayant levé son camp, marcha vers la

Q 2

Alexandria, July 23, 1840.

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

It, however, seems generally known in the Constitutional of France, where M. Deles was present; and he took an opportunity to inform me, that he had seen the Turkish sheet and the Turkish sheet had produced a great effect in the minds of the French people, and that the French people were bringing his Highness to reason, by representing to him, that in their determination as to the Egyptian question, if reason and persuasion shall prove

I have little to add, except  
a letter of Captain Napton dated

"The Paula's troops marched out yesterday morning, and, once, they set the whole country in a blaze, a strong letter to the Egyptian Admiral, which I wrote to Abbas Pasha.

the insurgents are divided among themselves; have been abused by many of  
the English Ambassadors. The insurrection has been put down very shortly, and  
then will finish all hope of Syria being released from the power of Mehemet Ali,  
by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves.

- You will find that the strength of the insurgents has been very much magnified.

"Our Consul knows nothing, and he will believe nothing, against the Syrians. A Frenchman has read me a letter from Solyman Pasha, saying, that the insurrection had been put down, and another from his Secretary, detailing the whole of these operations.

"It appears they marched as far as Hismmau, about eight hours from here, and did not meet above 200 of the insurgents, of whom the Athamans disposed. The Emir Beeler also went and beseeched them to give up their arms, which they refused to do."

- It is said to be around 1000 in the mountains, and I believe there is a considerable number of them. I presume a part of the army which is about to return here will be sent to Teyshi. General Omat Pasha is at Mergi and will I presume be sent to the place which is necessary.

I have to close this letter to which Captain Napier alludes in the above extracts and of the reply made by his Excellency Solyman Pasha.

in the above extracts, and of the reply made by his Excellency's Secretary, M. de  
C. de Napier also informs me of the fact, that the Emir Halil, son of the  
Emir Bushair, was sent to the Emir with which he had taken part, and  
that he was accompanied by a regiment of Makhzen Ab.

1154, 420

(Signed) G. LLOYD HUGHES

PA—I have this moment obtained the particulars of the naval force mentioned in the first portion of this despatch.

It is to be compared of the

Egyptian line-of-battle ship	No. 9.	Halep	-	100	Guns
Docto.	No. 12.	Beny Suof	-	102	"
Turkish line-of-battle ship	No. 9.	Borgy Zaffar	-	70	"
Docto.	No. 12.	Tiseric	-	96	"

Which force, it is said, I do not know how truly, is intended to be as back the troops under the command of Abbas Pasha in Syria, which formed the expedition lately sent from this port.

Incident 1 in No. 57.

*Captain Napier in the Star-Admiral commanding the Egyptian Squadron at  
B. 1804.*

*Her Majesty's ship "Pincerful,"  
Beyrout, July 14, 1840.*

Fig.

I OBSERVE with pain and regret, that a general conflagration began in the mountains a few hours after the march of the troops from this place. We have no information of whether the inhabitants at Lebanon are in favour of the Sultan, I do not conceive that the Christian population can be justified in carrying on the war against

I write to you, Sir, as an Egyptian Admiral, and the officer holding the  
 high office of Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Navy, and I am deeply commiserate to  
 his Highness's views on the subject of the destruction of thousands of women and children,  
 who are the victims of the war.

For people who are not in the same situation, the situation is different. For people who are not in the same situation, the situation is different.

1. The first step is to identify the main topic or question being addressed. In this case, the focus is on the relationship between the variables being studied.

CHARLES NAPHER

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## Inclosure 2 in No. 57

Solyman Pasha to Captain Napier.

THE paper which has been sent to us in English, with its Arabic translation from the *seras* of the *Captain Napier* *commanding the English vessels* in the port of Beyrout, as received by us, from its Arabic translation we have understood its meaning.

On our arrival at the place called Ain-el-Hajmige, we there found 100 or 200 insurgents, not originally from this place, but from Balbec, and from the part inhabited by Mutash, who had come since the insurrection of this mountain, which has since submitted, they therefore, knowing themselves guilty, and feeling the hand of punishment, in order to stir up the inhabitants, set fire to the different villages, saying, "Why have you submitted, and have given up your arms? We, therefore, choose to serve you in this manner," and to which the Christians of the mountains can attest and affirm.

The above-mentioned insurgents, being at a place called Malay, opposite the camp *some* Albanians were sent against them, I have there, after a fight, when, on pursuing them, the aforesaid insurgents, according to their promise, burnt the villages which they met with in their flight, and so gained the reputation of being brave, and were afterwards brought in armed, but no injury was done them, and they were allowed to go, after being furnished with a *teskara* for their safe conduct.

The villages of Haded, Babda, Soafet, and other large villages like them, besides others near them, which are under us, have asked for security (*Iman*), which has been granted them; and they have submitted peaceably, and have given up their arms. Nothing has been done to them, only at the expulsion of the above-mentioned insurgents, they took from them, their arms, &c. The cavalry of Kadal being, like us, troops, they know very well the laws of war, and therefore those who are led astray must expect to be killed, destroyed, &c., which they deserve, as they are not children; still quarter (security) is given them, as they may have been misled by the insurgents; even those who are found wounded after a battle, are not destroyed. But if his Excellency the *Senior Officer*, intends making any observations with regard to the movements or actions of the camp, then it does not appertain to us to answer; we cannot naturally but follow the instructions of our Master his Highness the Viceroy.

In consequence, all such answers can be given only by his Highness the Viceroy, our Master, and the Consul-General residing in Alexandria, who alone are competent to do it, and which we beg to notify to your Excellency.

(Signed) SOLYMAN PASHA

No. 58.

Colonel Hodge to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(Private.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 24, 1840.

I HAVE little of interest to communicate to your Lordship, further than those facts I have already stated in my accompanying *rapports*.

At the first outbreak of the Syrian insurrection, I had hoped that the Admiral would have seen fit to prevent the landing of the Egyptian troops at Beyrout, and to have used his best efforts to prevail upon the crews of the Turkish ships of war to return to the Bosphorus. Had a steamer been here at my disposal, the Admiral would have had ample time, even to communicate with Lord Ponsonby, as it was, he had due notice.

The rage and bitter hatred of Mehemet Ali towards Lord Ponsonby is indubitable to witness. He accuses his Excellency of being the cause of preventing an amicable arrangement between himself and the Porte. I refrain from any allusion to Lord Ponsonby in my interviews with the Pasha.

I distinctly see the increasing animosity of Mehemet Ali against England. He endeavours to screen it in every way he can, for he fears us; nevertheless, he hates us. But, my Lord, all this is natural. *Lord* *is* *the* *only* *Power* *that* *opposes* *his* *ambitious* *views*; *France* *openly* *states* *its* *policy* *in* *the* *face* *of* *him*; *Russia*, *I* *believe*, *tells* *him*, *that* *she* *will* *not* *allow* *him* *to* *do* *as* *he* *pleases*; *he* *may* *be* *able* *to* *effect* *with* *the* *Porte* *Austria* *and* *Prussia*; *entirely* *for* *the* *good* *of* *Great* *Britain*; *but* *he* *is* *not* *able* *to* *do* *so* *without* *incurring* *the* *dangers* *to* *which* *he* *is* *exposed*. Should France succeed in *placing* *in* *his* *present* *possession* *of* *Syria*, *I* *very* *much* *fear* *that* *British* *influence* *and* *interests* *will* *be* *gravely* *deteriorated*; *and* *that* *Mehemet* *Ali* *when* *once* *secure*, *will*, *by* *every* *means* *in* *his* *power*, *thwart* *our* *views* *and* *interest* *our* *policy* *as* *regards* *this* *portion* *of* *the* *Ottoman* *Empire*. *It* *is* *not* *that* *he* *is* *an* *old* *man*, *and* *cannot* *live* *much* *longer*; *but* *he* *is* *very* *strong* *and* *active* *in* *his* *views* *and* *policy*. *I* *am* *not* *at* *all* *surprised*, *as* *the* *Porte* *is* *not* *able* *to* *do* *as* *he* *pleases*, *and* *he* *is* *not* *able* *to* *do* *so* *without* *incurring* *the* *dangers* *to* *which* *he* *is* *exposed*. *I* *know* *that* *my* *predecessor* *had* *a* *high* *opinion* *of* *him*, *and* *that* *he* *thought* *him* *attached* *to* *England*. *I* *believe* *entirely* *the* *contrary*, *and* *I* *hesitate* *not* *to* *give* *it* *as* *my* *opinion*.

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officers of his own; and who can say, that once within the Dardanelles those officers would surrender their command, if the Porte should have the courage to demand it.

I shall, upon these grounds, do all in my power to oppose what is proposed by the Colonel.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 60.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 240.)

My Lord.

Paris, August 7, 1840.

THE King and the Royal Family left St. Cloud on Wednesday evening for the Chateau d'Eu.

Having heard that the President of the Council intended to follow His Majesty to that residence last night, and to be absent from Paris for some days, I went yesterday to the Foreign Office to see his Excellency before his departure.

I told him that I had not paid him this visit for the purpose of making any communication from my Government, for my messenger from London had arrived that morning, and had brought me no instructions (though I owed to him I expected them) to make any observations on the Ordinances which had appeared in the "Moniteur" of Saturday last, and which, unfortunately, having the appearance of menace, might naturally have provoked a demand for explanation. I observed, that the moderation and calmness of my Government were also shown by its not having called upon Parliament for a vote of credit for the augmentation of our naval force, notwithstanding the official announcement of the military and naval armaments of France.

I trusted that this moderation and this confidence in the continuance of peace would calm the public mind in France, which had been so unnecessarily excited; and that the press—at least that part of it which was under Ministerial influence—would not continue its invective against England, and that the two countries would not be stimulated into war by the violence of newspapers, when there existed no real ground of quarrel between them.

M. Thiers assured me that he had endeavored to restrain the violence of the press, and particularly the personal attacks on your Lordship; but the writers in France pursued their course, he called them, felt strongly the affront that had been offered to France by her exclusion from the position of influence she had a right to occupy in the affairs of Europe; and the giving vent to these feelings could not be prevented.

M. Thiers then adverted to the suppression of the insurrection in Syria, which insurrection he was persuaded had accelerated, if not caused, the conclusion of the Treaty between the Four Powers. He had never the slightest doubt, he said, that the insurrection had been suppressed, but he was surprised that measures had been taken on the expectation of its succeeding.

With respect to the conditions of peace between the Porte and Mehmet Ali, he said, as the Porte had been informed that France would not oppose his acceptance of them, but he thought that Mehmet Ali would not consent to evacuate Syria, and the late on, as he understood that the proposition was accompanied by the degrading notification that only ten days would be allowed to him to give an answer to it.

M. Thiers then added, that though France would not oppose any arrangement to which Mehmet Ali chose to consent, France would not suffer conditions to be imposed upon him by force without her intervention. I observed to M. Thiers, that if France had no objection to the conditions, but only to the imposition of them by force, that I had no doubt (the influence of France being

so irresistible at Alexandria, under the present circumstances) that if France advised the Pasha to accept those conditions, he would have no objection to accept them. He answered, that I was mistaken in this supposition: Mehmet Ali was a man, like Napoleon, who would risk "le tout pour le tout," and that he had only that day had a letter from M. Eugene Perier, now at Alexandria, who wrote, "C'est un homme de bronze." Upon my asking whether he expected that Mehmet Ali would order the army of Ibrahim to march upon Constantinople, he answered, "we are too much interested in preventing it, not to use our utmost efforts to deter him from it."

M. Thiers said he should not return to Paris till Monday evening or Tuesday, and that he expected to meet M. Guizot at the Chateau d'Eu.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 61

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord.

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 14, enclosing copies of the Convention for the pacification of the Levant, reached me on Monday last at Krasnot-Selo, where I had been invited by the Emperor to assist at the marriage.

The Emperor said I must be at the conclusion of this Convention. Before dinner on Monday His Imperial Majesty took me aside, and spoke for some time on the subject. He said the Emperor was at the present moment the highest importance to this Convention, as it would be a warning to the future, and a guarantee of the spirit for the repression of hatred which animates the Powers of Europe.

The Emperor was unable to conceal his joy at the assurance which will be caused to M. Guizot and M. Thiers, and His Imperial Majesty was, and in expressing his satisfaction at being able to prove to France that the rest of Europe could act without her.

His Imperial Majesty gave no opinion as to the mode of carrying out the provisions of the Treaty, but he felt full confidence in the success of our proposed arrangements.

I scarcely observe to your Lordship, that one of the great sources of gratification to the Emperor in this necessary measure of pacification was with France, and France, is, that His Imperial Majesty considers that it may become the great work of a future session, creating the necessary basis for the overthrow of the French Government, but he even thinks it may seriously affect the stability of the present dynasty.

In the conversations which I have had with Count Orloff, and Count Camille during my stay at Krasnot-Selo, they made several allusions to the marriage of France with Mehmet Ali, and to her proceedings in Tripoli and Tunis, but without any expression that in action to her colonizing projects in Africa France would never rest until she had reached her final object.

It is the language now held by the Emperor and those immediately around him; no opportunity is lost of attempting to rally France, and to excite her policy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 41.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 19 inclusive, were delivered to me on the 29th instant, by the messenger Waring.

I saw Count Nesselrode yesterday. His Excellency responded warmly to the feelings expressed by the Emperor at the late news from London, and upon my asking what measures had arrived from Syria, His Excellency said that the insurrection would greatly facilitate the arrangements necessary for carrying the proposals of the Four Powers into effect.

He told me that two divisions, of 15,000 men each, stationed in the Crimea, would be held in readiness to embark, if necessary, for the defence of Constantinople, but he seemed desirous that the contingency requiring the active co-operation of Russia in the field, might not arise.

There evidently exists a disinclination to incur unnecessary expence at this moment, and the transport of Cavalry on the Black Sea is attended with so many difficulties, that the conveyance of horses required for the field-Artillery, which ought to accompany even 15,000 Infantry, is almost impossible: it becomes a serious hindrance to any expedition, and renders it impossible for Russia just now to send an army on any other than defensive service.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 63.

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 31.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, August 5, 1840.*

I DO not remember any event to have occurred since I have been at Berlin, which has given so much satisfaction as the signature of the Convention by England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia: no doubt the satisfaction would have been greater, had the Government of France thought fit not to have separated themselves from the Four Powers. But the difficulties of the French Government to adhere to a line chalked out for themselves made every one see, that concession to their dictation would submit the Continent, not to the will of the King of the French, not to the will of the French Government, but to the will, the caprice, the will of the French press; for in this case, the press of France has made the French Government its slave. Such a state of things would not long have been tolerable. And great credit is due to your Lordship for having come to the rescue of the northern nations. The general fall of the funds, and the wretched language of France, certainly created uneasiness amongst the mass; but every one capable of forming a political opinion, sees that the success of the views of the Four Powers will secure to Europe many years of peace, whilst submission to the views of France would place it on a foundation of sand.

Yesterday the telegraph announced the intention of the French Government to call out 150,000 men, and to arm and man several ships of war. I saw Baron Werther after he received the news: he told me that he regarded the measure as wise, and that the Emperor was probably now satisfied with parade and the display of force as with action, but that it caused no apprehension to his Government, for I am not accustomed to see them so calm on an occasion so trying. I afterwards saw Count Moltke, who left Berlin yesterday to reside near Prince Metternich. He told me that the Prince having ratified the Convention, would not shrink from going through with it.

Count Bresson has held to me moderate and reasonable language, but my

Colleagues tell me that the violence of his language to them surpasses all that can be imagined. His opinion is probably to get rid of the Prussian Government, as well as the minor German States; he has failed in both. The Prussian Government is firm, and the Ministers of the minor States are unanimous in their approbation of the Convention. Count Bresson strove hard to prevent the Convention receiving its ratification, but failed. It will be sent to England to-day.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 64.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1840.*

I HAVE to request your Excellency that you should be so good as to forward to me, as soon as possible, a copy of the despatch of the Emperor of Austria to the Emperor of France, dated the 10th of August, and of the reply of the Emperor of France to the Emperor of Austria, dated the 11th of August, and of the despatch of the Emperor of Austria to the Emperor of France, dated the 12th of August, and of the reply of the Emperor of France to the Emperor of Austria, dated the 13th of August.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 65.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 13.)*

(No. 244.)

My Lord,

*Paris, August 10, 1840.*

I AM again confined to my room by an attack of gout, but M. Tiers paid me this day a visit, and he came to Paris to see me, and I had some conversation with him relative to the present state of the Eastern Question. His tone was more calm and moderate than when he last conversed with me, and he was much pleased with the conciliatory language towards France, of your Lordship's speech in the House of Commons last week upon the Convention of the 12th of July. He was not, however, he said, without anxiety for the future, and he would willingly have given his wishes for the preservation of peace, but he said that he was not prepared for averting a misunderstanding.

I was asking him of the circumstances to which he alluded, and saying to him, that I was sure any suggestion he might make for the attainment of that object, which was consistent with the honour and dignity of England, would be favourably listened to by my Government, he answered, that he could say nothing to me, the Ambassador of England, which would not be considered as official; and intimated, that the dignity of the French Government would be committed by my making to me, under the present circumstances, any suggestion; and he then went on to say that much would depend in the first place on the attitude which Mehemet Ali received the Convention, and in the second place on the consequences subsequently. He said that he was not prepared to make any statement of the attitude of Mehemet Ali, but that he was sure that the Convention would be received by him with satisfaction, and that he was sure that the Convention would be received by him with satisfaction, and that he was sure that the Convention would be received by him with satisfaction.

M. Thiers told me that he was sure that the Convention would be received by him with satisfaction, and that he was sure that the Convention would be received by him with satisfaction, and that he was sure that the Convention would be received by him with satisfaction. He added, that if a blockade of Egypt and Syria be instituted, our commercial



ships may not consider that according to the Maritime Law of Nations, such blockade is legal; he remembered that during the late civil war in Spain, there was a question of blockading the ports occupied by the troops of Don Carlos, and that the law authorities of England had decided that the English Government had not the right to blockade them.

If American merchantmen, or French merchantmen, bound to a port of which the Sultan is Sovereign, were captured, their owners would apply to their respective Governments for redress, and he knew not how those Governments could refuse compliance with such application.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 66

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston—(Received August 13.)*

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, July 26, 1840.*

SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, in my despatch No. 69, of the 23rd instant respecting the mission of M. Prier, I have acquired information, that his negotiations with his Highness the Viceroy have entirely failed.

I am assured that the propositions and advice tendered to the Pasha by M. Prier on the part of the French Government, were repulsed with something resembling anger. They are said to have been no sooner made, than distinctly rejected by his Highness. M. Prier will return to Toulon to-morrow, and having no other present means of transmitting this communication to your Lordship, I avail myself of the kind offer of this gentleman to take charge

The fact of the inflexible determination of Mehemet Ali, has been confirmed in a subsequent conversation with the British Consul in this port, to whom he said, "England will not have me as the friend of the Porte, then she shall have me as its rebel. Henceforth I will not pay to the Sultan one para of tribute, nor will I yield one foot of territory."

I do confess, that the stand now taken by Mehemet Ali and his language baffle my comprehension. The Pasha is not a heated enthusiast of light actions and empty words; nearly half a century of successful fortunes have been the fruits less of hazard than of uncommon prudence. Yet this branding of all former supposes either blind and uncalculating insanity, or a firm reliance on some means of safety, some element of defence, invisible to the generality of men. From Europe Mehemet Ali can have no right to expect support; neither can he deem his own force competent to an unequal struggle; and, indeed, he does not put it forward prominently as any assurance for his success.

Mehemet Ali is an aged man, but he is full of life, vigour, and intellect. I have before given my opinion to your Lordship, that I believe him capable, if pushed to the last extremity, of adopting some resolution at once desperate and formidable. I become more and more impressed with the belief, that the Viceroy feels his strength to consist not in his fleets and his armies, but in his

whence might spring new interests, now combined

It is far less likely, that he looks forward to any serious differences between the Great Powers, than that he contemplates the decomposition of the Turkish Empire. Repeatedly he has asserted, that he is able at any time to revolutionize the dominions of the Sultan. Whether his boast be true or false, I know not. That his agents are widely disseminated through European Turkey; that his partisans are numerous, that his reputation is high, that several districts of the Empire have lately evinced symptoms of feverish action; that the majority of the population is Christian, are facts generally notorious.

These may have had a great effect in nourishing the exaggerated pretensions of the Viceroy, and perhaps have become the origin of those incendiary projects which he may seek to oppose to measures of coercion.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 67.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston—(Received August 13.)*

(No. 72.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, July 27, 1840.*

IN the evening of yesterday, I received information, through the Prussian Consul-General, of a conversation that had passed between Count Medem and the Pasha, relative to his late offer to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sublime Porte.

Mehemet Ali is stated to have expressed himself in angry terms, at the refusal of Rehid Pasha to allow Ahmed Pasha to return in command of the fleet to the Bosphorus. The Pasha then, in plain and distinct terms, told the Prussian Consul-General, that his offer to the Porte had been, to restore the ships, men, and officers, one and all, without distinction as to rank or person; that since the Porte had objected to receive the Capudan Pasha, he conceived himself free to rescind his offer; and that it now remained for him to consider whether he should carry his intentions into effect. But, he added, in any case, the fleet shall remain here for some time longer.

Count Medem remonstrated with the Pasha upon this change of his intentions, and said, that he conceived he had not the power to retract his offer, having officially and unsolicited communicated to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers his determination to restore the Turkish squadron, unconditionally, to the Porte. To which the Pasha replied, "The Porte declares her hands to be tied; that she is no longer a free and independent State; that her powers and interests are confided to the Great European States; why, therefore, should I restore the fleet to them? By doing so I would only furnish weapons to be used hereafter against myself." Count Medem assured him, that unless he fulfilled his promise, and immediately sent back the fleet to Constantinople, no other could be placed upon it. Mehemet Ali then said, "I do not say that I shall not return the squadron, nor do I say that I will; I shall think over the matter."

This circumstance will convince your Lordship of the perfidy and want of good faith in Mehemet Ali; and I trust that it will awaken a conviction in all the Great European Powers, of the necessity of promptly coming to such a decision as the Pasha of Egypt shall be treated with the decision and contempt with which all previous communications have been received by him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 68.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 148.)

My Lord,

*Thessalonica, July 19, 1840.*

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR JOHN LOUIS arrived here last night in the "Hydra" steamer. He objects to see the place, and will be on board a day.

Sam Bey, the Embassy sent here by Mehemet Ali, has sailed this day in the "Nido" Egyptian steamer.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

(No. 159.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 22, 1840.

ON the 18th, the French Ambassador reiterated his efforts to persuade Rechid Pasha to come to an immediate arrangement with Mehemet Ali, saying, that the mission of Sami Bey was an act of submission made by Mehemet Ali, and that the Pasha would immediately restore the Ottoman fleet; that despatches had arrived direct from France in a steamer, in eleven days, urging the immediate arrangement; and that another steamer had taken M. Eugène Perier to Alexandria to engage Mehemet Ali to make some abatement in his demands, which he, (the Ambassador,) hoped might be obtained, &c.

To this pressing application Rechid replied, that the mission of Sami Bey was not an act of submission; that the Ottoman fleet being the property of the Sultan must be restored, sooner or later, to its lawful owner; and that the Sublime Porte would not deviate from the policy it had adopted, nor act without the concurrence of the August Allies; that if Mehemet Ali made propositions to the Porte they should be taken into consideration, and if they appeared reasonable, the Porte would then send them to its Allies, and consult with them thereupon, &c. Having positive knowledge of the foregoing, I sent an instruction to the Dragoman to be delivered to Rechid Pasha, as follows:—

"You will offer my best compliments to his Excellency, and my congratulations upon the display of firmness and sound policy, so conspicuous in his conduct in the whole of the serious affair of Egypt."

refuses, with calm dignity, the baseless assertion of the Ambassador, that the mission of Sami Bey, and the offer to restore the Ottoman fleet, constitute an act of submission on the part of the Pasha of Egypt; and the determination expressed by his Excellency, that the Sublime Porte will continue to adhere to its engagements with its August Allies, must have made the French Ambassador feel how much the Sublime Porte deserves the confidence it enjoys with its engagements, or into the adoption of equivocal conduct to be defended by sophistical language. His Excellency's fine sentiment of right defies the subtleties of finesse, and his wisdom sees, that truth is the strongest arm that can be used for the defence of the interests of the Sublime Porte.

- I should have deeply lamented any concession to the Pasha of Egypt; I know that persons the best qualified to judge of his secret purposes are convinced, that it was not his intention to reduce the Ottoman fleet; and I believe that, if now it be his intention to do so, he is acted upon by the dangers in which he finds himself, and which force him to seek his advantage in the act which, it is (1804), he will perform.

"I consent in the views of his Excellency respecting the fleet, that it must be restored sooner or later; and I entertain strong opinion that it is not impossible but the return of the fleet at this moment, under the conditions which were annexed to it by Mehemet Ali, might be highly muchierous to the Sublime Porte; his Excellency recollects that Mehemet Ali proposed to send the fleet back, under the command of his son, Said Bey. His Excellency knows, that Mehemet Ali has placed a large number of his own men in the fleet, and it may be, that he will place more of them in it whenever he shall send it back. If, by such management, Mehemet Ali can obtain the real control over the fleet, which is not only possible, but easy, that fleet, when it shall arrive here, will be the master of the Dardanelles and of the capital, and, acting in union with the parliament of Mehemet Ali, will render me given a rupture, and thus imperil Majesty the Sultan will be compelled to move only in the manner in which Mehemet Ali shall order his creatures to direct. I will not do the French Ambassador the injustice to suppose, that he can have such a result in view in urging, as he has done, his Excellency upon the subject of agreement with Mehemet Ali; but it is possible, that other less elevated and generous minds may have a full perception of the effect that might attend upon it, and even if no

"I will take this opportunity to offer an observation for his Excellency's consideration. The main, indeed the only, argument of the French and other supporters of the cause of Mehemet Ali against that of the Sultan, rests upon the impotence of the Pasha's power, and the difficulty, or, as they state it, the impossibility of compelling him to return to his duty, and restore the provinces he has taken by force from his Sovereign. This argument has already received a signal contradiction from the events in Syria; but, supposing it to be uncontradicted, and that it could still be said of Mehemet Ali, that he is too powerful to be coerced, must it not follow that he will be more difficult to be coerced, after he shall have been established as the legitimate ruler of the territories he demands? If the Powers of Europe have now hesitated to employ force against him, will they be more ready to employ it when he is stronger? And if Mehemet Ali should violate the new engagements which it is proposed should be made, as he has violated those that ought to have bound him hitherto, will the Powers, in that case, be more likely to act against him? or will they not be much more likely to listen to the arguments the French have used on the present occasion, and which will apply much more forcibly to the new state of things? It appears to me that this observation affords good reasons why the Sublime Porte should continue to refuse to violate its agreement with its August Allica, and to listen to the councils of the French Ambassador.

"When the situation of Mehemet Ali is examined it will be seen, that he is almost under the necessity of making new conquests. Egypt is nearly exhausted, and Syria also; the population of the countries cursed with the rule of the Regenerator, has been diminished one-half, and what remains of it consists of old men and children for the most part. The system of the Pasha lays waste every thing; it is essentially the destroyer of the sources of strength and wealth, and seems to produce only licentious armed plunderers for the profit of their Chief. Mehemet cannot long exist without new countries to despoil; he has already turned his eyes to the Pashalik of Bagdad and other parts; and if he should seize upon them, who will resist him, after he shall have been placed in that situation of power by which he will become the rival of the Sultan under the flimsy disguise of vassalage? I have shown, that the European Powers will have stronger reasons than, than are now advanced for their present conduct, to induce them to abstain from interference; and it is too probable, that the subjects of the Sultan may be dazzled by the successes of Mehemet Ali, and incline rather to submission to his will, than to resistance of his power.

"These are only a portion of the evils that I apprehend from the councils of the French and the supporters of Mehemet Ali. There are many others of various magnitude which I will not describe; but who can imagine that internal peace can be in existence in the Ottoman Empire, when its illustrious provinces are in disorder, that there may not grow up a strength sufficiently great to place these new dignities and territories in danger? It would appear, that the crown of the Ottoman family is put in peril whenever Mehemet Ali shall be recognized as the lawful proprietor of the government of any portion of Syria."

I hope that, in holding this language, I have been speaking in exact truth, and that I have not been guilty of any exaggeration. I have not alligues the best support I can; for they have formidable enemies who have access to the Sultan, and do not fail to place things before him in a false light. What I have written will be communicated to His Majesty, and, as I believe it to be strictly true, I hope it may have weight.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**



No. 70

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

No. 130)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 14, 1840*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, as reported in your despatch No. 153, is held to Rechid Pasha, with the view of confirming the Sultan in his determination not to make a separate arrangement with Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 71

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville*

No. 200

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 14, 1840*

YOUR Excellency's despatches to No. 244 inclusive have been laid before the Queen.

I have to express to your Excellency the sincere gratification which Her Majesty's Government derive from learning that the tone of M. Thiers has become more calm and temperate, and more in accordance with those friendly relations which it is so much the wish of Her Majesty's Government to see maintained between the two countries, and nothing certainly shall be wanting on the part of Her Majesty's Government which can be deemed compatible with the interests, the honour, and the engagements of Great Britain, to encourage and increase the return of friendly feeling on the part of France.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt, with especial satisfaction, that orders have been sent to the French fleet in the Mediterranean to avoid all collision with the British naval force, because Her Majesty's Government have not been without apprehension that some indiscreet act on the part of the naval officer commanding the French fleet might bring on events which both parties would have reason to deplore, but for which, in such a case, the French Government alone would be responsible.

Your Excellency may assure M. Thiers, that the British squadron will studiously avoid anything which may be calculated to bring on unprovoked collision with the French ships; but the British Admiral has orders which he must execute, and of course he cannot permit himself to be thwarted or obstructed by any foreign force in the execution of those orders.

Your Excellency may, however, inform M. Thiers, that he is perfectly correct in his supposition as to the manner in which Her Majesty's Government understand the Law of Nations as applicable to Blockade; and the Four Powers who have signed the Convention of the 15th of July, stand in this respect, with regard to the Sultan, just in the same relation in which France, England, and Portugal, stood to Spain, by virtue of the Quadruple Alliance. The Four Powers cannot be at war with Mehemet Ali, any more than the three could be at war with Don Carlos, because no Power can be at war with the subject of another State, and as a commercial blockade is a purely belligerent right, the Four Powers cannot exercise that right of blockade against Mehemet Ali. But a Sovereign may lawfully interdict communication with any part of his territory which is in rebellion against his authority, and may prevent supplies of all kinds, being furnished, either by sea or land, to such of his subjects as may be found in rebellion against his authority, and therefore the Sultan might, with respect to Egypt, take measures which his Allies would not be entitled themselves to take.

With respect to the notion that Mehemet Ali might ask for the intervention

of France, it is needless for me to point out to your Excellency that, in the situation in which these affairs now stand, it would be impossible for the Five Powers to accept the interposition of France between them and Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 72

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 157, Confidential)

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 1, 1840*

THE French Ambassador lately said to a person well known to me, that his own opinion is, that the best settlement to be made is to divide the Pashalics now held by Mehemet and Ibrahim Pasha, and place the other members of Mehemet's family at the head of each of them, leaving the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet, and a portion of his Syrian power; and he added, that if I would adopt the above measure, my influence with the Turks would assure its being accepted by them. This plan is too shallow to be even plausible, and, if executed, would make things worse than they are.

His Excellency further said, that M. Thiers had told him in a letter dated the 24th ultimo, that M. Eugène Perier had orders to counsel Mehemet Ali to be very moderate in his demands.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 73

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 159)

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 1, 1840*

HIS Excellency Rechid Pasha told me that the Porte has determined to detain the Ottoman fleet in Bosna Bay to perform a long quarantine, should Mehemet Ali demand its return to Constantinople. The above may be effected by proper management.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 74

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 160)

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 1, 1840*

I ENCLOSE a Report from Mr. Wood, dated 22nd July. I presume your Excellency will have received from Mr. Consul Moore, his Reports upon the subjects of affairs in his Consulate. I nevertheless send what he has written to me.

In a private letter from Mr. Wood, he says, that very slight assistance and encouragement from the Porte would have secured the defeat of the Egyptians.

I have also the honour to forward copy of a Petition to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, from the Syrians, which is signed by several Chiefs.

I likewise enclose copy of a Petition to Her Majesty's Ambassador, from the Syrians, signed by the Chiefs.

I enclose also copy of a Petition to the French Ambassador, from the Syrians, signed by the Chiefs; and a Report from Mr. Consul Werry at Damascus,





only proved himself ungrateful to, and forgetful of, your Majesty's great bounty to him, but dared, most perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your Sacred Person. Seeing ourselves thus placed in this most wretched and miserable condition, bordering on the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation, we have got up and raised your Majesty's ~~legitimate and lawful rights~~ of the legitimate and lawful rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for which we shall continue to fight to the last breath of our existence; and therefore we trust to the Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your Majesty's assistance, to overpower that common Enemy of yours and ours, and to drive him away from your Dominions.

Hence, we again supplicate and implore the Throne of your Majesty's Universal Mercy and Clemency, to turn your Royal Face towards us with your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our mud kurny having stopped all the roads against us by land and also by sea, and thereby prevents us receiving any supply of the necessary commodities, and ~~we are now in a state of distress~~ to oppose us, we most earnestly entreat your Majesty to afford us the useful recourse for the opening of the roads, &c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent ruin. But no, never will your Majesty's Imperial and Paternal Mercy and Benevolence allow such a disastrous calamity to befall us! And we pray the Almighty God to preserve your Sacred Person, and to perpetuate the days of your Glorious Reign with happiness and victory.

Signed and Sealed by your Majesty's Slaves

No Date)

THE NATION OF MUTUALI.  
THE NATION OF DRUSE  
THE CHRISTIAN NATION  
FARIS HONEISH  
FRANCIS EL-HAZEN, *Seraskier*  
HAIDAR KAYED BEY  
YOUSSEF SHEHAB, and  
FARIS SHEHAB.

#### Inclosure 3 in No. 74

*Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to His Excellency the British Ambassador*

After the usual Compliments,

THE humanity which so eminently distinguishes all the acts of the British Government,—the readiness with which it steps forward to the assistance of the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed by that portion of their fellow-creatures that are blessed with happier Governments,—embolden the Syrians to appeal to England for her mediation to rescue them from the destruction with which Mehemet Ali threatens them now.

Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he has trampled us under foot by an oppression which knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most atrocious and cruel.

For the last eight years, we have acceded to all his demands, and because he has left us nothing more to give him, he menaces us with extermination, nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he drinks the very blood of our children, and saturates the countenances of his soldiers with the blood of our families. Driven to despair, we have taken up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard our dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword with which he threatens to erase us from among men.

By the world, we place the protection of Great Britain. In the humanity of her Government, and in the generosity of one of the greatest

and most powerful of nations, rest all our hopes in this cruel crisis. All that we demand is to be allowed to return to our legitimate Sovereign Abdul Medjid, a natural desire coming from loyal subjects. Why should two millions and a-half of His Majesty's subjects be sacrificed to the personal ambition of one man, who himself, forgetful of the benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword against the bosom of his own Sovereign?

We have but one prayer—we seek but to be allowed to enjoy, in common with the rest of His Highness' subjects, the rights and privileges secured to them by the Hatti Sheriff; and it is in this hope that we submit our petition to your Excellency, praying that you will be pleased to lay it before the "Divan" of Great Britain, the Ally of our August Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may be honoured with speedy glad tidings, before we are utterly destroyed by the Governor of Egypt.

May the Almighty prolong the days of your Excellency with happiness to the end of time.

(Signed)

(L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB  
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR  
(L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HADEISH  
(L.S.) PRINCE JOUSEFF SHEHAB.  
(L.S.) SHEIK FRANCIS EL-HAZEN, *Seraskier*.  
THE MARONITE NATION  
THE DRUSE NATION  
THE MUTUALIS

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 74

*Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to His Excellency the French Ambassador*

(Literal Translation from the Arabic)

After the usual Compliments,

THE painful news that have reached us by the newspapers, have struck a terrible blow to Syria,—they have torn the hearts of men, women, and children, now incensed to be exterminated by Mehemet Ali, to whom France has deigned to grant her powerful protection. Can she be possibly ignorant of the evil this man has made us suffer since fortune has made him master of Syria? They are too ready to believe. Suffice it to say, that the most distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppressions, have since been inflicted upon us, and we have lost all desire of returning to the paternal government of our August Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is not this a legitimate desire from a loyal people? France, a nation so great, so magnanimous, that has extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages spilt so much blood to establish it in her own Government, refuses us to-day her powerful influence to obtain the enjoyment of the same good!

The French press says, "that France will not admit of any arrangement that has for basis the restitution of Syria to its legitimate Sovereign." Can it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to see us crushed by a systematic oppression which alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government from others.

We wish but to be allowed to return to the protection of our legitimate Sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred years. We demand but to participate in the privileges and rights of the Hatti Sheriff which our gracious Sovereign has granted to all his faithful subjects, without exception, with distinction. We appeal to the justice of the French Government,—we supplicate the French nation at large, to assist us to obtain our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled us to take up arms for the defence of our lives, or to bury ourselves in the ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one, and as such, we sincerely trust that the French Government will not abandon us in a moment so dangerous.

It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency this, our prayer, begging  
that you will be so good as to forward it to your August Master  
the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdal Medjed.

(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.  
(L.S.) PRINCE JOSEPH SHEHAB  
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR  
(L.S.) SHEIK FRANCIS EL-HAZEN, *Seraskier*.  
(L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HABESH

THE MARONITE  
THE DRUSE  
THE MUTALI } NATIONS

Inclosure 5 to No. 74

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

(No. 54.)

(Extract.)

Damascus, July 20, 1840

BY all the advices received here from Mount Lebanon, in the district of  
Der-el-Kumar and Mitten, the insurrection is terminated, or nearly so. The  
forces under Osman Pasha, which advanced from Zahle along the Beeccha, to  
Hannana, and Kaffer Suloman, put him in immediate communication with the  
Emir Bechir, who has been a long time in the mountains. His views, which  
neutralized the movements of the other revolted Emirs and insur-  
gents. I hear that the troops under Osman Pasha pillaged and committed great  
barbarities on the villages of Furzoul, Ber-el-Elias, Hannana, and some other  
places, on their march in the Beeccha to the foot of Mount Lebanon. It is stated  
that the Emir Bechir has been taken prisoner, and that the Emirs and the  
the Emir Bechir to his Excellency Sheriff Pasha state the insurrection to be  
finished in that direction.

Mr. Consul Moore will inform your Excellency of the events passing in his  
district. The insurrection has been terminated, or nearly so. The  
forces under Osman Pasha, which advanced from Zahle along the Beeccha, to  
Hannana, and Kaffer Suloman, put him in immediate communication with the  
Emir Bechir, who has been a long time in the mountains. His views, which  
neutralized the movements of the other revolted Emirs and insur-  
gents. I hear that the troops under Osman Pasha pillaged and committed great  
barbarities on the villages of Furzoul, Ber-el-Elias, Hannana, and some other  
places, on their march in the Beeccha to the foot of Mount Lebanon. It is stated  
that the Emir Bechir has been taken prisoner, and that the Emirs and the  
the Emir Bechir to his Excellency Sheriff Pasha state the insurrection to be  
finished in that direction.

The country to the north and south of this district is at present quiet, and  
in this city everything is equally so. There have been rejoicings and salutes  
fired four times a-day, of twenty-one guns each, for the birth of the Sultan's  
daughter.

By my latest advices from Aleppo, Ibrahim Pasha remained encamped at  
Aleppo. He has not yet moved. He has not yet moved. He has not yet moved.  
Those at Orfa, on the east of the Euphrates, both regulars and irregulars,  
continued in that district without any alteration.

The insurgent Mutali, Emir Mahomed Harfoursh, is just come into town  
to make his submission, on pardon, to the Government.

Inclosure 6 to No. 74

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby

[See No. 53, page 54]

No. 76

Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord,

Tüplitz, August 13, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a letter which I  
addressed to Prince Metternich, requesting that orders might be sent to the  
Austrian Consul at Alexandria, to inform his conduct to that of Colonel Heddes,  
in case the latter should hereafter be sent upon, under your Lordship's orders,  
to quit Egypt.

The inclosed extract of a private letter from the Prince contains his answer,  
which is favourable.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

Inclosure 1 to No. 75

Lord Beaule to Prince Metternich.

Mon Prince,

Tüplitz, July 31, 1840

YOUR Highness will see, by the inclosed extract from an instruction to Colonel  
Houges, that in a certain specified case he is authorized to embark. It is highly  
to be desired that the language and conduct of the Consuls of the Four Powers  
in Egypt should be identic, and, having little doubt of your concurrence in the  
propriety of that which is hereby enjoined to the British Consul, I venture to  
suggest to you the expediency of furnishing the Austrian one with a similar  
instruction.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

Inclosure 2 to No. 76

Prince Metternich to Lord Beaule

(Extract.)

QUANT à Laurin, l'Internonce a reçu l'ordre de s'entendre avec ses trois  
Collègues à Constantinople pour des directions uniformes à transmettre aux  
Consuls en Egypte. Les instructions auront, il n'est point permis d'en douter,  
répondu à cette intimation.

No. 76

Lord Wilham Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 34, Confidential)

(Extract.)

Berlin, August 12, 1840

YESTERDAY I had the honour to be received by His Majesty in a private  
audience. I think it very fortunate that I saw the King, for I was enabled to  
inspire him with confidence as to the probable result of our proceedings in the  
East, and to put out of his head all apprehensions regarding war with France;  
not that I found the King at all disposed to regret his adherence to our policy,  
or to believe in the probability of war; but there is a large party here, and  
amongst them some of the old Ministers and general officers of the late King,  
disposed to censure their own Cabinet for becoming a party to the Convention,  
and to sow the seeds of alarm and discontent whenever warlike or gloomy  
language appears in the French papers. Their sad forebodings operate on the  
mind of Baron Werther. Yesterday morning I found him in the King's ante-  
chamber, much agitated at the news received in the morning, of a fall of 2 per



cent in the French Funds and the return of the Egyptian fleet to Alexandria, after having quelled the insurrection in Syria. He told me that we ought not to push France too hard—pousser la France au bout, and that as our acts in Syria were based on an insurrection that had failed, it was probable that we should fail also. It was almost useless to tell him that we had no thoughts of bearing hard on France, and that our policy was not based on a partial insurrection; but it was necessary that the King should know how matters stood, and as he will probably see Prince Metternich at Dresden, and the Emperor of Russia in St. Petersburg, it is of vast importance that he should have understood in his breast chambers his interview with those two great supporters of the Convention.

I am happy to say that a good deal has been perfectly done, perfectly master of the subject, master of the sound policy with respect to the step he had taken, and confident in the resources of Her Majesty's Government. At the same time, he showed no bad feeling towards France, but wished that better terms should be granted to M. Thiers. A private step should be the means of inducing the French Government to adhere to our policy. The arguments—France not not actual against the King, and he does not intend to take any notice of them, but he feared that M. Thiers might be rash enough to seize America, or take an unadvised step into the African waters, and so we were your Lordship to let the French Government understand that any hostilities against any one of the Great Powers, would be considered as an act of hostility against the whole. The King afterwards spoke at length and in the warmest language. His desire to live on the best terms with England; saying, that it was not only the old policy of Prussia, but that a close alliance between these countries now furnished the best guarantee for the preservation of peace.

## No. 77

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 20.)

No. 46.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 7, 1840.

IN conversing this morning with Count Nesselrode, his Excellency informed me, that although the French Government naturally felt great annoyance at the conclusion of the Convention of the 15th of July, and that M. Thiers had at first appeared disposed to adopt a hostile tone, nevertheless his accounts from Paris were satisfactory. Count Nesselrode read me Baron Brunnow's and Count Pahlen's last dispatches, and they completely agree with the intelligence forwarded to me by your Lordship on the 28th of July. Count Pahlen pointedly remarks on the silence observed towards him by the King and M. Thiers, with whom he had had late conversations, in which no allusion whatever was made to the Question that now agitates the Cabinets of the Great Powers.

Count Pahlen reports, that Russia is still at Paris as the antagonist of this conspiracy against France, as it is there called; that Russia has to bear the greatest share of the odium cast on the Allies; and that he finds that the best line of conduct for him to pursue, is to keep, as far as possible, aloof from all discussion on the Question.

Count Nesselrode told me that he had otherwise nothing to communicate, but that all the necessary steps to carry out the stipulations of the Convention were taken, and that he should send a messenger to London to-morrow with the Convention.

Upon my inquiring as to the troops in readiness to be sent from the Crimea, his Excellency said that he believed 20,000 Infantry might be immediately embarked, but he still hoped that the contingency requiring the appearance of this force before Constantinople, would not occur. Count Nesselrode was not able to inform me upon whom the Emperor would confer the command of the expedition. The French Ambassador received a messenger on the 5th instant; he has not however made any communication to the Russian Government, nor has Count Nesselrode seen him for some time.

To judge from the language held to me yesterday by M. de Barante, the French Government must have considerably modified its tone since it first became acquainted with the Convention of the 15th of July.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

## No. 78.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 44.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 21, 1840.

THE journals having generally stated that M. de St. Aulaire had been sent to his post for the purpose of obtaining the consent of Prince Metternich to a plan which would constitute France mediatrice in the Eastern Question, and that he had completely failed in his object, the organs of the Government have sensationally declared, that M. de St. Aulaire was never sent on any such mission, nor ever, which may be presumed to follow as a matter of course, failed in the execution of it. I have heard, however, from a private source, almost certain to be correct, that the instructions of M. de St. Aulaire tended to the object supposed, and that after his interview with Prince Metternich, he wrote word "qu'il en était profondément affligé," adding, that he found the Russian Ambassador all-powerful.

I have &c.

(Signed)

HENRY L. BULWER

## No. 79

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 21, 1840.

A VARIETY of reports having been prevalent yesterday, and a considerable fall in the funds having taken place, I called this afternoon on M. Thiers to inquire from him whether he was acquainted with any cause for the alarm? He told me that he was not; but he mentioned, in the course of conversation, that he understood that an English military force had been sent from Gibraltar to some destination not known.

As I was unacquainted with the circumstance, except through the newspapers, I could give him no answer thereupon; but added, that I had also heard that a French expedition of some kind was preparing. M. Thiers replied that there was no truth in this rumour; that as much as the other Powers did, France would do, but that she would certainly not be the first to commence any measures calculated to lead to general hostilities.

The tone, indeed, of M. Thiers and his friends, I should say is at this moment much more moderate than formerly; and the reaction to be expected in the country, and more especially amongst the capitalists, is to be expected to arrive. But, in the mean time, the preparations for reinforcing the Marine are pursued with vigour; the order has been given for the purchase of 25,000 horses, and the belief in a war, though not perhaps the wish for it, gains ground.

Various plans have, I have passed through the mind of the President of the Council, and been by him brought before the Cabinet; among which, not without great effect, he says, I should be inclined to place the seizure of some position in the Mediterranean, which would be justified to us in the same manner as the recent armaments, viz., as a means of preventing more direct measures of a warlike nature, by satisfying the honour and amour-propre of the French nation, and which would be presented to that nation, of course, in a different manner.

But nothing as far as I can learn, has been decided upon; and a sort of general bewilderment, the extrication from which it is resolved to expect from events, has succeeded to the recent wish for some violent and decided course of conduct. An effort to come to an accommodation would perhaps be made if any opportunity occurred; or, on the other hand, any circumstance tending greatly to inflame the state of opinion, might bring them to a crisis, and lead M. Thiers to ask everything on some warlike proposition to the King.

At the present moment, such as the public generally agitated and uncertain, open to any resolution which a chance might suggest, and cer-





from Baron Brunnow, of the arrival of the ratification of the Convention of the 15th July.

There was no necessity for urging Count Nesselrode to avoid delay: for such was the satisfaction of the Imperial Government at bearing of the conclusion of this Convention, that not a moment was lost in preparing the ratifications.

The vain efforts of the French Government to dissuade the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin from ratifying the Convention are known here, and the dignified conduct of Her Majesty's Government in neither demanding explanations from the Emperor, nor in making excuses for not doing so, nor asking supplies from Parliament, are appreciated by the Imperial Cabinet; but I do not think, notwithstanding the approval on the part of the Russian Government, that the Emperor will be so easily persuaded to participate in a misunderstanding between the British and French Admirals in the Mediterranean, as laying the foundation of a quarrel between the two countries. He will not rest satisfied with the humbled position of France, and his hatred of that country is such, that I am informed he is again encouraging his favourite dream of a march to Paris, and the re-establishment of the elder branch of the Bourbons. He will undoubtedly be much disappointed if, through the wisdom and moderation of Great Britain and Austria, the field of operations can be confined to Turkey and Egypt.

I believe the actual settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question to be quite a secondary consideration with the Emperor; and had France assented to the arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government, His Imperial Majesty's main object would have been defeated, hence has arisen the rapturous joy of the Emperor at the conclusion of the Convention.

His Imperial Majesty's satisfaction at the ability displayed during the late negotiations, has been manifested by the bestowal of the Order of St. George, 1st class, on Baron Brunnow and all the members of the Mission. It is also a mark of his high regard for the British Government, that the Order of St. Anne, 1st class, has been bestowed on Baron Brunnow. Count Nesselrode has read me his last despatches from London. They contain an account of a conversation with your Lordship, which is related with great cleverness; and I need scarcely add, that all Baron Brunnow's late reports are extremely satisfactory to the Imperial Government.

In the course of conversation with Count Nesselrode, I mentioned, that the Emperor, at my audience the other day, had alluded to the possibility of France forcing the Dardanelles, and said, that he had written to Constantinople on the subject. Upon my inquiring as to the nature of the communication that had been made, his Excellency explained that a mere instruction had been sent calling the attention of the Turkish Government to such a contingency, in order to prevent it from being taken by surprise in the event of the appearance of a French squadron.

I have, &c.,  
J. A. D. SOMERSET, D.

No. 83.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.

Private and Confidential)

Cher Lord Palmerston,

Ashtedham House,

le 7 Août, 1840.

Je vous prie de m'excuser de vous avoir en-  
voyé par le courrier de Paris, au lieu de vous l'envoyer  
directement par le courrier de Constantinople, comme je  
l'aurais dû faire.

Je vous prie de m'excuser de vous avoir en-  
voyé par le courrier de Paris, au lieu de vous l'envoyer  
directement par le courrier de Constantinople, comme je  
l'aurais dû faire.

Je vous prie de m'excuser de vous avoir en-  
voyé par le courrier de Paris, au lieu de vous l'envoyer  
directement par le courrier de Constantinople, comme je  
l'aurais dû faire.

nous appeler. Malgré que nous n'ayons qu'un Chargé d'Affaires à Constantinople, l'Empereur n'a jamais voulu me laisser partir maintenant de ma personne. Il m'a dit, "Je ne veux pas prêter; je ne veux pas donner prise aux ennemis. Je serai fidèle au Traité, et ne me déviendrai pas de mon principe." Je vous avoue pour moi personnellement, cher Baron, que malgré la guerre et l'embarras de l'Empereur, je desirais tout mon cœur avec l'Empereur et tous ces gens bien pensants, et il y en a beaucoup chez nous, que nous n'en venions pas à cette extrémité. Et il est très-probable que nous en serons quittes pour les préparatifs. Ibrahim, à mon avis, ne fera pas la sottise de marcher sur Constantinople. Outre les difficultés qui l'attendent, les Français, qui sont si braves dans les journaux, seront les premiers à l'en empêcher. Je suis en cela à côté de tout cela que le Gouvernement Anglais apprendra à connaître le véritable caractère de l'Empereur, et que la parole de ce Souverain est au-dessus de tous les événements; qu'on le prenne pour son guide.

Je suis charmé de pouvoir vous communiquer ce qu'Orloff vient de m'écrire. Vous verrez par là que chez nous tout est prêt; mais aucune démonstration ne sera faite sans nécessité absolue; aucun vaisseau, aucun soldat ne bougera, à moins que la Turquie ne nous appelle dans le cas prévu par notre Convention. Le nom d'Orloff est d'un grand poids dans cette affaire; Méhémet Ali verra qu'il trouvera à qui parler, s'il fait le méchant.

Rien de plus sage de la part de l'Empereur, et rien de plus satisfaisant pour nous tous que la détermination de Sa Majesté de n'envoyer Orloff à Constantinople que dans le cas où les circonstances exigeraient une action militaire. Tout ce qu'il y a de mieux à faire, c'est la présence de notre simple Chargé d'Affaires; et elle attestera d'autant plus que la Russie ne veut pas jouer un rôle dans cette question. Mais si les événements exigent la présence d'une force matérielle, alors notre Chargé d'Affaires ne serait plus à même de diriger ces forces, et en ce cas, personne ne saurait mieux le faire qu'Orloff. C'est pourquoi la confiance de l'Empereur en ce choix est tout à fait dans l'esprit de l'Alliance, car je ne connais personne qui désire plus sincèrement que le Comte Orloff, une entente amicale et durable entre la Russie et l'Angleterre.

Veillez me faire savoir le jour où vous viendrez en ville, et recevez, etc.

(Signé) BRUNNOW

No. 84.

Colonel Hodgkin to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 27.)

(No 74.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No. 14, of the 16th of July, together with its inclosures.

Under all the circumstances, I think it most prudent to adopt entire reserve until that arrival at Alexandria which your Lordship announces.

Great agitation prevails in the public mind at Alexandria. Méhémet remains inflexible, arms and warlike stores are continually forwarded from the Arsenal at Cairo. The forts of the coast are being completed in guns, powder, and stores. It is reported that the work of fortification is proceeding in this precautionary operation.

Ibrahim Pasha the younger has returned from Arabia, and has reached Cairo, he will probably be followed by the troops he lately commanded. It was yesterday reported that he had been ordered to proceed to Syria. The day it is pretended that he is not to remove from Cairo, I shall, of course, watch carefully the movements of his division.

Méhémet Ali has lately told the Russian Consul General, very distinctly, that he will not yield the Turkish fleet, he added, that he is ready to meet any measure of coercion, by ordering his son to march instantly on the capital.

It is only by some very rapid and vigorous blow that this question can be speedily and successfully settled. Distant dangers will neither excite the fears, nor induce the submission of Méhémet Ali.

400 Island of arms have been given up to the Egyptians, he also i

that six Emirs and fifty-five Sheiks of the late insurgents are prisoners, and are about to be punished.

Reports of an action near Tripoli are entirely without foundation; but Commodore Napier writes, that Syria is in such a condition that it may be acquired with ease by any Power.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 85

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 162)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 5, 1840.

HAVING well considered the matter, I yesterday morning recommended to my Colleagues to communicate to the French Ambassador the fact of the signature of the Convention between Her Majesty and the Four Great Powers. My Colleagues approved of it, and desired me to carry it into effect; and I wrote the letter that evening of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Therapia, August 5, 1840.

OUR Colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and myself, are anxious to manifest our respect for your Excellency's person, and the high value at which we estimate the relations of friendship by which our several countries are happily united at this moment, and we hope that your Excellency will accept as the evidence of the sentiments here expressed, a communication which, in the name of our Colleagues, I have the honour to lay before you.

Your Excellency is acquainted with the ardent wishes of the Governments of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to devise measures in concert with the Government of France for the pacification of the Levant, by the united efforts of the Five Powers; and your Excellency knows that the Government of France has not thought itself at liberty to concur in opinion with the other Great Powers, friends of France, upon that point.

This is the subject of the communication I am charged to make to your Excellency, and to acquaint you that the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, have signed a Convention with the Sultan, for the purpose of securing the future peace of Turkey.

The Four Courts, we are convinced, in making this Convention, have felt the greatest regret to find themselves acting in an affair of European interest, without the warm concurrence of France; but that regret, it is evident, must be diminished by the consideration, that the co-operation of the French Government has been denied, in consequence of motives which induce the French Government to abstain from taking part in measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali, but not from the desire or intention of the French Government to oppose the measures which the Four Courts, in concert with the Sultan, might judge to be necessary to obtain the compliance of the Pasha of Egypt. It is to be presumed, therefore, that the Four Courts must entertain the hope, founded upon the known friendly feelings of France, and upon the evident interest of all, that the separation which has taken place will be of short duration, and that the powerful influence of the French Government at Alexandria will be exerted to persuade Mehemet Ali to submit to the arrangements which the Sultan will propose.

Having thus, in compliance with the wish of our Colleagues, made the foregoing communication, mainly for the purpose of manifesting our esteem and regard for your Excellency's person, I have nothing more to say, than to assure your Excellency of my highest consideration.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 86.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 163.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 5, 1840.

I BEG your Lordship to pardon me if I do not send you a detailed account of proceedings here, for, in truth, I have not had time to do more than was necessary for me to do to forward the measures that have been resolved upon, and which will be immediately put in action.

The greatest promptitude appears to me to be necessary, not only to forestall the enemy, but also so to act upon the Syrian mind, as to include the accomplishment of the objects in view, without the effusion of blood; and this, I think, may very probably be accomplished by what has been done, for I expect that the Syrians will rise nearly as one man, when they hear that they are to receive aid; and I hope the Egyptian Army itself, or at least many of the followers of Mehemet Ali, will abandon his fortunes, when they see that there is an irresistible strength opposed to him.

I will not now state what I did previous to the facts I will below report as the joint acts of all, but I may take the liberty to praise the activity of his Excellency the Intermuncio in carrying through the measures agreed upon.

On the 3rd, in the morning, I received your Lordship's Instruction No. 103; Baron Sturmer also received Prince Metternich's Instructions, containing reports from London of the 16th July.

I proposed to our Colleagues of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to visit Rechid Pasha; and his Excellency having been made acquainted with the Convention, and being ourselves agreed, we waited upon him in the early part of the day.

A formal Note to be written by the Sublime Porte, confirming the adhesion of the Sultan to the Convention, which I have seen and approved of, but which, being in French, I have not yet had time to send to the Sultan. I have, however, a good man, who will leave this on the 7th in the morning in a steamer, and go direct to Sir Robert Stopford, to whom I have written to notify the fact.

A frigate and a corvette, with 8,000 muskets on board, and the necessary ammunition which are to set off on the 7th instant. Three other vessels, one being, I believe, of the line, which are to take 5,000 or 6,000 men on board, to be sent to the order of Admiral Stopford, as much ammunition as may be found in the stores here.

It has been since determined by the Sublime Porte, that the Grand Vizier should write a letter to the Emir Bechur, setting forth what has taken place; and also, that the "Article Séparé" shall be translated into Arabic, and circulated as widely as possible amongst the population of Syria.

Rechid Pasha proposes to name the Pashas who are to have the government of the countries to be taken from Mehemet and Ibrahim Pashas. On this point my mind is not decided, but I incline to favour it.

If the measures taken here are followed up actively elsewhere, and without delay, I anticipate the happiest results.

In obedience to your instructions, I send Mr. Alison to Egypt with Rifat Bey.

I again beg to be excused for the hurried report I send home. I propose to despatch the Messenger Wright on Saturday, after Rifat Bey and the vessels shall have actually left this place for their destination.

I have given ample instructions to Mr. Wood, by letters sent to Admiral Stopford to be forwarded, and also instructions to Mr. Consul Moore. I hardly have a doubt that the Emir Bechur will abandon the Egyptians the moment he knows how matters are, and on this point your Lordship will be informed of the grounds I rest on, by the letters I will send on Saturday. I beg to call to your Lordship's favourable notice the good conduct of Mr. Wood. He has encountered also no small personal danger.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Z 2









No. 167.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 9, 1840.*

I HAVE the honor to transmit to your Lordship per copies of the letters I receive from Mr Consul Moore and Mr Dragonian Wood and also I enclose my instructions to those gentlemen.

(Signed) I have, &c.  
POMSONBY

Inclosure I in No 94

Mr. Conrad Moore to Viscount Ponsonby

(Extract.)

Beirut, July 25, 1840.

LEBANON is a sleeping volcano, and its oppressed and exasperated inhabitants are only waiting a favourable moment to try once more the fortune of arms.

I saw two old men who had attended an interview for the purpose of expressing their sentiments and those of their countrymen. They seemed determined to address a Message through your Excellency to the British Government, stating their wrongs, and imploring its intervention.

But arms and ammunition and a nucleus, however small, are necessary to the success of the insurgents—with these Syria is free. It was more than I could calmly bear to see the tears on the cheeks of these venerable men, whilst in accents of despair they begged me to support their prayers for relief, and that the ships might not leave this place.

The English Government might now secure unbounded influence in Lebanon, as the French have entirely lost the confidence of the inhabitants, first from having deceived them with promises of support and also from the policy of the French Cabinet in favour of Mehmet Ali being now universally understood in the mountains.

Abbas Pasha is at the Emir Bekir's residence and the Emir Hahj continues the work of disarmament; he gives however no date for the villages to gain the status of Lebanon. The Emir Bekir is holding Syria otherwise than by an occupying military force about the question he is absorbed and anxious with his people.

Near Tripoli there is still an insurgent force of from 4,000 to 5,000 men; they have cut off the water from that town, and lately defeated, with considerable loss, the troops who had made a sortie against them. They also got possession of a good supply of arms.

The "Edinburgh" is gone down to Tripoli, taking the passenger who came down by the "Cyclops."

The Americans were last night embarked from this port for Tripoli to act against the insurgents.

Six insurgent Ezzurs who surrendered themselves to the Emir Bechir in the neighbourhood, are to be sent to Alexandria.

The disarmament in this vicinity goes on, but many fugitives escape to the fastnesses and to the camp near Tripoli.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94

Mr Wood to Vincent Ponzio.

My Lord

Her Majesty's Ship "Portland,"  
 Royal Navy, June 24, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 15th instant. Affairs have altered very little since I last had the pleasure of writing to your Lordship under date the 22nd instant. The state of the Government has undergone no material change; and though I feel anxious to

mention a few things that have occurred here, yet I think it of more importance to avail myself of the immediate departure of the "Edinburgh" for Tripoli, to visit that part of Syria, where, from late intelligence, I firmly believe an attack took place between the insurgents and the Egyptians on the 20th instant, when the latter were defeated.

This goes far to prove what I had the honour to state to your Lordship relative to the strength and organization of the insurgents in the north. Here they are disarming the mountaineers, but slowly, as almost all have retired to their fastnesses. The Egyptian troops have not returned, which tends much to show the difficulties they have to encounter in the execution of the service for which they first went to the mountains.

The Druses are in a most desperate state they deplore daily our assistance and profess that if we give them the means, they will rise in arms. All they want is a map of the land and arms they possessed but very few at the commencement of the insurrection and I believe the Egyptians have not been able to collect many of them. There was never perhaps a more favorable moment for separating Syria from Egypt and carrying through Lord Palmerston's policy with regard to Mount Lebanon and that without risk on either our part. I am explaining to the Syrians the wisdom of policy of Great Britain &c, and the success that will necessarily attend its complete execution, if they want us or if they can get help from us. I have tried to explain all this to them and to put in good words but they always feel a direct assurance from us, other than that they are not to be trusted.

Our independence at this time is very great, & that is much greater than that of France, which has been declared to be almost null by her own people so soon as she has seen a patriotic man on her side, without any doubt they are a desperate people, & I do not know of any very great power in the country. The Princes are weak in opposition to the citizens with follow the citizens, & saving the appearance, so that we have it well as to be at every point to our political liberty, & the balance over the people. The citizens are very weak in the country, & the Princes are not to be trusted. They say that the Princes are not to be trusted, & that they are rendering them a tribute, & are either by words, but in a very great and they, a tribute to some of their chief prices, or by some other means, & as they are not to be trusted, & are not to be trusted, but what we hear was to be trusted, & are not to be trusted, & are not to be trusted. They complain that even the Government of the Princes has not been able to send over either in spirit, or in action, which is a fact. I am sure. All these circumstances are very discouraging, and they are fully aware of their form and situation. Mr. Smith has not made their appearance from Constantinople, & the Princes who were to accompany him. It is a very great pity, indeed, that so much apathy should have been shown by the People at a moment so favorable to our interests. The Princes seem to feel this.

I feel positive that had the expedition been prevented from landing, Syria would have been free at this moment, for I would have undertaken to persuade the Four Bechis to have joined the insurgents. His nephew, nevertheless, assures me that his uncle will abandon Mehmet Ali the moment he is sure that England, or any other European Power will assist the Syrians in good earnest. I may not add, my Lord, that I will spare no exertions to follow up your Lordship's views, notwithstanding the difficulties with which I am surrounded, as the difficulties of my position; for the arguments I may use with the Syrians may be very proper, but they wish to see them seconded by some very powerful aid indeed, to hear what assistance the Porte is likely to give them. I may pretend too much, but, my Lord, my life at this moment is at stake. I may not be made acquainted with the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, but I may pretend too much, and the man who runs such a risk must take more than a common interest in the affair about which he is employed, and thinks, therefore, he has a right to know what perhaps, it would be prudent he should not know. I am sure your Lordship will excuse this scrawl; but I have only a minute to write it before I join the "Edinburgh," and I feel anxious to say all I can in such a short interval.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) RICHARD WOOD

Inclosure 3 in No. 94

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Consul Moore.

Dear Sir,

Thessalonica, August 4, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, have determined and agreed to succour the Syrians, who will receive support immediately from them and the Sublime Porte, in such manner as those Powers may judge it proper to give it, provided the Syrians return fairly to the allegiance they owe to the Sultan, and reject the yoke of Mehmet Ali. You will take care to express this to the inhabitants of Lebanon and Syria Proper. I do not authorize you to do so to the inhabitants of Palestine, because I am not acquainted with the facts that may take place with relation to that country: but you will not say one word about Palestine, either one way or the other.

If the troops serving the Pasha will return to their proper obedience to the Sultan, they will be rewarded as well as pardoned, the same as the Ottoman sailors and others. The Sublime Porte will send arms and ammunition to Syria, &c., as soon as possible: those who are wise will take the side of the Sultan, and those who are foolish may continue to depend upon a Pasha of Egypt in defiance of the Great Powers. You will state these things to whatever you please, but you will not do it in a formal manner, nor in writing, because the Sublime Porte will send its own proclamation, and this is intended to prepare people to receive it. You must not compromise your position, nor act officially, but you have my authority for making the facts known.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 94

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Wood.

Dear Mr. Wood,

Thessalonica, August 4, 1840.

I HAVE received your letter, and am glad you are going on to Tripoli. I hope you will receive this without delay. I send it to the Admiral to be forwarded to you instantly. I direct you to declare in my name loudly to whoever chooses to hear you, that I am authorized to acquaint the Syrians that the British Government, in union with the Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, will protect the Syrians who shall return to the direct obedience of the Sultan; that the British fleet is ordered to succour the Syrians; and the Sublime Porte will send arms and ammunition; that if the troops now acting under the orders of Mehmet Ali desert to the Sultan, they will be rewarded as well as pardoned, the same as the Ottoman sailors and others. I repeat to you that the same will be done for the Syrians who shall return to the direct obedience of the Sultan. Mehmet Ali is determined to resist the propositions made by the Allies, and to exert all his means to effect it. &c. The Representatives thought it expedient to mention to the Sublime Porte what they had heard, and at the same time to say their Governments would certainly exert the means of which they could dispose to assist the Sublime Porte against any attack Mehmet Ali might have the audacity to make.

I write in the greatest haste; but I write decidedly. You will not of course give copy of a letter written in such haste, but you can give the sense in any way you like: don't be afraid of responsibility,—but be prudent, do not expose yourself to danger needlessly. Tell your friends they are sure of success and

liberation from misery if they choose to act like men. Tell the Egyptians that they can now not only liberate Syria from the tyranny of the Pasha, but that by acting truly, the Pasha will no longer be permitted to misgovern Egypt.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—You must take care not to speak of Palestine because I am not certain what may be done about that country. You will observe you must not say one thing nor another about it. If Mehmet Ali resists even for ten days, he will lose all the advantages that may have been offered to him.

You will not be deterred by the exception I have above made, from executing all that this letter enjoins you to do.

No. 95

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31)

No. 168

My Lord,

Thessalonica, August 9, 1840.

RECHID PASHA sent me a message by M. Etienne Pissani confiding to me his delicacy about the Sultan who being approached by some persons hostile to the Ministers and in the interest of Mehmet Ali and his family young and inexperienced was in danger of being intimidated by the representations made by those persons of the power of Mehmet Ali and of its means for making an attack upon the Sultan. &c. and the Pasha suggested the advantage of an official Note from the Representatives of the Four Powers, calculated to prevent the Sultan being alarmed. I have this evening seen the Intermuncio, who had been to visit Rechid Pasha and had heard from him what is above stated, and the Intermuncio drew up an official Note, of which I approve; and he will communicate with our Consuls at Russia and Prussia, and if they concur in it we will send it in. I understand that the Note is that having learned from the Consuls at Alexandria that Mehmet Ali manifested his determination to resist the propositions made by the Allies, and to exert all his means to effect it, &c. the Representatives thought it expedient to mention to the Sublime Porte what they had heard, and at the same time to say their Governments would certainly exert the means of which they could dispose to assist the Sublime Porte against any attack Mehmet Ali might have the audacity to make.

I think to me that this Note, if it be sent, will be useful, not only as it will serve the particular object of Rechid Pasha but as it will put upon the minds of those who are Mehmet Ali's friends, mainly because they flatter themselves he may be likely to succeed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 96

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31)

No. 169

My Lord,

Thessalonica, August 9, 1840.

I ASK you to write to Rechid Pasha to say that I have this evening seen the Intermuncio, who had been to visit Rechid Pasha and had heard from him what is above stated, and the Intermuncio drew up an official Note, of which I approve; and he will communicate with our Consuls at Russia and Prussia, and if they concur in it we will send it in. I understand that the Note is that having learned from the Consuls at Alexandria that Mehmet Ali manifested his determination to resist the propositions made by the Allies, and to exert all his means to effect it, &c. the Representatives thought it expedient to mention to the Sublime Porte what they had heard, and at the same time to say their Governments would certainly exert the means of which they could dispose to assist the Sublime Porte against any attack Mehmet Ali might have the audacity to make.

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to take some measures, as Caliph, calculated to defeat the attempt of Mehemet Ali, which I conceived might be done by some publication being made in the Mosques by authority of the Sultan, as Caliph, which should expose to the people the truth and make it understood that the Allies have come forward to assist the chief of the Mussulmans' religion and therefore cannot have any intention to destroy that religion of which the Sultan is the head and with the preservation and prosperity of which all his best interests are intimately and irrevocably connected and identified. That if the flag of the Sultan is seen flying in conjunction with that of his European Allies it is because he is forced to contend against a rebel Pasha who aims at the partition of the Mussulman Empire, — a partition which, if effected, must leave the Empire with a diminished force for its defence against any attack from any of its enemies. That the meanest intelligence must understand that a half is less strong than a whole. That he who endeavours to divide the Empire, cannot be so true a friend to religion as he who endeavours to keep its whole force undivided and united, but that he is more for one who seeks his own interest and aggrandisement, even at the expense of all his fellow Mussulmans. I add that I know the friends of Mehemet Ali are endeavouring to receive the people, and that I believe it is expedient to counteract them which may be easily done by some such measures as I have mentioned.

The Intermunro brought me from Rechid Pasha a Note, which is intended to be presented to the Monteur Ottoman in which a part of what I have above stated to your Lordship is expressed; but I hope something also will be said of the Mosques which is, I think, more important to be done than what is intended by the papers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

#### Inclosure in No. 96

*Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Ruouf Pasha. — August 1, 1840.*

*(Translation.)*

TOUT le monde connaît la haine mortelle que Son Altesse Hozrew Pacha me portait.

Ayant, cependant, à cœur le bien et le salut de la religion de la Sublime Porte et de la sainte orthodoxe Musulmane, et voyant comme votre Altesse sait, de faire, de tems à autre, sous le Vizarat de Hozrew, des protestations de dévouement, et de prier que l'on s'entendît pour fermer la plaie qui saigne.

Quoi qu'il en soit, pensant qu'une fois Hozrew déposé, tous les Ministres, d'accord entr'eux, et dépouillés de toute haine, ne s'occuperaient que du bien de la religion et de notre Sublime Porte, j'ai voulu faire preuve de mes intentions. C'est ce que j'ai fait à votre Altesse Sami Bey, pour qu'il présentât à Sa Majesté Impériale mes félicitations sur la naissance d'une Princesse, et qu'il vous complimentât sur votre avènement au poste de Grand Vizir.

Samî Bey n'avait pas de mission spéciale de parler d'affaires; mais comme il est bien avant dans ma confidence, et qu'il connaît bien mes affaires, il était autorisé, pour le cas qu'on voudrait lui faire des questions, à dire ce qu'il savait et de ma position et de mon langage.

Samî Bey de retour ici, m'a informé de l'entretien qu'il avait eu dans quelques endroits, d'où il conste qu'il n'a été consenti à aucun accord. Mais Samî Bey m'a rapporté aussi l'accueil extrêmement flatteur qu'il a reçu et les honneurs dont il a été l'objet de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale, ainsi m'empêchant de saisir l'occasion d'un bâtiment à vapeur Français qui était sur le point de partir pour aller à Jeddah, j'ai écrit à votre Altesse deux lettres de remerciemens.

En conséquence de cette heureuse harmonie, j'ai voulu prouver par des faits la fidélité que je professe, et le parti de rendre la Flotte Impériale était pris lorsqu'on a introduit par de la solution de la question dans la Conférence de Londres; et l'on a acquis la certitude que la solution a eu lieu d'une manière contraire aux intérêts de toute la nation Mahométane. J'ai, en conséquence, remis mes

affaires entre les mains de la Providence Divine pour tous les cas; et j'ai entrepris en y employant tout mon zèle et toute mon activité, de mettre les pays qui font partie des États de Sa Hautesse et qui se trouvent placés sous son autorité, ainsi que les populations, à l'abri d'un coup de main de la part de l'ennemi de notre foi; et je mets tous mes soins à faire faire les fortifications nécessaires sur les côtes de l'Égypte et de la Syrie, conformément à mon premier plan.

J'ai aussi expédié en toute hâte une personne dans le Hedjaz, avec ordre de ramener toutes les troupes régulières qui s'y trouvent; et afin que pendant leur absence la tranquillité et la sûreté des deux Villes Saintes ne soient compromises, j'ai donné à l'Emir de la Mecque, Mchéméd Ben Aou, le commandement d'un corps suffisant de troupes irrégulières qui se trouve là; mesure propre, pour à présent, à y maintenir le bon ordre autant qu'il est possible.

Je soupire jour et nuit en réfléchissant sur les dangers auxquels les États Musulmans vont être exposés; sur les désordres qui vont survenir (Dieu nous en préserve!) parmi les populations. Une considération cependant me console: c'est que le Très-Haut, l'Être plein de miséricorde qui a conservé cette bienheureuse nation pendant mille deux cent et tant d'années, daignera jusqu'à la fin la rendre victorieuse et triomphante.

J'ai considéré avec un plaisir que de représenter à votre Altesse cet état de choses, mais je jure sur mon Dieu, que rien de faire une menace ne m'est point passée par la tête.

Que ces représentations soient mises sous les yeux des Ministres Étrangers, ou qu'elles soient lues par la nation Musulmane, je n'ai au-dessus aucun regard et je n'en suis pas jaloux.

Votre Altesse informera de ce qui a été dit plus haut, donnera les ordres qu'il lui paraîtra de donner.

(L.S.) MEHEMET ALI.

*Le 3 Djénan-ul-Akhir, 1236*

#### No. 97.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 31.)*

No. 171

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 9, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, that I have received officially from the Sublime Porte, notification of the departure, yesterday, of an Ottoman frigate, and a corvette, with arms and ammunition destined for the Syrian insurgents against Mehemet Ali. These ships are under the command of Mustapha Effendi an officer who, during some years, was serving in British ships of war, and is esteemed to be a good sailor. He will have the advantage of returning to the insurgents when and where they feel themselves strong.

Three other ships are related to transport troops to Syria, but they first want to transport the food and the other necessaries destined for that service. They will also be directed to seek Sir Robert Stopford, and will proceed by his orders to Cyprus.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

#### No. 98

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 152)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1840.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to No. 172 inclusive.

With reference to your despatch No. 162, I have to acquaint your

Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which you made to the French Ambassador, as stated in that despatch, respecting the signature of the Convention of the 15th of July.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 99

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

(No. 153)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 31, 1840

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the measures which you took as reported in your despatch No. 153, on receiving my instructions respecting the Convention of the 15th of July.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 100

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No. 154

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 31, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government are glad to find, that the Porte is taking active measures to carry into execution the arrangements of the Convention of the 15th of July. Your Excellency will impress in the strongest manner upon the Turkish Ministers, that the success or failure of that Convention will depend entirely upon their own exertions.

Naval operations will, undoubtedly, do much towards compelling Mehmet Ali to comply with the Convention. Whatever can be effected by naval means will be accomplished by Great Britain; but the process so performed would be long, and in order to bring matters to an early and decisive termination, some considerable pressure must be applied to Mehmet Ali by land. That pressure must come from the British troops in the East. The British ships in the Mediterranean may possibly be landed to assist in the operations, but it is not probable that the British ships in the Mediterranean will be able to do any more at present than to assist in the operations.

Syria, of course, is precluded from her geographical position, from sending troops to Syria, and Austria, on her part, has been very anxious to decline to place any portion of her army in a position in which its return to Austria would depend not only upon the naval assistance of a Foreign Power, but upon the continuance of friendly relations between Austria and those naval Powers whose fleets might cut off the return of Austrian troops. What a bold the Maritime Powers might acquire over Austria, if a large body of Austrian troops were placed in a situation beyond sea, where their return to Austria might be cut off, the refusal of the Austrian Government to send troops to Syria does not seem altogether very unreasonable.

As to Russia, it is on every account desirable that she should not be called upon to send troops to Syria.

Turkey, therefore, is the Power that must find and furnish the means for the execution of the Convention. It is not at first sight very difficult to be done, because Turkish troops, protected by a British squadron, and directed in their movements by the advice of British officers, can be sent to Syria in great numbers.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 101.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 21, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 35 and its inclosure.

I saw Count Nesselrode yesterday. His Excellency told me that reports had reached him from Alexandria, stating that when Mehmet Ali was informed of the negotiation of the Convention of July 15, he at once declared that he should order Ibrahim Pasha to march on Constantinople; and that, in consequence of this intelligence, Baron Lieven, an Officer of Engineers, who was employed in a similar service in 1833, has been despatched from hence, with some others, to Constantinople, to make arrangements for the possible appearance of the Russian force, and to get some fieldworks thrown up to protect the arrival of the first division.

Count Nesselrode told me also, that they had not a sufficient number of vessels in the Black Sea to effect the transport of more than half the troops, and that the same vessels must be employed for the transport of the Russian force. It was impossible to fix the exact time at which the Russian force would be landed. He further informed me that they had calculated that Ibrahim Pasha would require six weeks to march from his present position to Constantinople, and upon my inquiring the number of Russian troops that he expected to see, Count Nesselrode said that it would amount to 20,000 Infantry, 800 Cavalry, 4000 Artillery, and 72 pieces of Field Artillery.

In closing my letter, I have to say that Count Nesselrode spoke with much satisfaction of your Lordship's speech in the House of Commons, and expressed his confidence in the execution of the late Convention, as given by your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

No. 102

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 22, 1840.

A MESSENGER from Paris arrived at the French Embassy early this week.

M. de Barante called on me yesterday and told me that he had not received any official instructions as to the language he was to hold at the present moment, but that he had been privately informed by M. Thiers, that he was to remain passive and await events.

After some conversation upon the general bearing of the Turco-Egyptian Question, M. de Barante said that he had heard that a Russian force was preparing to be sent to Constantinople. I said, only in the event of Ibrahim Pasha threatening an attack on the Turkish capital, a contingency which we hoped would not arise; but that, at all events, the military movement of which he spoke, would not offer the slightest danger to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. M. de Barante replied, that he hoped not; but he thought it dangerous in another point of view, as giving a fresh impulse to public feeling in France, which it would be almost impossible for his Government to withstand; and that he con-









On the 1st of May, 1840, a separate negotiation had been carried on between Great Britain and Russia, with every detail and step of which, however, the French Government was suspended for a time in the early part of this year, first by an expected, and afterwards by an actual, change of Ministry in France. But in the beginning of May, the Baron de Neumann and myself determined, on the part of our respective Governments, to make one more attempt to bring about an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

One objection which had been urged by the French Government to the last British proposal was, that, although it would give Mehemet Ali the strong defensive position extending from Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, it would deprive him of the Fortress of Acre. In order, therefore, to meet this objection, Baron de Neumann and myself proposed to M. Guizot, that the Northern Boundary of that part of Syria which should be administered by the Pasha, should be drawn from Cape Nakhora to the Northern end of Lake Tiberias, so as to include within its limits the Fortress of Acre; and that the Eastern Boundary should run down along the western bank of Lake Tiberias; and thence, as before,

the lower part of Syria could only be given to Mehemet Ali for his life, and that neither England, nor Austria, could consent to recommend the grant of hereditary tenure to Mehemet Ali in regard to any part whatever of Syria. We went to the utmost extent to which we could go in the way of concessions, in order to obtain the co-operation of France: and that it was therefore our last offer.

The Baron Neumann and myself made this communication to M. Guizot separately; Baron de Neumann on one day, and I upon the next. M. Guizot told me he would report to his Government the proposition I had made, and the statements with which I had accompanied it, and would let me know their reply whenever he should receive it.

Soon afterwards, the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia stated to me, that they had reason to believe that the French Government, instead of dealing upon this proposal themselves, had transmitted it to Alexandria for the decision of Mehemet Ali. That this was placing the Four Powers in negotiation, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali. That, besides the delay which would be thereby occasioned, this was what their respective Courts neither intended to do, nor could consent to do.

I think it was on the 27th of that month, M. Guizot came to me, and read to me, from a letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, the answer of the French Government to our proposal. This answer was a positive refusal. M. Thiers stated, "That the French Government knew for certain that Mehemet Ali would not consent to any division of Syria, unless compelled thereto by force. That France could not co-operate in the employment of force against Mehemet Ali for such a purpose; and, therefore, France could not be a party to the proposed arrangement."

France having thus refused the ultimatum of the British Government, it became necessary for the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers to consider what course their Governments should there pursue.

The position of the Five Governments was this: All Five had declared their conviction that it is essential for the balance of power, and for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that the integrity and independence

of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty should be maintained; and all Five had pledged themselves to employ all their means of action and influence to maintain that integrity and independence. But France, on the one hand, contended that the best way to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire was to leave the Sultan to the mercy of Mehemet Ali, and to advise the Sultan to submit to any terms which Mehemet Ali might determine to base upon as a condition of peace, while the Four Powers, on the other hand, considered that the further continuance of the present state of military occupation of the Sultan's Provinces by Mehemet Ali, would be destructive of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and fatal to its independence. They thought, therefore, that it was necessary to confine Mehemet Ali within narrower limits.

France, after nearly two months' deliberation, had not only refused to agree to the plan proposed by the Four Powers as an ultimatum of concession on their part, but had again declared that she could be no party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not of his own accord, and without coercion, consent. The Four Powers, therefore, had no other alternative, but either to adopt the principle of settlement pressed upon them by France, and which consisted in recommending to the Sultan entire submission to the demands of Mehemet Ali; or else to act upon their own principle, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be compelled to agree to some arrangement consistent in its form with the rights of the Sultan, and in its substance with the integrity of the Turkish Empire. By the first course, the co-operation of France would have been obtained, by the second course, that co-operation would have been refused.

The Four Powers, therefore, had been obliged to proceed upon the principle of peace; for the attainment of future security; for the practical execution of principles, which all the Five Powers had concurred in declaring. They valued the co-operation of France not for its own sake, nor for the advantage and convenience of the moment, but for the good it was to accomplish, and for the future consequences that were to result from it. They were anxious to co-operate with France in doing good; but they were not prepared to co-operate with her in doing evil. Therefore, believing, as they did, that the policy recommended by France was injudicious, was unjust towards the Sultan, was pregnant with future dangers to Europe, was at variance with the principles which the Five Powers had deliberately professed, the Four Powers held that they could not make the sacrifice which was required at their hands as the price of the co-operation of France; if indeed that can be called co-operation, which was to consist in letting events take their own course. Unable, therefore, to adopt the views of France, the Four Powers determined to carry into execution their own.

But this determination had not been unforeseen; nor had its probability been concealed from France.

On the contrary, it was the very object of the Four Powers to understand with the Four Powers, and were to act without her.

And Sebastiani replied, that he foresaw that we should do it, he would foretell the result.

and should then address ourselves to France; and that France, as friendly after our failure, as she had been before our attempt, would give her good offices to arrange matters, and would probably persuade us then, to agree to things which we declined to consent to now.

Similar intimations were also made to M. Guizot, as to the course which the Four Powers would probably pursue, if they should be unable to come to an agreement with France. Therefore the French Government having declined the ultimatum of the Four Powers, and having, in declining it, again laid down a principle of conduct which it knew that the Four Powers could not adopt, the principle, namely, that no settlement ought to be made between the Sultan and his subject, except upon such conditions as the subject might choose, spontaneously to accept, or in other words, to dictate, the French Government must have been prepared to accept the principle of conduct which it laid down.

The Four Powers, in determining so to do, could not justly be represented as separating themselves from France, or as excluding France from the settlement of a great European affair. On the contrary, it was France who separated herself from the Four Powers. For it was France who had laid down for herself a principle of action which rendered her co-operation with the other Four Powers impossible.

And here, without wishing to indulge in controversial observations, the past, I feel it indispensably necessary to remark that this voluntary separation of France from the Four Powers was not merely evinced by the course of the negotiations in London, but, unless Her Majesty's Government has been greatly misinformed, it had also taken place in a still more decided manner by the course of the negotiations at Constantinople.

The Five Powers had, by the Collective Note which was presented to the Porte on the 27th of July, 1840, by their Representatives at Constantinople, declared to the Sultan that their union was assured, and they had requested him to abstain from any direct negotiation with Mehmet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pasha, without the concurrence of the Five Powers. And yet, Her Majesty's Government have good reason to believe, that for many months past, the French Representative at Constantinople, has been in communication with Mehmet Ali, and has earnestly endeavoured to induce him to separate himself from the Five Powers.

It is France, therefore, that has separated herself from the Four Powers, and not the Four Powers that have separated themselves from France.

With respect to the course pursued by Great Britain, the French Government must admit, that the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government upon the affairs of the Levant, have never, from the commencement of these negotiations, varied in the slightest degree, except in as far as Her Majesty's Government has offered to modify those views and opinions for the purpose of obtaining the co-operation of France, and those views and opinions have at all times been frankly and unreservedly expressed to the French Government by arguments which to Her Majesty's Government appeared to be conclusive.

In the early stages of the negotiation, the declarations of principle made by the Government of France, led Her Majesty's Government to imagine that the Two Governments could not but be in the course of carrying their common principles into execution. But the opinions of the French Government upon the means of execution, even in the outset of the negotiations, from those of the British Government, then France has no right to represent, as an unexpected schism between England and France, a difference which the French Government knew all along to exist. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government as to the means of execution, have undergone a change since the negotiations began, then France has no right to impute to Great Britain a divergence of policy, which arises from a change on the part of France, and not from a change on the part of Great Britain. But in any

case, when Four out of the Five Powers found themselves agreed upon one course, and when the Fifth Power, by its own course, strictly adhered to the principle of conduct which it laid down, it is not reasonable to expect that the Four Powers should, in deference to the Fifth, give up opinions in which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent interests of Europe.

It is France, therefore, that has separated herself from the Four Powers, and not the Four Powers that have separated themselves from France. The integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under its present arrangements, necessary for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the security of Europe, as France has never been able to effect an arrangement which the Four Powers intend to effect between the Sultan and the Pasha, would, if it could be executed, be the most complete and the best; and as the objections of France have applied not to the end in view, but to the means by which that end is to be attained, Her Majesty's Government trust that the separation of France from the other Four Powers, which Her Majesty's Government most deeply regret, cannot be of long duration.

For when the Four shall, in conjunction with the Sultan, have brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its subject, as may be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and with the future peace of Europe, there will no longer remain any point of difference between France and the Alliance; and there can then be nothing to prevent France from concurring with the Four Powers in such further arrangements for the future as may appear to be necessary in order to give effect to the good result of the intervention of the Four Powers in the affairs of the Levant, and to secure the Ottoman Empire from any future danger.

Her Majesty's Government will look forward with eagerness to the time when France will have been able to take part in the arrangements for the future. But until that time, Her Majesty's Government, in the exercise of their own discretion, have declined to take part in measures of coercion against Mehmet Ali, surely that Government cannot object to employ its means of persuasion to induce the Pasha to submit to the arrangements which are to be proposed to him, and it is obvious, that there are many topics which may be urged, and many prudential considerations which might be pressed upon the Pasha with more effect by France, as a neutral Power, taking no part in those affairs, than by the Four Powers, who are actively engaged in executing the measures of coercion.

It is thus as it may; Her Majesty's Government feels confident that France will be able to take part in the arrangements for the future. The Four Powers on that occasion; for their object is disinterested and just. They look to reap no selfish advantage from the engagements which they have contracted; they seek to establish no exclusive influence, and to make no territorial acquisitions; and the ends they aim at must be as honest as to France as to themselves, because France, like themselves, is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power, and in the preservation of general peace.

You will transmit officially to M. Thiers a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 104

Count Nesselrode to Count Menden.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, September)

Monsieur le Comte,  
St. Petersburg, le 10 Juin, 1840  
J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint la Convention qui vient d'être signée à Londres entre la Russie, l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, la Prusse, et la Porte Ottomane, et qui règle définitivement la Question  
2 E 2



d'Egypte, et réalise ainsi d'un commun accord l'assistance que les Puissances s'étaient engagées à accorder au Sultan dans ses différends avec Méhémet Ali.

Lorsque vous recevrez la présente, l'Agent de Sa Hautesse sera déjà probablement arrivé à Alexandrie, et aura sans doute obtenu de vous et de vos Collègues tout l'appui et toute la co-opération que vous aurez été à même de lui accorder, pour assurer le succès de sa mission.

Nous connaissons la haute sagesse et la profonde sagacité de M. le Comte de Titon, et nous sommes convaincus qu'il se fera un plaisir de vous faire part de ses impressions sur la position actuelle de l'Egypte, et de vous faire part de ses suggestions pour les offrir à l'attention de Sa Hautesse. Les Quatre Puissances, en agissant ainsi, ne font que se conformer à l'intérêt qu'elles ont à la sauvegarde d'une transaction Européenne, et à assurer en même temps la stabilité de sa famille pour un long avenir.

Cependant, si contre toute attente, Méhémet Ali repoussait les offres de conciliation qui lui auraient été faites, il ne pourra s'en prendre qu'à lui des fâcheuses conséquences qui en résulteraient nécessairement pour lui. Ainsi, Monsieur le Comte, nous ne saurions vous engager à user de tous les moyens de persuasion dont vous pourrez disposer, pour inspirer à Méhémet Ali des sentimens de modération, et pour le porter à adopter une résolution conforme à ses véritables intérêts.

Veillez dans ce but, vous adresser à vos Collègues et agir avec un bon accord avec eux, car cet accord est le plus sûr garant du succès; toutefois, les Cabinets signataires de la Convention du 4 Juillet, ayant réservé à l'Angleterre la tâche de réaliser les combinaisons qui ne sauraient manquer de faire une vive impression sur l'esprit de Méhémet Ali, ce sera aussi à Mr. Hodgkin qu'il appartiendra plus particulièrement de prendre l'initiative des démarches qui devront en être la conséquence; mais dans tous les cas, vous accorderiez à lui, ainsi qu'à MM. Laurin et W. de Mevius, l'appui et la coopération de vos Collègues, et vous leur ferez part de la situation de la crise actuelle.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 103

Comte Nesselrode à M. de Titon. — (Communicated by Baron Brunnow, September.)

Monsieur,  
St Pétersbourg, le 10 Juillet, 1840.  
Vous avez déjà été informé directement par M. le Baron de Brunnow, que la grave et importante question sur laquelle s'était fixée depuis près d'une année toute la sollicitude de l'Empereur, vient d'être résolue d'une manière entièrement conforme aux hautes intentions de notre Auguste Maître. En effet, après des efforts constants et multipliés, notre Ministre à Londres a signé, le 4 Juillet, une Convention destinée à régler la Question d'Egypte, d'un commun accord, entre la Russie, l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, la Prusse, et la Porte Ottomane, et à résoudre ainsi l'appui que les Puissances ont formellement promis d'accorder au Sultan dans ses différends avec Méhémet Ali.

En vous transmettant aujourd'hui une copie de cet acte, je me fais une forme persuasion qu'il aura été accueilli par le Sultan avec autant de satisfaction que de reconnaissance, s'est empressée de le revêtir de sa haute sanction.

Il est probable que lorsque vous recevrez la présente, la Porte aura déjà usé de l'initiative qui lui appartient, pour faire notifier à Méhémet Ali, les conditions de l'arrangement qui vient d'être arrêté, et que le

fonctionnaire chargé de sonner le *Vak* Royal y souscrira dans le délai fixé, sans qu'il y ait eu de la part de l'Empereur aucune restriction.

Nous espérons donc que l'acte sera exécuté dans le délai fixé, et que M. le Baron de Brunnow aura sans doute pu parvenir à vous le faire parvenir, sur les copies de l'acte à la Porte les copies de l'acte de la Russie et de la Prusse, et sur les copies de l'acte de la Russie et de la Prusse, et sur les copies de l'acte de la Russie et de la Prusse.

Tout semble indiquer que l'unanimité avec laquelle les Quatre Puissances ont arrêté leur résolution, et l'appui que cette décision obtiendra de la part de leurs Agens en Egypte, suffiront pour déterminer le Pacha à accepter les offres d'accommodement qui lui seront faites au nom de Sa Hautesse. Méhémet Ali, selon toute apparence, ne pourra pas s'opposer à la volonté unanime de la Russie, de l'Angleterre, de l'Autriche, et de la Prusse, et préférera peut-être de se soumettre plutôt à leur décision que d'exposer son avenir et celui de sa famille, à tous les dangers et à toutes les incertitudes que son obstination pourrait entraîner pour lui.

Vous voudrez bien observer que les Cabinets Alliés ont dû établir comme une éventualité possible, que Méhémet Ali refuse les offres de conciliation qui lui seront faites, et qu'il veuille pousser les choses à l'extrême, en faisant marcher ses troupes par l'Asie Mineure, pour menacer et s'emparer de Constantinople.

Pour un pareil cas, vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, déclarer à la Porte, que l'Empereur, invariablement résolu, comme il l'a toujours été, de ne pas laisser à Méhémet Ali le temps de se préparer à une telle entreprise, et que jamais des engagements réciproques que les Puissances ont contractés, ne leur ont fait perdre de vue l'importance de la situation, ont envoyé sa flotte de la Mer Noire avec des troupes de débarquement, pour défendre la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, du moment où l'Armée Egyptienne tenterait de franchir le Taurus et où Sa Hautesse croirait devoir faire un appel à l'assistance de la Russie.

Mais tout en vous chargeant, Monsieur, d'offrir cette assurance à la Porte, nous nous plaisons à croire qu'une semblable nécessité ne se présentera point pour le Sultan. L'apparition des escadres Anglaise et Autrichienne sur les côtes de la Syrie, l'appui qu'elles prêteront aux populations qui cherchent à secouer le joug de Méhémet Ali; les dangers que ces soulèvemens peuvent amener pour l'Armée Egyptienne; l'impossibilité où elle sera de recevoir désormais des secours et des munitions; enfin, la certitude de rencontrer sur son chemin les forces de la Russie, sont autant de motifs pour nous faire espérer que Méhémet Ali, loin de vouloir tenter de nouvelles agressions, se décidera à accepter les termes de la pacification qui lui sera proposée de la part du Sultan, dès qu'il aura acquis la conviction qu'il ne saurait plus compter désormais sur la jalouse et sur les hésitations des Cabinets.

Cela sont du moins les vœux bien sincères que nous formons. Veillez bien, Monsieur, vous adresser à toutes les démarches que les Représentans d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, et de Prusse, croiront devoir faire auprès de la Porte, soit pour lui expliquer les déterminations les plus conformes aux vœux des Quatre Cours, soit pour accélérer, autant que cela pourra dépendre de vous et des autres Représentans, le moment d'une pacification prompte et immédiate. Plus que jamais il est d'une haute importance que les Représentans des Puissances signataires de la Convention du 4 Juillet, se maintiennent sur une même ligne de pensée et d'action.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 2)*

(No. 60.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 31, 1840

I HAVE the honour to enclose to your Lordship the copy of a paper, the "Sacre," supposed to be in the interest of M. Toets and which reports a conversation that has taken place between His Majesty King Louis Philippe and the Ambassador of Austria, and also the Prussian Charge d'Affaires. I need not observe that the report here given is incorrect: it is true, however, that His Majesty, in a private conversation at which no person was present but the individual to whom His Majesty was speaking, did express himself with warmth both to Count Apponyi and M. de W. and that afterwards said to M. de Rothschild, "J'ai dit à ces Messieurs la vérité."

He then entered into conversation with M. de Rothschild, — a conversation in which M. de Rothschild's story afterwards joined, and it does appear that this conversation, though exaggerated in the report of it, was of a nature to give some foundation for the newspaper account though how it found its way to the public press remains a mystery.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

P.S. I should state that Count Apponyi assures me that His Majesty never made use of those expressions with respect to your Lordship which were attributed to him.

No. 107

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 128.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 3, 1840

I HAVE to signify to your Excellency the entire approbation of Her Majesty's Government of the steps taken by you in pursuance of the Convention of the 15th July, as reported in your despatches of the 8th and 9th of August.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 108

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 3.)*

(No. 173.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 11, 1840

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of an official Note presented by the Representatives of the Four Powers to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and which I mentioned already to your Lordship in my despatch No. 108 of the 9th August.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 108

*Note from the Representatives of the Four Powers to Rechid Pasha.*

LES Soussignés, Représentans des Quatre Puissances signataires de la Convention conclue à Londres le 15 Juin et dernier, se sont empressés de donner communication par leurs Drogmans à Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, des rapports qu'ils ont reçus de leurs Consuls respectifs en Egypte.

Son Excellence y aura vu que Méhémet Ali, qui avait déjà été informé qu'une décision allait être prise par la Conférence de Londres, s'en est expliqué envers ces Consuls de manière à faire entendre qu'il ne considérait aucune réclamation territoriale, et de plus, qu'il paraît disposé à recourir à des mesures extrêmes dans le cas où des moyens coërcifs seraient employés contre lui.

Les Soussignés croient inutile de s'arrêter à faire ressortir l'in vraisemblance de l'exécution de menaces auxquelles les nombreux embarras de la position de Méhémet Ali ôtent le caractère de gravité qu'il voudrait leur donner. Mais en tout état de cause, ils sauront cette occasion pour renouveler à la Sublime Porte l'assurance la plus formelle de la ferme résolution de leurs Cours de vouer tous les moyens dont elles peuvent disposer, à la défense de la cause à laquelle elles viennent de s'identifier par un acte solennel et mémorable; et quelles que soient les éventualités à venir les Soussignés ont la juste confiance de croire que cette cause triomphera de tous les obstacles et de tous les périls.

Les Soussignés, etc.,

(Signed)

PONSONBY.  
BARON DE STURMER  
TITOW  
COMTE KENIGSMARK

Constantinople, le 11 Août, 1840.

No. 109

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 4.)*

(No. 176.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 17, 1840

RECHID PASHA sent M. Franceschi to me this morning to communicate a message the Pasha has received from the French Ambassador through M. de Sturmer, the French Ambassador. My servant, by mistake, delivered the message to the Internuncio, and delivered the message to His Excellency, who came here immediately with M. Franceschi, and prepared a despatch for Prince Metternich detailing the communication, and of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy that will save your Lordship the trouble of details from me.

M. Franceschi said, that Rechid Pasha is not alarmed, though he is aware of the gravity of the situation of the affairs; he said, the Sultan is not alarmed and is firm.

With the assistance of M. de Sturmer, I desired M. Franceschi to tell His Excellency Rechid Pasha, that the Sultan might depend upon the support of his Allies.

I added, that the Internuncio and myself, and, I doubted not, our colleagues also, would be ready to give Rechid and the Ottoman Government aid, if any should be wanting, to confirm the Sultan's view.

I understand that one member of the Council, that is, Said Pasha (Capudan Pasha), expressed alarm, saying, the French fleet is very strong; suppose it were to seize the English fleet? Rechid Pasha seems not to have been himself aware of the number of British ships of the line in these seas. I sent him the account.

I was, to a certain degree, prepared for the hostility of France, by



what passed at a visit made by M. Titow to the French Ambassador, when the latter, in the course of conversation, said he thought war between France and England inevitable. This appeared to me to manifest either a very injudicious and improper levity in the Ambassador, or that he had received information from his Government that warranted what he said. I, however, certainly did feel, as I now do, almost unable to give credit to what I consider to be little less than an act of insanity on the part of the French King.

If indeed this proves true, and if France is ready to fight, I think the notion I had of the political objects at which France aims, in giving her support to Mehmet Ali, may be found correct. I had a long conversation with Baron Stürmer, and another with M. Titow. We were all of opinion, that we ought to carry into execution the measures already agreed upon, only taking care not to run rashly into danger. I proposed that the squadron with the troops on board should sail as fixed, on the 20th, but should not pass the Dardanelles till Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should give them the order to do so. The Admiral is not in force perhaps to be sure, but what the French might venture to attempt. We are of opinion that we ought to do all we can to prevent the French from doing what they are doing, as well as throw disgrace upon us; for nothing can exceed the insolence with which the French have acted.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 109.

Baron Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

Constantinople, le 17 Août, 1840.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient d'envoyer M. Franceschi chez mes Collègues d'Angleterre, de Russie, de Prusse, et chez moi, pour nous faire la communication suivante.

M. l'Ambassadeur de France a fait dire hier, le 16 de ce mois, par son Drogman à Réchid Pacha :

Qu'il a l'ordre de lui signifier, que le Gouvernement Français, le Roi et la Nation, considèrent comme une injure faite par le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman à la France la conclusion du Traité qu'il a signé à Londres sans le concours et à l'insu du Plénipotentiaire Français, et qui a pour objet une question où la France, dès le principe, a été partie intégrante ;

Que le Gouvernement Français s'opposera de tous ses moyens à toute exécution de ce Traité.

Qu'il attend, pour se décider, le résultat des démarches qu'il fait faire dans ce moment auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin, afin d'en obtenir l'annulation du Traité.

Que loin d'employer, comme on le lui demandait, son influence morale auprès du Pacha pour le porter à la soumission, il lui accordera toute l'assistance qui est en son pouvoir pour l'aider à résister à l'intervention étrangère.

Qu'il réunira ses efforts aux nôtres pour soulever les populations d'Asie et d'Europe contre l'administration actuelle en Turquie, dont le Gouvernement Français se déclare l'ennemi, et qu'il considère comme celui du pays.

Que M. de Pontois fera connaître au Sultan et à toute la Nation Musulmane, que la France, loin d'avoir pris part à une Convention dirigée contre les intérêts de l'Islamisme, la condamne hautement, et s'opposera à son exécution.

Réchid Pacha a répondu, que ce langage a d'autant plus lieu de le surprendre, que la France avait elle-même concouru à la Note Collective du 27 Juillet de l'année dernière. Là-dessus le Drogman de France a répliqué, que M. de Pontois avait prévu cette objection, mais que d'abord le Gouvernement Français avait accepté, sans avoir jamais

approuvé, la co-opération de son Ambassadeur à cette démarche ; qu'au surplus, il s'agit ici de mesures coercitives dont il n'est fait aucune mention dans la Note susdite, et que c'est contre ces mesures que la France se prononce en ce moment.

Le Pacha a répondu : "je suis profondément affligé de la déclaration que vous venez de me faire, car j'ai toujours considéré la France comme une des plus anciennes amies de la Porte ; il ne dépend pas de moi d'empêcher la réalisation d'un acte auquel la Porte ne s'est décidée qu'avec le concours de quatre de ses Alliés et quels qu'en puissent être les résultats, le Gouvernement de Turcs s'y opposera. La réponse que M. de Pontois veut faire connaître au Sultan ce qu'il vient de lui faire dire par son Drogman le Pacha est prêt à l'accompagner à l'audience de ce Monarque pour lequel il ne saurait avoir rien de caché.

Je n'ai pas besoin de dire à votre Altesse combien Réchid Pacha a trouvé dur et fastidieux le langage que le Gouverneur de France a chargé son Ambassadeur de tenir à la Porte dans cette circonstance.

M. Franceschi m'a raconté, que Réchid Pacha ayant été appelé hier chez le Sultan, Sa Hautesse lui avait dit, en lui montrant d'un doigt la Sultane Mère venant de recevoir de l'ex-Capoudan Pacha, on ne sait par quelle occasion, mais probablement par le bateau à vapeur Français arrivé le 14 de ce mois. Dans cette lettre, Ahmed Foyzi Pacha, après avoir assuré à la Sultane que Méhémet Ali était inébranlable dans sa résolution de résister, ajoute qu'il dépend de lui de révolutionner toutes les Provinces d'Asie et d'Europe ; et il adjure, implore, et supplie la Sultane d'interposer son influence auprès de son fils pour éviter à la Nation les maux dont elle est menacée, et peut-être la chute de l'Empire.

Ces lettres m'ont paru assez importantes pour les porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse par une estafette qui partira demain à l'aube du jour.

Agréez, &c.  
(Signed) STÜRMER

No. 110

Vicomte Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 177)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 17, 1840

I INCLOSE two Reports from the Austrian Consul-General, which the Internuncio was so good as to give me. They state that Mehemet Ali has ordered Ibrahim to concentrate his troops, to be ready to march into Anatolia, and to threaten Constantinople.

I conceive the Pacha has grossly exaggerated both the amount of his army and of his influence. I think it might be shown that he could not march 10,000 men under the circumstances of Syria, and it is to be remembered that at least 6,000 of the troops are Syrians, who are kept with their colour solely by the Albanian Police. They will be able to abandon Ibrahim when any other standard is raised, and the Albanians can be gained by the Porte, if the easy means that have been communicated for so doing are adopted.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 110.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer

M. le Baron,

Alexandrie, le 6 Août, 1840.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient d'envoyer M. de Laurin à la Porte, chargé de dire au Sultan ce qu'il vient de lui faire dire par son Drogman le 29 Juillet, sur le bateau à vapeur la "Gorgone," pour se rendre à Vourla,

résolut de ne laisser sortir aucun de ses vaisseaux de guerre du port d'Alexandrie.

Par conséquent, les restes de l'Armée d'Arabie, qui, d'après mon rapport d'hier, auraient dû être transportés en Syrie sur quatre vaisseaux de ligne dont deux Egyptiens et deux Ottomans, seront probablement expédiés par la voie d'El-Harsch, si toutefois l'on ne renonce entièrement à cette expédition. En attendant, on a donné l'ordre que ces troupes restent au Caire pour y reposer, et cet ordre a été transmis par le Pacha de Ras-Eddin, aujourd'hui à 8 heures du matin.

Les vaisseaux de guerre Anglais paraissent avoir fait naître dans l'esprit de Méhémet Ali des appréhensions sérieuses qu'il s'efforce de cacher, mais qui sont révélées par des mesures extraordinaires et par des propos qu'on n'est pas habitué à entendre de sa bouche. C'est ainsi que lui est échappée la remarque qu'il n'était plus prudent d'expédier par mer les provisions et les munitions pour l'Armée du Taurus. Par cette raison, des Gûmen (bâtiments de transport Égyptiens), sur lesquels on avait commencé à charger ces provisions, ont été employés depuis à des courses sur le Nil, et l'on a aussitôt renoncé à les affréter dans le but sus-indiqué.

La disposition d'esprit de Méhémet Ali est toujours la même. Il fait entendre aux Consuls, à chaque occasion, qu'il porterait les choses à l'extrémité, si l'on voulait lui arracher quelques provinces. Il dit qu'il a 150,000 hommes de troupes en Syrie qui sont prêts à se battre, et avec lesquels il peut monder l'Égypte et menacer même Constantinople. Il prétend pouvoir compter sur l'esprit qui règne parmi la population Musulmane tant en Asie qu'en Égypte. Mais quand on lui rappelle que l'Égypte est une terre de guerre aux Européens, il fait accorder aux siens, en contradiction avec ce qu'il dit aux étrangers, qu'il ne s'agit pas de guerre, qu'il n'y a pas de différends entre lui et le Sultan, mais seulement avec quelques étrangers; qu'au surplus, la France s'efforcera de régler les différends par la paix, et que tout pourrait bien, sans peine, être arrangé à l'amiable.

Cependant ces assertions ont manqué leur but; car les Musulmans, qui depuis longtemps ont été habitués à voir le Sultan sur la situation présente de l'Égypte, ont été convaincus par tout ce qu'il y a de contradictions dans ses paroles, qu'il n'est ni sincère ni courageux.

La question de savoir si Méhémet Ali par suite de cette position des choses cédera ou embrassera le parti insensé de révolutionner la Turquie, cette question, dis-je, est difficile à résoudre.

Personne n'ose lui conseiller la première alternative. Quelques uns sont tombés en disgrâce pour l'avoir fait, d'autres sont soupçonnés par lui de perfidie. Un de mes Collègues et moi, nous lui parlâmes, en tout dernier lieu, dans ce sens. Il accueillit nos observations comme des sujets de controverse depuis longtemps épuisés, et nous pria de ne plus l'entretenir de révolutions. Mais il semble qu'une voix intérieure dans laquelle il place une aveugle confiance, le pousse à prendre le dernier parti. Il me dit à cette occasion, "Je ne saurais que je ne peux qu'agir comme je le fais, ou périr."

Cette manière de voir le tient presque entièrement isolé de ses entours. Il n'y a que quelques amis et quelques journaux qui le confirment dans ces idées, mais que je m'en vais le démontrer.

Les officiers supérieurs de l'Armée, et ses principaux employés, j'ai entretenu des relations fréquentes avec plusieurs d'entr'eux. Aucun d'eux ne le pousse à la résistance. Ce sont autant d'aimantations serviles mais passifs de son honte faite, qui, au fond, craignent qu'il n'amène par quelque résolution précipitée, sa ruine et la leur. Les officiers supérieurs de l'Armée partagent à peu près ce sentiment. Un petit nombre de ces derniers, et ce ne sont pas les plus éclairés, préfèrent la guerre à la paix. L'ambition et la jalousie d'Ibrahim Pacha ont été les causes de cette disposition.

Ceux qui poussent Méhémet Ali à la guerre ce sont quelques Européens Arabes, et quelques illustres voyageurs qui firent connaissance avec lui, et qui ne rougissent point de lui faire avouer que les Cabinets Européens ne se jetteraient jamais à accorder à la Porte une assistance matérielle contre lui, que par conséquent il n'avait qu'à vaincre le Sultan pour disposer à son gré de la Turquie Asiatique, enfin, qu'un fait accompli était toujours pardonné et sanctionné. C'est dans ce sens que ces conseillers s'expriment dans les feuilles

publiques, et c'est ainsi qu'ils raisonnent dans leurs correspondances confidentielles avec Boghos Bey et les habitués du palais.

Méhémet Ali dit qu'il peut compter sur le concours des Musulmans au-delà du Taurus comme aussi de ceux d'Europe. Au fond, le Pacha lui-même ne sait pas ce qu'il doit en penser. Les efforts d'exciter les sujets du Sultan à la révolte ont été souvent renouvelés, mais sont toujours restés sans effet. Il y a eu, dit-on, des promesses vagues de la part de quelques Chefs religieux et même de quelques Primats des provinces Ottomanes; mais personne jusqu'ici n'a pu apprendre si, et jusqu'à quel point, on pouvait faire fond sur ces promesses.

S'il est victorieux il peut compter sur des partisans, vaincu il devra s'attendre à une défection générale.

Cette prédiction doit être sortie de la bouche d'Ibrahim Pacha, lorsque, l'an passé, son père eut proféré la menace d'envahir l'Anatolie, si les Puissances au bout d'un mois n'arrangeaient pas ses affaires au gré de ses désirs. Ces mots sont d'autant plus significatifs qu'ils expriment la conviction de l'homme à la valeur duquel Méhémet Ali a confié tous les moyens de réaliser ses vœux.

Méhémet Ali ne s'est exprimé très-clairement qu'à l'occasion dont j'ai fait mention dans mon rapport du 10 du mois passé. Il a dit qu'il se proposait de détourner une attaque de la Syrie et de l'Égypte, il envahirait l'Anatolie, et il paraissait même devant Constantinople.

Dans le même rapport que j'eus l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence le 10 du mois, je parlai d'un ordre relatif à la concentration de l'Armée. D'après les renseignements que j'ai reçus, les troupes de l'Armée d'Arabie sont dirigées sur Alep et de là sur Ourfa. Osman Pacha reste dans le Caire, et les troupes de l'Armée d'Égypte sont dirigées sur le Caire. Ses Régiments (milices) et ses Albanais doivent prendre leurs quartiers d'hiver dans les environs du Caire.

L'Armée de Marache n'est ni nombreuse ni pourvue du nécessaire, par cette dernière raison, elle ne saurait être augmentée, d'autant moins que les contrées avoisinantes n'offrent aucune ressource.

Les troupes réglées en Égypte se composent, à l'exception de la flotte, de 30,000 hommes. En revanche, on exerce avec beaucoup d'assiduité les milices d'Alexandrie et du Caire, mais ces exercices sont si peu du goût des indigènes, que de deux régiments formés au Caire par les ouvriers de fabrique, plus de 10,000 hommes se sont évadés ou cachés.

D'après les rapports de M. Champion, qui vont jusqu'au 3 de ce mois, il règne au Caire une grande consternation et une disette d'argent excessive. Le Kalsch (digue du Nil près du Caire) fut percé le 1er de ce mois, le Nil ayant atteint une hauteur de 17 jugs et 9 koral. Ce fleuve n'arrive d'ordinaire qu'à la hauteur de 12 jugs et 6 koral. Méhémet Ali craint que la crue ne soit si forte qu'elle mette les digues en danger.

La frégate à vapeur Anglaise "la Gorgone", nous apporte dans ce moment des nouvelles de l'Égypte. Elle rapporte que les troupes de l'Armée d'Arabie et les vaisseaux Anglais stationnés devant cette ville avaient fait voile pour Youla.

Les insurgés de Tripoli opposaient encore une résistance qui, bien que faible, n'était pas sans danger pour les troupes de l'Armée d'Arabie. A Beyrouth et dans ses alentours tout était tranquille, seulement les Albanais continuaient à commettre leurs excès habituels.

J'ai l'honneur, etc.  
Signé) LAURIN

P. S. du 6 au soir.

Méhémet Ali s'est tout-à-coup décidé à quitter Alexandrie pour le 14 à 20 jours et à faire un voyage dans la Province d'Arké (Damiette). Il partira demain matin. La nouvelle des décisions prises au sujet des affaires de ce pays, laquelle vient d'arriver par le bateau à vapeur "Le Cyclope" expédié de Youla, paraît l'avoir consterné. Je le verrai dans une heure et tâcherai d'apprendre quelque chose sur cette détermination subite.



Inclosure 9 in No. 110

M de Laurin to the Baron de Starnay

M. le. Barro.

Alexandrie, le 5 août, 1840, à 11 heures du soir.

JE reviens dans ce moment d'une audience chez Méhémet Ali

Il quitte Alexandrie pour 8 à 10 jours seulement ; les ordres qu'il avait adressés à Ibrahim, pour qu'il eût à concentrer ses armées près du Mont Taurus furent renforcés en dernier lieu. Toutes les troupes disponibles en Syrie sont dirigées sur Marache et Ourfa. Méhémet Ali croit que, jusqu'à la fin de ce mois, les Russes ne pourront pas avancer au premier signal. Il dit que tout est prêt, et que, quand même il ne pourrait rassembler que 5,000 hommes, toutes les populations s'uniraient à eux, et qu'en peu de temps l'Anatolie entière serait en état de révolution. " On ne doit pas se faire illusion," continua-t-il, " la guerre est résolue ; elle commencera dès qu'un vaisseau de guerre ennemi fera mine de bloquer Alexandrie ; il y aura alors ce point que de faire des restitutions." Il ajoute, que cela pourrait mal finir jusqu'à un ruis complet. Quelle horrible et affreuse détermination ! L'Armée du Yémen est arrivée au Caire. Il ignore encore ce qu'il doit faire d'elle. Tantôt il donne l'ordre de l'envoyer tel, tantôt il veut qu'elle reste là où elle se trouve, et finalement il fera partir ces pauvres victimes pour le désert, afin de les envoyer en Syrie par la voie d'El Arach et de Raia.

Il a remis les Villes Saintes (Mecque et Médine) au Chérif Mahomed. Il dit avoir donné à ses troupes irrégulières, et n'en avoir conservé qu'un petit nombre nécessaire au Chérif, et qui ont été remises sur l'ancien pied. Les deux autres Généraux du Hedjaz et du Nedjd, Ahmed et Kourchid Pacha retournent pareillement en Egypte; leurs neuf régimens ont, dit-il, beaucoup souffert, mais ils comptent encore 11,000 hommes qu'il veut expédier en

Tout donc doit se porter en Syrie. C'est là qu'il veut allumer l'incendie qui devra s'étendre sur toute l'Asie, afin que tout s'y précipite pour l'éteindre, et que personne n'attaque son côté vulnérable (la Syrie et l'Égypte). Il tient ferme à ce plan d'actions.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.  
(Signé) LAURIN

No. 111.

*Frederick Douglass to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received September 4.)

No. 1781

My Lord,

Therapia, August 17, 1840

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls at Damascus, Aleppo and Tarsus.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure in No. 111.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Her Majesty's Consuls at Damascus, Aleppo, and Tarsus.*

Sir,

Therese, August 14, 1940.

I HAVE to request that you will exert all your means for obtaining information of any intention, or any act indicating intention on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to assemble his army with a view to march in the direction of

the Bosphorus; and if you see any such indication, you will despatch messengers to me with all the information you can furnish; and I have further to bid that you will not trust to one messenger alone for transmitting intelligence of importance, but employ more.

I have, &c ,  
[Signed] PONSENBY.

No. 112

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received September 4.)

(No 179)

Mr. Linn.

*Therapia*, August 17, 1940.

M. TITOW read me despatches from his Government, stating that the Emperor had ratified the Convention with the greatest pleasure. I know your Lordship will see these despatches and I say nothing more of them.

M Titov cordially agreed to a proposition I made, that the Four Representatives should visit Rechin Pasha to-morrow, for the purpose of giving the Porte encouragement, and of discussing what is to be done. However much the conduct of France may be a cause for regret, there is no reason to have the least fear of the success of her arms, should she act in conformity with her threats.

[illegible]

I have, &c.,  
Signed) PONGONBY

No. 113.

Letter to Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

(No. 160.)

My Land.

Foreign Office, September 4, 1840

I HAVE received this afternoon your Excellency's despatches from No 175 to No 180, both inclusive

With reference to your despatch No. 176, giving an account of the threatening communication made to Rehid Pasha by the French Ambassador, on the 16th of August, with a view to deter the Porte from ratifying the Treaty of the 15th of July, I have to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government cannot for a moment doubt that the sincerity of the Turkish Government will have led it to ratify that Treaty immediately, without the slightest regard to those unworthy measures; and Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that Rehid Pasha has too much penetration not to have seen that those threats were solely intended to intimidate the Porte, and were never meant to be carried into execution. It is most probable, indeed, that as they have failed to produce their intended effect, they will be disavowed by the French Government; and that it will be said at Paris, either that M. de Pontois

exceeded his instructions, or that the French Dragoman delivered his message accordingly.

At all events, it is little creditable to the French Government, that its agents at London and at Constantinople should hold on the same subject, and at the same time, language so diametrically opposite, and that while in London, and indeed at Paris also, through M. Thiers to Lord Granville, France is giving the most positive and unequivocal assurances of peace, it should at Constantinople be threatening the date of a revolutionary war—but the very violence of the menaces of M. de Pontois is a sufficient proof that those menaces were never intended to be followed up by corresponding action.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No 114.

Lord Beaurale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord,

Königsberg, August 27, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a letter to Lord Ponsonby which I omitted to send by the last occasion.

Prince Metternich, after his interview with M. de St. Armand, viz. the 10th inst., has received the French ultimatum, and has answered it by the same day. The French ultimatum, as it is called, is a demand that the Powers should immediately send troops to the East, and that they would be embarrassed with the result. He supported the same opinion to me, of the necessity of doing so, however I expressed a doubt, saying, that the course was not to be taken, but that it was a question how far it could be carried. He answered me, that those who were in favour of such a course, would be struck by the show of force and superiority that such an action would give to France; and that it would produce a revolution in the East, and produce to unstable opinion throughout the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan, and produce revolt against his authority. Prince Metternich made no answer.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 114

Lord Beaurale to Viscount Ponsonby

(Private.)

Dear Ponsonby,

Königsberg, August 30, 1840.

METTERNICH strongly recommends that in case of the occupation of a point on the coast, the French should occupy it, and that the French should have a point in the place, France will immediately occupy it. If you see no objection to this mode, pray take the necessary steps to secure its being adopted. Stopford may probably have a letter to this effect, but if not, I have no doubt of its being sent. Direct to Vienna, and communicate to me. You will be present. I shall be present. Yours, &c.

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No 115.

Lord Beaurale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 115.)

My Lord,

Königsberg, August 29, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship extract of an instruction from Admiral Lalande, which has been transmitted by Admiral Bandiera to Prince Metternich.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Extract of Instruction from Admiral Lalande to the Commander of the French Squadron in Syria.

SUPPONGO caro comandante che non tarderete a vedere una Divisione Inglese in Siria. L'Ambasciatore Inglese in Constantinopoli con una politica tenebrosa spalleggia la rivoluzione del Libano, ed è perciò che ha scritto al Contre Ammiraglio Lons, onde far partire per quella costa una parte della squadra per combattere i rivoltosi e sostenere ed impedire se sia possibile, lo sbarco delle truppe Egizie in quel punto.

Siate molto politico con loro, ma non mischiatevi nella spedizione attuale. Se i profeti Francesi vi domandassero soccorso, fate sapere a loro, che la Francia è disposta a sostenere il loro diritto, sempre però ch'essi sieno notomessi al loro rispettivo Governo. Io non sono il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, ma la conoscenza che ho del paese, come altrove lo spirito che domina nel nostro Governo, credo di non sbagliare dandovi un tal consiglio.

No. 116

Lord Beaurale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 118.)

(Extract.)

Königsberg, August 30, 1840.

AN Estafette having arrived yesterday evening from Constantinople, Prince Metternich immediately sent for Count Maltshan and myself, and read with us the despatches from Baron Stürmer and Count Königsmarck, which coincide with the report inclosed in Lord Ponsonby's No. 126, with some modification, however, in M. de Testa's account of the language held to Rechid Pasha by M. Franceschi, as received by him from the mouth of his Excellency. The difference, however, does not affect the substance of the message of which M. Franceschi was the bearer, and Prince Metternich, in reading the despatches, commented with great severity on the conduct of France, while I applied myself chiefly to pressing upon his attention, that it is the interest of Mehmet Ali to bring France forwards, and that by putting the army of Ibrahim Pasha in movement, and thereby necessitating the arrival of the Russians at Constantinople, he has the power of doing so; from whence it results, according to present appearances, that peace or war are in his hands.



*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received September 4.)

My Lord,

Königsberg, August 30, 1940.

He began by stating to Prince Metternich, that in a conversation between M. Guizot and Baron Bülow, the latter had admitted that some device for reuniting France to the Four Powers, might by possibility be hit upon by Prince Metternich, if it were tried at Vienna. To this the Prince at once answered, that it was a piece of stupidity; and that Austria would not consent that the negotiation should be transferred there; speaking so decidedly as to impose silence on that head.

M. de St. Aulaire then produced the instructions to M. Cochelet and M. Périer, notifying that both these gentlemen had utterly failed, and that Mehmet Ali would make no concession whatever.

Prince Metternich, after prefacing his conversation by declaring it to be entirely private and unofficial, as in his Ministerial character he was resolved not to speak one word except in London, declared himself to be perfectly satisfied with the language held by both those gentlemen, as well as with the instructions to them as far as they went, remarking, however, that they were short of what was wanted. "What is necessary," he said, "is to have a more explicit declaration from the Emperor that he will not permit any further concessions whatever."

for her to satisfy at once the Sultan in his wish for protecting Mohemet Ali in Egypt, and the Sultan within his present limits, leaving at the same time Syria to be contended for by arms. M de St Aulaire did not controvert this; but I fear it would be found difficult in practice, and though it might be a reasonable course for France, it would hardly answer as a justification for M Thiers in the steps which he has taken.

I further pointed out to M. de St. Aulaire, the danger to which Mehmet Ali is exposing himself by the game he is playing, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] with him, he may be swept out of Egypt as well as Syria, without it being in the power of France to stir for his assistance.

All the projects for the reunion of France to the Four Powers, which have as yet been communicated to Prince Metternich as having received the sanction of any French Agent, have repined upon the supposition that the Four Powers are to begin by retracting the acts they have signed. This, Prince Metternich declares to be utterly inadmissible, so that, if France is in earnest wishing that reunion to take place, she must seek it in another direction.

According to the reports from Paris and London, there exists a wish and expectation that Prince Metternich should bring forward a plan by which this war is to be effected. This plan has been already proposed by him. It is, that France should declare her continued adhesion to the principles of the Collective Note, that she should separate herself from the coercive measures intended to enforce them; that she should protect Mehemet Ali in Egypt, that she should do the same by the Sultan within his present limits; that she should leave the question of Syria to be decided between the Four Powers and Mehemet Ali, and, that she should notify these intentions at Constantinople, and to the Four Powers.

is Prince Metetrnich's plan, and it is useless to expect any other (from him at present)

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

*Lord Beauregard to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received September 4.)

My Lord

Königsberg, August 31, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH was to have gone to Paris to-day, and I intended to have left Konigswart for Vienna yesterday evening, but he came to me in the morning, and said, that if he were to persist in this intention, he should be separated from the Ambassadors for ten days, which might be fertile of events of the highest interest. He therefore proposed to me to remain here, in which case he would request M. de St. Aulaire to return a few days upon M. de St. Aulaire to fix himself here, when he should leave Marienbad. He further stated, that he had sent for that Ambassador, in order to show him the last reports from Constantinople, adding, that he should immediately dispatch a courier to Paris, and call upon the French Government to explain itself, awaiting the answer at this, the nearest point in the Austrian dominions to Paris, as the Emperor would not wish to be understood as being in communication with the French Government.

...the attitude to be assumed by Austria. "I regret you."

to explain to M. Thiers, that it is with the utmost regret I enter upon this course of conduct, you have seen me the most conciliating of men; and I still am so where conciliation is possible; but this declaration of France to the Turkish Government is an act of madness. . . . that I am forced to avow to myself, that there is no going on with a Power which so conducts itself. You see me strongly moved, but it is Metternich who is speaking to St. Aulaire, when I show you my despatches, you will find in it the calm which one Minister should show in addressing another. When, he continued, can answer for the consequences of such acts as these; suppose the Turks, in a moment of alarm, were to call the Russians to their aid, who would have brought them to Constantinople? I promise you that if ever there, they would not go away till the whole affair should be ended, and I take care, that in that case their presence there would not be due to Turkey, nor to the Four Powers, but to France." M. de St. Aulaire having attempted to excuse the proceeding, as having been dictated by the first irritation arising from *amour-propre*, Prince Metternich answered, that *amour-propre* was not a word to be used in affairs, that there were always two *amour-propres*, and that if each were to be indulged, encounters between them would embroil the world, "*C'est une maladie*," he added, "*qu'il ne faut pas caresser*." The Prince's despatches to Paris are not yet finished, and as they will surely be sent on to London, I shall not delay Mr Mellish, in order to give an account of them.

It is impossible to suppose the conduct of M de Pontois to have been  
 Prince Metternich looks upon it in this light; and these strong  
 demonstrations of his are therefore only to be looked upon as a part of his game.  
 He feels sure that the act of M de Pontois will be disavowed. He feels equally  
 sure that it was engaged him from Paris, and he therefore seizes upon the  
 gross fault which has been committed by the French Government, in order to  
 use it against them to the utmost, and to draw from it every possible advantage  
 for himself and his Allies. The circumstance, however, is a most fortunate one

for us, as France will either be compelled to enter into satisfactory explanations, or, if she should withhold them, Austria, from the tone she has assumed, will be forced to support it by acts.

I have asked Prince Metternich, what is his object in keeping the Ambassadors together and near himself and what use he means to make of them when the answer of France shall arrive? He has assured me, that his only purpose is to employ them as a means of communication with their Governments.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 119.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 128.)

My Lord,

Königsberg, August 31, 1840.

DESPATCHES were received late last night from Baron Neumann, and were hastily and imperfectly read to me. All I collect from them is, that Baron Buloz and King Leopold have been engaged in a sort of intrigue for displacing the negotiation from London, and transferring it first to Vienna, and then to Constantinople, and that Baron Neumann has in some measure given in to it.

I have already stated to your Lordship, that Prince Metternich had pronounced himself against this project; and upon this occasion he renewed his protest against it with additional force, saying that if an attempt were made to transfer the negotiation, which he had set up at London, it would never be got together again; and that an attempt to carry on a simultaneous negotiation in two places would lead to destruction, and that in this affair Vienna is nothing; and that there he will neither listen nor speak officially, but will send everything to London.

I learn in confidence from other persons, that if the negotiation were removed from London, it is more than probable that Russia would withdraw from it.

The Prince was much pleased with your Lordship's conversation with M. Guizot, as reported by Baron Neumann.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 120.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 126, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 9, 1840.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 109, of the 27th ultimo, inclosing a letter which you had addressed to Lord Ponsonby recommending that in case any point on the coast of Syria should be occupied by Her Majesty's forces, that point should be so occupied in the name of the Sultan, I have to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your Excellency's suggestion, which is in strict conformity with the spirit of the Instructions sent to Sir R. Stopford. Her Majesty's Government at the same time very much doubt the intention of the French Government to occupy Smyrna in case of the occupation by the British forces of any point on the coast of Syria; and they are rather inclined to think that M. de St. Aulaire's intimation to that effect is only a part of a general system of menace by which the French Government has imagined it could intimidate the Four Powers, and prevent them from acting in concert.

When His Majesty the King of the Belgians was in England, I mentioned to Lord Beaumont that Her Majesty's Government had received information from Paris

that the French Government intended to send an expedition to take possession of Candia, and I represented to His Majesty what an outrage such a proceeding would be upon the rights of the Sultan, whom the French Government professes its desire to support and to protect, and I said that an act so dishonourable on the part of France would deprive her of the good opinion and confidence of every other Power, and must lead to very serious consequences. His Belgian Majesty assured me that he did not believe that any such scheme would be carried into execution; that M. Thiers might possibly have proposed such a plan, but that he was convinced that the King of the French never would consent to any thing of the kind.

If France were to occupy any part of the Sultan's dominions, it would be necessary for the Allies to call upon her immediately to state with what view, for what purpose, and on what pretence she did so, and whether to aid the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, or to aid Mehemet Ali against the Sultan? It does not, however, seem likely that the French Government would lightly take a step which might involve her in such serious discussions with the other Powers of Europe.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 121.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 128.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 9, 1840.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 119, of the 30th ultimo, reporting what passed between Prince Metternich and M. de St. Aulaire, and M. de St. Aulaire and your Excellency, with reference to the project made by France that some device for reuniting France to the Four Powers might possibly be hit upon by Prince Metternich if it were tried at Vienna, I have to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve generally the language held to M. de St. Aulaire. Her Majesty's Government, however, consider that it would be inexpedient and dangerous to suggest to the French Government that France should protect Mehemet Ali in Egypt, because this would be to sanction the interference of France between a Sovereign and his hereditary subject for the purpose of collecting tribute against his Sovereignty.

It is perfectly consistent with established usage and with the friendly relations existing between the Sultan and the Powers of Europe, that the Powers of Europe should assist the Sultan against his subject, but it would not be consistent with these relations, nor with a restoration of peace between France and the Porte, that France should by force protect Mehemet Ali in Egypt against the arms of the Sultan, and such protection afforded by France to Mehemet Ali would in fact be an act of direct war by France against the Sultan.

I have further to state that Her Majesty's Government never have wished or expected any new plan from Prince Metternich.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 122.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

No. 131.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 9, 1840.

WITH reference to the content of your Excellency's despatch No. 121 of the 27th ultimo, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with Prince Metternich in the opinion that it would be inexpedient to



transfer the negotiations on Turkish affairs from London to Vienna, as suggested by Baron Bülow, and they think so for the reasons assigned by Prince Metternich.

Baron Bülow mentioned this idea to me, but I stated to him that I thought it impracticable.

I am &c  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 123

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 5.)

No. 61.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 40 inclusive.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I made an official communication of your Lordship's despatch No. 36, to the President of the Council, with whom I have since conversed as to its contents, though he was at that time but imperfectly acquainted with them; his principal object, however, seemed to be to ascertain whether your Lordship made any proposition relative to a change in the Treaty of the 15th of July, and I understand that he has since expressed to others, though he did not to me, his disappointment that such was not the case.

A variety of rumours, proceeding from persons supposed to have official information as to such a circumstance, had, indeed, for the last few days been prevalent as to the despatch which I have observed by my despatch of 28th August, marked "Confidential;" and these idle reports, by now creating a sort of disappointment, may unfortunately interfere with the good effects which the confidence in the official statement of your Lordship were otherwise so well calculated to produce.

M. Thiers, however, spoke to me with much calm, and said, that it was far from his wish to appear in any way to menace or to alarm Her Majesty's Government; such an attempt, he added, would, he knew, be frivolous and ineffectual, but at the same time he thought it his duty to state, that he was thoroughly convinced that Mehmet Ali would not make the concessions that were required from him; and that also, on referring to the words he made use of with respect to his own measures, he (M. Thiers) was almost persuaded, those words being "that he would not resort to aggressive measures unless he was himself attacked," that the Pasha would consider even a blockade an attack, and that, consequently, every probability existed of instructions being sent to Ibrahim Pasha to cross the Taurus.

I replied to M. Thiers, that such an event would, doubtless, be one of a very serious character, and that I could not say it would not happen, but that I still entertained some hopes that, placed in the face of the perils of so unequal a contest, Mehmet Ali would yet, though at the last moment, yield, and thus afford the happiest termination to our present differences.

I should, however, inform your Lordship, that I have since learnt from private sources, that there may be some reason to fear that the Viceroy of Egypt may adopt the hazardous project to which M. Thiers alludes, though I cannot but at the same time believe, that the people who hear and report his observations are not sufficiently aware that no person in the East ever talks of giving way, until the moment at which he finally resolves to abandon all resistance, is arrived, but, be this as it may, I have the satisfaction of being able to observe to your Lordship, that the warlike feelings which, but a short time since, were so general throughout this country, seem at present to be rather dying away, under the influence of a variety of circumstances calculated to produce such a result.

The attempt to call out the national guard in the great towns has, in many cases, been found too hazardous. At the same time, the municipal authorities and principal persons declared that they must quit the country, and that, in short, begin to see that the mighty efforts of 1793

could hardly be effected without its revolution. I am persuaded, also, that the quiet but various measures which have lately been adopted by the Assembly have had their effect here, and no more comparisons are made of the respective navies besides the rumours I believe most unfounded respecting M. Thiers and the recent speculations, by having weakened his popularity, have made him more dependent upon the King; while the publication of the Memorandum has removed a variety of erroneous impressions in short the reaction to which from the first I looked forward amongst the more quiet and mature part of the population is taking place.

At the same time, many circumstances may arise out of the present state of affairs in the East which would almost compel the present President of the Council to act up to the tone which he has allowed his agents to use, and has in fact already employed, and in that case, of course, his resignation as an alternative which he would not be obliged to say whether he might not then be bound to violate his commands, or words more precise whether as head of a powerful position in a position to the very advantage of the army, which is now distinguished by the might and prestige of the effects of a war policy, or one of those warlike passions which would be considered as being somewhat relaxed, and for which it may always be well during a crisis, and the present to be prepared.

I have, &c,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 124

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 7.)

No. 37

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 20, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 38 inclusive, were delivered to me on the 20th instant by the messenger Waring.

I called yesterday on Count Nesselrode for the purpose of learning if he had received any intelligence from the Levant, but he said that nothing whatever had arrived, or had any fresh light been thrown on the Eastern Question since our conversation last week. His Excellency read me the latest despatches from Paris and London; they did not, however, contain matter worthy of much remark. The intelligence reported in a private letter from Count Pahlen, which he also read, was similar to that enclosed to me in your Lordship's No. 36. The language of M. Thiers is described as greatly altered and become much more calm, since he had received accounts of the ratifications of the Convention of the July 15, having been despatched to London.

Count Nesselrode in speaking on this subject expressed his regret at the reservation made by the Prussian Cabinet,—that Prussia could only be considered as called upon to give her moral weight in carrying out the provisions of the Convention; saying, that a remark of the kind was perfectly useless, as nobody looked for active co-operation from her; but his Excellency said, that he deplored her other declaration,—that if war resulted, she should not consider herself bound to take part in it,—as being a departure from the principles of the alliance, and that if this became known to France, its effects might be baneful. Count Nesselrode added that this declaration was confidentially made to the Four Powers, and that it was resolved to keep it secret from France. I told his Excellency that I did not consider the cause of the Alliance weakened by this declaration, as he apprehended by this proceeding, for if Prussia could not assist in active operations in the Levant, the fact of her peaceful intentions in Europe (should they become known), must act as a security against war, and deprive France of a pretext that might be raised for attacking the Rhenish provinces. If Prussia armed, as France was doing, a collision might be inevitable, and, at all events, the immediate cause of jealousy and misunderstanding was removed.

I inquired if any further instructions had been sent about the march

of troops from the Crimea, and his Excellency said not. He seemed to hope that the presence of a Russian force before Constantinople would yet be unnecessary; but he said, that in three or four days he should receive fresh news from Alexandria, which he would immediately communicate to me. His Excellency finished with the observation that he should like to hear of the disembarkation of a couple of thousand British soldiers in Egypt; that that country was quite unprovided at the present moment with any means of resistance; he thought the greatest confusion would be thereby caused to Mehemet Ali, and that a general insurrection against his authority might follow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 125

Viscount Palmerston to M. Guizot.

Foreign Office, September 9, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with what was agreed upon between himself and M. Guizot, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of the French at this Court, in their recent interview, has the honour to transmit to M. Guizot an extract from a despatch received by Her Majesty's Government a few days ago from Lord Ponsonby, together with a copy of the instructions referred to.

Her Majesty's Government was convinced, even before the Undersigned had the honour of showing these papers to M. Guizot, that the message which had been conveyed to the Porte by M. de Pontonis must have been dictated by the person who delivered it, and that M. de Pontonis must have made such a communication entirely without instructions or authority from his own Government, and indeed, in direct opposition to the spirit of the instructions which he had received, because the language used upon this occasion by M. de Pontonis was directly at variance with the language which has been held by the French Government to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, by M. Guizot to Her Majesty's Government in London, and, as far as Her Majesty's Government are informed, by the French Agents at Alexandria to Mehemet Ali. For, at Paris, M. Guizot, in his speech, long ago from the meeting held at the Chateau d'Eu, declared that the strictest orders had been sent to the French Admirals in the Levant, to avoid anything which might lead to collision between the French and British ships of war; in London, M. Guizot, both before and since his visit to the Chateau d'Eu, has always stated to the Undersigned, that the armaments of France are purely precautionary, and in no respect whatever aggressive; that France intends to remain for the present entirely quiet; but thinking that the measures which the Four Powers are about to take in the Levant may, by possibility, lead to events which might affect the general balance of power, or alter the state of possession of the Powers of Europe, or, in some way or other, bear upon the direct interests of France, the French Government had deemed it right to place itself in an attitude of observation at Alexandria, the French Agents are understood to have informed Mehemet Ali, that France has no intention whatever of taking up arms in his support. It was therefore obvious to Her Majesty's Government, that the M. de Pontonis's communication, authorized by the French Government to hold, at Constantinople, a language directly the reverse of that which had been held by the French Government everywhere else; and the more especially, as the language held by M. de Pontonis is directly at variance with all the public and official declarations, made by the French Government, of the principles upon which the policy of France, with regard to the Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, is founded.

The Undersigned has great pleasure in acknowledging that the con-

viction thus felt by Her Majesty's Government has been confirmed by the belief expressed to him by M. Guizot upon this matter, on which, however M. Guizot stated that he had received no information from his own Government, of which he knew nothing but what the Undersigned had said before him. The Undersigned therefore in transmitting to M. Guizot the accompanying papers, in order that they may be made known to the French Government, begs to assure M. Guizot that he makes this communication in consequence of any doubt which Her Majesty's Government might have entertained as to the truth of the statement of M. de Pontonis, and it is fitting that, in a matter of such deep importance to the French Government, the French Government should have been assured of the truth of the statement which is reported to have been used by one of its Agents, and from that which the French Government itself has received.

The Undersigned has, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.

Extra.

Therapia, August 17, 1840.

RECHID PASHA sent M. Franceschi to me this morning, to communicate a message the Pasha has received from the French Ambassador, M. de Pontonis, French Ambassador. M. de Pontonis, who was with me on the 15th, delivered his message to me, which I communicated to M. Franceschi and presented to the Prince Metternich, during the transmission of which I saw the Pasha's copy, and that which was sent to the French Ambassador, which I saw from the Pasha's copy.

M. Franceschi said that Rechid Pasha's statement that he is aware of the privacy of the situation of the affairs of the Sultan's Government, and that he is aware of the situation of the affairs of the Sultan's Government.

With the concurrence of M. de Sturmer, I desired M. Franceschi to tell the French Ambassador, Rechid Pasha, that the Sultan's Government is aware of the situation of the affairs of the Sultan's Government.

I added, that the Internuncio and myself, and I doubted not our colleagues, were all agreed to give Rechid Pasha the same answer.

I was to a certain degree prepared for the hostility of France by what passed at a visit made by M. Titow to the French Ambassador, who, at that time, was of a very hostile nature, and he thought war between France and the Sultan's Government was inevitable. This appeared to me to manifest a very improper levity in the Ambassador, or, at least, a very improper levity in the Ambassador, or, at least, a very improper levity in the Ambassador, or, at least, a very improper levity in the Ambassador.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125

Baron Sturmer to Prince Metternich.

See Inclosure in No. 109, p. 112.]



Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 7, 1840.

YOUR Lordship may be aware that Count Appony having received from Prince Metternich a report from Baron Stürmer as to the conduct of the French Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed to ascertain clearly from M. Thiers, whether that Ambassador was ever authorized by his Government to inform the Porte that in the event of the Sultan's becoming party to the Treaty of the 15th of July, France would appeal from such a policy to the Mahomedan population, and even assist Mehemet Ali against the Four Powers. Having learnt that in conformity with such Instructions, Count Appony had waited on the President of the Council, and that he had been informed that the Emperor had been informed of this interview, and that the language used was neither so delicate nor civil;—"Vous pouvez dire à Rochus Pacha qu'il n'a rien vu de tout cela;" words; and then entering into some sort of explanation, he observed, that M. de Pontenis might have said, that France would appeal to the opinions of the Mahomedan population, but not to the population itself, and that he (M. de Pontenis) might also have warned the Porte that there were certain acts of coercion which France would not tolerate; but that his (M. de Pontenis) was not authorized to say more than that he strictly conformed to the circumstances that occurred.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 18, 1840.

I PROPOSED to my colleagues that we should be taken to avoid exposing the Turkish squadron and troops to any risk of being molested by the French, and for that purpose, it was settled that I should write privately to Captain Walker, and desire him to delay the squadron at the Dardanelles, until he should have had communication by letter with Admiral Stopford. I acted accordingly this day, and the squadron is to sail to-morrow.

My Colleagues and myself were of opinion that it was best not to say anything of this to the Ottoman Ministers, lest they should imagine that we were influenced by fear; and I therefore enjoined Captain Walker not to mention the matter to anybody, and to make some pretext for the slight delay.

The Consul at the Dardanelles is instructed to forward Captain Walker's letter to the Admiral. I know the Admiral had but one ship, and that he might be exposed to attack, and however improbable that might be, I thought it right to have the Turkish squadron secured.

I enclose a report which I requested Captain Walker to send upon the subject of the squadron and his appointment to the command. I trust your Lordship will approve of the firmness with which Captain Walker resisted the purpose of the Capudan Pasha to place an Admiral in the line-of-battle ship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 17, 1840.

IN compliance with your request, I have the honour to transmit a statement of the particulars relative to my appointment to command of the Turkish naval force about to proceed to the coast of Syria.

On the 6th instant, the Capudan Pasha informed me that the Sultan, as well as the Council, had decided on giving me the command of the Ottoman naval force, consisting of one ship of the line, two frigates, and two corvettes, intended to act in concert with the combined forces of the Allied Powers; adding, that as I should be the Sultan's Representative as well as his Commander, it was necessary that I should be provided, as well as the honour of the nation, should be provided, and added, that he hoped the afflicting intelligence he had just heard,—the death of my child,—would not prevent my acceding to their wish. My reply was, that although my loss was severe, I would not allow private feelings to interfere with public duty; I therefore accepted their offer, and begged to be permitted to leave Constantinople never have cause to regret the confidence they had honoured me with. After this communication, everything proceeded with the greatest expedition, and on the 8th a frigate and corvette left to join Sir Robert Stopford. On that day I pointed out to the Capudan Pasha the necessity of appointing a proper Commander of the force, and I thought my orders were properly executed, as well as to superintend the preparations. On the 10th the Capudan Pasha informed me that Ibrahim Bey was to be placed under my command, to represent the Turks, and to see that my orders were strictly obeyed. To which I replied, that if such was their decision, I must beg to decline the command, as he had the rank of a Major, and was not a superior officer to the Turkish service. He was not at all deterred by this, and on the 11th he returned to the Pasha, and I am confident that the moment we left Constantinople no attention would be paid to the orders I might give. He pressed this point hard, and requested me to think of it, and give him my decision on the following day. To this I replied, that it did not require a second thought, and that I had quite made up my mind not to accept the command on those conditions. The following day he informed me that everything had been arranged; that the man I named should be appointed to the line-of-battle ship, and that he should have most positive instructions to see that all orders were strictly obeyed. I thought it necessary to mention this arrangement. The chief officers of the squadron have been assembled and told by the Capudan Pasha, in my presence, that I had been appointed to the command of the squadron, and that all orders issued by me were to be obeyed as if proceeding from himself, in addition to which, the Capudan Pasha has written to the Commander of the squadron, to see that all orders were strictly obeyed.

I have now only to inform your Lordship, that the line-of-battle ship left Constantinople on the 12th instant, and is now at the Dardanelles, where she remains with the frigate and corvette, waiting the arrival of the transports; and I fully expect we shall be able to leave this on Wednesday evening the 19th instant, with the following vessels, namely, one ship of the line, one frigate, one corvette, and one transport, for whole having on board 5,500 troops.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) B. W. WALKER,  
Captain, R. N.













qu'elles renfermaient d'outrageant pour une Puissance indépendante, et de révolutionnaire.

Il fallait donc croire que M. de Pontois pour se tirer d'affaire, ne se fait aucun scrupule de donner aujourd'hui un démenti formel à Réchid Pacha, auquel il est peut-être bien aisé de susciter par là quelque désagrément, et de commencer ainsi à miner l'administration actuelle. Voilà ce qui nous devons tirer au clair dans l'intérêt de Réchid Pacha et de la vérité. Je suis convenu avec MM. le Comte de Königsmarck et Titow, que j'enverrais dès le lendemain le Baron Testa chez le Pacha pour informer ce Ministre de l'intrigue ourdie contre lui et l'avertir de se mettre en garde. J'ai chargé M. de Testa de lui lire non seulement ma dépêche à votre Altesse qui contient le message tel qu'il a été rendu par M. Franceschi, mais aussi celui que lui-même m'avait adressé, et de me rendre un compte fidèle des observations auxquelles ces deux pièces auraient pu avoir donné lieu de la part du Pacha, ainsi que des passages, s'il y en a, qu'il trouverait inexactes ou dont sa mémoire ne pourrait garantir l'authenticité.

Votre Altesse daignera voir, par le rapport ci-joint de M. de Testa, comment il s'est acquitté de cette commission. A ce rapport s'est trouvé annexé un autre, rectifié par le message de l'Ambassadeur de France que Réchid Pacha a souscrit de sa propre main pour attester la vérité de son contenu. En comparant les assertions qui s'y trouvent avec celles que renferme le message tel qu'il nous a été rendu par M. Franceschi, on est obligé de convenir que, quelle que soit la différence des termes et l'ordre dans lequel se suivent les idées, les points principaux restent les mêmes.

M. Franceschi nous a dit que "le Gouvernement Français unirait ses efforts à ceux de Méhémet Ali pour soulever les populations d'Asie et d'Europe." Réchid Pacha ne garantit pas cette expression, mais bien celle que la France est toujours en fait contre l'administration actuelle de la Turquie; qu'elle fera connaître ses intentions à toute la Nation Musulmane; et qu'elle favorisera toutes les communications et tous les échanges commerciaux au système politique actuel.

Cela ne s'appelle-t-il pas soulever ou révolutionner un pays? La propagande la plus zélée ne saurait aller plus loin.

M. Franceschi nous a dit, en outre, que la France, loin d'employer son influence morale auprès du Pacha pour le porter à la soumission, lui accordera toute assistance qui est en son pouvoir pour l'aider à résister à une intervention étrangère. D'après le rapport rectifié du Baron Testa, cette menace n'aurait été que conditionnelle, c'est-à-dire, elle ne serait effectuée que si les intérêts et la dignité de la France l'exigent. Mais M. de Pontois n'a pas déclaré que le Gouvernement, le Roi et la nation, considéraient la Convention comme une injure? Or, ce dernier mot annonce une atteinte tellement sensible portée à la dignité de la France, qu'il était bien permis de considérer le cas où la menace devait s'effectuer comme déjà existant.

Réchid Pacha, avec qui j'ai passé la soirée hier, m'a dit que la perfidie des Français était révoltante. Il m'a raconté que le message que M. de Pontois lui avait fait faire et qu'il voudrait nier aujourd'hui, a été fait à tous les fonctionnaires publics, qu'on s'était servi envers plusieurs d'entre eux de termes encore beaucoup plus forts qu'envers lui; que M. Cor a dit au Grand Vizir, que "le Gouvernement Français voudrait pouvoir faire annoncer du haut de chaque minaret ce qu'il venait de lui dire de la part de son Ambassadeur;" que l'on ne s'était pas borné à ces communications incendiaires, mais qu'on s'était efforcé de répandre le message de M. de Pontois dans le public, et que tous les habitants de Constantinople en avaient été informés presque en même temps que lui; que M. Cor avait dit à M. Rouet (le Secrétaire particulier de Réchid Pacha), que la France était déterminée à faire éloigner toute l'administration actuelle et ses adhérents, pour parvenir à effectuer un arrangement direct entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali; que M. de Butenval avait dit au même individu, qu'il fallait que quelqu'un réglât dans cette affaire et que ce ne serait pas la France.

Toutes ces preuves réunies ne sauraient laisser le moindre doute sur la mauvaise foi de l'Ambassade de France, qui a voulu se tirer d'une situation odieuse par un mensonge qui, je n'en doute pas, aura du retentissement dans le monde, et dont la diplomatie prendra acte pour redoubler désormais de précaution dans les affaires auxquelles la France sera appelée à intervenir. Réchid Pacha regrette comme de raison, de n'avoir pas dit à M. Cor dans le temps, qu'un message aussi important que celui qu'il venait de lui faire, ne saurait être communiqué que par écrit, afin que l'on ne puisse pas se méprendre sur la valeur des termes.

Parmi les raisons que j'ai agitées plus haut qui ont pu faire agir le Gouvernement Français dans cette circonstance, il faut que j'ajoute encore celle de ne pas vouloir empêcher la sortie des vaisseaux et des troupes de débarquement que nous pressons de tous nos moyens, ainsi que ceux d'arrêter Méhémet Ali et de lui prêter un appui moral par un langage aussi péremptoire tenu à la Porte et dont il n'aura pas manqué d'informer d'avance le Pacha d'Égypte.

Outre la communication faite par M. de Pontois aux Quatre Représentants, cet Ambassadeur en a adressé une pour le même objet par vent, à Réchid Pacha. Sa lettre se trouve ci-jointe ainsi que la réponse de ce dernier.

J'ai l'honneur &c  
(Signé) PALMERSTON

No 133

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No 132

My Lord

Foreign Office, September 10, 1840

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the Note which you transmit with the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia addressed to the Porte on the 11th of August, and of which a copy is enclosed in your despatch, No. 173, of that day.

I am, &c  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No 131

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No 131

My Lord

Foreign Office, September 14, 1840

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which is reported in your despatch, No. 182, your Excellency and yourself took for the purpose of assuring Réchid Pacha of the terms of the Convention between you, and of your mutual attention to its maintenance, which you have given to your respective Courts with reference to the Convention of the 15th of July.

I am, &c  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No 130

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No 130

My Lord

Foreign Office, September 15, 1840

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the message which is reported in your despatch, No. 181, your Excellency took to assure the Turkish squadron under Captain Walker, from being attacked by the French fleet.

I have at the same time to instruct your Excellency to inform Captain Walker that Her Majesty's Government very much approve the judgment and decision with which he resists the attempt of the Capudai Pasha to capture the Turkish command of the Turkish squadron by the aid of an Austrian ship.

I have likewise to instruct your Excellency to recommend to the Porte to

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equip and send to Captain Walker the Egyptian frigate which has been captured by Commodore Napier; and if there is any difficulty in getting Turkish sailors to man her, the Porte should engage Greeks.

This frigate, if equipped, might be placed under the command of Count Nagest.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 136.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 75)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of two despatches addressed by me to our Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, and which were forwarded to his Excellency by a recent opportunity.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 136

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 16, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant, containing your instructions, to which I shall faithfully conform. In compliance with the desire there expressed, that the Convention should be widely promulgated in Syria, I have already sent thither three copies of that instrument, and I have directed the Consuls at Damascus, Aleppo, and Beirut, to exert every effort towards forwarding the intentions of your Excellency.

A copy of the Convention, and the consequent instructions of Viscount Palmerston, I forwarded as early as the 10th of August but many reasons caused me to exercise my discretionary power of keeping secret the determination of the Four Powers until the arrival of the Sultan's Envoy. Among these motives, one of the most powerful was, that I could not do otherwise without running great danger of furnishing to the Pasha such early warning of his coming difficulties as might materially assist him in taking precautions, and guarding himself at all points.

On the 11th of August, Rifat Bey reached this port, and was subjected to a reception which excited surprise. He has been lodged very commodiously in the Pasha's sea baths. Both in conjunction with my Colleagues, and alone, I have had with his Excellency several private and confidential interviews. We are all highly gratified by the very judicious choice of the Sublime Porte, whose Envoy displays those rare qualities which render him perfectly equal to the difficult mission with which he is intrusted.

On the 12th instant, the French steamer of war "Tartare," reached Alexandria, having come in eight days from Toulon. She brought despatches for M. Cochet, and also conveyed the Count Walewski, charged with an extraordinary mission to Mehmet Ali. This arrival, and the news from France, which speedily circulated, produced a powerful impression in the city.

The precise object of Count Walewski's mission has not yet been ascertained, but enough has appeared to leave little doubt as to its general character. The Count, in conversations with the Russian Consul-General and with myself, declared openly that he had not come to dissuade Mehmet Ali from accepting the terms of the Convention of the 15th of July; but he added, that he possessed no instructions to advise his acquiescence with those propositions; and that he was directed to inform the Pasha that, as regards the

Egyptian Question France has decided on adopting an armed neutrality, awaiting the further progress of events.

Mehmet Ali is much accustomed to view every communication in the light most favourable to his own interests, and your Excellency can well estimate the effect of a message must have on his ardent and resolute temperament. Hence there can now subsist hardly a doubt as to the fate of Rifat Bey's propositions.

Since our last, Jan. the temporary absence of the Pasha from Alexandria has been the subject of the Turkish papers, and I to Ahmed Pasha to know when they should be allowed to return to their homes? They also had the imprudence to sign a sort of round-robin, which, of course, constituted a grave breach of discipline. It is also pretended, truly or otherwise, that they had entered into a plot, which many say had for object the destruction by fire of both the fleets. The result has been melancholy. Last night, seven superior officers, after having been bitterly upbraided by the Pasha, were sent to the fortress of Aboukir, and thirty-eight officers of inferior rank have been sent as prisoners to the Arsenal.

Since little time since, the army of Arabia entered Egypt. It is commanded by Ibrahim Pasha junior, nephew of Mehmet Ali. Yesterday evening, a first detachment of these troops, conveyed in seven large boats, reached Alexandria.

Measures of precaution and defence continue to be pursued day and night with unremitting activity. The regiments in garrison are paraded with frequency and are diligently exercised in ball-practice, and the general use of their arms.

Every thing tends to lead us to suppose that Mehmet Ali has already finally resolved on a course of resistance as usual as it will prove successful.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

Inclosure 2 in No. 136

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 16, 1840.

ON the arrival of Rifat Bey in Alexandria, Mehmet Ali was absent from thence on a tour of the Delta.

The Pasha returned to this city on the afternoon of the 14th instant. The same evening he was visited by the French Consul-General.

Early this morning, Rifat Bey was liberated from quarantine, and at half-past eight o'clock, a.m., he had his first audience of the Pasha. This was the first time since the arrival of Rifat Bey and the Consuls-General of the four Powers.

It appears that the reception of the Sultan's Envoy was any thing rather than gracious or favourable, but the results of that interview are fully related by Rifat Bey himself, in Minutes which I have now the honour to inclose.

Discouraged by his want of success, Rifat Bey at first proposed an immediate return to Constantinople; but in conjunction with my Colleagues, I represented to him the propriety of awaiting the expiration of the first and second periods of ten days specified in the Convention, and at whose termination it will be proper to make new and formal summonses of compliance. With these suggestions Rifat Bey has fully concurred, and we have exerted our joint efforts to encourage the Envoy and to console him for his recent check.

To-morrow I shall proceed, together with my Colleagues, to wait on Mehmet Ali, and we purpose urging on him respectfully, but most earnestly, the acceptance of the Convention, in the name of the Sultan. It is our duty to make it known to him that the determinations now depend wholly on France, and it is no longer permitted to doubt what are the inclinations of that Power.

This very day in returning a visit of Count Walewski, now residing with the French Consul-General, I had a conversation of some importance both with

the Envoy and with M. Cochelet. The tone of both was full of menace, but it did not strike me that they were yet perfectly certain as to the precise policy of their Government. They evidently await the arrival of the next steam-packet with intense anxiety. Count Walewski, however, told me very distinctly, that backed by the strong manifestation of public opinion in France and highly dissatisfied with the uncourteous communication of Lord Palmerston to his Excellency M. Guizot, the French Cabinet was resolved to resist at once any measures of coercion exercised against Mehemet Ali.

For the purpose of carrying out your Executive that  
concerns the rates are to be adopted, it is essential to strike out other and enter  
yourself in a list. At the same time, not present any protes-  
tation against the rates and your own performance. The so-called  
union is the last step by other persons engaged in the work to avoid opera-  
tions, would be the probable result of the case. As the physician I observe  
that a well-known case and a well-known case.

There's another point to consider I believe to draw attention. The Brits were sent residents to Alexandria as a most important mission, are blamed to have been pushed. I have said remarks for some years that since the British had a navy base Egypt covers the whole theory when I see developments here it will show themselves on the protection of Mahomet Ali. There will be an extremely productive and autonomous development.

It is, however, by which it can be reverted to a certain extent, seems to me to be that it is a good idea. A great deal of trouble has been experienced in the past, and it is therefore the Queen's service should be the same as the service of the State, and that Her Majesty's Government should be able to take the necessary steps to the safety of property of those who shall seek the protection of a State.

I have, &c.  
Sincerely, C. LLOYD BODGES

Inclosure 3 to No. 136

## Report of the Interview between Rifat Bey and Mehmet Ali

**AUJOURD'HUI** Dimanche, à 2 heures à la Turque, son Excellence Rifaat Bey s'est rendu sur invitation expresse chez Médinet Ali, accompagné de son état-major, et le rapport de la réception qu'il en a faite est contenu dans les lignes suivantes :

Après les saluts et les compliments d'usage, le Pacha se trouvant seul avec Rifat Bey, lui demanda en qu'il venait à lui dire, ainsi que la nature de son affaire. Rifat Bey répondit : Monseigneur est appelé à se rendre à la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, à Constantinople, pour assister à la cérémonie de la signature de la paix. Le Pacha, après avoir réfléchi un moment, lui dit : Vous savez bien que vous n'êtes pas encore marié, et que vous n'avez pas encore de femme. Rifat Bey lui répondit : Oui, Monseigneur, mais j'ai une fiancée, et je compte l'épouser à Constantinople. Le Pacha, après avoir réfléchi un moment, lui dit : Vous savez bien que vous n'êtes pas encore marié, et que vous n'avez pas encore de femme. Rifat Bey lui répondit : Oui, Monseigneur, mais j'ai une fiancée, et je compte l'épouser à Constantinople.

A cette lecture, le Grand Vizir Mehmet Ali fit une réponse, aussi bien que celle qu'il fallait à nous dès le début de la négociation. Il commença par dire qu'il était parfaitement instruit de la situation de l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que de la situation des Russes en Europe. "Je m'en donne fort," dit-il, "que l'Empire Ottoman se soit mépris jusqu'à ce jour, sur mes véritables vues, qui n'attendent qu'à chercher les moyens propres pour rendre à l'Empire Ottoman son ancienne force et tous les avantages dont je pourrai être capable, et je regrette vraiment, de voir que vous rejetez si indignement les bons offices que je vous offre. J'ai eu tort d'envoyer Sami à Constantinople, et de lui donner la mission qu'il a eue. Hassan, l'un de mes fils, ainsi que je l'avais toujours cru, le seul qui se soit opposé à l'arrangement de notre affaire; mais aussi tous mes autres collègues qui sont à Constantinople, sont également animés de dispositions hostiles contre moi.

“ Je dois vous faire observer cependant, que du vivant de feu Sultan Mahmoud I. de glorieuse mémoire, on m'a offert la possession héréditaire de l'Égypte et des provinces de Saïda, jusqu'à Tripoli, et on m'a assuré en même temps, que plus tard on s'entendrait aussi, pour ce qui concerne le gouvernement des provinces de la Syrie. Les propositions qu'on me fait maintenant sont évidemment absurdes, et de nature à occasionner ma perte. La France est prête à venir à mon secours, et m'a offert plus d'une fois son intervention, mais je l'ai toujours refusée. Je ne veux ni servir ni protéger les troupes des Puissances Chrétiennes, de ravager le territoire Musulman; et je suis prêt à sacrifier à l'amour de ma nation, ma vie et tout ce que je possède.”

Rufat Bey répondit : — " Les efforts que nous avons toujours employés, et que nous employons encore, ne tendent aussi qu'à un seul et même but, celui de l'indépendance du sort de l'Empire Ottoman et de la Nation Musulmane ; mais permettez-moi de vous dire, que toutes les protestations et les assurances que dans ce sens, votre Altesse a faites jusqu'ici à l'Empire Ottoman, sont restées sans résultat. — Pour moi l'Empire Ottoman n'aurait-il pas voulu vous admettre au nombre de ses Vassaux, pourquoi aurait-il eu recours à l'intervention des Puissances Européennes pour vous mettre à la raison ? Je crois que c'est votre Altesse qui a été la cause que cette affaire est arrivée à ce point ; car si dans le commencement elle avait voulu être moins prétentieuse et plus modérée dans ses demandes, cette question serait arrangée il y a longtemps. Quant à votre animosité contre Hosrew Pacha, elle date de longtemps, nous le savons, mais je dois vous faire observer, nous, que ni Hosrew Pacha, ni les autres Ministres de la Sublime Porte, ne sont en opposition, ainsi que vous le supposez, à la solution de la Question Européenne ; et si maintenant ils agissent autrement envers vous, c'est le nouvel état des choses qui leur en impose l'obligation. Sans Bey lui-même en aurait fait un usage, et eût compté un nombre des fonctionnaires de la Sublime Porte. — Votre Altesse croit que les Ministres de Sa Hautesse sont animés de dispositions hostiles. — Votre Altesse vient de dire que son le Sultan Mahmoud avait refusé de vous accorder la principauté héréditaire des provinces de Sardis, mais je ne puis nullement qu'il ait pu jamais entrer dans l'intention du feu Sultan Mahmoud de lui conférer une telle faveur. Quoiqu'il en soit, votre insistance à ce point vouloir faire abandon d'aucune des provinces qui sont en ce moment sous votre domination, ne prouve que trop, que ce n'est point, ainsi que vous le prétendez, pour me faire craindre tout à l'heure, l'intérêt de l'Empire Ottoman, mais que vous avez réellement en vue votre propre intérêt et celui de votre famille. "

Mahémet Ali ne laissa emporter par ses dernières paroles, et d'un air en colère à Rûst Bey : " Vous êtes un homme cruel, le langage que vous me tenez est tellement opposé à mes vœux qui sont toutes dans les intérêts de la France, que ces paroles là ne sont bonnes qu'à tromper un petit enfant, et pas un de dixante-douze ans."

« Bey lui répondit, " Vous avez tort de me donner la qualification de  
« sans m'avoir connu, et vous m'autorisez ainsi à ne point ajouter foi à  
« des protestations que vous venez de me faire."

« Cette réponse de Rissat Hey, le Pachà se leva tout en riant et se promena quelques instans le long de la chambre, et puis, tout d'un coup, reprit la parole. « Croyez-moi, » dit-il à Rissat Hey, « je n'aime jamais à faire des sermons, et je déteste tous ceux qui ont contracté ce vice ; mais puisque vous m'y obligez, je vous jure sur mon fus et ma parole d'honneur, que je ne pense nullement à mes intérêts, ni à ceux de ma famille, et que je n'ai rien de plus à cœur que de vous des services à mon empire et à ma nation. Le territoire de l'Égypte pourra bien suffire à mes successeurs. »

A ces paroles Rissaf Bey répondit, « Il est du devoir de l'Empire Ottoman de protéger tous ses intérêts ; et il ne serait pas bien avisé de faire le démembrement de son empire. »

Méhémét Ali répondit, "Ce que vous dites n'est point exact, en m'ac-



stamment animé pour le bien de ma nation, vous cherchez à me contraindre de toutes les manières possibles, il ne me reste qu'à chercher à me défendre par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir; et je suis prêt à périr plutôt que d'accepter vos propositions. Voilà ma première et ma dernière réponse.

Rifat Bey répondit: "Ma mission ne consiste qu'à vous faire la notification de l'arrangement arrêté entre les Quatre Grandes Puissances, et d'obtenir votre réponse définitive. Mes instructions ne m'autorisent nullement à employer auprès de vous les voies de persécution pour vous engager à vous y soumettre, et si je le fais maintenant c'est pour prévenir l'effusion du sang, et les conséquences graves auxquelles donnera lieu votre refus d'accepter les propositions de l'arrangement dont il s'agit; et comme il ne dépend que de vous d'éviter tous ces malheurs, je vous laisse la lettre vizirienne qui vous a été expédiée à ce sujet, afin que vous ayez le temps de la lire bien à votre aise et de faire vos réflexions pour me donner une réponse définitive, que je viendrai chercher d'ici à quelques jours." En disant ces paroles, Rifat Bey quitta le Pacha et se rendit auprès de S. Bey, qui lui donna à entendre, que c'était avec un sentiment de déplaisir qu'il avait lu le contenu de la lettre vizirienne, et le langage que je lui ai tenu.

Il m'a dit qu'il était impossible d'exprimer à Rifat Bey les sentiments que j'ai éprouvés en lisant la lettre vizirienne et parlant avec lui. Il m'a dit qu'il était impossible d'exprimer à Rifat Bey les sentiments que j'ai éprouvés en lisant la lettre vizirienne et parlant avec lui. Il m'a dit qu'il était impossible d'exprimer à Rifat Bey les sentiments que j'ai éprouvés en lisant la lettre vizirienne et parlant avec lui. Il m'a dit qu'il était impossible d'exprimer à Rifat Bey les sentiments que j'ai éprouvés en lisant la lettre vizirienne et parlant avec lui.

A ces mots, S. Bey me fit une réponse. "Les instructions qui à cet égard ont été données par la Sublime Porte, sont bien limitées, et pour pouvoir en agir ainsi, elles sont, au contraire, exorbitamment limitées, et ma mission ne consiste, sachez le bien, que d'avoir du Pacha, dans le délai accordé, telle réponse qu'il jugerait à propos de me donner, quelle que d'ailleurs en puisse être la nature.

"Il est très-essentiel aussi de vous faire remarquer, que la nature du Protocole de la Question Orientale conclu en dernier lieu à Londres, ne permet pas à la Sublime Porte d'y déroger aucunement en faveur de votre Chef, quand bien même elle en aurait plus tard le désir. Aussi est-il de mon devoir au moment de prendre au Pacha connaissance de l'arrangement, de lui faire connaître que, si elle ne s'y soumet pas, elle se rendra coupable d'une violation flagrante du Protocole de Londres, et que, par conséquent, elle s'expose à toutes les conséquences qui en résulteront.

Après avoir dit ces choses, S. Bey se retira, et Rifat Bey et Mehmet Ali, avec moi, nous sommes restés seuls.

No. 137

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that on the evening of the 17th inst. I went to the house of the Consul-General to wait upon Mehmet Ali, and we attempted to urge on him respectfully, but earnestly, the advantages of the arrangement proposed by the Four Powers to the Sublime Porte.

His Excellency, however, stopped our representations by a declaration, that his determination was taken. I have the honour to inclose the *procès-verbal* of our interview drawn up by one of my colleagues.

Nothing seems to remain but to await the expiration of the twenty days expressed in the Convention when a last application will be again made to Mehmet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 137

Minute of the Interview between the Consul-General of the Four Powers and Mehmet Ali, on the 17th of August, 1840.

Le 17 Août, à 4 heures de l'après-midi, les quatre Consuls Généraux se réunirent à l'effet de se rendre chez le Pacha et de lui présenter des ordres, dont le contenu est le même de la part des Représentations de Londres, Vienne, Constantinople et Saint-Petersbourg. Rifat Bey et Mehmet Ali se trouvèrent seuls. Les quatre Consuls Généraux se rendirent vers le Palais du Vice-Roi, traversant la place d'Alexandrie et arrivant au quartier du Pacha, où ils furent reçus par le Pacha lui-même.

Après les premières complaisances d'usage, et quelques paroles de bienvenue sur l'arrivée des Représentations de Londres, Vienne, Constantinople et Saint-Petersbourg, le Pacha se mit à lire la lettre vizirienne.

Après avoir lu la lettre vizirienne, le Pacha se mit à lire la lettre des quatre Consuls Généraux. Il lut avec beaucoup d'attention, et après avoir fini, il dit: "C'est une belle lettre, mais nous avons appris la réponse que vous avez donnée à l'Envoyé de la Sublime Porte, et elle n'est pas satisfaisante; mais nous espérons qu'une plus longue réflexion vous fera accepter les stipulations qui vous ont été proposées."

Après avoir dit ces choses, le Pacha se mit à lire la lettre des quatre Consuls Généraux. Il lut avec beaucoup d'attention, et après avoir fini, il dit: "C'est une belle lettre, mais nous avons appris la réponse que vous avez donnée à l'Envoyé de la Sublime Porte, et elle n'est pas satisfaisante; mais nous espérons qu'une plus longue réflexion vous fera accepter les stipulations qui vous ont été proposées."

Nous répondîmes que nous nous flattions, malgré cette réponse, qu'il finirait par prendre une résolution plus conforme aux vœux de son Cours, à ceux de la Sublime Porte, et compatible avec le repos général.

M. le Consul Général reprit le Pacha, et dit: "Je vous prie de ne pas faire d'inutiles efforts pour me faire changer d'avis, car vous n'y réussirez point. Je ne me soumettrai jamais à des conditions déshonorantes pour moi."

"Les clauses du Traité ne sont nullement déshonorantes pour vous," lui répondîmes. "elles ne peuvent l'être, puisqu'elles sont fondées sur la justice." Les circonstances ne sont plus les mêmes aujourd'hui, votre position a changé; vous ne sauriez dorénavant vous flatter d'obtenir de la Porte les mêmes avantages qu'autrefois. Vous devez vous résigner à ce que vous trouvez dans le Traité, et vous ne pouvez rien attendre de plus.

Le Pacha répondit alors à notre proposition de se retirer pour parler avec nous, et dit: "Je vous répondrai de même: de cette manière nous évitons toute discussion désagréable."

Nous consentîmes, sur sa demande, à changer de sujet, mais tout en lui exprimant qu'il était autant du devoir de notre charge comme de celle de l'intérêt que nous lui portions, de l'engager, par tous les moyens en notre pouvoir, à écouter la voix de la prudence et de la modération, à ne point se précipiter à des extrémités qui pourraient avoir les conséquences les plus

finances tant pour la suppression que pour la transformation de la loi que nous nous réservons de continuer à revenir sur ce sujet dans un prochain rapport. Il faut aussi noter que la loi sur la décentralisation a une finalité de ramener les dépenses de l'Etat à des niveaux et pour lesquels avec les intentions de la loi de décentralisation, nous nous sommes fixé des objectifs.

Les oracles de l'avenir ne se réalisent pas sur des objets plus ou moins en fait ou en apparence, mais sur des choses plus réelles. L'écriture avec le papyrus est une œuvre métaphysique.

No. 174

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 77.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 19, 1960

I RECEIVED yesterday morning a visit from Count Walewski, special Envoy from the Court of the Tsar to M. de Moltke.

When I had last the honour of meeting Count Walewski with M. Cochelet, the latter told me that the Count was in the country. He said that he had just been informed by a friend of his that he was staying at a certain place for the first step of his journey from Warsaw to London, and that he would be there for a few days. He said that he would be glad to see me, and that he would be glad to hear from me. He said that he would be glad to see me, and that he would be glad to hear from me. He said that he would be glad to see me, and that he would be glad to hear from me.

I am writing you to tell you how much I love you and how much I care about you. I hope you are well and happy. I miss you very much and I hope to see you soon. Love,  
[Signature]

that I was not in a position to do so. I was not in a position to do so.

The first of these is the world, and the second is the world of France.

[illegible]

$\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$

[illegible][illegible]

I have, &amp;c

6. LLOYD JONES'S

No. 139.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9)*

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 13, 1840

ON the evening of the 18th instant, I received from his Excellency Boghos Bey a circular despatch, which had also been simultaneously addressed to the Consuls-General of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Having next day consulted with my Colleagues, we drew up and presented a joint Note in reply to the communication of his Excellency Boghos Bey.

I have now the honour to inclose both documents for the information of your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. LLOYD HODGES

Enclosure 1 in No. 139

Booths Bay to Colonel Hudson.

M. le Comte-Général.

Alexandrie, ce 18 Août, 1840

J'ai eu l'honneur de vous informer par ordre de son Altesse le Vice Roi mon maître que le directeur du Laboratoire avait approuvé. Son Altesse ayant reconnu que le fait avait été l'objet d'un grand parti par les intrigues de quelques émissaires les représentants du tout de par les tout infimes. Afin d'arriver à un but son intention est de faire exécuter la surveillance la plus active sur toutes les entrées de la Syrie tant à l'égard en conséquence d'arrêter quelques personnes qui avaient été trouvées suspectes à cause des exhortations données par eux à la population à se révolter et à se lever. Les navires à bord desquels les personnes susdites se trouvaient purger leur quarantaine, à Jaffa et à Haïfa. En outre, son Altesse est résolue à agir contre tout individu qui se verra trahir sa foi et sa patrie. Elle a déjà acquis des renseignements positifs de certains individus qui ont été trouvés et ce les renseignements sont d'une importance capitale et de grande utilité.

Non, Madame, l'ordonnance ne vous laisse ni la parole, ni l'extension  
de la parole, ni la libre volonté, mais laisse-les tous à Dieu. Il ne  
vous permet ni vous empêche de rien à votre gré, pour éviter de  
vous en servir.

Daugetz agrón., &amp;c.,

సమగ్రము

BOGHOS JOUSSOUFY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 139

*The Consuls-General of the Four Powers to Boghos Bey.*

Alexandre, le 19 Août, 1860

118 Les Soussignés ont pris connaissance de la Circulaire de son Excellence  
R. H. B. en date du 18 courant. Ils ne sauraient se conformer aux désirs  
de son Excellence par son Altesse le Vice-Roi au sujet des affaires de la Syrie, attendu  
qu'après l'Article II de la Convention conclue à Londres le 15 Juillet, entre  
l'Empereur d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, de Russie, et de la  
Sublime Porte, cette province, moins le Pachaie d'Acre, doit être considérée  
comme rentrée sous la domination immédiate de la Sublime Porte, et qu'ils  
sont appelés à encourager et à soutenir, de tous leurs moyens, ceux des sujets  
de la Sublime Porte qui manifesteraient leur fidélité et leur obéissance à leur

(Signé)

A. LAURIN  
G. LLOYD HODGES  
E. WAGNER  
A. MEDINI



Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 19, 1840.

AT about 10 o'clock this morning I was visited officially by Hosrew Effendi, Dragoman of Mehemet Ali.

He informed me that the Viceroy had received an express from Abbas Pasha at Beirut stating that four British ships of war had arrived off the coast, and that the English Consul, together with a naval officer, had summoned his Excellency to the fort of Beyrout to evacuate the province with his troops, and to restore to the Druses the arms taken from them in the suppression of the late disturbances. He added, that Abbas Pasha had replied to these demands by requesting an interval of ten days, in order to obtain the instructions of the Viceroy.

Hosrew Effendi now announced to me, that Mehemet Ali had sent orders to his grandson to repel force by force, and also that the British Consul should be obliged to quit Beyrout the moment hostilities commenced.

To a question of mine, whether the Consular officers of other Powers would also be removed from Syria, Hosrew Effendi answered, that they had taken no part whatever against the Government of the Viceroy.

Hosrew Effendi further asked me whether I was aware that the naval officer commanding on the Syrian coast, had received any orders that could warrant such a course of conduct as that recently adopted; and if I had been informed of those orders, he wished to know why I had not communicated them to his master?

Having in the course of the morning related to my Colleagues the details of Hosrew Effendi's visit, I was afterwards returned a verbal answer to a verbal communication. We therefore instructed Mr. Alison, along with the first Dragoman of each of the other three Consulates-General, to proceed to the Pasha's Tent, where Hosrew Effendi had been received, and to deliver the Pasha's message, had been correctly delivered. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, they were desired to state in our names what follows—

That in virtue of the Convention signed at London on the 15th of July, Syria was now to be considered as reunited to the Empire of the Sublime Porte. That on the requisition of the Sublime Porte, the admirals of the fleets in the Mediterranean, belonging to the Powers parties to the above-mentioned Convention, had orders to give every assistance and support to such subjects of the Sultan as might manifest their submission or fidelity to their legitimate Sovereign. That as to the instructions of the Viceroy to his own authorities, enjoining them on the commencement of hostilities to expel from Syria the Consuls and Consular Agents of Her Britannic Majesty, we had to observe that the Viceroy could not with right and justice take any such step, since those Consuls and Agents were acting under Her Majesty's Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and in the dominions of that monarch. That should the Viceroy persist and put his threats in execution, the responsibility of his acts would rest entirely with himself.

This message was accordingly delivered to Mehemet Ali, and elicited the following verbal reply—

"He all that as it may, these are countries actually under my government. I am in my own possessions, and have not invaded those of the English. They, on the contrary, have come to attack mine. However, we shall see to whom God will accord these territories. As to the Consuls, if hostilities commence, they must naturally lower their flags."

On retiring, Hosrew Effendi said to the Austrian Dragoman that the British naval officer at Beyrout had not accorded a delay of ten days to Abbas Pasha, as I had understood in my interview of this morning.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES,

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 20, 1840.

IN the interview of myself and Colleagues with Mehemet Ali on the 17th instant, as detailed in the Minutes enclosed in my despatch, No. 76, of the 19th of August, the Viceroy having stopped our verbal representations, requested us to submit to him in writing any reflexions we might have to make on the present posture of affairs, and on the motives which should induce him to comply with the demands of the Sublime Porte supported by the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th of July.

We therefore jointly drew up and under date of yesterday addressed to the Viceroy a Mémoire of the above subjects, and I have now the honour to transmit a copy of that Mémoire for the information of your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

Inclosure in No. 141.

Mémoire addressed by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers to Mehemet Ali.

Alexandrie, le 19 Août, 1840.

PAR la conclusion de la Convention du 15 Juillet, la question de Syrie, de Mehemet Ali se trouve entièrement changée. Le Pacha n'est plus le maître de son territoire, et il n'est plus possible qu'il se maintienne dans son pays, sans le secours des puissances qui ont signé la Convention. Les stipulations de cette Convention sont si précises, et les garanties si fortes, qu'il est impossible de les méconnaître. Les Consuls des quatre Puissances signataires de la Convention, Mehemet Ali, se sont réunis pour la première fois, et la Convention est devenue une réalité. Le Pacha ne peut plus se reposer sur la force, et sur la violation religieuse des Traités. C'est ainsi que malgré des difficultés bien graves qui entourent les questions de la Grèce, de la Belgique, et de l'Espagne, les Conventions y relatives ont reçu leur complète exécution, sans que les intérêts de toutes les Puissances Européennes à l'égard de ces questions, n'aient pas toujours été identiques.

Croire encore à la possibilité d'un changement, ou d'une modification des conditions de la Convention du 15 Juillet, ou de l'Acte Séparé, ce serait se bercer d'un vain espoir; ses stipulations sont inaltérables et irrévocables, les termes péremptifs qui ont été fixés pour leur acceptation sont une preuve patente de la possibilité de leur exécution. Les Consuls des quatre Puissances, qui se présentent dans le cas de l'acceptation ou de la non-acceptation de la susdite Convention par Mehemet Ali.

En accédant à l'arrangement qu'on lui propose, le Vice-Roi prouverait à l'Europe et à la postérité, qu'il n'a pas seulement été un conquérant heureux, mais qu'il est à la fois homme d'état et profond politique. Quoi de plus glorieux que de fonder une nouvelle succession, de la voir reconnue par l'Europe entière, et par l'Europe entière; quelle consolation de pouvoir se dire à la fin d'une carrière brillante, "ce que j'ai créé passera à ma postérité, à mes enfants, à quels personnes ne pourra l'arracher."

De nos jours, ce n'est plus l'étendue territoriale d'un Etat, ni même sa force matérielle, qui en font le bonheur et la sûreté, ce sont les garanties plus ou moins fortes de son indépendance, en le faisant entrer dans le système politique de l'Europe. C'est ainsi qu'en jetant les yeux sur la carte, on voit beaucoup de petits Etats sans ressources à côté des Empires les plus puissants; ils n'ont à craindre aucune injustice ou oppression, toute l'Europe veille sur leur honneur et leur sécurité. Des garanties pareilles une fois obtenues, qu'importe à Mehemet Ali la grandeur ou la petitesse de son territoire, de plus, qui ne lui ont été jusqu'ici d'aucune utilité, et dont la posses-





[illegible]

" Il faut espérer," répondit alors Rufat Bey, " que cette affaire sera arrangée sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'en venir à cette extrémité, d'autant plus qu'il ne tient qu'à votre Altesse d'y porter un prompt remède par une réponse affirmative "

"Je vois, mon fils," dit Méhémet Ali à Rafat Bey, "que vous avez envie de m'engager à entrer du nouveau dans de longs détails à cet égard," et après avoir fait signe à Habib Efendi et Chérif Aga de sortir, il reprit la parole.

"Je regrette beaucoup," dit-il, "que pas un de vous n'ait eu jusqu'ici assez de prudence ni assez de sagacité pour reconnaître mon intention qui n'a eu jusqu'à présent, ni ne peut avoir d'autre point de mire, que le bien seul de la Sublime Porte."

"Je regrette de plus en plus les Princeses Eudon et les autres qui ont été déshonorées pour moi, les provinces qui sont sous mes ordres et m'a été conféré par feu Sultan Mahioud.

trouvent en ce moment  
sincère de rendre à  
certains nombre  
Vostre Altesse m'a dit,  
niés et sincère, les  
de leur devoir

dehors. A cet égard, c'est parceque je n'ai pas jugé à propos de vous dérang-  
er dans ma première entrevue, par une longue série de questions, peut-être, vous  
ennuyé; mais c'est le cas maintenant de suppléer au silence que j'ai dû  
tenir, et je suis persuadé que ce que je vais vous dire ne vous sera pas

Que votre Altesse me permette de lui demander avant tout, si les provinces attachées en sa possession, elle veut les avoir avec indépendance, ou bien elle consent à les administrer au nom de Sa Hauteurs, et comme un vassal

Vous voulez les avoir avec indépendance, une telle prétention est, contre  
Alfred ne peut pas en dire à tort, en opposition directe avec les Travaux actuels  
c'est en vain que les droits publics l'empêchent, aussi ne peut elle obtenir

D'un autre côté, je ne puis pas admettre qu'en demandant la possession des dites provinces, la pitié de votre Altesse soit réellement en lie de les admettre sous le titre de vassal du Sultan, car je me rappelle, il y a deux ans, que vous avez prouvé le contraire par des prétentions d'indépendance que vous

avec nous en avant et que heureusement les Cinq Grandes Puissances n'ont pas hésité à rejeter ~~la proposition~~

[illegible]

Les considérations que j'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre ne sont pas  
insensibles aux Ministres de Sa Majesté; et en travaillant dans les intérêts de  
la Nation, ils nourrissent l'espoir que, au bout d'un an, votre illustre  
Assemblée aura tracé une ligne de conduite plus loyale.

Il est évident que les raisons qui autorisent les Ministres de Sa Majesté à plaider en faveur de vos protestations les dédaignent et de vous une opinion si peu avantageuse; ces raisons sont-elles plausibles, les Ministres de Sa Majesté ont-ils raison au tort de n'en tenir aucun compte de vos protestations? Je ne puis le dire.

[illegible]

1. *Il y a* 2. *un* 3. *grand* 4. *nombre* 5. *de* 6. *lettres* 7. *et* 8. *de* 9. *chiffres* 10. *et* 11. *de* 12. *signes* 13. *et* 14. *de* 15. *symboles* 16. *et* 17. *de* 18. *caractères* 19. *et* 20. *de* 21. *autres* 22. *et* 23. *de* 24. *autres* 25. *et* 26. *de* 27. *autres* 28. *et* 29. *de* 30. *autres* 31. *et* 32. *de* 33. *autres* 34. *et* 35. *de* 36. *autres* 37. *et* 38. *de* 39. *autres* 40. *et* 41. *de* 42. *autres* 43. *et* 44. *de* 45. *autres* 46. *et* 47. *de* 48. *autres* 49. *et* 50. *de* 51. *autres* 52. *et* 53. *de* 54. *autres* 55. *et* 56. *de* 57. *autres* 58. *et* 59. *de* 60. *autres* 61. *et* 62. *de* 63. *autres* 64. *et* 65. *de* 66. *autres* 67. *et* 68. *de* 69. *autres* 70. *et* 71. *de* 72. *autres* 73. *et* 74. *de* 75. *autres* 76. *et* 77. *de* 78. *autres* 79. *et* 80. *de* 81. *autres* 82. *et* 83. *de* 84. *autres* 85. *et* 86. *de* 87. *autres* 88. *et* 89. *de* 90. *autres* 91. *et* 92. *de* 93. *autres* 94. *et* 95. *de* 96. *autres* 97. *et* 98. *de* 99. *autres* 100. *et* 101. *de* 102. *autres* 103. *et* 104. *de* 105. *autres* 106. *et* 107. *de* 108. *autres* 109. *et* 110. *de* 111. *autres* 112. *et* 113. *de* 114. *autres* 115. *et* 116. *de* 117. *autres* 118. *et* 119. *de* 120. *autres* 121. *et* 122. *de* 123. *autres* 124. *et* 125. *de* 126. *autres* 127. *et* 128. *de* 129. *autres* 130. *et* 131. *de* 132. *autres* 133. *et* 134. *de* 135. *autres* 136. *et* 137. *de* 138. *autres* 139. *et* 140. *de* 141. *autres* 142. *et* 143. *de* 144. *autres* 145. *et* 146. *de* 147. *autres* 148. *et* 149. *de* 150. *autres* 151. *et* 152. *de* 153. *autres* 154. *et* 155. *de* 156. *autres* 157. *et* 158. *de* 159. *autres* 160. *et* 161. *de* 162. *autres* 163. *et* 164. *de* 165. *autres* 166. *et* 167. *de* 168. *autres* 169. *et* 170. *de* 171. *autres* 172. *et* 173. *de* 174. *autres* 175. *et* 176. *de* 177. *autres* 178. *et* 179. *de* 180. *autres* 181. *et* 182. *de* 183. *autres* 184. *et* 185. *de* 186. *autres* 187. *et* 188. *de* 189. *autres* 190. *et* 191. *de* 192. *autres* 193. *et* 194. *de* 195. *autres* 196. *et* 197. *de* 198. *autres* 199. *et* 200. *de* 201. *autres* 202. *et* 203. *de* 204. *autres* 205. *et* 206. *de* 207. *autres* 208. *et* 209. *de* 210. *autres* 211. *et* 212. *de* 213. *autres* 214. *et* 215. *de* 216. *autres* 217. *et* 218. *de* 219. *autres* 220. *et* 221. *de* 222. *autres* 223. *et* 224. *de* 225. *autres* 226. *et* 227. *de* 228. *autres* 229. *et* 230. *de* 231. *autres* 232. *et* 233. *de* 234. *autres* 235. *et* 236. *de* 237. *autres* 238. *et* 239. *de* 240. *autres* 241. *et* 242. *de* 243. *autres* 244. *et* 245. *de* 246. *autres* 247. *et* 248. *de* 249. *autres* 250. *et* 251. *de* 252. *autres* 253. *et* 254. *de* 255. *autres* 256. *et* 257. *de* 258. *autres* 259. *et* 260. *de* 261. *autres* 262. *et* 263. *de* 264. *autres* 265. *et* 266. *de* 267. *autres* 268. *et* 269. *de* 270. *autres* 271. *et* 272. *de* 273. *autres* 274. *et* 275. *de* 276. *autres* 277. *et* 278. *de* 279. *autres* 280. *et* 281. *de* 282. *autres* 283. *et* 284. *de* 285. *autres* 286. *et* 287. *de* 288. *autres* 289. *et* 290. *de* 291. *autres* 292. *et* 293. *de* 294. *autres* 295. *et* 296. *de* 297. *autres* 298. *et* 299. *de* 300. *autres* 301. *et* 302. *de* 303. *autres* 304. *et* 305. *de* 306. *autres* 307. *et* 308. *de* 309. *autres* 310. *et* 311. *de* 312. *autres* 313. *et* 314. *de* 315. *autres* 316. *et* 317. *de* 318. *autres* 319. *et* 320. *de* 321. *autres* 322. *et* 323. *de* 324. *autres* 325. *et* 326. *de* 327. *autres* 328. *et* 329. *de* 330. *autres* 331. *et* 332. *de* 333. *autres* 334. *et* 335. *de* 336. *autres* 337. *et* 338. *de* 339. *autres* 340. *et* 341. *de* 342. *autres* 343. *et* 344. *de* 345. *autres* 346. *et* 347. *de* 348. *autres* 349. *et* 3

À la conclusion de la Convention qui, à cet effet  
res entre les Représentans des Quatre Puissances:  
il en soit, au point où en est l'affaire, il ne vous reste plus qu'à vous  
soumettre aux exigences de cette Convention

" Dans la circonstance actuelle," ajouta Rifat Bey, " trois choses sont à opposer, 1° victoire complète de votre part; 2° perte totale de vos troupes; 3° continuation du bonheur dont vous jouissez actuellement."

La première supposition, la force de ce nouveau Traité ne la laissera pas descendre en serait-ils plus assurés? assurément non, car il est hors de doute, que les Quatre Puissances signalées ne manqueraient pas de mettre tout en œuvre pour atteindre le but du Traité qu'elles viennent de conclure.

« ... vous, d'ailleurs, n'ayant rien de ce que je viens de vous dire, qu'il n'y  
« pour vous d'autre salut possible que d'accéder aux vues des Prussiens, signa-  
« lées. C'est ainsi le seul moyen de conjurer l'orage prêt à éclater de toutes

"Je sais que les Puissances Européennes," répliqua Méhémet Ali. "ont conclu une pacifique Convention, mais, par sa position, l'Egypte n'a rien à craindre





Count Walewski and M. Cochelet transmitted the official request by Her Majesty's steamer "Confiance," which sailed from hence on the 2nd for Malta.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 145.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 87.)

My Lord

Alexandria, August 24, 1840.

WITHIN a few days past the whole of the Egyptian and Turkish frigates and small craft, formerly moored in the old port of Alexandria, have been dismantled and placed in dry dock.

Merchant vessels are now ordered to discharge their cargoes in the new port.

The great harbour is thus cleared and is now occupied by a crescent of nineteen ships of the line placed in order of battle. They cannot be approached, owing to the natural obstructions across the entrance of the harbour, which has only three difficult entrances and of these the principal is defended by a detached force of four first rate vessels.

On the 15th instant Her Majesty's ship "Bellerophon" anchored at some distance from this place and has subsequently been joined by two Austrian frigates having on board Admiral Bandiera and the Archduke Frederick.

This morning Admiral Sir Robert Stopford arrived in the "Princess Charlotte," and in the evening was followed by the "Daphne" corvette.

I proceeded immediately to pay my respects to the Admiral. As he is placed in quarantine, and other persons were present my conversation with him could not of course be of a very confidential nature.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 146.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 25, 1840.

HAVING this morning visited the Pasha, in company with the Consul-General of Austria, a conversation ensued, of which the particulars are contained in the Minute I have the honour to inclose for the information of your Lordship.

This interview has placed it beyond doubt that Mehmet Ali will not reject the terms proposed by the Sublime Porte. At the same time it has become more than probable that should the Consuls-General of the four Powers persist in the Convention of the 15th July, not of their own accord quit Alexandria on the expiration of the twenty days of delay specified in the Convention, they will be expelled from Egypt by Mehmet Ali himself.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

P.S.—The Consuls-General of Prussia and Russia have forwarded to me Minutes, which I inclose, of their interview of this morning with Mehmet Ali.

G. L. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 146.

Minute of a Conversation between Mehmet Ali and the Consuls-General of Great Britain and Austria, on the 25th August, 1840.

LE 25 Août, à 8 heures du matin, MM. les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche et de la Grande Bretagne se rendirent auprès de Mehmet Ali, pour lui présenter les compliments d'usage des Amiraux Sir Robert Stopford et de M. le Baron Bandiera, et pour lui parler sur le parti à prendre à l'égard de la sommation que son Excellence Rifaat Bey venant de lui faire par ordre du Grand Seigneur.

M. le Colonel Hodges lui dit, que tant en sa qualité d'Agent de Sa Majesté la Reine, qu'en son particulier, et comme soldat franc et loyal, il se sentait le devoir de le supplier de prendre en sérieuse considération sa position, et l'attitude que les Puissances signataires de la Convention de Londres ont prise vis-à-vis de lui, de ne pas se faire illusion sur l'issue d'une lutte qu'il pourrait engager, en résistant ou se soumettant aux décisions d'une intervention si hautement placée et aux décrets de son souverain; qu'il doit se souvenir que les Quatre Puissances ont traversé l'Europe, et que dès-lors il n'y avait aucune chance en sa faveur.

Mehmet Ali répondit, qu'il était supérieur aux conseils qu'on pourrait lui donner à cet égard, qu'il venait d'expliquer la-dessus avec Rifaat Bey et avec les Consuls-Généraux, qu'il n'avait rien à ajouter, rien à changer; que sa résolution est prise, il n'a plus rien de plus à venir chez lui pour l'entretenir de cette affaire, parce qu'il la considérait comme une question déjà discutée et vidée. Il articula ces phrases avec une telle emphase que le Colonel lui assura qu'il ne le venait pas en ajoutant ses regrets sincères n'avoir été poussé par son Altesse à la déclaration.

Après un moment de silence, M. de Laurin prit la parole. Le Pacha observa, qu'il n'écouterait pas de conseils. M. de Laurin lui dit, qu'il ne voulait pas lui donner de conseils, mais qu'il avait une prière à lui faire. Le Pacha lui ayant accordé la parole, M. de Laurin lui dit qu'il s'agissait d'épargner une guerre à l'Orient. Mehmet Ali protesta de son innocence disant que jamais il n'avait eu l'intention d'engager une lutte, qu'il ne veut que défendre ses possessions actuelles, qu'en justice ne pourrait lui être contestée.

M. de Laurin lui dit, que la position offerte par la Sublime Porte, reconnue par les Puissances, était assez haute, honorable et saine, que l'Egypte, possédant un territoire, formant le plus bel héritage du monde et en encaissant il aurait à se reprocher la ruine de sa marine et les conséquences d'une guerre maritime. Mehmet Ali repartit avec chaleur qu'il n'est pas assez vaillant pour se faire battre au point de recourir sur des représentations, ce qu'il avait toujours par ses armes. Je suis tout résolu, continua-t-il, à vous vaincre pour me faire que je n'ai, n'ai droit à l'ancien St Jean d'Acre, et après six jours encore, vous vaincrez me disant que l'Egypte ne m'appartient plus. Ce terme passé, j'espère que vous ne viendrez pas chez moi pour me parler de ces choses-là. Car si vous venez encore me répondre ces vaines déclarations tout à fait inutiles, je vous envoie au contraire que vous pressiez des dispositions pour votre départ, car la guerre commence, je ne puis plus me fier de vous autres, d'ailleurs, votre honneur ainsi que ma sécurité personnelle l'exigent.

M. de Laurin repartit, que nous étendions des ordres de nos supérieurs, que le départ ne peut avoir lieu qu'après un rappel formel que nous sommes les parties lésées de nos Cours et les vœux du Grand Seigneur, qu'à l'honneur et l'impératif de nos nationaux, et notre sécurité personnelle nous obligent à agir, nous ne pouvons pas.

M. de Laurin ajouta, que tant à lui-même se conformerait strictement à ses instructions sans égard aux desirs et aux convenances de son Altesse, qu'il y resterait en tant que sa permanence sera compatible avec son honneur et ses devoirs.

Après quoi, nous nous sommes congédiés, en lui disant que nous retournerions le lendemain pour prendre sa réponse définitive, nous avons en même temps exprimé nos regrets de voir son Altesse persister dans son refus.





Méhémet Ali.—Ob, quant à moi, je n'en ai fait mystère à personne; ce ne sont certes pas de pareils raisonnemens qui pourraient ébranler mes décisions. Mon parti est pris. Je me défendrai à outrance. C'est avec l'aide de la Providence que j'ai obtenu ce que je possède depuis huit ans; c'est elle seule qui me l'arrachera.

Moi.—Vous nommez l'aide de la Providence, la force et la loi du sabre, hé bien, c'est par le même moyen qu'on vous fera rendre ce que vous avez usurpé; vous n'avez par conséquent pas à vous plaindre.

Méhémet Ali.—Le destin demeurera, vous savez que je suis Turc et par suite fataliste.

Moi.—Je l'ai toujours regretté. Les arrêts des Grandes Puissances sont irrévocables, la lutte que vous allez provoquer pourra être longue, mais son résultat ne saurait être douteux.

Le Vice-Roi se mit alors à se promener dans son appartement; puis passant en revue les troupes qui possèdent Syrie et le long de la côte évacuées par lui à 60,000 hommes, il m'annonça l'arrivée d'Ibrahim Pacha à Damas dans un voyage d'inspection, et la réponse que Soliman Pacha, qui se trouvait avec une armée de 40,000 hommes à Beyrouth, avait donnée à Commodore Napier. Au dire de son Altesse, il aurait déclaré à l'Amiral que s'il attaquait la ville, il y mettrait le feu, et qu'il s'en irait à la mer. Il les recevrait à la bayonnette, et les jeterait à la mer.

"Une pareille réponse," lui dis-je, "est plus facile à énoncer qu'à exécuter."

Méhémet Ali m'annonça ensuite la prise de trois de ses bâtimens légers, faite par Napier sur la côte de Syrie. "Cet état de choses," reprit-il, "peut durer longtemps. Avant le printemps prochain la guerre n'aura pas éclaté, car pour l'entreprendre il faut des troupes de débarquement, et les Autrichiens ne sont pas prêts à les fournir."

"Ne vous inquiétez pas à ce sujet," répondis-je, "et songez à vous-même. Les Puissances sont préparées, et les forces Autrichiennes ne tarderont pas à paraître. Il y a encore deux à trois mois de trêve, et j'espère que d'ici là tout sera terminé."

Notre entretien roula ensuite sur la prochaine visite de congé de Rifat Bey, au sujet de laquelle le Pacha me dit, qu'il lui remettrait une lettre conçue dans des termes très-polis et renfermant sa réponse. Puis il s'étendit sur les qualités de ce Bey, sur son caractère, ses connaissances; et m'assura que Rifat Bey réunissait toutes les qualités pour remplir un jour un poste très-élevé.

Après avoir fait encore quelques tours dans le salon, et au moment de prendre congé du Pacha, il me dit: "Mais, à propos, après l'expiration des dix jours, que comptez-vous faire? Mesieurs les Consuls se proposent-ils de rester ici malgré les hostilités? Cela ne pourrait avoir lieu, puisque nos rapports ne sauraient plus avoir un caractère amical, et qu'il existera de la méfiance entre nous!"

"Nous agissons selon nos instructions," répliquai-je, "et d'après ce que nous déciderons entre nous. Ce n'est qu'après l'expiration des vingt jours que nous serons en mesure de vous marquer quelque chose de positif à ce sujet."

Méhémet Ali.—Je conçois que vous devez rester ici jusqu'au second terme.

Moi.—Je ne puis le faire. Je suis sûr que je serais à même de les prévenir. Il me semble convenable et juste que vous ne dépassiez pas les vingt jours; et vous m'excuserez si je vous engage alors à partir.

Moi.—Je vous répète que nos instructions et nos résolutions fixeront l'époque de notre départ. Si nous jugeons convenable de partir même avant le terme prescrit, nous le ferons, et si au contraire nous jugeons à propos de rester plus longtemps, nous le ferons également. Nous n'avons absolument aucun ordre à recevoir de vous à ce sujet, et nous agissons selon les exigences du moment. Vous pouvez employer la force, et braquer des canons contre nous, mais vous en assumerez sur vous toute la responsabilité et les conséquences.

Méhémet Ali.—Je sais bien que de grandes responsabilités pèseront sur moi, puisque je suis condamné et que j'ai été mis au ban par les Grandes Puissances. Mais ces choses ont cessé; je ne vois pas de raison pour que Messieurs les Consuls restent ici.

"Nous agissons," repris-je, "selon notre devoir et notre dignité, et c'est par notre visite de congé que vous connaîtrez le jour de notre embarquement. Ainsi se termina mon dernier entretien avec Méhémet Ali."

Signé) MEDEM

No. 147

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

No. 147

My Lord

Alexandria, August 26, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a correspondence I have had with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

As regards my removal from a notice in the Private ref. sent by Méhémet Ali of the terms recently proposed, I have no further to say. My interpretation of your Lordship's instructions to me, and I do so because it seems possible, that the Admiral may have reasons, consistent with the service, which induce him to take a different view of the subject of my removal.

I have shown to my Lordship a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 16, of the 18th July, as regards my continuance here, and I have shown strongly that those instructions do not warrant my removal, after the departure of Rifaat Bey. I am by no means a swerver from the course these gentlemen have adopted of the service, and the twenty cases of cases.

When I to me, and solely by the fact of the conversion of the Pasha as they are related to your Lordship in the recent despatches, I should conclude that Méhémet Ali will not permit our advance in Egypt after the 5th of September. It, however, seems to me possible that the influence of France will be exerted in this matter, and that the Pasha will be deterred from insisting on our removal. Thus it appears to me safest and best to hold my present position until I find it untenable, and until his Excellency the Admiral shall concur in the same opinion.

With reference to a question of Sir Robert Stopford, as to the prospective safety of the Indian mails, and to my reply to that query, I have to add that the Pasha, two or three days since, declared to Mr. Briggs, one of the principal British merchants established here, that the moment hostilities commenced, he will stop the communications with India.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

P.S.—Since writing, I have received a letter from the Admiral, in which he informs me, that having become acquainted with my late conversation with Méhémet Ali, he now believes that I shall not be able to stay in Egypt after the 5th of September, and his Excellency kindly offers to receive me on board the "Princess Charlotte." Still, as I think that circumstances may arise, rendering my presence here of some importance, I shall not abandon my post except at the last extremity.

Inclosure 1 in No. 147

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Colonel Hodges.

Sir

"Princess Charlotte," off Alexandria, August 25, 1840.

UNDERSTANDING from our conversation yesterday, that you intended, in conjunction with your Colleague, to take a view of the position in the event of the Pasha's compliance with the terms recently proposed, and that you intended to state that it appears to me from the perusal of Lord Palmerston's letter to you of the 18th July, of which I was furnished with a copy, that this step should only be taken in the event of Méhémet Ali threatening to use any personal violence towards yourself, or British subjects, and property, or to interrupt the passage of the mails; and that it is desirable

that you should stay as long as you properly can do so, in order to be an organ of communication with the Pasha, assuring him, that the British Government is not guided by any ill will towards him; thus breathing a spirit of anything but direct hostility, till he shall himself force it upon us. I would therefore recommend great caution in taking a step of this nature, so long as your own safety and the honour and dignity of the country are not compromised.

I am very desirous to know, whether there is any intention of cutting off our communication with India, that I may send the necessary information by the "Alecto," now expected to start for Malta, as well as any decided information you can procure as to the protection of our Coal Depot and means of coaling, in order to adopt some other mode of securing our supplies if necessary.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,  
Admiral.

Inclosure 2 in No. 147

Colonel Hodges to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, Alexandria, August 25, 1840

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's despatch of this date, which I have just received.

I completely coincide with your Excellency's opinion as regards Viscount Palmerston's instructions, and whatever may be the resolution of Rifaat Bey, or of my Colleagues, I shall not remove from hence until circumstances absolutely force me to adopt such a measure. But, after the Pasha's declaration of this morning, that on the expiration of the twenty days' delay, neither our honour nor his interests will allow the continuance of the Four Consuls-General in Egypt, I consider it nearly certain that by the 5th of September next, I shall have no other alternative than to embark. Until then I entertain confident hopes that I shall be able to maintain my present position; unless, indeed, any warlike operations should be attempted on the Syrian coast, when it will be impossible to calculate on the steps the Pasha may take.

As regards the Indian mails, and the Coal Depôts in Egypt, I do not believe that they are in danger, so long as tranquillity subsists, but there can hardly exist a doubt that both will be interrupted the moment hostilities commence.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 148

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 90)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 26, 1840.

YESTERDAY evening I received a visit from Count Walewski, special Envoy from France.

Our conversation, though of some length, was general, and of an unimportant nature, with the exception of one or two particulars.

The object of Count Walewski appears to me to be the creation of distrust between myself and my Colleagues. To obviate such an effect, I related to those gentlemen all that had passed in my interview with the Count.

The Envoy expressed his pleasure at finding that the alliance with France still subsisted in safety. He told me again that his main mission to Egypt is to watch Mehemet Ali, and to dissuade him from taking such extreme steps as might create new irritation, and embroil the general tranquillity.

This morning the steamer had reached Alexandria from Toulon, and conveyed despatches for Count Walewski and M. Cochelet. The former assured me, that they were, in a great measure, the repetition of former instructions

already known to me with this difference that he was directed by M. Thiers to draw up and forward a report on the military and other resources of Mehemet Ali.

The Count used every effort to impress on me the necessity of a moderate course. He told me that when the Pasha first heard of the location of the frigate transport "Cafarshir," he directed that an embargo should be placed immediately on Her Majesty's steamer "Condance," then in this harbour. He added that it was only on the urgent and energetic interposition of France, that Mehemet Ali was induced to countermand that order.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 149

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 91)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 26, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of your Lordship, the procès verbal of an interview which took place this morning between Mehemet Ali and his Excellency Rifaat Bey, the special Envoy from the Sublime Porte, who was accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th July.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 149

Minute of an interview on the 26th of August, between Mehemet Ali and Rifaat Bey, special Envoy from the Sublime Porte, on the expiration of the first term of ten days.

SON Excellence Rifaat Bey et les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de France et de Prusse, sont allés à 2 heures du matin, au Palais El Ras-Etine, ont été introduits à la salle d'audience du Pacha.

Après les complimens usités, son Excellence Rifaat Bey adresse au Pacha l'allocution suivante:—

"J'ai déjà fait part à votre Altesse, il y a dix jours, des déceptions qui ont été provoquées entre la Sublime Porte et les Quatre Puissances, par suite de l'absence de la solution de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, et nous avons eu sur ce point, à l'expiration des dix jours, une réponse qui n'a pas été satisfaisante. Aujourd'hui expire le premier terme de dix jours, je suis venu, accompagné de Messieurs les Consuls des Cours Contractantes, pour recevoir votre réponse officielle."

Mehemet Ali répondit, "je vous ai déjà fait ma réponse, tant à vous qu'à Messieurs les Consuls, et celle que je vous donne dans ce moment ne peut être que la même."

Rifaat Bey reprit, "Permettez-moi de vous faire observer, que l'attention de la Sublime Porte ainsi que des autres Puissances Contractantes, étant la conservation de la paix et l'observation des traités, la réponse faite de tout ce qui arrive par la suite passera sur votre Altesse. Avant je me suis acquitté de ma mission."

"Il y a que Dieu," répartit Mehemet Ali, "qui puisse juger là-dessus; et c'est moi seul que je suis responsable."

Après cette déclaration, les Consuls-Généraux, par l'organe de M. le Colonel Hodges, ont demandé au Pacha s'il consent à considérer sa présente réponse, faite le 26 août, comme la dernière, et si, en attendant la Convention de Londres, du 15 Juillet?

2 T 2



Méhémet Ali a répondu de la manière la plus positive, "Oui j'ai déjà refusé et je refuse encore officiellement aujourd'hui, et je le ferai le lendemain des dix jours."

Les Consuls-Généraux répliquèrent, "Si c'est ainsi, nous prenons formellement acte de votre refus et nous devons en faire tous nos efforts pour que vous preniez sur vous toute la responsabilité et les conséquences de ce refus."

"Je répète," a dit le Pacha, "que je ne suis responsable qu'à la Providence." Sur la demande de Rifa Bey, le Pacha lui montra la réponse par écrit qu'il lui avait promise à la lettre vizirienne dont il était porteur, le Pacha répliqua qu'il la lui donnerait le jour de son départ.

Son Excellence Rifa Bey regardant la séance comme terminée, prit congé et tous partirent ensemble le Pacha.

(Signé)

RIFAT BEY.  
A. LAURIN  
G. LLOYD HODGES  
E. WAGNER.  
A. MEDEM.

Alexandrie, le 26 Août, 1840.

No. 150

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

No. 271

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 14, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatch No. 91 inclusive.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the steps which you took and the language which you used with reference to the proceedings of Her Majesty's ships on the coast of Syria, as reported in your despatch No. 79.

Her Majesty's Government also approve the Note which you sent in conjunction with your colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia addressed to Mehémet Ali on the 13th of August, and of which a copy is enclosed in your despatch No. 80.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 151

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

No. 281

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 14, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 84, of the 23rd of August, I have to instruct you to inform Mehémet Ali that the Five Powers who are parties to the Convention of the 15th of July, would accept the mediation of France between themselves and him. Those Powers are Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain. They have determined upon certain arrangements, and those arrangements they are resolved and able to carry into execution.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 152

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

No. 29.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 14, 1840

WITH reference to your despatch No. 30, of the 17th of August, marked Consular, I have to instruct you to state in writing to Mehémet Ali, if the state of things should render it necessary to do so, that Egypt is a portion of the dominions of the Sultan; that British subjects have certain rights and privileges as to the security of their persons, property, and commerce, in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of Treaties concluded between the British Crown and the Porte; and that any subject of the Sultan, whether in a state of obedience to, or of revolt against, the authority of the Sultan, who should take upon himself in any way, or in the slightest degree, to molest British subjects, or to interfere with the exercise of their rights and privileges, would incur a heavy and most serious responsibility.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 153

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

No. 311

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 15, 1840

I HAVE to acquaint you, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you used in your despatch No. 77, of the 19th of August, reported in your despatch, No. 77, of the 19th of August.

Her Majesty's Government also approve your intention of remaining in Egypt as long as circumstances will admit of your doing so, as reported in your despatch No. 88, of the 26th of August.

Her Majesty's Government also approve the answer which you and your colleagues returned to Mehémet Ali on the 13th of August, as reported in your despatch No. 78, of the 19th of August, respecting the intention of Mehémet Ali to re-establish a system of quarantine on the coast of Syria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 154

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 14)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 11, 1840

HAVING heard from a gentleman in M. Thiers' Cabinet, that an explanation had been given to the British Government, I asked M. Thiers himself to-day what was the case, and he replied that he did intend to give M. Guizot instructions to mention the matter to your Lordship, but that he had not yet done so, and that he had not even as yet answered your Lordship's Note of the 31st of August.

The capture of the Egyptian vessels has indeed produced a very strong sensation here, partly because it has been one of the Powers that the Four Powers are in earnest, and partly because it took place prior to

the expiration of the term which the Porte allowed the Pasha for consideration. People not seeing, or not being willing to admit, that when a delay of this kind is allowed, it is on the understanding that the party to whom it is granted, should remain in the same situation as that in which the summons found him, and that if he endeavours to improve that position, he forfeits inasmuch the truce accorded to him. At all events, the event in question has raised that excitement which I have always considered any accident of the kind might produce here; the journals have resumed their violent tone; the funds have fallen within these few days 10 or 12 per cent.; a panic at the Bourse still exists, and the apprehensions of war slide in rise, by the preparations to meet it. The contract for 20,000 horses at 850 fr. per horse, has been concluded with a M. Vaillant; the effective of the ~~horses~~ of the Marine has been increased from 10,000 to 15,000 head. Reports circulate of a new having received orders to prepare a regiment of a wing, on the National Guard, notwithstanding the prohibition which the execution of this project entails. It is on a pretext of an expense as I understand, of 150,000,000 of francs. The fortification of Paris at last determined upon will cost 100,000,000 more. It is also agreed that 50,000 men are to be drawn across the northern frontier, are being placed in a state of

These extraordinary measures necessarily create an idea that they cannot be undertaken without some adequate necessity, more especially as the change in the country was not made as so considerable. Many persons, therefore, think that we are on the verge of hostilities which must already have been decided upon.

The state of the funds in in general so nicely indicative of what is passing in the Council that it is not alone, ~~the~~ impossible that the President may have in contemplation one of those *coup d'état* of which he is so capable, but upon the whole, judging from the conversation of persons well qualified to know what was exposed to say what was going on, and seeing no reason why such a person should be so much more inclined to any act of aggression, I am inclined to think that this is not yet the case, but, at the same time, I should add, that with an increased wish for peace, and a determination to do all that is possible, he was not in general inclined to any act of aggression. By the arrival of Russian troops at Constantinople, though I do not consider that either of these events would make way certain, would create a great clamour for war. Any event compromising the influence of Mehmet Ali without crushing him (for if crushed, the French never sympathize with the fallen), would have the same effect; and it seems to me in the nature of things, that that crisis of which I have already spoken, as one which must place M. Thiers in the necessity of either retiring or acting, is at hand.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 155

Baronnet Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer

(No. 12.)

(EXTRACT)

Foreign Office, September 15, 1840

WITH reference to Lord Granville's despatch N. 234 of the 3rd ult., in which his Excellency reported that Count Walewski had been sent on a mission to Alexandria, I have to instruct you to ascertain and to report to me, by whom Count Walewski was sent, and what is the object of his mission.

No. 156

Lieutenant Palmerston to Mr. Bulmer.

(No. 54.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 15, 1940.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received from Colonel Hodges\*, together with copies of two despatches which he had addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting the course of events at Alexandria.

With reference to that part of Colonel Hodges' despatch which relates to the language held by Count Walewski, I have to instruct you to mention incidentally to M. Thiers, that Count Walewski has used at Alexandria, in conversation with Colonel Hodges, menacing language which could not have been authorized by his instructions.

Signed) **PALMERSTON**

No. 157.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 10.)

No. 82.1

My Lord,

Paris, September 14, 1940.

YOUR Lordship will have observed in my despatch No 76, a notice of the report that this Government intended some *coup d'état*, the nature of which however was not to be divulged. It is all done by this post a despatch marked "most confidential," which would seem to put the existence of any such project out of the question.

I have some reason to believe that a measure has been adopted, or at all events is agitated in the Cabinet at this moment, which accords in a certain degree with the rumours that are abroad, and will yet not wholly contradict the assurances which have been made to me. This measure is the sending of the whole fleet to Canoe, where I understand there is a most excellent harbour. In this manner the French Government would hope to reap the double advantage of avoiding any act of hostility to the First Powers, and of boasting at the same time, through their irresponsible organs, of an act of decision and vigour, which would give them the appearance of a Cabinet at any rate, able to do more than to

I have, &c.  
Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 158

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(Most Confidential)

(Extract)

Paris, September 14, 1840

A VARIETY of rumours having been abroad on Saturday, and to a certain extent accredited by leading persons in the city, as to some expedition to the Mediterranean being meditated, if not undertaken, by the French Government; a variety of circumstances also corroborating the rumours, (such as the secret embarkation of powder from La Rochelle, the orders given to all colonels to place their regiments on a war footing, a great augmentation of the artillery, &c., &c.,) I thought it advisable to see His Majesty the King of the French, who has always had the goodness to allow me to speak unreservedly with him on such matters.

\* From Colonel Rogers No. 75, Aug 19, 1840, p. 140.









leney recapitulates what he said to the undersigned respecting the expression "dans aucun cas," used by the undersigned in the Memorandum of the 15th of July, the undersigned has the honour to observe, that he did, at the time referred to, and in answer to the remark then made by M Guizot, explain to his Excellency what he now takes this opportunity of repeating, that by the expression in question it was never meant to imply, that France had engaged to consent to measures or arrangements that would have the effect of "altering the present balance of power in Europe." The undersigned is therefore in France ready to such measures of coercion as may be necessary in order to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the Treaty; and those arrangements are calculated to maintain, and not to impair, the balance of power in Europe.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) **PALMERSTON**

No. 105

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 124)

My Lord,

At about September 17, 1840

At Istanbul, September 10, 1840.

"THERE" is a person of the name of Prince Mehmet who has requested me to call your Lordship's attention to the Russian demand for the Sultan to refuse admission to the Russian troops in the fortified cities of the Empire. I have been informed that the Russian Government has been very much annoyed by the refusal of the Sultan to accede to their request. I have been going to the Sultan's Palace to request him to accede to their request, but he has refused to do so. He has said that he is perfectly satisfied that the army is well equipped and that the Sultan should give satisfactory answers to the Russian demands. He foresees, however, that there would be a great danger of war if all the Russian troops were to be admitted to the Sultan's Palace. He has said that he is perfectly satisfied that the army is well equipped and that the Sultan should give satisfactory answers to the Russian demands. He foresees, however, that there would be a great danger of war if all the Russian troops were to be admitted to the Sultan's Palace. He has said that he is perfectly satisfied that the army is well equipped and that the Sultan should give satisfactory answers to the Russian demands. He foresees, however, that there would be a great danger of war if all the Russian troops were to be admitted to the Sultan's Palace.

I have, etc.,

H. A. V. A. L. F.

No. 106

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 189.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 26, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a letter from the French Ambassador to the Emperor, of the 10th inst. (Encl. No. 1). All are well. He tells me he intends to answer, and to communicate his reply to the Representatives of the Four Powers.

It may be that the Ambassador hopes to find in this affair the means for the overthrow of the Ottoman Minister.

Price 3c.

PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 166

M de Pontoux to Rechid Pasha.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Thérèse, le 24 Août, 1840.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de la lettre en date du 23 de ce mois.

Je commencerai par vous faire observer, M. le Ministre, que la dénégation de M. Cor ne s'applique pas seulement aux mots signalés dans votre lettre comme formant l'unique différence entre sa version et la vôtre, mais que cet interprète affirme en outre n'avoir dit à votre Excellence, ni à aucune autre personne, "que la France soutiendra le Pacha d'Egypte si ses intérêts et sa dignité l'exigent," et s'être borné à déclarer, conformément à l'esprit et à la lettre de ses instructions, "que la France se croira de son droit de ne prendre conseil que de ses intérêts et de son honneur."

J'ajouterais, qu'en admettant même que les expressions dont s'est servi M. Cor fussent textuellement celles que lui attribue la lettre de votre Excellence, elles n'auraient nullement le sens que parait leur avoir prêté la communication faite aux Représentans des Cours signataires de la Convention de Londres, c'est-à-dire, qu'elles n'impliqueraient ni une détermination déjà arrêtée de la part de la France de soutenir la cause de Méhémet Ali, ni la pensée d'exciter des soulèvements dans le sein de l'Empire Ottoman.

Je suis donc en droit de me plaindre hautement et de la fausse interprétation donnée à mes paroles, et de l'usage qui en a été fait. J'espère que la réparation due au Représentant de la France ne lui sera pas refusée.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

(signé) E. DE PONTOIS

No. 167

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received September 20.)

 $\frac{1}{2} \pi$ 

My dear Sir,

Paris, September 18, 1840.

BEING aware that M. Thiers had just received despatches from the East, I called on him yesterday morning, in order to be able to communicate to your Lordship their contents, and in answer to my inquiry as to news, M. Thiers showed me passages from the communications he had received from M. Cochelet, the purport of which was:—

First: That the Viceroy of Egypt had accepted the hereditary Government of Egypt, and informed the Consuls of the Four Powers that as to the expectations he entertained with respect to the other propositions which he held, he had referred to the magnanimity of the Sultan.

Secondly, That his demands on the Porte, in explanation of the phrase, were the government of Syria, Adana, and Candia giving up the Holy Cities, for himself during his own life, or for Ibrahim during

Thirdly: That the French Agents, MM Cochelet and Walewski, had obtained from him, in addition to these terms, the further immediate concession to the Porte of Adana and Candia; and that, consequently, his (the Viceroy's) demands were now confined to the hereditary government of Egypt for himself and family, together with the government of the Pashaliks of Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo for himself during his own life, or for his son Ibrahim, during that son's life.

was now arrived at; and that he considered that the French Government





[illegible]

I should be wrong if I did not state to your Lordship, as my general impression of this conversation, that it showed a most earnest desire in Mr. Thiers for peace on the terms stated, and a great desire not to offend by the way in which he expressed himself as to his own probable conduct if those terms were not accepted.

Your Lordship will, in short, see my difficulty to consist in this,—that it was the evident wish of M. Thiers that I should state to you a

positive opinion as to his intentions, but that he should not stand compromised by what would be in the present position of affairs. I made no allusion of the making of a compromise, since your letter has at any time, in the preparations that are on foot, an undeniable ground for arriving at a clearer explanation.

Have &c.  
HENRY L. BULWER

No. 171

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 20.)*

(Private and Confidential.)

(Extract)

Paris, September 18, 1840.

I THOUGHT it desirable in consequence of my conversation in the morning with M. Thiers, to pay my respects to the King of the French in French, and to show how far the language of His Majesty corresponded with the French Minister.

Returning to the concessions which it appeared that Mehemet Ali was willing to make, I suggested that they were in some degree owing to the exertions of the French agents, I mentioned the rumours that were abroad, without referring to M. Thiers' name. I thought that that might not be considered fair by M. Thiers, but I felt obliged to do so, and the Ambassador being drawn slower by these recent propositions, and wanting to settle the point whether such was to be considered the case?

His Majesty replied to me, by saying that Krasovskii had done well.

We then entered into some general conversation on the Eastern Question; and on my remarking that I thought Mehemet Ali would be less likely to do so, if he saw that the British Government was not disposed to do so, he replied that he did not doubt that the British Government would do so, but that he did not think that the British Government would do so, if he saw that the British Government was not disposed to do so.

We then spoke of M. Thiers, and His Majesty seemed very interested in what we said. He said that he was very glad to hear that M. Thiers was still alive, and that he was very glad to hear that he was still in France. He said that he was very glad to hear that he was still in France, and that he was very glad to hear that he was still in France.

more guarded manner, than it was similar to those which M. Thiers as to the consequences which might ensue. The question on the basis which now offered itself; but at the same time M. Thiers seemed most anxious to have it believed that his Government was not prepared at the present moment with assent to the proposition. In speaking of M. Walowski, His Majesty said that he, M. Walowski, was not prepared to do so.

order that the Pasha, hearing language of moderation from such a man, might be convinced that it was not merely His Majesty, who was presented as "la paix à tout prix," but that it was also M. Thiers himself, sometimes considered warlike, who counselled concessions. "To this argument," said His Majesty, "I yielded."

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 92.)

My Lord,

*Paris, September 18, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that I understand that some misapprehensions have been created by the War Office in the East of Syria, as I am furthermore informed by good authority, though I cannot vouch for the correctness of the information, that the French Government, though other names are employed, are the real agents in this business.

I have written to Her Majesty's Consul, who gave me no notice of this fact, for any information he can furnish on the subject.

I have, &c.,

HENRY L. BULWER

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 94.)

My Lord,

*Paris, September 18, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship will see in two despatches that I send by this post, the recent proceedings of the French Government, and the state of two conversations I have had, the one with His Majesty the King of the French, and another with the President of the Council, which seems to bear out my previous impression, that the time was approaching at which he would probably take some decided step. If he do so, it is evident that it will be with great unwillingness.

I have thought that it might be agreeable to your Lordship to accompany these despatches by some general reflections.

From the beginning of this question there have been two dominant feelings here,—the one, that of the King, that peace was, if possible, to be preserved; the other, that of his Government, that France could never allow the question of the East to be settled without her, and contrary to her wishes. A variety of efforts have been made to conciliate these two feelings. The general armament and system of intimidation at the first announcement of the Treaty was one, since it was hoped that Prussia and Austria might thus be induced to withhold their ratification to the Treaty which their Ministers had consented to. The efforts of King Leopold was another, since it was hoped thus to obtain some proposition which might seem a concession to French policy, and justify the French Government in the eyes of the country for also making some concessions.

The mission of Count Walewski to Constantinople has also had this object, his instructions being, I have no doubt, to induce the Pasha to make considerable concessions to the Porte, but not to make all the concessions which France had declared were impossible.

Every effort hitherto to adopt a decided line, either for maintaining peace, or vindicating what are now known and received to be the views of France, has failed. The proposition to seize Candia, the convocation of the Chambers, and a variety of other schemes tantamount to war, have been rejected. On the other hand, no one has advocated the resolution of remaining quiet at all events, though if it were thought certain that the attempts of the Allies would be restricted to a blockade, which it is believed would fail, I have no doubt that the French Government would remain a spectator of what took place. In the meantime, the opinion of the country has undergone incessant fluctuations, but, upon the whole, has settled, as might be expected, into a wish amongst the more reflecting and opulent classes to avoid hostilities, and amongst the lower and more turbulent to provoke them.

The propositions of Mehmet Ali have brought to a close the negotiations, since they are a new endeavour to satisfy, at the same time, the vanity and the

apprehensions that are anxious to be suited. To be sure, they are a complete refutation of all the repeated declarations of His Majesty Louis Philippe and his Cabinet that the Viceroy of Egypt was a "Man of bronze," and would make no concessions—declarations either founded on total ignorance of the character of a people in the East, or on a desire to maintain the Pasha in possession, in which it has been seen that when things came to extremities he would yield. So far then their judgment has been at fault, or their objects have been failed. Still the mission of Count Walewski having been in vain much success, viz. that he has obtained something to offer to the Porte, and prevented all from being granted, if the present scheme be adopted, the French will have secured a considerable share in the merit of having brought this question, at the most critical moment, to a conclusion, and of having at the same time saved the Pasha and averted war.

I should add that many expectations are entertained in consequence of the position of Russia at Constantinople that the Divan without referring the question to the Four Powers will accept the propositions made to them. If this expectation be disappointed, and if the matter comes before the Four Powers, a considerable time must elapse during which the measures of our own Government have been agreed upon will have been adopted, and their result will form part of the considerations by which Her Majesty's Government will be decided. For my own part, regarding all matters as impartially as I can in my own mind, my opinion is, that some decided turn in public opinion should take place, the course of this Government under any extraordinary circumstances that may occur, will be guided by the mixed disposition which I have described. On the one hand, an earnest desire to avoid war, for which they are by no means prepared, notwithstanding all their exertions and exertions, and to induce them to consent to less favourable terms for the Pasha than are now spoken of. A conviction, on the other hand, that they could not after such expenses and exertions remain perfectly passive, were his ruin to be at hand, and they had time and means to prevent it without losing their character with a nation like this, would most probably induce them, in such an extremity, to interfere in his behalf, but the manner of doing so, even in this case, unless the nation were under considerable excitement would probably be of a half-hearted character, and were any excuse at all put forward to the public mind to offer itself for remaining quiet I never before looking at the character of the King and the apprehensions of his Ministers, such an excuse would be needed.

It is true that the French preparations are extraordinary and are nearly making for the worst, which is expected owing to the season that in the next three weeks pass over, which it was one of the objects of the proposition of which Count Walewski is the bearer to gain, the winter will intervene, affording at the same time the means of further negotiations, and of preparing for their failure.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)*

N<sup>o</sup> 19.

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 1, 1840.*

YESTERDAY morning Her Majesty's steamer "Hydra" brought the reports from the Consuls at Alexandria, which being before your Lordship need not be further mentioned. I immediately despatched M. Etienne to his Excellency Rehid Pasha, with the intelligence of the rejection by Mehmet Ali of the Sultan's proposals based upon the Convention of 1838.

His Excellency the Internuncio called on me soon after 9 o'clock, and having examined the reports, &c., &c., we agreed upon the measures as below:

1<sup>o</sup> That new Pashas should be named to the various Pashalicks now vacant by the refusal of Mehmet Ali, with the exception of Egypt, which latter should



be unnoticed till after the expiration of the second term of ten days ordained by the Convention of 15th July.

2°. That a Firman should be given, appointing Emir Bechar El-Kasim nephew of the Emir Bechar, to be Prince of the Druses, should the old Emir fail to return to his allegiance to the Sultan; a blank being left in the Firman for the date thereof which Mr. Wood should be authorized to fill up, if it become necessary to supersede a Firman, just granted, by which the present Emir Bechar is nominated Prince of the Druses. Your Lordship will see the reason for this measure, in Mr. Wood's letter of the 23rd August.

3°. The propriety of recalling the Consuls from Alexandria, in order to avoid the inconvenience of their being ordered away by Mehemet Ali.

4°. To have some corrections made in the orders from the Sultan to the Commander of the Ottoman troops sent to Cyprus, by which he (Selim Pasha) is enjoined to defer entirely to the councils, &c., of Sir Charles Smith, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions No. 121.

I communicated to his Excellency the Intermuncio, Mr. Wood's letter of 23rd August (copy of which I inclose), and his Excellency was as much gratified as myself with the admirable activity and energy of that gentleman in the performance of the work he has been charged with. Mr. Wood's letter contains more solid information on the affairs of Syria than all the other accounts put together. It states facts instead of vague suppositions, and it affords solid grounds for measures and for just conclusions, and the Intermuncio was much pleased when I proposed to him to take it to Rechid Pasha for his Excellency's information. In fine it was agreed that the Intermuncio should have the goodness to visit the Pasha and settle with him the points I have noted in this despatch. His Excellency went from hence, taking with him the chief Dragoman, M. Frederic Pinau to seek Rechid Pasha whom they at last found at Constantinople.

The Intermuncio called on me at night, on his way home and informed me that he had been told that the Ottoman Ministers had been in the very last conference, deposed with Mr. Wood's letter, and praised that gentleman's conduct in the strongest terms, and I take the liberty of expressing my hope that your Lordship will approve of the zeal and judgment with which Mr. Wood has acted in the difficult and dangerous business committed to him for execution.

It was agreed between the Intermuncio and me to send to the Consuls of our respective Governments in Constantinople a notice for the purpose of warning them of the alteration of the state of public affairs so far as Egypt and Syria &c. are concerned but not to issue as yet, any formal declaration upon the point.

I have &c.  
Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure 1 in No. 174.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

*Her Majesty's ship "Powerful,"  
Beyrout, August 23, 1840.*

My Lord,

THE intelligence that reached me calling me away to Tripoli for the second time was only on my return on the 14th instant that I saw the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 4th August, and in compliance with the instructions therein contained I addressed immediately a letter to the Emir Bechar a copy of which is now well translated, inclosing at the same time a copy of a French translation of the Firman. In consequence to the last communication of the Great Powers to the Sultan, I made use of the arguments I considered would persuade him to co-operate with us; and though he did not deem it prudent to reply to my letter, or to my verbal communications, in writing, nevertheless, he sent yesterday his medical attendant to ascertain in a more positive manner the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and to say, that he felt an inward pleasure and satisfaction at what was intended to be done for Syria.

qualifying that declaration by stating that as the people had been often deceived by such promises he conceived that his own personal safety imposed upon him the necessity of acting with caution and prudence, not to compromise his position by a premature avowal of his sentiments more especially as he was but a provided with the necessary quantity of arms to ward off single-handed, the vengeance of the Egyptians. His messenger frankly stated, that the Emir would prefer waiting until the troops, arms, &c., arrived from Constantinople, when he would be able to join us without apprehension.

Undoubtedly the delusive promises lately made by the French residents here must have greatly contributed to make the Emir distrustful, cautious and incredulous. The seizure however of all the Egyptian vessels and other hostile demonstrations made by us must have shown him that England was at earnest and an Avon version of the Convention of London, with which he was furnished must have removed his doubts with regard to our sincerity, and have made him a partisan of the Sultan.

To encourage him in his favourable disposition to his Sovereign I wrote him a confidential letter, wherein I explain to him that far from apprehending any hostility from the Porte, he could have no assurance that the Porte ever failed to be true towards him, that the Porte knew the difficulties of his position, and that the moment he returned to his allegiance to the Sultan, the Great Powers would not only support him but would secure to Mount Lebanon its laws, rights and rights.

I have now written to our friend the Emir Bechar El-Kasim to return him of his promise not to tell him that the moment was now come to fulfil it. In his reply, he expresses a ready willingness to support our views, and to furnish us with 1,000 men or even a greater number, if we can arm them.

I have the most positive assurances from the most noble Druse Sheiks, of their impatience to throw off the Egyptian yoke, and return to their duty to the Sultan.

While I was on shore I received daily messages from them, and from the Christian Princes also to the Emir Bechar, who disapproved of his conduct in the insurrection. They asked for assistance in the most energetic manner and urged on me the necessity of having immediate success, so that they might be able to put the Emir in a position without delay to resist the measures that the Egyptian Government are likely to take to prevent his escape.

My very confidential communications with the Maronite Patriarch whose influence in the mountains is very great, gave me an opportunity to assert in a positive manner the feelings of himself and of the clergy towards the Egyptians, and I have not hesitated to affirm that they are in readiness to resist them, as they are avowed to the Sultan.

To preserve the good intelligence that exists between the Patriarch, his clergy and myself I have thought it incumbent on me to address him also a letter, pointing to him the Convention of London, and the determination of the Great Powers to carry it through at the risk of going to war with Mehemet Ali. The Patriarch is under French protection and was therefore greatly alarmed by the French; motives of religion tended to attach him more closely to them, and I had, in consequence, an immense trouble to establish friendship between him and the clergy of Mount Lebanon, who are not only his, but possess pre-eminence the energy of Mount Lebanon, who are not only his, but possess immense power over the minds of the people. Circumstances I might mention have assisted me in the attainment of an object which I consider to be of the utmost importance and utility.

It is now a few days past every village I can traverse with the steps of the army. The army is now in the mountains, whilst they aspire to the walls of the city, and are now in the hands of the Egyptian army.

I have now a Syrian army in the state of excitement and it is not impossible that I should be able to expel the Egyptian army from the town.

I shall, my Lord, the moment the Turkish troops arrive, the whole army will be in arms, and provided that the means employed are sufficient to insure success in the first attack, the views of the Ministry will be accomplished forthwith. The only serious obstacle to be overcome, is the difficulty of bringing about a reconciliation between the two factions in the army, and who would not hesitate, perhaps







The Sultan's troops are already on their way later, accompanied by English ships of war. They have on board arms and ammunition, and I fully hope and expect, after the communications that have passed between us, that the people will seize this opportunity to render themselves worthy of the friendship and consideration of the protecting Powers, &c., &c.

(Signed)

RICHARD WOOD

Inclosure 7 in No. 174

Mr. Wood to the Emir Abdallah.

Translation

After the usual Compliments,

August 15, 1840.

It is with a lively pleasure that I announce to your Excellency that Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have unanimously decided on restoring Syria to the Ottoman Empire. The Ministry of Commerce have ordered the British fleet to blockade the coast with the Austrian ships of war, the port of Alexandria. Your ships, however, conveyed by a favourable breeze, have taken their position before the town of Beyrout, where the Commander has already commenced the raising of the Turkish troops, and the Turkish troops, moved into the service of Mehmet Ali, and the restoration of the army belonging to the Government.

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(Signed)

RICHARD WOOD

Inclosure 8 in No. 174

The Emir Bechar El-Kasim to Mr. Wood.

(Translation.)

After the usual Compliments,

YOUR letter reached us at a very important moment, the contents of which we have well understood, and we are very glad to hear of your state of health. You are, I am sure, in the best of health.

It is with a lively pleasure that I announce to your Excellency that Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have unanimously decided on restoring Syria to the Ottoman Empire. The Ministry of Commerce have ordered the British fleet to blockade the coast with the Austrian ships of war, the port of Alexandria. Your ships, however, conveyed by a favourable breeze, have taken their position before the town of Beyrout, where the Commander has already commenced the raising of the Turkish troops, and the Turkish troops, moved into the service of Mehmet Ali, and the restoration of the army belonging to the Government.

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(L.S.)

EMIR BECHAR EL-KASIM

Inclosure 9 in No. 174

Mr. Wood to the Emir Bechar El-Shehaby

(Confidential.)

After the usual Compliments,

I HAVE already done so much for you, and I am sure that your Excellency will be very much pleased to hear of my success. I have already done so much for you, and I am sure that your Excellency will be very much pleased to hear of my success.

I have already done so much for you, and I am sure that your Excellency will be very much pleased to hear of my success. I have already done so much for you, and I am sure that your Excellency will be very much pleased to hear of my success.

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attention; but this being impossible for me just now, I must limit myself to the foregoing only, which I beg again to submit to your Excellency's most serious consideration.

(Signed) R. WOOD.

Inclosure 10 in No. 174.

M. Frederic Pisan to Viscount Ponsenby

My Lord,

Péris, ce 31 Août, 1840.

NOUS avons vu Réchid Pacha à la Porte. La lettre pour Sélim Pacha a été changée. J'ai corrigé la traduction que le Baron Stürmer a prise. Il a lu le rapport de Mr Wood, et il a demandé les deux firmans. A 4 heures après-midi, je suis parti de la Porte, et Réchid Pacha allait partir pour Balta-Liman avec l'intention pour y dîner.

On y arrangera aussi l'affaire des deux firmans.

Je suis, &c.,

(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI

No. 175.

Viscount Ponsenby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

No. 102.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 1, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of his Excellency Rechid Pasha's answer to the French Ambassador's letter of the 23rd ultimo, and of the Count de Pontois' reply to that communication.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 175

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Le 27 Août, 1840

EN réponse à la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 25 du ce mois, je ne puis que lui répéter, en ce qui concerne le message de M. Cor, que la version que j'en ai donnée dans mon office du 22, est la seule que ma mémoire me permette de considérer comme exacte. J'ajouterai, M. l'Ambassadeur, que je ne saurais répondre que de cette version là, et que je reste donc étranger à toute autre version, ainsi qu'à toutes les interprétations dont son Excellence pourra avoir à se plaindre aujourd'hui.

Quant à l'usage qui a été fait du message, je n'hésite pas à déclarer, que je l'ai en effet communiqué à quelques uns des Cours amies de la Sublime Porte,

et puis me paraître content de la pratique diplomatique dans des circon-

stances qui n'ont pas de la publicité, en a fait au contraire l'objet de communications officielles envers les autres Ministres de la Sublime Porte, auxquels il a même ajouté, qu'il monterait sur les minarets pour faire connaître à la nation entière la manière dont son Gouvernement envisageait l'état actuel des choses.

D'après ce qui précède, votre Excellence est sans doute trop équitable pour ne pas reconnaître que ce serait plutôt au Gouvernement Ottoman à démentir une réputation, puisque M. Cor a déclaré que la France était contre l'adminis-

aucun acte que le Gouvernement Français peut considérer comme dirigé contre ses droits et de s'être bue à jeter hors de son souverain dans les circonstances dont il s'agit.

Je profite de cette occasion, &c.,

(Signed) RECHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175.

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Therapia le 31 Août 1840

Monsieur le Ministre

J'AI reçu dans la nuit de d'aujourd'hui la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 28 du ce mois, et j'ai vu la traduction de la lettre que vous m'avez adressée.

Je ne puis que vous dire que j'ai lu la lettre de votre Excellence, et que j'ai vu la traduction de la lettre que vous m'avez adressée. Je ne puis que vous dire que j'ai lu la lettre de votre Excellence, et que j'ai vu la traduction de la lettre que vous m'avez adressée. Je ne puis que vous dire que j'ai lu la lettre de votre Excellence, et que j'ai vu la traduction de la lettre que vous m'avez adressée.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

(Signed) R. DE PONTOIS

No. 176

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsenby

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 21, 1840.

(No. 181.)

I HAVE read your Excellency's despatch, No. 180, inclosing copy of a letter from the French Ambassador at Constantinople to the British Minister; and I have to instruct your Excellency to give the French Minister every support in your power in this affair.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 177

Mr. Pro Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 9.)

M. L.

Aleppo, July 2, 1840

I have the honour to inform you that the 4th and 5th of the 1840

of the 1840

of the 1840

of the 1840

of the 1840

I have, &c.,

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Mr. Pro-Consul Ferry to Viscount Ponsonby

Extract)

Ascpss, June 4, 1910

SINCE the date of my last letter to your Lordship, little or nothing of any interest has transpired within this district in any way meriting your Lordship's attention.

His Highness the Sirdar of Bikaner continues to remain at Marash, and nothing for the present about a any movement on the part of his Highness.

The following agencies of the Executive Branch are located on the northern and southern borders of the State: the American Marshal, Customs and the United States as well as all those who are in constant jurisdiction, continue to occupy their positions with little or no change.

He is not a very busy man. He is perfectly quiet in that district. His father is a Missionary and returned from the expedition he undertook against some of the Apaches. And then along the River, however, it was that he completely repulsed the Apaches, took a few captives and possessed himself of several excellent horses. He said that the Apaches who, with their numbers, it is said, he has not a more subtle mode of carrying on activity.

The Exalted Order of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. has the honor to represent at the Grand National Convention on the 30th ultimo from Marsh.

The Excellency is invested with a mission on the part of his Highness the Norankier, the object of which is to visit every district throughout Syria, to urge and compel the Governors to pay up the balances of the different taxes due to the State. The Excellency is to see that the taxes are paid, and that the same are not still summed uncollected, which sum he caused the Governor to pay down, and to receive the same when collected.

(d) ... human flesh left this yesterday for Damascus and the south of Syria, on the same mission as above noted.

I beg to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency the Seraskier has sent to Alexandria a shipper for the purpose of procuring the vessels and crews necessary for the service, and to be employed in the transport of the troops, arms, &c. &c. to the theatre of war. Mr. Woodhouse has obtained the necessary orders and remitted for to take the same.

I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship in my last despatch, that the old Barracks at Fort St. Philip, which were abandoned in April, 1804, had been abandoned; but has it yet been resumed. I beg, however, to inform your Lordship, that all the masons and workmen have been seized by the Government, and are all employed in finishing the new barracks, situated north-west of the town, which were commenced three years ago, but never finished. This step has been taken in consequence of the orders received from his Highness the Governor, to finish that building with all possible despatch.

ly the last advices from our Agents on the coast, they report their respective districts perfectly tranquil, and I am happy to be able to acquaint your Lordship that the whole of this comarcal jurisdiction is tranquil.

Inclosure 2 in No. 177

Mr. Pro-Censor Harvey to Finance Committee

(Estim.)

Algeria, June 25, 1940.

[illegible]

from Mr Consul Werry of Damascus, and Mr Consul Moore of Beirut, within whose districts these events are taking place and which will be more correct than any I could say before your Lordship from hence.

Since my last communication to your Lordship in consequence of the insurrectionary spirit which has manifested itself in the south of Syria, some movement has taken place among the different corps of the Egyptians which have been concentrated on this frontier and within this district.

On the 6th instant the 9th, 10th, and 14th Regiments of Infantry in garrison here received orders to march south of Havana, and on the following day the 14th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regt of Foot (onwards removed) left from here and we marched forward south. The Artillery has not yet left this but everything is in readiness and about expecting to receive orders to leave.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Malaga which point it is not expected he will quit for the present. The force he has with him is now composed of two regiments and one company of Artillery. The other regiments hitherto in that quarter have all been ordered sent to the coast by Izmir and Tripoli.

I am a member of the force at Yankton and have not been out of the state since I was a very young child. The force says that a lot of people are coming to the reservation from the north.

I have the honor to write to your Lordship, that by a very recent arrival from Giza, I am assured, that the corps of the Egyptian Army concentrated on that line both regulars and irregulars, continue to occupy without any change the same positions as I have already related to your Lordship. And I am further assured, that every tranquility reigns at present throughout that district.

I now exists at present here a great "Sochra." All animals are being  
forcibly seized by the Government for the transport of provisions and ammuni-  
tion and are not happy. I have made being captured a Hannu, of the  
tribe of the (one destroyed) or the (one destroyed).

This last week I have seen Mr. Woodard, I am sure that you  
 Alexander, and that he is a young man, a native of the Gaiour High, a  
 long and fine looking man, and one of the finest of the Gaiour  
 tribe. He is a very good man, and yet an insurrectionary spirit like the southern  
 negroes.

I am, however, sorry to say the last letters I have from our agents at Larkana report that the tribes of the Aker-Meer are engaged in part war, but that they are watching the movements of the Emir Beeder's mountains. With this exception, I can assure your Lordship, that the whole of this Consular district enjoys for the present every tranquillity, and is free from infectious and contagious diseases.

No. 174.

*Mr. Consul Herry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 12.)

*Democrat, August 18, 1940*

(Exhibit)

YOUR Lordship will have been informed that the Mount Lebanon insurrection has been suppressed, and some measures of it in the interior have been of Tripoli Mr. Consul Moore will transmit your Lordship information thereon.

It was given out by the Government here, that part of the forces employed for the construction and termination of the redoubts around the principal springs there, for which object materials were being collected here, the forces were also to march to the Haouran district, to compel the inhabitants to pay the Fendek Tax and furnish the annual quantities of grain required for the military depot here. For this end, Shrik Mahomed Rafai was sent for, to make the intimation to the Haouran population, and to require their co-operation to expel the Soudi Arabs from the Lodjra, to oblige them to return to their homes.



tions, and desist from marauding and subjecting the country to their depredations. He is still here and it is believed the Government has succeeded in concluding a favourable negotiation on these subjects.

I have not since heard that Abbas Pasha's forces are on their march hither, and since the reported determination of Mehmet Ali to maintain himself in Syria by force of arms there may be reason to think that these forces have been distributed along the coast.

I have not heard of any acts of open usurpation and rebellion in the direction to the south, and the country north of this city is for the present, in a tranquil state.

The Mutah Emir, Marwan Girwad Hartoush of the Babec district, has been reported to have his sons and others are for the present in a state of tranquillity. There are however some stories of border of Irregular Cavalry in that direction, approved by the Government to keep affairs in that state and to escort to the supplies of provisions which are sent from hence to the army.

By the latest advices from Aleppo of the 9th instant, Ibrahim Pasha was at Marast with but a small force. He was reported to be rather indisposed from fever.

No. 179.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord,

Beirut, August 21, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of my official letter and inclosures, dated the 14th instant, to Colonel Hodges, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, in reply to his communication to me of the "Acte Séparé" signed at London on the 15th July, 1840, by the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and which arrangement has for its object the pacification of the Levant.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—By the arrival of Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Alecto," this morning, I have been informed with respect to the contents of the 15th July, 1840, marked "Secret," the contents of which I beg leave to say, have my most careful attention.

Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

Mr. Consul Moore to Colonel Hodges

Sir,

Beirut, August 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, No. 14, in which you quote the "Acte Séparé" signed at London on the 15th July, 1840, by the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and which arrangement has for its object the pacification of the Levant.

I am further informed that a Protocol was signed at London on the 15th July, 1840, by which it is understood that the Government of the Sultan, certain of the Sovereigns of the Sultan, certain of the Sovereigns of the Convention shall be adopted without waiting for the formal ratification of the Convention.

I carefully notice your instructions, Sir, to propagate and make public as widely as possible the "Acte Séparé," and if possible throughout all Syria, the "Acte Séparé," to the end that the Syrians may therein find motives for consolation and encouragement; and I beg to assure you that

according to my means, I will co-operate with the utmost activity and zeal in promoting the objects and intentions now brought to my knowledge.

I beg leave to inform you that Commodore Napier arrived before Hayrout on the 13th instant, with four ships of the line, and has since been reinforced by Her Majesty's ship "Castor," and the "Gorgon" steam frigate.

On the 14th instant, Commodore Napier addressed to me a communication, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, and which I notified conformably with his desire, to the European Consuls, and to the British merchants resident here.

I now take leave to inclose transcript of a Proclamation to the Syrians issued the same day by Commodore Napier. The effect of the publication of the latter document has been most favourable in respect to the peace of the country, and encouraging the Syrians, who are now only waiting the appearance of the promised Egyptian arms, to throw off the Egyptian yoke. I have received pressing inquiries from the inhabitants of Lebanon, who have expressed a desire that they will not be long delayed, for they may be provoked to give time for the attack of the Syrians, and will be availed of by the Egyptian Government to sow dissension and to strengthen their own position and to procure the most advantageous arrangements.

Communications have been opened with the Turkish troops; but owing to the measures adopted by the Government, this has been a work of difficulty, and it was found that the Turkish troops have been induced into the hands of the Egyptian forces can be calculated.

Four individuals, one of the rank of Major and the others captains, have taken refuge on board Her Majesty's ship "Powder," and it is reported with other Beys, are anxious to follow their example. Hassan Pasha, now at the General, has been completely gained over by the Egyptians to leave much hopes of a return to his allegiance.

With respect to the troops, general notwithstanding their ardent language after their escape from the country and from the Turkish forces, they are off Beirut they will hardly have courage to rise. With view to attacking them, they attempt they might be induced to make to recover their arms. Commodore Napier ordered Her Majesty's ship "Ganges" to anchor off the harbor, where they have been surrounded by Egyptian forces; but the effect of previous notice was to induce them to attack at first, and then the measure was ordered to be withdrawn, and that it was intended to attack them, the idea of this time has been removed, but the fact that it will be the Proclamation can have its effect.

The four Beys have hitherto given no reply to the proclamation which have been sent them by Commodore Napier, and through other channels. The effect of the proclamation may be to induce them to surrender, but the fact that they have taken up arms to be sent to the coast to meet the arrival of the Egyptian forces, and the arms of the Turkish forces, it will be impossible to judge, for what will be the result.

The Emir Bachir El Kasbi, nephew of the great prince and next to him in influence, has reported to the Government that he is in the most favourable to the insurgent cause, and that he is in the most favorable to the insurgent cause, and that he is in the most favorable to the insurgent cause, and that he is in the most favorable to the insurgent cause.

An Albanian chief with sixty men has just offered to take service with the Sultan.

Commodore Napier has captured four or five vessels, with some troops, arms, and provisions, and has sent them to the Egyptian coast of war.

With the exception of a few insurgents in the district of Doms, near Tripoli, the late revolt must be considered as completely quelled, but the smothered fire, which is day by day increasing in intensity, will I feel bound to a flame throughout Syria, when the Syrian standard is once raised.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. MOORE.











was on and fixing the day for his departure he asked him on the 22nd to a law office in Sacramento to get a ruling of what he ought to do, whether he should withdraw or back with him? The hour came and he had equally pressed by the Justice of the Peace Alexander and he has finally decided to leave, that is, to withdraw his name from the case and to let the evidence in them, and leave the matter to them to answer for the consequences of remaining further longer than he ought to do.

Rufat Bey, on the first hint being given him to leave, being empowered in his instructions to return to Constantinople after the time had expired of the proposition, the Porte returned the answer to the demand of the Crime. After a great deal of discussion as to the period it would be necessary for him to stay in the place, that he should remain the whole term agreed upon, before its expiration could be produced as a pretext for the Pasha a pretext for withholding the orders which he had given for the evacuation of the territories, &c removed from the power of the Bey, &c. he is helpless, feels most acutely the injury done to him by the Pasha, &c. and has hitherto declined to do anything to return to his duty. He is now, as before, in a state of complete torpor, and is not at all disposed to do anything to assist the Porte in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the affairs of the Crimea. He is now, as before, in a state of complete torpor, and is not at all disposed to do anything to assist the Porte in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the affairs of the Crimea. He is now, as before, in a state of complete torpor, and is not at all disposed to do anything to assist the Porte in its efforts to bring about a settlement of the affairs of the Crimea.

the new Consuls waited upon the Pasha and dismissed with a request to state what they wished. A Circular Note was immediately issued to the Consuls, that all he had to do was to follow the Pasha's lead, and advice, which he has hitherto kept his

No reliance can be placed on the Pasha's fortifying the harbour; and the heavy ships of the Turco-Egyptian squadrons have been drawn up in a line at a sufficient distance from the shore.

**In another**

I cannot help thinking that the strict secrecy observed with regard to the  
has given the Pasha a first unfavourable impression.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

2. The second step is to gather relevant information and data. This can involve research, consultation with experts, or collecting data from various sources.

3. The third step is to analyze the information and data collected. This involves identifying patterns, trends, and relationships that can help in understanding the problem.

4. The fourth step is to develop a solution or answer. This involves applying the analysis to the problem and proposing a course of action or a final answer.

5. The fifth step is to evaluate the solution or answer. This involves checking the solution against the original problem and requirements to ensure it is valid and effective.

6. The sixth step is to communicate the solution or answer. This involves presenting the findings in a clear and concise manner to the relevant stakeholders.

7. The seventh step is to monitor and review the solution or answer. This involves tracking the progress of the solution and making adjustments as needed to ensure it remains effective over time.

8. The eighth step is to document the solution or answer. This involves creating a record of the process and findings for future reference and learning.

9. The ninth step is to share the solution or answer. This involves disseminating the findings to a wider audience to promote knowledge and best practices.

10. The tenth step is to reflect on the process and findings. This involves evaluating the effectiveness of the process and identifying areas for improvement for future tasks.

[illegible]

the attempt alone, unattended even by success, would have produced, in such a case. The Police would never take a line away from the Jews.

In connection with the discontent of the Egyptian soldiery, and the general detestation in which Mehemet Ali is held by the Fellahs, I may mention, that it is well known that several of the Pasha's Ministers disagree with him widely in the course he is pursuing with regard to Rust Bey's mission. An Egyptian acquaintance of much ability, whom I cannot see without danger to him under the actual system of espionage, informed Mr. Hay (who communicated it immediately to Colonel Hodges), that Setou Bey and several others had warmly remonstrated with him on this subject, but the Pasha takes no counsel. The fact, however, is kept a profound secret, for any indications of disaffection on the part of his immediate Ministers, through which he oppresses the multitude, would be attended with the most evil results to him. Among them there are above ten Pashas in different places, who only remain faithful to him, I am told, owing to the comparative destitution which his downfall would entail upon them. In this view of the case, a proclamation of the Porte, after the expiration of the whole term, containing a promise of an adequate provision for them, would be attended with very favourable results. The chances would decidedly be in favour of it, it is said, were it widely circulated.

The motives ascribed by well informed persons to Mehemet Ali, for offering such a stubborn resistance, are founded upon the calculation that the Allies cannot possibly take any efficient measures for coercing him before the ensuing spring, and that the conflicting interests of the European Powers, may lead to a more favourable arrangement than that now proposed to him. The news said to have been brought to him by the French steamer of yesterday and the day before, of the strictly confidential nature of the late negotiations, and the knowledge that no such alteration in the views he has adopted; indeed, it is remarked, that the cautious language of the Foreign Consuls, and the lately subdued tone of Colonel Hodges, have rather confirmed him in his opinion. Although they have reacted with great effect upon the minds of the British and French Governments, he looks upon that measure as having been hastily adopted under a false view of the state of the Turkish resources, and the value of the various means of defence he is, too, actively engaged in; and he had more with the view of impressing the conviction of his determination on the Courts of Europe, than in the hope of successfully combating the coercive measures of the Allies. In the course of the interview, which he was not permitted to prolong, I perceived still characterized it.

I have given Colonel Hodges immediate information of everything that has come to my knowledge connected with the business of the Mission, and of the conduct of the Port Admiral.

The unfortunate Druses, with the Emir Hardar, have been sent into Upper Egypt.

Fifteen officers of the Imperial fleet have disappeared within the last five days.

The Admiral, with the "Bellerophon" and "Daphne," and the Austrian frigate, having the young Archduke on board, are riding in the offing under a

I beg to refer to a private letter which accompanied my No. 3, and to my request of being allowed to go on board the fleet instead of returning with Hisat Bey, in the event of its being actively employed.

Poor Rıfat Bey has been sadly neglected here. With the exception of Sami Bey and Teka Effendi, our host, who came to see him once, he is shunned by every one. He is in very delicate health, and finds it impossible to eat of the horrid trash sent us from the royal kitchens. Indeed, I have been lately a great sutieler myself, but hope to get more accustomed to it. I have come to a very amicable understanding with a fellow who continually dodges me about the streets, he is very willing to go on my errands, if handsomely remunerated, which suits me and my acquaintance here vastly.

Believe me, &c.,  
(Signed) CHARLES ALISON

P.S.—2 r. x. The Pasha's final refusal is all over the town. I would not be astonished if something violent occur here, particularly if the Sultan's flag appeared off the port.

(No. 60)

My Lord

St. Petersburg, September, 2 1840

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 43 inclusive, were delivered to me on the 10th instant by the messenger Waring.

I had an interview with Count Nesselrode yesterday, and, according to your Lordship's instructions, communicated to him the despatch of Mr. B. Mr. B. was very much pleased that he had the satisfaction of seeing the despatch, and that a Russian who had a long time been in the hands of the English, and was glad to be put in possession of a document, of every part of which he

[illegible][illegible]

The Board of Directors are extremely anxious for fresh accounts from the public and that a Russian force be necessary for the collection of contributions, which will be effected before the setting in of the winter.

(Signed) I have, Sec.  
J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 187

No 61,

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 12, 1840.*

CONSIDERABLE activity prevails at Grossstadt, in consequence of the Emperor having ordered one division of the Baltic fleet, nine sail of the line and six frigates, (which had just been dismantled and laid up for the winter,) to be immediately prepared for sea.

I have no doubt, Sir, that the Admiralty desires me, as to be placed at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, but I cannot learn that there exists at present any intention of sending it beyond the Baltic.

When ready it will proceed to Swaborg, and probably winter there. The advantage of this squadron lying at Swaborg is, that it will be available for one month later in the year, and could put to sea some weeks earlier in the spring than if it remained at Cronstadt.

Signed) I have, &c.,  
J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 63 :

My Lord

St Petersburg, September 12, 1840.

M. CASIMIR PERIER, first Secretary to the French Embassy reached St Petersburg on the 10th inst. and it is probable that M. de Beaufrere will soon avail himself of leave which he has been long desiring, to return to France.

The language of the French Ambassador since the arrival of M. Périer is somewhat changed. He seems to count more on an alteration in the opinions of the Allies in the Turco-Egyptian Question than on any change in those of the Government to facilitate the return of a good understanding between the Five Powers. M. de Barante appears surprised at the sudden order sent to Constantinople for instantly commencing a revision of the Russian text and day, and at a counter-order to Paris yesterday. He gives out as his opinion that some important business must be taken up, that France is engaged, it was should be inevitable to be armed and ready to strike Germany at the very onset.

J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

No. 189

Esq. Palmerston to Mr Bloomfield

(No. 57)

24.

Foreign Office September 29 1940

I HAVE received your despatch No 61 reporting that Count Nesselrode had stated to you that it was intended to hold a conference to promote that all be necessary to co-operate with the British against the Russians and that the Russian frigates which the Imperial Government had ordered to be immediately equipped and I have instructed you to convey to Count Nesselrode the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this arrangement of the Emperor which Her Majesty's Government will have great satisfaction in

TAY & CO  
 S. 400 PALMURSTON

No. 190

No 1915

My Lord

Thessalon, September 8 1840

[illegible]

I have received from Mr Alison  
in your will find accounts of the state of Egypt, which are confirmed by  
the proceedings of the R. and are the proceedings of





While matters were yet in the course of discussion all Alexandria echoed the joyful news of his submission, which he had purposely promulgated; but this it was intended should not last long. Another voice came from the palace, ere the interview was yet over. Mehmet Ali has submitted to the desire and to the decision of his Sovereign—but of what avail? The Consuls have paralyzed his good intentions by a display of the overbearance of some unnecessary formalities, and have thus assumed the whole responsibility of whatever may result from it.

After the interview, the Ruskas mentioned the Sheeks and told them what he had done, and how he had been frustrated. They are, however, now in full possession of our version of the story and see very clearly into the deceit, so that matters are just where they were after the 26th, with his additional trust of a working version.

I may be old-fashioned, but I have not wanted to reach what you call "the past" in order to let the public version of and the interviews between the Pasha and the Communist Party be promulgated in Afghanistan, as I thought that, as a scholar, I was perfectly correct, yet it is generally a matter of no small difficulty to convince the lay audience in which one thus created and put things in their perspective, it is as if he wanted to take the stage with interviews. A comment by the Pasha is then a very questionable act. Are the Pasha's letters to try to be the voice of the world in addition to his country? Are we to be the dupes of his parties and the victims of its effects? As for the man we tried to get to know, as for the world I do not believe that any woman could assert the assertion of a sex which were to carry them all. This course, he would say, expressing in very different terms, has more effect. The world is a forward for the future.

His Bay deviewed in the belief of the Pallas's sincere desire to settle  
 the question of hereditary dominion, and where they were permitted, but the  
 cause to be moved is as far as the sea. All their practices upon him and  
 the cause of this are carefully watched, and most effectively counteracted. His  
 quality of mind is a strong, quick, and calm, collected exterior,  
 and he is able to put himself very properly under our counsel. But he is so  
 much and open to the most violent and he is so that he had to easily be  
 caused that the Pallas and the traders who surround him. Ahmed Hays  
 Pasha, and he himself are more than their wages and counsel to him.  
 An I have with him and am present at all his proceedings. I must not then  
 the power to see that his mind is very open to us and to our cause. The  
 Pallas is so on the contrary is as stubborn as a mule, and will not be con-  
 vinced by our counsel. To say to the matter, and that he is gratuitously  
 making a great way in which we have been enabled lately to  
 keep him with us, and he is so laughing at his vain fears and  
 attempts to make his own way in the matter, and to his great  
 amusement.

Admiral ... the ... of France ... been their ... The Admiral ... understand.

It is hoped that should the Pasha even give in, the same activity will still continue to be shown with regard to the coercing, until after all his troops shall have withdrawn within the limits of Egypt; for it is conceived that he may be capable of submitting, and issuing the necessary orders to Ibrahim Pasha with the sole view of checking the progress of the operations against him, which, as they cannot be resumed until next spring, will enable him to await the tide of events.

Rifat Bey has not received any communication from the Porte since his departure.

(Signed) CHARLES ALISON

I transcribe a list of all the Paasha's Paahas, viz., Ibrahim and Ahmed, nephews, and Kourachid Parmakeig, arrived by this at Cairo.

In Syria: Ibrahim, Commander-in-Chief; Sherif, Governor of Damascus, Abbas; Solymán, the renegade; Osman; Hassan of Constantinople, (these are at Acre. Sayda, and Derroul,) and Ahmed.

All these naturally think what will become of them, should the Pasha be stripped of his Government.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that on the evening of the 29th instant, M. de Metternich assembled together his Excellency the Spanish Envoy, the British Ambassador, the Consul-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th July.

(Signed) I have, &c.,  
G. LLOYD HODGES.

*Proceeds Verbal of an interview on the 29th August, between Mehmet Ali and  
Isaf Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.*

SLR L'invitation faite au nom du Vice-Roi par l'entremise de M. scow Efendi, les Consuls-Généraux de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, se sont rendus au Palais de Kas-Ettape, deux heures avant le coucher du soleil (5 heures de l'après-midi). Ils y ont trouvé son Excellence Rifat Bey, qui venait à peine d'arriver, conversant avec son Altesse.

Après les compliments d'usage, le Vice-Roi nous fit l'ouverture suivante : —  
J'ai donné, il y a trois jours, un refus catégorique d'accéder aux condi-





doubt he meant me to understand that the forcing Mehmet Ali to subscribe to the exact conditions imposed by the Treaty of the Five Powers would humiliate France

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

P.S.—I have the honour to inclose the "Moniteur," containing an article in contradiction of the statement put forth by the "Morning Chronicle."

Inclosure in No. 192.

Article from the "Moniteur Universel" of September 25.

LE "Morning Chronicle," dans son numéro du 21, émet une assertion dont il importe de relever la fausseté. Ce journal prétend que Mehmet Ali avait d'abord annoncé à la Porte et aux Cours des Quatre Puissances des conditions auxquelles il consentait à tout terme et que c'est par suite de l'insistance des Anglais et Français qu'il aurait restreintes à l'indivisibilité territoriale de l'Égypte et à la possession viagère de la Syrie.

Nous sommes en mesure d'opposer à cette assertion la preuve la plus absolue. Nous pouvons vous démontrer que sans les vives instances des Anglais et les pressions de Mehmet Ali, aucun traité n'aurait été porté à son terme. Il demandait, en effet, qu'on lui laissât garder, à titre viager, non-seulement la Syrie, mais la totalité des territoires qu'il occupe en ce moment, et ce n'est qu'après une très-forte résistance qu'il s'est décidé à y renoncer.

Les preuves de ce que nous avançons ici seront fournies aux deux Chambres.

No. 193.

Barl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 258.)

My Lord

Paris, September 25, 1840.

A COURIER arrived on Wednesday last with despatches from Prince Metternich to the Austrian Ambassador. Count Apponyi this morning read to me one of these despatches which he yesterday communicated to M. de Barante. It contains a long and argumentative dissertation upon the state of the Eastern Question. It is written in a pacific and conciliatory spirit towards France, and Prince Metternich seems to wish and expect that the concert between the Four Powers and France, which he considers to have been concluded by the Treaty of the 15th July, may be re-established. I tried not however to attempt to give an account of these despatches to Count Apponyi as I understood they have been transmitted to Baron Neumann for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 194

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 18, 1840

YESTERDAY the French Ambassador received a messenger from Paris. Amongst other things he was the bearer of a copy of your Lordship's despatch, No. 36, to Mr. Bulwer, which was accompanied by the observation, that the arguments contained in this document are precisely of the same tendency as those advanced in the Memorandum of July 17, only more diffuse, and that as France was unable to discover in it any new proposition, her attitude in the Turco-Egyptian Question must remain unchanged.

Count Nesselrode informs me however, that, notwithstanding this declaration, he has indirectly learnt that M. de Barante is charged with a communication to the Imperial Government, the object of which is to endeavour to lay the ground work for some plausible excuse to the French Chambers for the vast expenses to which the country has been exposed by the naval and military armaments, but the French Ambassador has not yet made any communication, or has he even sought an interview with the Vice-Chancellor.

(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 195

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 18, 1840

I CALLED on Count Nesselrode to-day, and his Excellency allowed me to read his last despatches from Alexandria, of the 26th August.

Amongst other papers I found a copy of a plan of operation against Mehmet Ali, dated 22nd August, which has been proposed to the Four Courts, by their Agents at Alexandria. Count Nesselrode seems fully to approve of the plan, but as his Excellency sends a messenger to London to-morrow, your Lordship will receive from Baron Brunnow any observations the Russian Government may have to offer on the subject.

Count Nesselrode appears desirous for the application of the most vigorous measures against Mehmet Ali, and expressed his regret at the force the Allies being, he thought, insufficient for carrying out the objects of the Convention, and he once more alluded, in an impressive manner, to the defenceless state of Alexandria, as an opportunity to be taken advantage of, for striking terror into the heart of the country.

The intelligence contained in Count Medem's reports will have long since reached your Lordship. The tone of his despatches scarcely calls for a remark. His style, though it is moderate, and shows an anxious desire for cordial cooperation with his Colleagues. In alluding to M. Walewski and M. Cochelet, Count Medem says, that their instructions appear to have been much modified, and that M. Cochelet had now been directed to engage Mehmet Ali to accept without delay, the conditions of the London Convention.

Rumours having reached me of the movement of Russian troops to the South, and towards the Principalities, I inquired of Count Nesselrode if they were true? His Excellency replied, that some changes had become necessary to supply the draughts required for the expeditionary army; and on my asking further, if there was any question of forming an Army of Reserve he said that was a subject which would become matter for consideration during the winter.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

No. 196

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 19, 1840.

AFTER the interview which I had yesterday with Count Nesselrode, the post of the 8th instant arrived from Constantinople, bringing accounts from Alexandria of the 30th ultimo.

Count Nesselrode has just sent me M. de Titow's despatch, covering one

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exercise of one of the most important attributes of sovereign authority, that is, to deprive him of the power of deposing a rebel Governor, and of placing a loyal subject in possession of the legal power attached to such post?

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PUNSONBY.

P.S.—I have not had an answer from the Internuncio respecting the question of deposing Mehemet Ali.

No. 200.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)

No. 198

My Lord,

Therapia, September 10, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the translation of the Firman appointing Emir Bechir El-Kasim Prince of the Druses, in case his uncle, the present Emir Bechir, should refuse to return to his allegiance to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PUNSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 200.

Firman appointing Emir Bechir El-Kasim Prince of the Druses.

Traduit de l'Arabe.

NOUS adressons ce Commandement Impérial qui doit avoir son effet dans tous les pays où il nous en sera adressé à l'Emir Bechir, à celui qui nous a adressé à présent Prince de la Montagne des Druses, et à tous les autres qui nous en adresseront. Nous ordonnons à l'Emir Bechir de se conformer à nos ordres, et de ne pas se laisser séduire par les promesses de ses ennemis, et de ne pas se laisser séduire par les promesses de ses ennemis, et de ne pas se laisser séduire par les promesses de ses ennemis.

Il était du devoir de l'Emir Bechir, d'après les ordres qu'il avait reçus, de se conformer à nos ordres, et de ne pas se laisser séduire par les promesses de ses ennemis, et de ne pas se laisser séduire par les promesses de ses ennemis, et de ne pas se laisser séduire par les promesses de ses ennemis.

Il nous est parvenu, parvenu, que l'Emir Bechir a manqué à toutes ces obligations, et qu'il persiste à se conformer aux ordres de Mehemet Ali, et à ceux de ses ennemis, et à ceux de ses ennemis, et à ceux de ses ennemis.

Vous, Prince, agissant avec cette fidélité et cet excellent jugement qui vous caractérisent, vous avez montré votre dévouement envers notre Personne Impériale, dévouement qui mérite une récompense; vous avez prouvé votre obéissance, et vous savez ce que vous nous devez comme notre sujet. Aussi notre Sublime Porte est-elle sûre que si vous étiez nommé Prince des Druses, vous donneriez de nouvelles preuves de soumission à nos ordres, et un nouvel essor à la fidélité, à la loyauté et au zèle qui sont innés en vous. C'est pourquoi nous avons ordonné la destitution d'Emir Bechir, et vous avons nommé et nommons Prince des tribus Druses; et le présent Commandement Impérial est conséquemment émané de notre Chancellerie Impériale.

Aussitôt donc que vous aurez reçu ce noble diplôme, vous le porterez,

en le publiant, à la connaissance de tous ceux qu'il faut et puis, vous remplirez les devoirs de votre poste en agissant avec votre fidélité accoutumée, et en gérant les affaires qui sont de votre ressort avec sagesse et équité, et d'une manière conforme aux vœux et aux intérêts de notre Majesté Impériale.

Parmi vos autres devoirs, vous avez à protéger la population et les tribus Druses sur lesquelles notre sollicitude souveraine veille sans cesse; à les mettre sur leurs gardes contre toute opposition à l'exercice de nos droits légitimes sur la Nation et l'Empire, et contre tout ce qui serait incompatible avec les devoirs de la soumission et du dévouement qu'elles doivent à la Sublime Porte; et à les empêcher de devenir les partisans de Mehemet Ali et des siens. Enfin, il faut que vous mettiez tous vos soins et que vous travailliez jour et nuit à faire ce que notre Sublime Porte attend de votre sagesse et de votre fidélité, et à mériter la continuation de la faveur qui vient de vous être conférée.

Et vous Cheikhs des Druses! lorsque vous saurez que nous avons nommé l'Emir Bechir El-Kasim, Prince des Druses, il faudra, ainsi que votre devoir l'exige, que vous vous unissiez à lui de cœur et d'âme pour exécuter nos volontés, et que vous vous conformiez au présent Firman en maintenant nos droits légitimes.

Qu'on ne voie parmi vous aucun procédé contraire à notre volonté souveraine, ni attentatoire à notre autorité dans nos Etats héréditaires.

Donné le seizième jour du mois de Réjeb, l'an mil deux cent cinquante-six. (2 Septembre, 1840.)

No. 201.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 199.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 12, 1840.

MR. ALISON was released yesterday from quarantine, and immediately resumed his duty at this embassy.

He reported to me two facts which I desired him to put in writing, and have the honour to inclose. The first shows that Mehemet Ali is fully aware of his own inability to resist, and that he regrets his evasion of the terms offered him by the Sultan; and at the same time it accounts for that act of folly by exhibiting a trait of the habitual falsehood by which he has hitherto prospered, and shows that it was still so strong as to make him deceive himself under the impression that others must be what he is.

The second is the record of facts calculated to render justice to the feelings of many people who had previously been supposed to sacrifice the national interest to private gain.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PUNSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 201

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Therapia, September 12, 1840.

CONFORMABLY to your Lordship's desire I beg to transcribe notes of the opinions expressed to me by several persons at Alexandria.

M. d'Anastasi, the Swedish Consul-General, and the wealthiest and most esteemed person in Alexandria, said to me, "Although I am the Pasha's creature, and have enjoyed his bounty for upwards of twenty-five years, I would rather witness his downfall than that the European Powers should in any way back out of this question after the decisive

tone they have assumed in it. Europeans would lose all consideration in the East, and their name would be for ever connected in it with the shameful defeat of their policy by a Pasha.

The same feeling was expressed by several English merchants.

One of my friends, Rifat Bey, during the second term of the Convention, what he thought of the state of the affairs? "My first impression," replied he, "is that the Pasha would gladly fall back upon his position during the first term, so as to enable him to secure Egypt and Acre on the conditions of the Convention. What convinces me the more in this opinion," continued he, "is the nabbling offer with which Sami Bey accused me of having assumed a tone calculated to define the Pasha into the forlorn hope of Acre. My reply to this unjust imputation affords the only instance in which I ever exceeded the bounds of eagerness during the proceedings. I am only a scribe. Sami Bey's ingenious message to their vent, it having been their own work, for they have ever obstinately persisted in the belief that I was secretly empowered to make some concession in the event of the Pasha's continuing to resist firmly to the last."

"My second impression is, that the Pasha and the people about him were prepared to make great sacrifices rather than that hostilities should commence."

Rifat Bey expressed to me his private opinion, that if the Pasha's conduct should induce the European Powers to have recourse to an armed coercion, it would be a great pity to forego the opportunity which they would be so justified in availing themselves of in restoring to Turkey the use of the Straits. He proceeded to say that the success of this question will now admit of nothing but the most vigorous steps. It were better to make immediate concessions with a good grace, rather than dribble away time in useless negotiations with a man who says, "I humbly crave Syria, and if it is not granted to me I will keep it the way I acquired it, which is sword." But added he, these are opinions I would only express when consulted."

The efforts of the English merchants have been lately mainly directed to the point of the present impossibility of the Powers of England to attack and carry Alexandria, where their interests are mainly centered. They imagined to themselves a series of schemes and plans for this purpose, entertained in quarters entitled to authority. They felt so assured on this point, that they declared their intention of evacuating Alexandria, and should the Consul General withdraw. It would appear that all other feelings on this question have been lost in the exultation with which they view the policy of England opposed so successfully to that of France.

Those who have been most active in crying down the vigorous policy pursued by the Government at home, have been the most disappointed in seeing it so firmly borne out by the Government at home. Mehemet Ali, who was formerly derided with regard to his position, which he thought was entertained of him in Europe, by the formation of the Quadruple Alliance. Could he recall the last ten years of his life, he would forswear the company of all travellers and political mountebanks, and make the tour of Europe—he may now be looked upon as a desperate gambler at his last stake.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) C. ALISON

No. 202

Vicount Ponsonby to Vicount Palmerston.—(Received October 2)

(No. 200.)

My Lord,

Thessalon, September 14, 1840

I HAVE the honour to enclose notes in original and in translation, which I this day received from the Sublime Porte, and also a Project of a Note to be addressed to the members of the Diplomatic Corps, with the

exception of the Austrian Internuncio and myself. The Note will be sent on the 15th or 16th.

Your Lordship will be prepared for the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and for the establishment of a blockade, by my despatches, particularly No. 197. The Representatives of the Four Powers have unanimously supported the Porte in these measures, being convinced, after the most mature consideration of the state of affairs, that there was no other line to take that would not have left the greatest possible advantages in the hands of Mehemet Ali, and allowed scope for the operation of the French policy. We also were satisfied that half measures would induce those to adhere to Mehemet Ali, who would probably abandon him when they should see that the Porte was in earnest, and was really supported by the Four Great Powers, and that France could not produce any effect upon them by her attempts to intimidate.

It is intended to send the notification of Mehemet Ali's deposition, and of the blockade, in a steamer, to the officer commanding the British ships of war before Alexandria, and to request him to send them to the Pasha under a flag of truce, or in such other way as he may think proper. I will write to him to that effect, and the steamer will be sent off on the 16th or 17th instant.

I will acquaint the Admiral with these measures, and call upon him to accede to the request of the Sublime Porte. The Internuncio will write to Admiral Bandiera to the same effect.

The period fixed for the commencement of the blockade, namely, that when the ships of war shall be stationed before the Ports, was determined, after consultation with those who are supposed to be best fitted to give advice.

The declaration made by the Porte has been purposely couched in such words as to avoid giving occasion for questioning its legal form. We were afraid that some error might creep into anything technical which should come from the Ottoman Chancery.

We have not yet settled the question of the admission or non-admission of the French steamers acting as mail-packets into the port of Alexandria. I incline to the admission, as the safest part to take, being that which will take away one cause for complaint, and which may, if necessary, be changed for exclusion.

I was doubtful on the subject of the recall of the Consuls, lest it should be an inconvenience or hurt to the merchants. But the consideration of other points weighed strongly with my Colleagues in favour of the recall, and I could not refuse to consent to the formal demand made by the Porte. I am of opinion that my Colleagues are right in the views they take of the political face of this matter. It was thought right to direct the Consuls to come to Constantinople.

I shall send by the steamer instructions to Colonel Hodges, which will be drawn up in concert with my Colleagues, who will send similar to their Consuls.

It has been considered necessary to include Syria in the Sultan's declaration of blockade, because it might not be possible, without that authority, to prevent even British ships from carrying supplies to the Egyptians. It might perhaps be difficult to blockade the whole extent proposed, with perfect efficacy. But it is supposed the important ports can be effectually blockaded by the means in the Admiral's hands, and that it will not much matter if minor points be disregarded.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—We have discovered an error in the Turkish Note respecting the blockade, and I have withdrawn it from this despatch to send it to the Porte for correction, and therefore I only send the translation, which is correctly what the Note ought to have been.



## Inclosure 1 in No. 202.

*Note from the Sublime Porte to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(Traduction.)

MEHEMET ALI n'ayant pas accepté les propositions pacifiques qui lui ont été faites dans les deux termes fixés par la Convention, il est devenu nécessaire de le destituer du gouvernement d'Égypte, et conformément à cette même Convention d'employer des mesures coercitives. Il a été établi également, toujours d'après le sens de la Convention, que les Quatre Cours coopéreraient aux dites mesures, à l'exécution desquelles on va procéder.

Comme il n'est pas convenable que pendant la guerre, les Consuls des Quatre Cours à Alexandrie restent à leurs postes, nous pensons que les circonstances exigent qu'ils soient rappelés. En priant qu'on veuille bien prendre à ce sujet les dispositions nécessaires, nous adressons la présente Note Officielle à votre Excellence ainsi que nous le faisons envers les Visions d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie.

Nous offrons à Votre Excellence l'expression, etc.  
18 Réjeb, 1256.—(14 Septembre, 1840.)

## Inclosure 2 in No. 202.

*Note from the Sublime Porte to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(Traduction.)

MEHEMET ALI n'ayant pas accepté les conditions qui lui ont été offertes au rés. l'Acte Séparé du Traité d'Alliance conclu à Londres, Sa Hautesse a résolu d'employer des mesures coercitives pour la défense de ses droits incontestables. Elle a daigné ordonner que Méhémet Ali Pacha soit destitué de son poste de Gouverneur d'Égypte, et, comme préliminaire de l'opération, il a été décidé de soumettre tous les ports et côtes de l'Égypte et de la Syrie, à un blocus très-rigoureux. Par conséquent, nous prions votre Excellence de vouloir bien s'entendre avec son Excellence M. l'Intendant pour que les Amiraux d'Angleterre et d'Autriche, ainsi que les Vaisseaux de la flotte de la Méditerranée, assistent efficacement aux opérations des Vaisseaux Ottomans chargés d'effectuer le dit blocus. Dans ce but nous avons remis une Note Officielle à son Excellence M. l'Intendant, et nous remettons la présente, qui est identique avec celle-là, à votre Excellence, en lui renouvelant l'assurance de notre considération.

18 Réjeb, 1256.—(14 Septembre, 1840.)

## Inclosure 3 in No. 202.

*Project of a Note to be addressed to the Members of the Corps Diplomatique.*

ATTENDU que Méhémet Ali Pacha n'a pas adhéré au plan de pacification qui lui a été proposé d'après le Traité d'Alliance qui a été conclu dernièrement à Londres entre la Sublime Porte et les Quatre Hautes Puissances pour la solution de la Question Égyptienne, et son ambition personnelle, étant mise en état de rébellion, il est devenu nécessaire de lui retirer le gouvernement de l'Égypte aussi, et de faire bloquer avec la plus grande rigueur, comme une première mesure des moyens coercitifs qu'on va employer contre lui, tous les ports et toutes les échelles de l'Égypte par les vaisseaux de la Sublime Porte conjointement avec les flottes des Puissances Alliées.

Il est convenu que le blocus commencera le jour que les vaisseaux chargés de l'exécution de cette mesure se trouveront devant les lieux qui devront être bloqués.

Comme les conditions nécessaires du blocus se trouvent expliquées

dans les codes des Droits des Nations, la présente Note Officielle a été rédigée et remise au très-distingué Charge d'Affaires de Russie, ainsi qu'il en a été remis aux autres Ministres du Corps Diplomatique, afin que l'on connaisse dès à présent la mesure arrêtée, et que l'on avertisse en conséquence ceux qu'il faudra.

Je renouvelle, &c.,

Signé RECHID

## No. 203.

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)*

(No 126.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 25, 1840

PRINCE METTERNICH disapproves of the resolutions which have been adopted at Constantinople, and agrees entirely with the reasons alleged against them by M. Thiers, which you will see in the Internuncio's report, transmitted for comment to your Lordship.

The mischief being done, Prince Metternich looks for the remedy, and sees none, unless in separating the attitude of the Four Powers from that which has been assumed at Constantinople. He says he had not contemplated that this affair was to lead to a general war, but that he now feels that result to be imminent, unless we can succeed in convincing the French Government that the professions we have put forward are honest, and that the Powers have no intentions beyond them, at the same time that we give it the means of acting upon public opinion in France, by which it may otherwise be carried beyond its wishes and intentions. With these views he recommends that a communication destined to become public, should be immediately addressed by the Four Powers to the French Government, representing what has taken place at Constantinople, as a change of position between the Sultan and the Pasha, which the Representatives of the Four Powers have thought fit to comply with at the request of the Porte, but that the Courts do not regard this as changing their attitude, which remains precisely what it was before these resolutions were adopted. For further security, the Prince would have no objection to see the support of the Four Powers pledged to obtaining the ultimate restitution of Egypt to the Pasha, under whatever turn affairs may take, either hereditarily or for life, nor does he appear disinclined to add an assurance that the final repartition of Syria shall be decided by the same principles which would have directed the Four Powers in their efforts to regulate it before the resolutions recently resorted to at Constantinople had been adopted.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

P.S.—I inclose an extract from Count Königsmarck's Report, by which your Lordship will see that the Porte has left a door open for the renomination of Méhémet Ali to the Pashalic of Egypt.

## Inclosure in No. 203.

*Count Königsmarck to his Government*

(Extract)

1. QU'EN réponse à la dernière lettre de Méhémet Ali (jointe en traduction au postscriptum de mon très-humble rapport No. 57), le Grand Vizir lui annoncerait sa déposition comme Gouverneur d'Égypte.

Que cette déposition sera portée à la connaissance du public de la manière dont il est d'usage d'annoncer la destitution de tout autre Pacha; qu'on ne nommera pas un nouveau Gouverneur d'Égypte afin d'avoir plus

de facilité pour la réintégration de Méhémet Ali si l'avenir le demandait; que Iszet Méhémet Pacha (mentionné dans mon très-humble Rapport No. 57) recevra le titre de Séraskier de Syrie et sera chargé de pourvoir provisoirement à l'administration de l'Egypte.

No. 204

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 272.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 2, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have received accounts from Constantinople, stating, that it was the intention of the Sultan to publish an Edict depriving Mehemet Ali of the government of Egypt, in consequence of his having refused the second as well as the first offer made to him. But Her Majesty's Government look upon this measure as a means of coercion employed by the Sultan, in order to obtain the acquiescence of Mehemet Ali in the terms proposed to him, and it does not appear to Her Majesty's Government that this Edict prejudices the arrangement which the Sultan might be disposed to make in Mehemet Ali's favour, if the Pasha should at an early moment withdraw his refusal, and accept the conditions of the Treaty.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 205.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 4.)*

(No. 266.)

My Lord,

*Paris, October 2, 1840.*

I WENT this morning at an early hour to Auteuil, for the purpose of finding out what language M. Thiers would hold respecting the bombardment and capture of Beyrout. I found the Cabinet Council already assembled at his house, and I had an interview with him of only a few minutes.

I regretted, I said, to have disturbed him during the sitting of the Council, as I had no communication of any importance to make to him, the object of my visit being merely to inquire whether any more detailed account from Beyrout and from Alexandria, than that which appeared in the "Moniteur" of this morning, had reached his hands? M. Thiers answered, that he had no other account than the telegraphic despatch. He appeared not a little excited, and spoke of the event announced in the despatch as of very grave importance, but said, that in his ministerial capacity, he was not authorized or prepared to say anything to me upon the subject.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 206.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 274.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 5, 1840.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 263 of the 28th ultimo, containing the substance of a conversation which your Excellency held with M. Desages, the Directeur des Affaires Etrangères,

respecting the report that Count Walewski and M. Cochelet had obtained from Mehemet Ali the retraction of his consent to the conditions of peace proposed by Rifat Bey; and I have to make to your Excellency the following observations upon certain points in M. Desages' statements, upon which that gentleman appears to be imperfectly or incorrectly informed.

With respect to the allusion made by M. Desages to "the Treaty of Kutaya," I have to state that there was no such thing as a Treaty concluded or signed at Kutaya. The manner in which the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali were, on that occasion settled, was, that the Porte published a firman on the 14th of April, 1833, by which Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim, were reinstated in all the Governments which they had before possessed, with the addition of those of Syria and of the towns of Aleppo and Damascus; and subsequently, another firman was published, conferring upon Ibrahim Pasha the government of Adana.

With respect, moreover, to the merit which the French Agents take to themselves, for having, as M. Desages represents, prevailed upon Mehemet Ali to agree to give up Adana, your Excellency will see, by former communications from Colonel Campbell, General Hodges, and Lord Pensance, that Mehemet Ali has for a long time past professed his willingness to evacuate that island, and I doubt not, because he has been conscious that while the Allies have the command of the sea, he has no power to retain it.

Copies of the communications above referred to, were transmitted to your Excellency in my despatches No. 369 of the 22nd of November, 1839, No. 66 of the 18th of February, 1840, and No. 240 of the 4th of August last; but, for more convenient reference, I transmit to your Excellency, as marked in the margin\*, extracts from the communications in question.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 207.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 275.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 5, 1840.*

M. GUIZOT called upon me yesterday, and read to me a despatch from M. de Pontois from Constantinople, of the 15th of September, and the French papers containing the telegraphic report of its receipt by the 11th of September, through Alexandria and of the 24th, through Malta.

Before he began to read these papers, he said that he was not come to make to me any communications from his Government, nor to speak on their behalf for any extraneous subject; that he simply wished that we know the accounts which had reached Paris, and to make thereupon some observations of his own.

M. de Pontois stated in his despatch, among other things, that Mehemet Ali had been removed from his office, and Iszet Pasha had been appointed Pasha of Egypt in his stead; that the Sultan had declared a blockade of the Straits of Egypt and Syria; that Ibrahim Pasha had arrived at Constantinople, for the purpose of tracing out an encampment at Nicomedia for a Russian Army, and that Rechid Pasha had told M. de Pontois, that in a short time there would be assembled an army of 60,000 Turks in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

I informed M. Guizot, that some of these statements were erroneous.

\* From the Earl's Private Papers. No. 30, October 19, 1840, p. 476, P. L.—Colonel Holker's Papers, No. 3, July 17, 1840, p. 6. P. L.—Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Palmerston, No. 141, July 2, 1840, p. 4, P. L.



that Mehemet Ali had indeed been removed from his post of Governor of Egypt, but that no successor had been appointed in his room, and that the post had been intentionally left vacant, in order to leave a door open for an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, if he should retract his refusals, and submit to the terms of the Treaty; that consequently Izet Pasha, who has been appointed Governor of the Pashalik of Acre, has been ordered to take charge provisionally of the temporary administration of Egypt. But I said that as for the present Izet Pasha would be able to go neither to Acre nor to Egypt, the whole of this arrangement seemed to me to be a declaration of right, and a means of moral coercion against Mehemet Ali, rather than a real or practical measure. I assured M. Guizot that M. de Pontois was quite mistaken as to the object of Baron Laeven's mission, that the Baron, no doubt, was sent to Constantinople to make the proper arrangements for the timely arrival of a Russian force in the Bosphorus, if the advance of Ibrahim should require the Allies to give effect to the stipulations of the Third Article of the Treaty of July, but that it is a Turkish and not a Russian force that is, or is to be, encamped at Nicomedia; that the presence of 60,000 Turks at Constantinople would probably render the aid of a foreign land force unnecessary in any case, for the defence of Constantinople, and that what has been going on in Syria seems to place entirely out of the question an advance of Ibrahim to the north.

M. Guizot then came to the news from Syria, the bombardment of Beyroot, and the landing of the Turkish, British, and Austrian troops. He said, that nothing of this kind was mentioned in the Treaty, (a copy of which he had brought with him,) and that the French Government little expected, that at the very moment when Mehemet Ali had shown such a disposition to concede and negotiate, measures of such severity should so suddenly and abruptly be taken; that this had produced a great and painful sensation at Paris, that the French Cabinet had met once to consider what, under the circumstances, it would be proper for them to do; but that no demands having been come to, they were to meet again; that this was a very serious matter, and he could not say what it might lead to.

I said, in reply, that certainly there was no mention in the Treaty of any specific measures, except the cutting off of the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, but that by the Treaty the Four Powers undertook to re-establish the Sultan's authority in Syria, and of course, therefore, they are justified in employing whatever means may be necessary to accomplish that purpose; that Mehemet Ali, instead of accepting the conditions offered him, had refused to negotiate, and that the Treaty does not contemplate negotiations with Mehemet Ali, but that it does contemplate a just and necessary and special warfare of the severest degree of severity which is warranted by refusing the severest gradations of terms to be offered to him, and that the Treaty intended that if he refused the second, as well as the first offer, the Sultan would be free to withdraw his promise of the temporary government of Egypt, and would be at liberty to take such measures as his own interests and the interests of his Allies might suggest. I said, that in spite of our warning Mehemet Ali had refused our second offer, and the Sultan has exercised his right as a Sovereign, to dispossess Mehemet Ali of his Government, being moved thereunto by his own view of his own interest, and by the advice of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, that the principal reason which had led the Porte and the Four Representatives to think this measure expedient was, that it would deprive Mehemet Ali of all legal authority over those who are under his command, and prevent him from using against the Sultan an authority delegated to him by the Sultan.

I said that as to the reports at Beyroot the British Government had received no accounts from Syria of so late a date as the period when these things were said to have happened, and that I was very glad indeed to hear such good news, and thought that these events would reflect to parties, except Mehemet Ali, from their embarrassments. I reminded M. Guizot, that he had repeatedly said to me, when talking of the under-

taking in which we have engaged in the Levant, that if we did the thing quickly all would be well, but that if the matter lingered and was not soon brought to a successful termination, new and unforeseen questions might arise, and serious difficulties might be created, productive of embarrassment between France and the Four Powers. I said, that we had therefore only followed the advice of the French Government, in endeavouring to do the thing quickly; but that difficult things cannot be done quickly without vigorous actions.

I remarked, moreover, that the operations which seemed to have taken place were not of such a nature as to excite the slightest jealousy or alarm on the part of France; that there had been no prolonged occupation of Turkish territory by a large body of European troops; though I begged to be understood as by no means saying, that in case of need such a measure might not be resorted to; that the landing had been effected chiefly by Turkish troops, in the name, and under the flag of the Sultan; and that if, as was stated, a few hundred British and Austrian Marines had landed also, they came there as a subsidiary and auxiliary force, in the same manner in which the British Marines had been employed at Hissar and at St. Sebastian.

M. Guizot did not dwell further on this point, but said, that we should now see whether the Syrians are really as adverse as they have been represented to be to the rule of Mehemet Ali; because if those accounts were true, which he had no doubt they were, nothing now remained to prevent the Syrians from joining the Sultan's standard. I said, that the result would soon clear up this matter.

I then said, that I hoped he would urge his Government to take no precipitate step upon this matter; that there is nothing in these events which ought to disturb us, or to excite us, when the Treaty does not justify, or which the French Government has any right to complain of; and M. Guizot promised me that he would write as I had suggested.

I think it proper to lose no time in informing your Excellency of the substance of this conversation, in order that you may hold similar language to M. Thiers, and that you may carefully dissociate him from any first step which you may have reason to think the French Government inclined to take.

I send your Excellency a copy of an evening newspaper which contains the most interesting and accurate accounts which have been received from the Levant. You will see from these accounts, that the success of the Allies had been complete, as far as their operations had proceeded, and what is of great importance, that the Syrians were joining the Sultan's standard by thousands, and that desertion had already begun among the troops of Mehemet Ali. These operations, in fact, seem to be decisive as to the probable issue of the contest, and, at all events, they prove the futility of Mehemet Ali's demand to be allowed to retain the government of the whole of Syria for his life.

Mr. Robert Stopford will have been joined by the "Cambridge," the "Rodney," and "Vanguard," soon after the date of these accounts; and those ships carried out a reinforcement of Marines, and a fresh supply of military stores.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 208.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 5.)

No. 72.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 26, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66, in which I reported that Count Nezelrode expected to receive a communication from the French Ambassador on the Turkish Question, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that M. de Barante told me, a few days ago, that he was

instructed, in the event of Count Nesselrode opening the subject to speak of the conciliatory language of M. Walewski at Alexandria, and of the disposition of the French Government to arrive at some satisfactory arrangement with Mehemet Ali. M. de Barante gave me the impression that he was charged with a sort of *per oïf* French mediation, and I told the Vice-Chancellor the opinion I entertained.

Whatever may have been M. de Barante's instructions, they have signally failed. The French Ambassador has called on Count Nesselrode, and spoke on M. Walewski's mission; and Count Nesselrode assured me, yesterday, that their conversation was without result; and that had any proposal been made, he should have referred the French Ambassador to London, as the seat of the Conference.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 209.

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 74.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 26, 1840.*

COUNT NESSELRODE has received despatches from Constantinople of the 14th, and from Alexandria of the 30th instant, which he has sent me to read at the moment of writing the messenger. His Excellency forwards copies of them to Baron Brunnow, by this opportunity, for your Lordship's perusal.

I have had only a few minutes conversation with Count Nesselrode, on the important decision taken by the Ottoman Government, to declare Mehemet Ali dismissed from the government of Egypt. His Excellency was evidently unprepared for this novel feature in the transaction, and in alluding to the language of M. Titow, when discussing with the Representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople the consequences of dismissing Mehemet Ali, he merely said that he apprehended the most serious consequences must follow his dismissal. He gave no opinion to either of the despatches that had come into my hands, leaving me to pass my own judgment on the consequences.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 210.

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 47.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, September 30, 1840.*

AFTER the arrival at Berlin of the propositions which Count Walewski was charged by Mehemet Ali to offer to the Porte, Count Brunnow made constant and energetic efforts to persuade the Prussian Cabinet that the moment was come to settle the Eastern Question by an expression on the part of the King, that the spirit of the Treaty was obtained; and that to exact harder terms from Mehemet Ali would be unwise and unjust, and lead to war.

I thought it necessary to ascertain the King's opinion as I took advantage of his opportunity to present the subject to him, and with His Majesty at the moment of his departure I said to him in the same way of thinking, that he determined to adhere to his Allies in the Convention of July, and to allow the British Cabinet to take the initiative in the policy to be followed.

To-day, however, matters are much changed. In an interview I have this instant had with Baron Werther, I found his Excellency agitated and

irritated by news of the 14th, just arrived from Constantinople. This news is accompanied by letters from Prince Metternich, who states that Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Sublime Porte has persuaded the Sultan to declare that no terms are to be granted to Mehemet Ali, that he is to be treated as a rebel, and attacked as such. Prince Metternich expresses his hatred of these violent proceedings, and his language has made such an impression on Baron Werther, that he regrets ever having been a party to the Treaty, the spirit of which he said, has been exceeded by this undisciplined act. I called to his attention Article VII. of the Aute-Signe.

I learnt from his Excellency that he intended to censure Count Königsmarek for having supported the views of Lord Ponsonby at Constantinople; and to write to the Prussian Minister in London, to instruct him to remonstrate with your Lordship against the policy of the Porte, and to expose the dangers that threaten Prussia, &c. I would be called the levity of our conduct. This state of things in the court of Baron Werther might lead to serious consequences were it not subject to the control of the King; but, as I have frequently told your Lordship, His Majesty is at this moment the pivot on which turns the foreign and domestic affairs of Prussia, and I have not now any means of ascertaining the King's opinion. I fear, however, that the letters of Prince Metternich will bear much weight.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 211.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell.*

(No. 76, Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office October 6, 1840.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 47 of the 30th of September reporting Baron Werther's answer to the despatches received by him from Constantinople and Vienna of the declaration of outlawry published by the Sultan against Mehemet Ali.

Her Majesty's Government regret very much the arrogant violation which characterises the language of the Prussian Government upon the subject of the Treaty of July, and of the arrangements to which that Treaty relates. But the geographical situation of Prussia and the want of firmness of mind in Baron Werther, sufficiently account for these changes. The events, however, which have now taken place in Syria, will probably embolden the Prussian Government, by showing them that the task which the Four Powers have undertaken, is much less difficult of accomplishment than the French Government has endeavoured to represent it; and if our operations in Syria should be successful, the whole affair will soon be settled, and all further danger of war arising out of these matters will be at an end.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 212.

*Sir Thomas Reade to J. Bidwell, Esq.—(Received October 5.)*

(Private.)

(Extract.)

*Tunis, August 29, 1840.*

I MENTIONED to you before how very desirous the French Admiral and Consul were to ascertain whether I had received any further instructions in respect to the question of the tobacco monopoly, for they are fearful that it may ultimately be the cause of a more active interference with the regency on the part of the Sultan; and, most undoubtedly, if Turkish forces were once admitted here, the position of the French in Algiers, but



particularly in the province of Constantine, would be on a very different footing to what it is at present.

I have had an interview with the Bey since his return; he received me in a more friendly and flattering manner than he had ever been accustomed to do previously; this arises from the turn which has taken place on the Eastern Question for there cannot be a doubt of his anxiety to avoid, by every means in his power, putting the Hatti Sheriff, as well as our Commercial Treaty, into effect; and he conceived that if Mehemet Ali should be successful he would have a better chance of carrying his own views into completion. He has been looking likewise for the aid of the French Government, and I think it more than probable that he has received, secretly, encouragement from them. He now sees, by the actual state of the Eastern Question, that his hopes are on the wane and hence his increased civility to me. I have now no doubt that the object of Admiral de Rosamel's visit, was to impede the introduction of any Turkish forces which might have been sent to this regency, as had been rumoured, for the purpose of carrying the Hatti Sheriff into execution.

No. 213.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville*

(No. 280.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 6, 1840.

HER MAJESTY'S Government have been informed, that some time in the early part of September, Prince Metternich conveyed, through an intermediate channel, to the French Government, the opinions contained in the paper which I forwarded to your Excellency, but Her Majesty's Government have not learnt what the French Government did thereupon. I have therefore to intrude your Excellency to take an opportunity of casually ascertaining conversation with M. Talleyrand, to the opinions so expressed by Prince Metternich, and of asking him whether he has done anything in consequence thereof?

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

Inclosure in No. 213.

*Substance of a communication stated to have been made by Prince Metternich to the French Government*

Si j'étais le Ministre Français voici la position que je choisirais.

Après les éclaircissements qui m'auraient été donnés, et après avoir pris connaissance du texte de la Convention du 15 Juillet, je déclarerais

1°. Que la France proclame aujourd'hui comme elle n'a cessé de le faire jusqu'ici, son adhésion au principe qui sert de base à la Convention.

2°. Que la France ne saurait en faire autant en ce qui concerne les mesures coercitives dont l'exécution a commencé; non que la France ait l'intention de séparer les moyens du but, mais parcequ'elle ne saurait voir dans les moyens adoptés ceux qui peuvent conduire au but avec sûreté.

3°. Qu'en conséquence, la France ne saurait s'associer à l'emploi des mesures coercitives, mais qu'elle restera fidèle au principe de soutenir l'Empire Ottoman et le trône du Sultan.

4°. Que dans le cas où l'événement constaterait l'inefficacité des moyens coercitifs, et où par conséquent il résulterait de leur emploi des dangers pour la Porte Ottomane la France se déciderait à prendre en considération, avec la Porte et les autres Puissances, les moyens les plus propres de secourir l'Empire Ottoman, et à mettre les moyens à exécution selon les circonstances du moment.

No. 214.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 93)

My Lord

Alexandria, September 2, 1840.

I WAITED on Mehemet Ali on the 29th, at 4 o'clock P.M., and told him that I had just returned from seeing Admiral Stopford, who intended coming to Alexandria on Monday forenoon, and that he would be glad to wait upon his Highness. I therefore requested to be informed when it would be his convenience that I should present his Excellency.

The Pasha replied: That he had sent Omer Bey that morning to enquire after the Admiral's health, and that Sir Robert Stopford had told Omer Bey that he had already arranged with me for his debarcation on the 31st of August, and that he had expressed to me his wish to pay his respects to the Viceroy.

Mehemet Ali added, "I shall be very happy to see the Admiral at this hour on Monday next 4 o'clock P.M."

The Pasha then alluded to my opinion to his own position, but as I replied directly to his observations he said, "You may possibly take Syria from me but you, as a soldier, must know that Egypt is safe, and that you can never tear it away. You can do nothing this year, and I promise you, that we shall have a war in March that will fully occupy the Powers of Europe. However, it is useless for you and I to talk more on such subjects, and let me beg of you to tell your Colleagues, when they again call on me, to state simply the objects of the visit, and to be satisfied with the answer I give, for I am determined to abstain from discussion with any of you." I then took my leave.

On the appointed day, Admiral Sir Robert Stopford and Admiral Baron Banchiera, together with the principal officers of the allied squadrons, paid a visit of ceremony to Mehemet Ali, by whom they were received with perfect courtesy. Towards the conclusion of the interview, Admiral Stopford expressed some wish to see the Pasha again, in order to converse with him on questions of public interest. The Pasha explained to me his desire to be excused from what must be an unpleasant and useless debate. At the same time he invited the two Admirals along with the Austrian Consul-General and myself to dine with him next day; but a painful indisposition of his Highness has prevented the intended entertainment.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 215

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 94.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that a few days since, Count Meslem Russian Consul-General had an interview with Mehemet Ali in order to communicate to him a despatch of Count Nesselrode, announcing that the Convention of the 15th of July had been ratified, and tendering to the Pasha the advice to submit in time.

The Pasha said, "The reasons given by your Court is the same which you and your Colleagues have already given. I am not doubt that war is resolved against me; Mehemet Ali has become a wicked man in the eyes of your Courts; you reproach me with many things."

Count Meslem observed to the Pasha, that he abstained now from discussing the position because I had told him the day before that the Pasha declined all such argument.

The Pasha pursued, "The conditions imposed are dishonourable to me, and I will never submit. After eight years of labour in Syria I will not yield to such humiliation." Count Medem answered, that the proposed conditions could not have the effect the Pasha supposed: that the Allied Courts had come to a decision compatible at once with the tranquillity of the East, the dignity of the Sultan and the Pasha's honour, that the Convention besides affords a perfect guarantee for the future security of his Highness and his family in the possessions accorded to them.

Mehemet Ali rejoined "Very well, but it is quite useless to discuss such subjects. The other day I made overtures for an arrangement, you at first accepted them and then refused them."

Count Medem then said, that the Consuls-General could never have accepted the Pasha's proposals, which would have been to do anything but what nature exulted with them, but that they had given the recommendation to manifest his return to submission by sending back the Sultan's fleet and evacuating Syria.

The Pasha ended the conversation by these words, "Let us say no more of the matter. I will never send back the fleet until the affairs in which we are engaged are settled."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 216.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 6, 1840.

YESTERDAY morning his Excellency Rifat Bey, together with the Consuls-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th of July, waited on Mehemet Ali in order to receive his final reply to the demands of the Sublime Porte. The Pasha being confined to his room by a painful indisposition, gave his official answer through the medium of his Minister, Sami Bey.

The details of our interview are contained in the Procès-Verbal I have the honour to enclose and of which the original was yesterday forwarded to his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby at Constantinople. The hasty departure of his Excellency Rifat Bey, and the consequent want of his signature, prevent my forwarding to your Lordship a duplicate instead of a copy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

Inclosure to No. 216.

Procès-verbal of the interview which took place on the 5th September, between Sami Bey and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.

ARRIVÉS au Palais du Vice-Roi, nous trouvâmes dans la salle d'audience, Sami Bey, Secrétaire Intime de son Altesse et son Excellence Boghos Bey, qui nous annonça que le Pasha était retenu dans ses appartements par suite d'une grave indisposition et de sa presque absence de ses médecins. Sur la demande de son Excellence Rifat Bey, Sami Bey était autorisé à nous donner la réponse officielle pour laquelle nous étions réunis, c'est-à-dire le rapport que nous étions chargés de lui présenter. Son Altesse de nous communiquer en son nom sa réponse finale. Après avoir reconnu de concert avec les Quatre Consuls le mandat de Sami Bey, son Excellence Rifat Bey répondit, "nous sommes venus à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours, pour demander quelle est la décision que son

Altesse a prise à l'égard des stipulations de la seconde alternative de la Convention."

Samy Bey répliqua, "en égard aux décisions des Quatre Grandes Puissances et aux ordres de son bienfaiteur le Sultan, le Pasha avait accepté avant l'expiration du second terme, le refus de l'Altesse et aujourd'hui je vous confirme officiellement cette résolution. Quant à la Syrie, sa non-acceptation n'étant pas un refus de son Altesse l'Empereur en ses nombreux services rendus à l'Empire Ottoman, soumettre à ce sujet une demande à son souverain, c'est de la part des Quatre Grandes Puissances, et se flatter que son Excellence Rifat Bey, que MM. les Consuls des Quatre Puissances voudront bien la communiquer à leurs Cours respectives."

Rifat Bey répondit, "vous savez de quel poids est l'acceptation que par la lettre de la Porte et par nous ne sommes pas autorisés à accepter une acceptation conditionnelle, et qui ne serait pas accompagnée de la remise de la flotte Ottomanne entre les mains d'Israël Bey et des autres pour l'évacuation de la Syrie et des autres provinces rentrées sous la domination de la Porte. Nous devons regarder une pareille acceptation comme un refus." "Mais," ajoutèrent les Consuls, "si son Altesse voulait accompagner ses propositions du renvoi de l'Escadre et de l'expédition des ordres susmentionnés, nous nous empresserions de les appuyer auprès de nos Cours respectives." "Cependant," reprit Sami Bey, "son Altesse regarde ses propositions comme une acceptation."

"Quant à nous, nous ne pouvons, d'après la lettre de la Convention, l'envisager que comme un refus formel, et par conséquent la Sublime Porte se réserve de prendre, de concert avec ses Alliés, telle résolution ultérieure à l'égard de l'Égypte que ses intérêts lui dictent."

Samy Bey ayant alors remis à son Excellence Rifat Bey, la lettre contenant la réponse et les propositions du Vice-Roi, et l'objet principal de la visite étant terminé, les Consuls-Général demandèrent à Sami Bey, si le Vice-Roi consentait à recevoir à son palais, à son appartement d'Alexandrie? "Son Altesse considérant ses propositions comme une acceptation," reprit Sami Bey, "et non comme un refus, elle ne croyait plus en trouver dans un état d'hostilité avec les Quatre Puissances, et elle ne voit pas pourquoi elle ne pourrait pas accepter les Consuls de son Altesse."

Mais quant à nous, nous regardons votre proposition comme une non-acceptation, et nous vous demandons si, malgré cela, son Altesse nous garantit l'inviolabilité de nos personnes et de nos pavillons et la sécurité pour nos nationaux?"

"Cela s'entend," répondit Sami Bey, "il ne peut y avoir aucun doute là-dessus."

(Signed)  
RIFAT  
G. LLOYD HODGES  
A. LAURIN  
E. WAGNER  
A. MEDEM

Alexandria, ce 5 Septembre, 1840.

No. 217.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

No. 96.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that this morning the British and Austrian Admirals, with their squadrons, left Alexandria for Beyrout.

The "Asia" and "Daphne" have been left behind, for the purpose of attending to the sick and property.

It has been arranged that I should, to-morrow, follow the Admirals in the "Cybele" steamer for the purpose of consulting with them, with the Commodore, and with Sir Charles Smith.

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It is also my intention to communicate with the British Consul in Beyrout, as well as with the General commanding the Pasha's forces at Beyrout.

The observations and information acquired during my stay on the Syrian coast, will be duly submitted to the judgment of your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 219.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

(Private.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 15, 1840.

The arrival of your accounts that I have sent your Lordship, since your departure, is an important one. The Government of the Pasha, will be very anxious to know what has been passing at Alexandria.

Sir Robert Stopford arrived on the 5th of this month, and sailed for Syria on the following day. It was decided between the Admiral and myself, that I should go to Beyrout the following day, and he left the "Cyclops" steamer at my disposal for that purpose. The "Hydra" arrived the morning of the day I was to leave, bringing the unofficial intelligence that the Consuls were recalled; that Mehemet Ali has been proclaimed Sultan, and that a Viceroy was to be appointed to replace him. This intelligence, which was soon followed by the seizure of the money and the closure of the banks, led me to conclude that the Pasha was going to Beyrout, and I accordingly despatched the "Cyclops" to join the Admiral. As I have not yet received word of my accounts, I am not up to this date, and I know not whether the news brought by the Captain of the "Hydra," be true or not.

Mehemet Ali has been seriously ill. Though a little better, he continues very weak, and requires aid to be raised from his couch. The French Government has offered to send him to Sicily, if he will consent to leave Egypt, and the Consul-General has been ordered to accompany him. Many will be disposed to think that the Pasha would be satisfied with the hereditary rights of Egypt, guaranteed to him by the Four Contracting Powers, but that, as a matter of courtesy and deference to France, he would require that Power to be a party to the guarantee. Should Mehemet Ali, however, recover, which it is probable he will, I very much doubt that he will ever relinquish his hold of Syria, so long as he is able to retain it. His ambition and vanity are excessive, and your Lordship may rely that he will use all his efforts and resources to do mischief, and if possible, to retard and complicate affairs, as to cause a general war in Europe, which he knows is sure to take place in March next. France is now encouraging him, and not only replenishes his coffers, but feeds his vanity. But the old boy is too shrewd to place an entire reliance on the sincerity of her assurances. The great display of force that the Pasha is now making, is at the express desire of France, and I told the French Consul-General so, two days ago.

I experience much satisfaction in assuring your Lordship that the Consul-General of the other Three Powers, co-operate with me in every respect. The conduct of Count Mettem has become unexceptionable. That of the Austrian Consul-General was recently suspicious; but it seems to have had its origin in motives of personal interest which link him to this country; and since he has found that he is carefully watched, he may, probably, more cordially act with his Colleagues. I do not have a distinct proof against him; but were I sure of Lord Beauvale being in Vienna, I should write to request of him to ascertain, if possible, the character of the communications made by M. de Laurin to Prince Mettem.

The present interruption at Alexandria to the egress and ingress of ships is only injurious to British commerce. For instance, one vessel

consigned to Joyce and Co., and under the British flag, has been sent back to Malta, because she had on board sixty tons of steel and iron cable for a line-of-battle ship; while three vessels under the Begum flag, and one under that of Mehemet Ali, have entered this harbour without molestation, though excessively laden with improved cannon of large calibre, together with ammunition and shells. I knew that these vessels were expected, and I regretted the circumstance to Sir Robert Stopford, who declared to me that he had no authority to detain or intercept the progress of any flag but our own.

Mehemet Ali has little reason to advocate the interests of the British interests were from whom I have received the most favourable opinion of the Government of my letters, and our reciprocal friendship. My opposition may be due to my own views, but when I was considering the unavailability of our arms as owing to their being existing in the instance of the seizure of the harbour or goods, as they are in an accessible position, I addressed to your Lordship. Such circumstances may give your Lordship some idea of the difficulties I am encountering with here, but I am sure that it is not your Lordship's approval of my conduct I shall be amply rewarded for the temporary advantages I am now undergoing.

Sir Robert Stopford and his Staff did me the honour to stay a week with me. The Admiral seemed to dwell much upon the inadequacy of the means of the Government, as they were of Government. Commodore Napier, in his letters to me, seems to entertain the same opinion. I quote with him, that they must be supplied before they attempt anything. A failure would be utterly ruinous. The Admiral is not quick in coming to a decision; but once decided, I am sure he will act with vigour and energy; he is a safe man; and your Lordship well knows that the Commodore possesses all the daring and enterprise that can be required for such a service. I anxiously wait the news from Syria.

When my departure from Beyrout is decided, which is becoming necessary, I purpose returning with my family to Alexandria, and one of the Admirals will stay at his post. As the time is short, I have a word to say to your Lordship, and to your family, particularly in connection with the affairs of the Government, and to your own estate, but I purpose sending Mr. Hay to Lord Palmerston, or whom the Government may think best to be very weighty, and I will be sure will profit by the activity and capacity of Mr. Hay.

It is my very anxious hope that I may be permitted by your Lordship to accompany the fleet in all its movements and operations. Without much presumption, I may venture to believe that my knowledge of the affairs of Egypt, its resources, its public men, and its localities, may be of some service to the Admiral. Should the necessary measures, likely to be adopted, be such that I may be of any kind, I regret I am unable to conduct them not without advantage. My professional connection must also give me the means of estimating with tolerable accuracy the warlike operations; and I should obey with lively satisfaction your Lordship's instructions to report to you on such subjects.

I submit this matter with great deference to the consideration of your Lordship; hoping that what I have above advanced may induce compliance with the wish I have ventured to express.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

September 18, 1840.

P.S.—I beg leave to acknowledge your Lordship's private letter of the 7th of August, as well as that of the 15th, which I had the honour of receiving yesterday by the "Prometheus" steamer.

I would hasten to lay before Mehemet Ali the wise considerations exposed in your Lordship's communication, could I perceive the smallest chance of their producing an advantageous impression on his mind. I have, however, come to the conclusion, that, so far from obtaining such a

result, my attempts at persuasion might induce the Pasha to believe that the Government of the Empire were not so fully aware of the state of affairs as they really were. The Pasha has no objection to my ever again expressing my repugnance to discourse on this subject, and has declared his firm resolution not to discuss the matter with any of the four Consuls. Another motive urges me to avail myself of the discretionary power of silence intrusted to the Consul General. I do not trust the Pasha with the furnishing of the three Consuls need with an exception of the same example, and, honestly speaking, I am not much disposed to trust the weakness of my Russian, or the duplicity of my Austrian Colleagues.

The position of all four becomes every day more embarrassing. We are, of course, objects of suspicion and vigilance to the Government and to the people; we appear in a light by no means dignified or calculated to exact respect. I anxiously await the accomplishment of reports which have reached this city, that the Representatives of the Allied Powers are recalled from Egypt.

## No. 219

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received October 6.)

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Alexandria, September 20, 1840.

YESTERDAY arrived off this port the steamer "Oriental," bearing Her Majesty's mails for the Colonies. I was anxious to know the views of the Honorable House of Commons, and in the evening obtained the following information from my power to the effect of our political relations with this country, and having so done, I could not expect that the responsibility of landing these mails would be imposed upon me.

In consequence, however, of instructions given by Admiral Sir John Lewis to the officer who came from Malta charged with the Indian mails, a letter was sent to the Egyptian authorities, in which I was charged to assume the onus of ordering these mails to land. Before doing so, I secured a expedition to meet Mehemet Ali Pasha, from whom I sought to elicit the promise for their security during their passage through Egypt.

I accordingly called on Mehmet Ali there in range of 7 o'clock. I found him seated in his divan. By himself and by those about him I was received in the most cold and almost repulsive manner. I was evidently a very unwelcome visitor. After a few inquiries as to the Pasha's health I said that we were a full Indian mail steamer was daily expected. The Pasha observed very carelessly that he had not known so much. I added that the Indian mails from England and Malta had also reached Alexandria, and I expressed my hope that they would also be received in due season. The Pasha took no notice, but merely asked, "And why?" I explained that I feared I should have to leave the steamer at night, as the berth of a Mediterranean steamer was not a very comfortable one. He then expressed some surprise and concern, and the Pasha went on to say, "The powers of this steamer are civilised. I have adopted measures which perhaps may be too late for my complaint. I said that I did not well in I understand his meaning. He continued, "Others have suffered with the complaint, and it is to be deprecated upon." I told him that if his allusion was to Great Britain, I could not assent to the remark. The Pasha, with one of those sudden changes of opinion which he is so prone to, said, "You may take it, or leave it; but my remark is in the mouth of every one." I said, "Perhaps of every one in Alexandria." The Pasha averted his head, and with an impatient toss of his hand, rejoined, "Of every one, - of every one."

(On this I informed the Pasha that his answers would decide me to prevent the mails from landing. The expression of this resolution evidently had its effect, the cause of which I was soon able to ascertain. It consisted in there being French mails on board, which, as I knew from the

French Consul-General, were anxiously expected by the Pasha's friends. After the exchange of a few more uneasy expressions, I again put the question whether the mails might pass or not. Metemet Al reflected a few seconds and then making a signalling-forward gesture of his hand, he replied, "Let them proceed." On my asking distinctly whether they would be safe in their passage the Pasha said, "Yes, for this time only."

On my observing that from the Pasha's tone I considered it as willing to enter into general political conversation the Pasha made an abrupt reply, to the effect that I had already had my answer.

In the course of our conversation, the answers of Mehemet Ali were short, cold, and harsh, without being precisely uncourteous. He received every remark which did not absolutely require notice with perfect silence, or at most with a slight wave of the hand.

The tone of Mehemet Ali was tranquil but severe. One could only trace anything like excitement in his occasionally pulling through his fingers tufts of his white beard, and taking with a little violence frequent and very large pinches of snuff. His demeanour was that of a man profoundly incensed, and who has resolved on some energetic course.

On my retiring, the Panha made a gesture, which, instead of being the common salutation, seemed to be rather the outward motion of the hand, indicating an order to be gone.

As I left the Divan I was followed by one of the Pasha's officers, who obtained my assurance that the French mail would be immediately landed, and he communicated the Pasha's desire that the "Aradne" Coal Depot, now in this harbour, might be removed to the rear of the Egyptian squadron, a wish with which I promised to comply.

Thus your Lordship will perceive that Mehemet has declared himself on the subject of the overland communication with India; and that it is now impossible for the future to risk the passage of the Government mails through Egypt. I consequently trust that your Lordship will make the communications and arrangements you may judge requisite to meet so important a difficulty. My representation just stated forwarded to proper information for the guidance of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay.

(Signed) G LLOYD HODGES

Inclosure in No. 219

Colonel Hodges to Sir James Carnar, Bart.

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Alexandria, August 20, 1840

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that the "Oriental" steam-packet, charged with the mails for India, reached this port yesterday, and brought instructions from Admiral Sir John Lewis not to land those mails, except with my authority. It thus became of importance to elicit from Mehmet Ali a promise for their safe passage through Egypt.

With such an object, I visited the Parba at 7 o'clock this morning. At first he refused to give me any engagement. I then said that such being the case, I would direct that the mails should not be disembarked. On this the Parba reflected, and at last said that they might proceed "for this time only."

The motive of this concession was known to me. It chanced that a French officer, a member of the French Legation at Peking, was sent to the "Oriental," and to this fortunate accident we owe the permission which has now been granted.

the Indian mails for the future cannot be risked in Egypt. Besides this, there are in town consistent, and, I believe, correct rumours that British and Turkish forces have effected a landing near Beyrout, and that blood has been shed.



I, therefore, request your Excellency to make such communications and arrangements as you may deem requisite, in order to meet so serious a difficulty.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 220.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6)

No. 100)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose your Lordship copies of two despatches I received from Captain Haines, Political Agent for the Honourable East India Company's Government at Aden.

In a private letter addressed to me by Captain Haines, dated 9th of August, I was informed that a French ship was expected to make her appearance in these seas. We have now a vessel armed for 18 guns and a frigate is fully expected. There is a French brig at Mocca and a transport laden with guns and arms is at Massawah; they are no doubt, waiting to gain a footing in Abyssinia."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 220.

Captain Haines to Colonel Hodges.

Political Agent's Office,  
Aden, August 9, 1840.

(Extract.)

THE person in whose hands the sea ports of Yemen were given by Ibrahim Pasha, on the evacuation of the Egyptian troops, is named Sheriff Hassan, a bigotted proud man; the ports were given in consideration of his paying Mehemet Ali Pasha 90,000 German crowns annually; and I fear he must have received his Governments under the advice or direction to throw every impediment in the way of British commerce, for his conduct since has been insulting in the extreme; he has increased the duties to 7 per cent., refused any supplies being sent to Aden; directed the Vice-Consul's flag to be kept down, and written me an insulting letter. His arrogance can easily be punished by blockade.

The "Sphinx" steamer left Bombay on the 19th of July, and made her passage to Aden in 18 days.

Inclosure 2 in No. 220.

Captain Haines to Colonel Hodges.

Aden, September 10, 1840.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that up to this hour no further attempt to annoy our outposts has been made by the neighbouring tribes.

I have entered into Commercial Treaties with Tedjoura, Zeyla, and Incher, and obtained a grant of the Islands of Mussahab at the entrance of Tedjoura Bay for the Brits.

The French squadron shortly expected in the Red Sea, as far as I can learn, are,—

One 44-gun frigate,  
One 36-gun frigate, named "Dordogne"  
One 16-gun corvette, named "Caroline."  
One 10-gun "Ankobar," laden with arms, now at Massawah.

Being suspicious of the intention of such unusual visitors, I have despatched an 18-gun sloop to Massawah, to see what they are doing, the "Ankobar," previous to going to that port, failed to obtain by purchase a place in Assab Bay and afterwards tried their success at a place and port called Heyb, by fair offers, but on being disappointed the Chief wishing to ask my opinion prior to entering into any bond, threats of an armed force were, I am given to understand, made use of.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. B. HAINES.

No. 221.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship two military states, the first of the Pasha's forces in and about Alexandria, on the 14th instant, and the second an account of the troops recently arrived or employed prior to the 15th instant.

Both these documents may somewhat exaggerate numbers, as is usually the case in all armies; but I should observe, that computations simultaneously made at the Russian Consulate-General, carry the amount of the existing force at Alexandria to 42,000 men.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 221.

State of the Military Force at Alexandria, September 14, 1840.

	Men
Egyptian Marines - - -	17,000
Men of the Arsenal - - -	3,000
1 Regiment of Haoud Bey Infantry - - -	2,000
7 Companies - - - - -	2,000
National Guard - - - - -	6,000
Irregular Turkish Artillery - - - - -	1,000
1 Regiment of Artillery (60 guns) - - -	4,000
2 Regiments of Cavalry - - - - -	1,000
2 Regiments of the Hedjaz Army - - -	6,000
	38,000
1 Regiment of Cavalry expected - - - -	600
	39,100
Turkish Marines - - - - -	7,000
Reservable Inhabitants, available as an Irregular Force for the defence of Alexandria - - - - -	6,000
1 Regiment of National Guards, available - - - - -	2,000
Bedouins of the Delta, who can be raised immediately for a defensive operation - - - - -	10,000
Total - - - - -	64,600

## Inclosure 2 to No. 221.

*Account of Troops recently arrived at Alexandria, and of those employed prior to the 15th of September, 1840.*

20th Regiment of Infantry from the Hedjaz.  
3rd " Cavalry from Upper Egypt.  
4th " " "

10,000 Bedouins of this neighbourhood have been sent to Syria.

10,000 Bedouins are to be raised in Said.

5,000 Troops are expected from Nubia and from Soodan, of which number 2,000 form the deficit of two regiments of Infantry, the remaining 3,000 are composed of Irregular Troops, Turks, Bedouins, Arabs, Arnaouts, &c. &c.

13th Regiment of Cavalry on its way to Alexandria.

No. 222

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 103)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

ON the 19th instant arrived off this port the "Oriental" steamer, bearing the mails for India.

I so precautionary measures I adopted on that occasion are fully detailed in my despatch No. 90, of the 20th of September.

Your Lordship will there perceive that, in an interview with the Pasha, His Highness told me explicitly that the Indian mails "might pass unmolested for that time only."

In order to prevent the chance of mistaking the Pasha's meaning, I was accompanied by my private secretary, who immediately on our return to my residence, made copious minutes of the conversation which had just taken place.

Yesterday I obtained information from the Russian Consul-General, that on the same day of the 20th instant, the Pasha had been visited by Captain Lyons, Agent for the Honourable the East India Company's Service, and that he had received the Pasha's assurance that, not only should the mails pass in perfect safety on the present occasion, but that they should continue to do so as long as he himself had authority in Egypt.

Captain Lyons did not think proper to make known to me this most important information, utterly at variance with all the Pasha had previously declared to myself, and it was only on my writing to him for a confirmation or denial of the rumour which had reached me, that he favoured me, about an hour since, with the public letter I have the honour to inclose.

It appears to have omitted to mention a grave fact which Count Molenau has been positive. It is, that when the Pasha gave to Captain Lyons the assurance mentioned in his letter, he also requested him to communicate it officially, not only to Her Majesty's Government at home, but also to that of India.

I leave your Lordship to appreciate the motives which may have induced the Pasha to pursue the very remarkable course detailed in the present communication.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

## Inclosure 1 to No. 222.

*Colonel Hodges to Captain Lyons.*

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

Sir,

I HAVE just received information from Count Medini that the Pasha yesterday made to you a communication to the effect, that the East India mails would be secure in their passage through Egypt, not only on the present occasion, but so long as he himself remained in the country.

So, I am assured, being totally at variance with one given me the same morning by the Pasha, who said that the Indian mails might pass for that time only. I shall feel obliged by your informing me at your earliest convenience whether the report of Count Medini is correct, in order that I may make the necessary intimation to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 2 to No. 222.

*Captain Lyons to Colonel Hodges.*

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in reply to your letter received at 7 last evening, that the Pasha informed me he had no intention whatever of preventing the passage of the mails through Egypt, before, and as a proof that no such intention was entertained by His Highness with respect to the present mails, the mail from India, a double mail, had already nearly reached Atfe, on its passage down the Nile, at the hour you had the conversation with the Pasha on the subject, & in the morning of the 20th.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) THOMAS LYONS.

No. 223

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)*

(No. 104)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the copy of an order which I have just received from his Excellency Viscount Palmerston, in a despatch of the 17th instant.

I have also been informed by Captain Fisher, commanding Her Majesty's naval forces off this port, that he has on board a despatch to His Highness, which contains the deposition of that Pasha.

Having consulted with my Colleagues, we have concluded not to leave this place until the Imperial State despatch mentioned by Captain Fisher has been safely delivered to its address. We shall then embark on board of Her Majesty's ship "Asia," and after some delay, sail for Alexandria, where we shall remain until we are ordered to proceed to Constantinople, for the sake of conferring with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and afterwards to Constantinople, where I shall wait for your Lordship's further instructions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.



Inclosure in No. 223.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges.*

Sir,

*Thessalonica, September 16, 1840.*

IN consequence of the position in which Mehemet Ali has placed himself, by his rejection of the gracious offers made to him by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the Sublime Porte has thought fit to notify to all the Foreign Missions at Constantinople the deposition of Mehemet Ali from his post as Pasha of Egypt, and also the establishment of a blockade by the Sublime Porte, of the échelles of Egypt and Syria. His Highness has also made known to the Representatives of the Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th of July, 1840, his desire that the alliance there contracted should be manifested by the recall of the Consuls-General of those Powers from Alexandria. I have, therefore, your legation here, and have also by other grave considerations, my Colleagues of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and myself, have determined to comply with the request. I have therefore to instruct you to leave Alexandria after the reception of this despatch, and to proceed at your convenience to Constantinople, to take up your place as you may think proper for the service of Her Majesty, considered under the new state of affairs which has terminated your duty of communication with Mehemet Ali.

With relation to the interests, and other personal interests of Her Majesty's subjects, which have been confided to your protection, your judgment and knowledge of their situation will direct you in adopting the best measures for placing them in the greatest security possible to be attained.

With respect to the Consular Agents of the British Government in the various parts of Egypt and Syria, you will leave them to follow the instructions with which I have furnished Her Majesty's Consul at Beyrout, under date the 8th of September, and of which I transmitted a copy to you at Alexandria.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) **PONSONBY**

No. 224.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)*

No. 103.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, September 22, 1840.*

IN consequence of the instructions of his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, I have deliberated how I might ensure to my countrymen the greatest degree of security during my absence; I have, therefore, placed them, until further orders, under the protection of the Consul-General of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. This public officer is a man of high respectability, and has accepted the important charge I have just confided to him.

I have now the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of all the despatches I have addressed to various individuals, in consequence of the instructions I have received for my removal from this country.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) **G. LLOYD HODGES.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 224

*Colonel Hodges to Mr. Consul Larking*

Sir,

*Alexandria, September 22, 1840.*

I HAVE just received the instructions of his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby to suspend my functions as Consul-General, and to embark on board one of Her Majesty's ships anchored off this port.

Youself and the other Consular officers resident in Egypt will remain at their posts, but will strike their flags, and await further orders.

You will please to communicate the purport of this despatch to the Consular officers under your jurisdiction.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) **G. LLOYD HODGES.**

Inclosure 2 in No. 224

*Colonel Hodges to Mr. Consul Larking*

Sir,

*Alexandria, September 22, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have just received from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby a despatch containing the instructions made known to you in my previous despatch of 10th inst. His Excellency also apprises me that the Sublime Porte has thought fit to notify to all the Missions at Constantinople the deposition of Mehemet Ali from his post as Pasha of Egypt, and also the establishment of a blockade of the échelles of Egypt and Syria.

As I await the orders of Her Majesty's Government respecting the removal of British subjects from Egypt, it has been arranged that they shall remain provisionally under the protection of a Power long united by ties of alliance and friendship with the British Crown.

The Consul-General of Her Majesty the King of the Netherlands has undertaken to superintend the interests and safety of those who remain. You will give him every practicable assistance in the execution of the important task he has assumed.

I request you to furnish the necessary information and directions to all Consular officers and others under your jurisdiction.

You will also please to assemble the British merchants and residents of Alexandria, to whom you will make known the substance of this communication.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) **G. LLOYD HODGES.**

Inclosure 3 in No. 224

*Colonel Hodges to Captain Lyons.*

Sir,

*Alexandria, September 22, 1840.*

IN consequence of instructions from Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, it is my command to suspend my official functions in Egypt, and I shall retire on board one of Her Majesty's ships anchored off this harbour.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) **G. LLOYD HODGES.**

Inclosure 4 in No. 224.

*Colonel Hodges to the Netherlands Consul-General.*

Sir,

*Alexandria, September 22, 1840.*

I HAVE just received a despatch from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, in which he informs me that the Sublime Porte has notified the deposition of Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt, and his Excellency instructs me to suspend at once my official duties in this country. I shall therefore immediately embark on board one of Her Majesty's ships now anchored off this port.

Since some time may elapse before the arrival of instructions respecting

the removal of the British merchants and residents now in Egypt, I have considered it advisable to place them provisionally under the protection of some friendly Power. You have been pleased, Sir, to accept this important duty, and I assure you that I experience every satisfaction in confiding the safety and interests of my fellow-countrymen to the temporary charge of a public officer so universally respected, and the Representative of a Crown united by ancient ties of alliance and amity with that of Great Britain.

The British Consul in Alexandria has been directed by me to strike his flag. He will still conduct the duties of his Chancery unofficially.

I must also recommend to your care the British ship "Ariadne," formerly coal depot; she remains anchored in the harbour, but her officer and crew, as well as the national colours, will be immediately removed from on board.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 5 in No. 221.

Colonel Hodges to Captain Anderson

Alexandria, September 22, 1840.

Sir, I HAVE to request that you will remove the "Ariadne" coal depot, under your command, from her present position to the rear of the Egyptian squadron.

You will please to make the arrangements you deem most advantageous respecting the moorings of that ship.

So soon as you shall have changed her position, you will remove with your crew and the national colours on board Her Majesty's ship "Ana," where you will await further orders.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 225.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 202.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 16, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Notification, dated the 15th instant, which I have made to Her Majesty's Consul-General for advertising Her Majesty's subjects in these parts, of the blockade declared by the Sublime Porte, of a blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, and that the ships of war are assembled before the ports to be blockaded; and further, that the Sultan requested the aid of Her Majesty's naval forces, and those of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, for carrying the blockade into effect, to which demand the Austrian Intermuncio and myself had given our consent.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 225.

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Consul-General Cartwright.

Sir,

Therapia, September 15, 1840.

HIS Excellency Reshid Pasha, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, has notified to me that the Sublime Porte has ordered the blockade of the ports of Egypt and of Syria, and that the blockade will be enforced as soon as the ships of war shall be assembled before the ports to be blockaded; and that His

Imperial Majesty the Sultan has requested the aid of the naval forces of Her Majesty and of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria to carry into execution the above-mentioned blockade. I have now to inform you that his Excellency the Austrian Intermuncio and myself have given our consent to the demand, and to request you to take the usual means of publication to make the communication I have now the honour to make to you, known to Her Majesty's subjects in these parts who are interested in the matter.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

No. 204.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter I wrote to the French Ambassador, and his Excellency's reply upon the subject of the blockade.

It was not my purpose to do more than an act of civility and attention to the Ambassador, and I wrote as little as possible.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Therapia, September 16, 1840.

I TAKE the liberty to acquaint your Excellency, as Ambassador of a Sovereign closely united in friendship with the Queen, I have the honour to serve that His Majesty the Sultan, having requested the aid of the naval forces of Her Majesty, they will be employed under the authority of the Sultan in carrying into effect the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, which have been declared in blockade by the Sublime Porte. I venture to trouble your Excellency with this communication, in order to prevent, as far as may be in my power, the occurrence of any inconvenience to French commercial interests that might arise from want of information of the facts.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

M. de Pontois to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Therapia, le 17 Septembre, 1840.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence, de la lettre qu'elle a bien voulu m'écrire, en date d'hier, pour me donner connaissance de la part que les forces navales de Sa Majesté Britannique vont être appelées à prendre à l'exécution du blocus des ports d'Egypte et de Syrie ordonné par le Sultan.

Et, vous permettant d'ajouter mes remerciements de cette communication, je crois devoir, M. l'Ambassadeur, vous prévenir de l'impossibilité où je me trouve de faire usage, comme indiqué dans votre lettre, d'ajouter, en effet, content de vous faire observer, sans entrer dans l'examen du côté politique de la mesure dont il s'agit, et des objections qu'elle peut soulever sous ce rapport, qu'un blocus ne saurait, en principe, avoir d'existence légale et devenir obligatoire pour



le commerce étranger qu'après l'expiration des délais qui doivent, conformément à l'usage et aux règles du Droit des Gens, suivre la notation officielle et régulière de cette mesure

Je prie, votre Excellence, d'agréer &c  
Sigue E. DE PONTOIS

No. 227

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)*

No. 206 )

My Lord,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose reports relating to Syria, which my Colleagues were so good as to allow me to copy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 227

*Circular addressed by Solymen Pasha to the Consuls of Foreign Powers residing at Beyroul.*

Monsieur le Consul,

Beyroul, le 27 Dymari-ul-Akhar, 1256

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire savoir que son Altesse Mehemet Ali a refusé les conditions de l'arrangement que le Sultan lui propose d'accorder avec les Cours de la Grande Bretagne d'Autriche de Prusse et de Russie, lesquelles conditions lui ont été communiquées par son Excellence Rifat Bey, l'envoyé de Sa Hautesse, conjointement avec MM. les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Puissances sus-mentionnées.

Son Altesse Mehemet Ali a répondu à cette communication, que ce qu'il avait conquis par les armes les armes seules pourraient le lui enlever.

(Signé) Le Major-Général des Armées,  
LE GENERAL SOLYMAN

Inclosure 2 in No. 227

*Military orders issued by Solymen Pasha.*

ORDRE DU JOUR.

*Etat-Major Général des Armées Egyptiennes.*

Mardi, le 27 Dymari-ul-Akhar, 1256.

LA côte de Syrie, depuis la hauteur de Khanyanés jusqu'à la limite au nord de Tarsous, est en état de siège. En conséquence, l'Autorité Militaire aura à connaître des délits et crimes commis par les gens du pays ou étrangers, quels qu'ils soient, elle sera chargée de l'administration des recettes et impôts, des travaux de défense, et les officiers civils du Génie et ceux de l'Artillerie et du Génie de l'Armée active et sédentaire passeront sous cette Autorité.

Connaissance du présent ordre sera donnée à tous les Commandans civils et militaires des provinces, ainsi qu'à MM. les Consuls des différentes Puissances vu ce qui concerne les étrangers.

(Signé) Le Major-Général des Armées,  
SOLYMAN

# ORDRE DU JOUR.

## ARTICLE 1.

TOUT individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui introduira en Syrie des écrits ou proclamations tendant à fomenter la désobéissance ou la révolte, sera puni de mort

## ART. 2

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui distribuera des écrits ou proclamations tendant à fomenter la désobéissance et la révolte, sera puni de mort

## ART 3.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, porteur ou révélateur d'un ou plusieurs écrits ou proclamations tendant à fomenter la désobéissance et la révolte, sera puni d'une peine de cinq à vingt ans de fers.

## ART. 4.

Sera réputé révélateur d'écrits ou proclamations subversifs tout individu qui, après l'expiration de dix jours à compter du jour où le dit ordre aura été publié dans son village, dans sa ville, ou dans son district, n'aura pas tenu à l'autorité locale tous écrits ou proclamations répandus par les instigateurs de la révolte et existant chez lui ou sur son

## ART 5.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui introduira ou distribuera en Syrie des armes des munitions de guerre, ou provisions de bouche, sans l'avis et l'approbation de l'autorité locale, sera puni de mort

## ART. 6.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, prévenu et convaincu d'espionnage sera puni de mort.

## ART. 7.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui excitera par ses paroles, par ses écrits, ou au moyen de l'argent, les habitants à la révolte, sera puni de mort.

## ART. 8.

Il n'y a rien à changer dans la composition des Conseils de guerre.

## ART. 9.

Les jugemens à mort et aux galères ne pourront être exécutés sans avoir eu l'approbation du Major-Général commandant l'Armée des côtes.

## ART. 10

Il sera donné connaissance des présents ordres à MM. les Consuls des différentes Puissances vu ce qui concerne les étrangers.

(Signé) *Le Major-Général des Armées,*  
**SOLYMAN.**

Mardi, 1<sup>er</sup> 27 Djeumadul-Akhir, 1255.

Inclosure 3 in No. 227.

*The Austrian-Consul at Beyrouth to Soliman Pasha.*

Monsieur le General

Beirut, le 28 Août, 1940

J'AI reçu hier la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser sous  
a date du 27 Février et Akhie pour m'informer qu'on son Altesse Sérénissime Ali a  
reçu les propositions qui lui ont été adressées par le Sultan et qu'il a pu par  
son Envoyé, conjointement à MM. les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes  
Puissances Alliées. Arrivés à la lettre de votre Excellence j'ai trouvé ceux  
cités au jour de la susdite date, portant la confirmation de la mise en état de  
signature de la dite lettre le 27 Février, nous en avons eu la connaissance  
dès ce jour et nous qui serions en mesure de le faire par les traités que nous  
avons et aux termes de retour. Comme ces articles sont conformes aux Condi-  
tions exécutées entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale Royale  
Apostolique et la Serénissime Porte Ottomane et que la procédure et les  
règles de la susdite lettre qui seraient exécutées par les susdits Ambassadeurs,  
je ne puis protester contre le contenu de la dite lettre, mais toute satisfaction  
qui serait à ce sujet nous affecterait.

Je salue, etc  
(Signé) PIERRE LAURELLA

Inclosure 4 in No. 227.

*M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer*

**Monsieur le Baron.**

Alexandrie, le 7 Septembre. 1840

Le nouvel Russe vient d'arriver de Beyrouth avec des dépêches de la part des Consuls en Syrie. Celles des nôtres sont de Damas du 27, et de Beyrouth du 29 Août dernier.

Les premières portent que, Dumas jouit d'une apparente tranquillité ; que le Gouvernement a reçu de nouvelles assurances de la part de la France, et que la France est prête à donner à Méhémet Ali, et surtout que les Chrétiens cherchent à s'emparer de la Syrie, non pas pour y restaurer la domination du Sultan, mais bien pour y établir la leur. Que cependant tout cela ne répond qu'à des vues égoïstes, et que le Gouvernement anglais ne peut pas se permettre de dérouter les insurges de la Montagne de Tripoli, qui continuent à se défendre sous les ordres de l'Émir Hangar.

Les rapports de Beyrouth confirment la désertion de la majeure partie des Naglouziens, qui étaient fort peu satisfaits de la manière dont Osman Pacha les traitait et impatients de retourner chez eux pour reprendre les travaux d'agriculture auxquels Abd-el-Hadi les avait soustraits, en leur promettant l'expulsion des Maronites et un riche butin en récompense, et qui, au lieu de leur être décerné, l'a été aux autres troupes, et aux Albanais.

étage un des fils de l'Emir Béchir, et qu'il l'a envoyé à St. Jean d'Acre. Ce qu'il y a de plus saillant, c'est la déclaration de la côte de la Syrie depuis Khan-yannés (frontière du désert d'Egypte) jusqu'à la frontière de la Carmanie (Ottomane, en état de siège, et la sanction des peines à infliger aux contrevenants la police d'un tel état

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de faire mention de cette déclaration faite par Solomon

Pacha dans mon rapport du 4 du courant il ne me reste que de soumettre à votre Excellence copie des actes publiés à cette occasion par le susdit Major-General ainsi que de la protestation que les Consuls ont interjetée contre les arrêts en question, et que notre Consul à Beyrout m'a envoyés joints à son rapport du 29 Août dernier.

J'en ai rien appris sur les opérations du Commodore Napier. Il a reçu dernièrement des renforts considérables, et l'Amiral Stopford s'est rendu hier lui-même à Seydlitz.

Les communications par mer sont interrompues à un tel point que Mchael Ali comprend l'impossibilité de faire parvenir à son arc-chevé par cette voie. Du reste, ses nouvelles sur l'état de la Syrie sont tellement contradictoires que les Anglais envoient Mr. Hoopes à Beyrouth pour recueillir des renseignements plus précis sur les lieux et en dresser un rapport à ses supérieurs.

Quand à Meinet A, il ne cesse de dire que l'état de la Syrie est satisfaisant. Mais les thèses qu'il prétend pour tenir cette promesse et obéissance prouvent qu'il n'y croit pas lui-même.

André, etc  
(Sigue) LAUREN

Inclosure 5 in No 227

*The Russian Consul at Beyrouth to Count Mordoukh.*

M le Conte.

Beirut, le 11 Août. 1840

LE Général Solymán Pachá, Commandant en Chef des troupes de la côte, vient de communiquer au Corps Consulaire, le refus du Vice-Roi aux dernières propositions qui lui ont été faites par Rifa' el-Khalidi, Bey de la Syrie, en concert avec les Représentants des Quatre Puissances Alliées. Solymán Pachá fait accepter cette proposition de la part de la Syrie, mais il ne s'engage à aucune mesure relative à la mise en état de siège de la côte, et aux mesures de police intérieure. Il se borne en même temps avec la plus grande activité à la mise en état de défense de toute la côte de la Syrie. Des troupes sont déjà échelonnées depuis Tarsous jusqu'à Gaza.

Beirut est le centre des opérations militaires du Pacha. L'aile droite de ce vaste système de défense, est appuyée sur Antakia, et formée de quatre régiments réguliers et de deux irréguliers se forme de quelques escadrons de Cavalerie entre Jaffa et Uzza. Tarnous et Adana sont gardés par les Bachs-Bozouks. Un régiment de Cavalerie et 3,000 à 4,000 hommes de fantassins réguliers, forment la garnison de St. Jean d'Acro; mais les principales forces sont réunies dans deux camps, elles consistent en 5,000 ou 6,000 Arméniens, et de Napoléoniens, et près de 10,000 hommes de troupes régulières, qui sont prêts à se porter sur le premier point de la côte de qui sera le point d'une invasion par la mer. Les Hédâs occupent toujours le même campement à côté de la ville, et sont très exactement observés.

10500. — Paris, le Commandant en Chef de cette armée réduite à un effectif de 1000 hommes paraît sincèrement attaché aux intérêts du Vice-Roi, et si les soldats ne partagent pas ses sentimens, ils paraissent néanmoins dociles et soumis à leur Général, puisque toutes les démonstrations des Anglais n'ont obtenu jusqu'à ce jour aucun résultat. Une discipline sévère est observée parmi les troupes, et la sécurité publique n'a pas encore été compromise.

Abraham Pacha se trouve depuis trois jours à Haïbec, avec Elmir Béchir et le chef de l'administration militaire de la Syrie, Pacha Bey. La route de toutes les affaires Syriennes paraît s'y clore et le calme sur la région du Vieux-Roi est connue, et nous sommes peut être à la veille d'un état d'hostilités entre les troupes et l'Escadre Anglaise. Celle-ci est composée maintenant de cinq vaisseaux de ligne, une frégate, une corvette, et un bateau à vapeur, et continue à capturer non plus les vaisseaux et les cargaisons du Gouvernement Egyptien, puisqu'il ne s'en présente plus, mais bien des nombreux expédiés par le commerce. C'est ainsi que deux cargaisons de riz ont été saisies dernièrement. Aux protestations des propriétaires, négocians Arabes de Beyrouth, le Commandant Namer fit répondre qu'il garderait les cargaisons pour les vaisseaux



qui sont attendus à Beyrouth, et qu'il payerait au prix de la place. Il avait déjà renouvelé ses démarches auprès de Soliman Pacha, afin d'obtenir des provisions pour ces marins et soldats égyptiens qui sont en son pouvoir, ce Général répondait avec très peu de ménagement et se hâta en même temps au Consul Anglais qui n'avait pas à intervenir dans les affaires. Plus tard il l'invita, par écrit, à quitter la ville, afin de pouvoir à sa sûreté personnelle.

Mr Moore vient de me prévenir qu'il ne quitterait la ville qu'à la suite d'un ordre quel des autorités. Il a fait la même réponse à Soliman Pacha, se fondant sur ce qu'il n'y a pas de guerre déclarée entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Égypte. Cette explication vient de donner lieu à de violentes remarques de la part du Pacha, qui lui observa entre autre, que la flotte Anglaise tout en bloquant le port d'Alexandrie, laisse sortir des bâtimens de commerce qui sont ensuite capturés ici. D'ailleurs il est à présumer qu'on ne tardera pas à interdire toute communication entre les vaisseaux Anglais et la ville et je suis porté à croire que Soliman Pacha sollicite, à cet effet, des ordres de son Gouvernement.

Les courses dans le Liban de Mr Wood, beau-frère du Consul, et ses efforts pour fomentier des troubles, ont enfin provoqué des ordres et des mesures énergiques de la part du Gouvernement, pour la cause de cet émissaire secret. Je n'ai rien de plus à vous dire sur ce point, en prévenant Mr Moore, et depuis, son beau-frère ne quitte plus le bord.

Les nouvelles de l'intérieur sont très-alarmantes; si le projet d'expédition ne réussit pas, les Turcs sur ce point vont à effectuer avec succès. Il faut à redouter que l'attachement des Musulmans à leur Souverain légitime, ne se manifesta par le massacre des Chrétiens, dans plus d'une localité, et notamment dans la fanatique cité de Damas.

J'ai l'honneur, etc.,  
Signé BASILY

No 228

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 207.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

I have the honour to inclose copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehmet Ali Pasha, announcing his deposition from his post &c &c

I have, &c.,  
Signed PONSOMBY

Inclosure in No. 228

The Grand Vizier to Mehmet Ali

J'ai pris connaissance de la lettre que votre Altesse m'a envoyée par le retour de mon Moustéchar, son Excellence Rûfat Bey. Tout comme vous n'avez pas adhéré aux propositions du premier délai qui vous avaient été faites d'après la Convention, de même la Sublime Porte et les Quatre Cours Allées vous avez de même refusé d'accepter les propositions du second délai. Or, comme dans de pareilles affaires officielles et publiques, le fond de la chose ne saurait être changé par des subterfuges et par des faux-fuyans, et comme on ne peut pas sortir du cercle tracé par la dite Convention, Sa Hauteuse le Sultan vient par une Ordonnance Impériale de décharger votre Altesse aussi des fonctions de Gouverneur d'Égypte.

Quant à la lettre de change de 500 hommes que vous avez remise à son Excellence le Moustéchar, comme l'acceptation de cet argent ne s'accorderait ni avec sa mission officielle, ni avec les réglemens établis de la Sublime Porte, je ne puis que vous renvoyer ci-jointe la traite en question.

C'est à cette fin que la présente lettre, &c

18 Rejeb, 1256.

(Signé) RAOUF

No. 229.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 208.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of my despatch to Colonel Hodges, recalling him from Alexandria.

Your Lordship has been informed of the demand made by the Sublime Porte for the recall of the Four Consuls-General.

My despatch to Colonel Hodges was written in concurrence with my Colleagues, who have each written to their several Consuls-General to the same effect.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

Inclosure in No. 229

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges.

[See Inclosure in No. 223, p. 240.]

No. 230.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 210.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

RECHID PASHA asked my Colleagues and me for letters of introduction to the Consuls in Candia for two Agents, the Porte wished to send there to open a communication with the Pasha Governor of the Island; and his Excellency asked me to get the Admiral to send the Agents in a ship of war.

The Intermuncio gave a letter as desired. The Russian Minister thought it not proper to give one, but as I could not get one from him, and I think the Prussian Minister and my Consul. I gave a letter for Mr. Consul Ogley, telling him that the bearers desired to be introduced to the Pasha which I wished might be done if it could be effected without danger to the Agent's person, and adding, that he would tell Mr. Ogley the nature of his business. The Agent here mentioned is Mr. Redhouse, a very discreet, clever man, who will not act rashly.

I also wrote to the Admiral, informing him of the Pasha's desire to have these Agents sent in an English vessel to Candia, and at the same time said I was not acquainted with the grounds upon which Rechid Pasha acted on this occasion, but I had desired Mr. Redhouse to get from the Pasha a full account of the matter which he should state to the Admiral, who would then act according to his own judgment in the affair, and added, that if Candia could be obtained for the Porte and taken from Mehmet Ali, it would certainly be a good thing, &c.

Mr. Redhouse and his Chief, one Nouri Effendi, a man employed in some of the offices at the Porte, will depart from hence this evening in the steamer hired by the Porte, and will go to Beyrouth, where the Admiral is.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 231.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)*

(No. 211.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of my letter to Admiral Stopford, acquainting him that the Sublime Porte declared the échelles of Egypt and Syria to be in a state of blockade.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure in No. 231.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

Sir,

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your information, copy of an official Note from the Sublime Porte, containing the declaration of a blockade of the échelles of Egypt and Syria.

I have further to acquaint you, that the Sublime Porte having demanded the aid of the naval forces of Her Majesty and of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, his Excellency the Austrian Internuncio and myself have consented to the demand of the Sublime Porte.

The period fixed by the Sublime Porte for the legal commencement of the blockade is the time when the ships to be employed in the blockade shall be actually before the place to be blockaded.

The blockade has been notified by the Sublime Porte to the Foreign Ministers; and I have made known to the French Ambassador, that the naval forces of Her Majesty and of the Emperor of Austria would be employed as allies of the Sultan, and under the authority, and in the name of the Sultan to aid in carrying the blockade into execution.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 232.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)*

(No. 213.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 20, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of a Note from the French Ambassador to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which I have just received from the Porte.

As I had information the day before yesterday of the intention of the Ambassador, I requested the Internuncio to propose to Rechid Pasha that the Sublime Porte should make a declaration to denat the particular action made by the Ambassador at this morning the Internuncio had done, accompanied by M. Francesech \* when I was agreed that the Porte should make a declaration to denat the foregoing effect. The Sublime Porte having learned that I would have at last of the date of the commencement of the blockade was expected in a manner that cannot admit of any contest. The Sublime Porte has then proper to declare that the blockade, &c. shall take place on the

The date is intended to be one month after the date of the original declaration.

\* M. Francesech represented Rechid Pasha.

My object is to cover the Porte from the charge of having acted irregularly, and to take from the French the means of cavil about the specification of the date. I wished the date to be specified in the first declaration, but another opinion prevailed. M. de Pontois seems to me to have made a confusion between a blockade declared against a Foreign Power and one directed against a portion of the territory of the Sovereign who declares it. In the first case, there are many things necessary to be done which I presume are not in the second. A Sovereign has clearly a right, in case of the rebellion of a city or a port to cut off all communication with that city which might, in his opinion, tend to give succour or force to the rebels who hold possession of it, and the same must be predicable of provinces. The Sublime Porte has several times acted in this way, the last time being in the case of Samos, three or four years ago.

I do not think it necessary to enter into an argument on this point, which appears to be clear. The Porte will make the above-mentioned declaration to-morrow, and I will send the "Talbot" with it to the Admiral.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

Inclosure in No. 232.

*M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.*

Therapia, le 17 Septembre, 1840.

L'AMBASSADEUR de France vient de recevoir la Note officielle que lui a adressée la Sublime Porte pour lui donner connaissance de la détermination qu'elle a cru devoir prendre de bloquer les ports et échelles de l'Egypte et de la Syrie.

Il va s'empresse de transmettre cette Note à son Gouvernement, en regrettant de ne pouvoir lui faire connaître également le caractère précis de la mesure qui vient d'être adoptée, les principes de droit maritime qui régleront son exécution, et les effets qu'elle aura pour le commerce étranger.

L'Ambassadeur de France, sans entrer pour le moment dans l'examen du côté politique de la mesure dont il s'agit, et des objections qu'elle peut soulever sous ce rapport, croit de son devoir de faire observer, dès à présent, à la Sublime Porte, qu'un blocus ne saurait en principe avoir d'existence légale, et devenir obligatoire pour le commerce et les sujets des Puissances Etrangères, qu'après l'accomplissement des formalités, et l'expiration des délais prescrits par les Droits des Gens et par l'usage.

(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

No. 233.

*Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)*

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 30, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH has sent instructions to the Internuncio, prohibiting him from concurring in any proposition which shall not be within the limits of the Convention of July, and directing him, in case any such proposition should be made, to refer to his Court for orders.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.



*Earl Grenville to Viscount Palmerston.---(Received October 7)*

(No. 268.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 5, 1840.

THE state of things here has an appearance very menacing to the internal tranquillity of the country and to the general peace of the world. Her Majesty's Government, under the conviction that France has no just cause for war, and that a contest against the other Four Great Powers of Europe would be disastrous to France, is perhaps disinclined to believe that the French Government will engage in such a contest. If a sense of justice, if prudential motives were to guide the councils of the country, the conclusion would be well founded; but the opinions of the reflecting portion of the community have but too frequently been a poor thing, which makes them too ready to give credit to any appearance of a disregard of their influence and importance in the affairs of Europe; who have an overweening confidence and belief in the success of their country, which has always been in glory, who cherish the recollection of their military success, and try to forget the reverses which followed it. All these feelings have been flattered to the highest pitch by the press, since the conclusion of the Quintuple Treaty of last July. The press of Paris and of the departments, the ministerial, the legitimist, the republican, and the Napoleon newspapers, have all joined in one chorus to persuade the people that the July Treaty was an affront to France, which its Government was bound to resent; and they have so well succeeded in exciting the popular feeling, that although the King sees all the danger of war to himself and his family and the country, I cannot indulge the hope that if the hostilities against Mehemet Ali be not brought to a speedy termination by the Pasha's submission to the Treaty of July, or by some arrangement that can bring France again into the Councils of Europe in the settlement of the Eastern Question, we shall have it in our power to stop the career of popular opinion, and preserve peace. His Majesty was raised to the Throne by the voice of the people, and if that voice be decidedly expressed in favour of the assertion by France of her claim to be consulted on the terms of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and of assisting the Pasha, should such claim be rejected by the Allied Powers, the King must yield.

I doubt whether M. Thiers could, under present circumstances, under the present excitement which he has himself contributed to create, continue Minister, pursuing a pacific policy, and passively waiting the result of the hostile measures adopted against Mehemet Ali. For him to do so would be to justify before the Chambers the enormous expenditure which on his own responsibility, and without the sanction of the Representatives of the people, had been incurred, and apparently for no object.

The question of convoking the Chambers was, I understand, yesterday deliberated upon in the Cabinet Council. The opinions of the members of it differed, and it was decided that the question should be referred to the Chambers, and that the measures which should be adopted in the mean time. According to report, various propositions, such as sending the fleet with troops on board, to Alexandria, or occupying other points of military importance, were discussed, but no decision taken. The King, I know, is very averse to an early convocation of the Chambers, he fears that the acrimony of the debates will exasperate the people against England, and render more difficult the preservation of peace; but if M. Thiers will only remain at the head of affairs on the condition of the Chambers being immediately convoked, the acceptance of his resignation on that ground would be so unpopular, that I doubt if His Majesty would be able to find another Ministry who would undertake the direction of affairs in this difficult and dangerous crisis.

The intelligence which has been lately received of the vigorous co-operation of Her Majesty's naval forces with the Turkish troops on the coast of Syria, has rekindled the warlike vehemence of the press, and I must also say has given additional animation to M. Thiers' conversation with me. I was at Auteuil on Saturday evening. He said that this cruel destruction of the prosperous commercial town of Beyroot was undertaken before the Sultan had

given any answer to the propositions of the Pasha, which, at the suggestion, and under the influence of France, he had made to the Sultan; and that the bombardment, at the same time that it was an act of positive violence against the Pasha, was one of moral violence against France. He said that France had given ample proof of its disinterestedness as well as patience. There are, however, limits to the warlike measures of the Allied Powers, the transgression of which France would not tolerate; and he then said, with some emphasis, that no French Government, be it what it might, could refrain from resisting the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Egypt.

I have endeavoured in this despatch to put your Lordship in possession of the grounds on which I think war by no means improbable. I need not add what satisfaction it would be to me, to find that I am mistaken, and that the King, who has, I am confident, the sincere and anxious desire to preserve peace, shall be able to defeat the intentions of those who are hallooing on the country to a war of which no one can foresee the end or the consequences.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 235

*Viscount Palmerston to Barons Brunnow, Schleinitz, and Neumann.*

Foreign Office, October 8, 1840.

THE Undersigned, in conformity with what was settled between himself, Baron Brunnow, Baron Neumann, and Baron Schleinitz, in a Conference held between them on Saturday last, the 3rd instant, has the honour to transmit to Baron Brunnow a copy of a Memorandum which Prince Metternich forwarded to the Undersigned from Koenigswart on the 31st of August last, containing a statement of the opinion entertained at that time by Prince Metternich, of the course which would be advisable for the Four Great Powers to pursue with reference to the Tureo-Egyptian Question, in the then existing state of affairs, and the Undersigned has the honour to state to Baron Brunnow, that it appears to Her Majesty's Government, that it would be expedient that the Four Powers should propose or suggest to the French Government such a course as is sketched out in this Memorandum. The Undersigned, therefore, requests Baron Brunnow to have the goodness to inform him whether he is willing and authorized, on the part of the Russian Government, to concur in making such a suggestion to the Government of France.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 236

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Grenville*

(No. 281.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 8, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, No. 268, reporting the menacing aspect of public affairs at Paris with regard to the internal tranquillity of France, and to the general peace of the world.

With reference to the observations made to you by M. Thiers upon the Eastern Question, I have to instruct your Excellency, if M. Thiers should again advert to the question which any French Government would propose to the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Egypt, to remark, in a friendly manner, that as Egypt is a province of the Turkish Empire, and as Mehemet Ali is a subject of the Sultan, holding his authority in Egypt entirely by delegation from the Sultan, it is not easy to see upon what ground France, or any other Power, could be entitled to say that the Sultan should not exercise towards Mehemet Ali the right which belongs to every Sovereign as against a subject, to remove

him from his post, if he is disobedient and rebellious; and it would surely not be consistent that a Power which like France has repeatedly proclaimed its determination to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's throne, should give armed assistance to a rebellious subject of the Sultan, in order to enable that subject to set his Sovereign's authority at defiance, and to retain forcible possession of a large province of that Sovereign's empire; and your Excellency will, moreover, observe, that for France to do so would be inconsistent with the positive and explicit declaration contained in M. Guizot's Note of the 18th of September. But your Excellency will say that, according to all appearance, this is a barren discussion of an abstract question, because it may reasonably be expected that when Mehemet Ali finds that the Syrians have generally risen against him, and have declared for the Sultan, and when, consequently, he can have no hope of retaining Syria, he will make his peace with the Sultan, and will not render it necessary for the Sultan to proceed to extremities against him in regard to Egypt.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 237.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Private)

My dear Granville,

Carlton Terrace, October 8, 1840.

I AM going out of town for a day, and have not time to write you a despatch, therefore, I send you a private letter instead.

Pray go to the King immediately, and say you are instructed to deprecate in the most friendly, but at the same time the most earnest manner, steps which we hear are under consideration, and which, if taken, would either make war inevitable, or at least render the continuance or resumption of it they have ceased) of friendly relations a matter of the utmost difficulty.

We hear that two things are under consideration—first, what is now called an *Ancrage*; secondly, some declaration as to what France will, and what she will not permit.

Now, as to the first, it would be (and you will know how to convey the idea in civil terms) nothing more or less than an act of piracy.

The Five Powers, France included, have declared their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

Four out of the five are labouring to carry their principles into practice.

The fifth, for reasons of her own, declines being a party to the execution, and therefore, because the other four are acting up to her own principles, she is to be excused from a portion of the territory of the very Sovereign whom she has pledged herself to support. Such a proceeding would be an inconsistent with every principle which governs, or ought to govern, the intercourse between man and man, or between nation and nation, that we are sure that the King of the French will never permit a thing which would cast an indelible stain upon the honour of his Crown. But such an act of lawless violence must lead to serious consequences, and, to go no further, it would probably bring twenty or thirty Russian line-of-battle ships into the Mediterranean, what to do when they got there, it is not for us to say; but England could not remain a tame spectator of such a proceeding, and surely there is no need of creating fresh subjects of angry feeling between the two countries. I shall write you a despatch upon this subject, and, indeed, have for some time been intending to do so, but have never been able to find the hour and a-half requisite for that purpose.

Then, as to a declaration, if France makes us a friendly communication tending to lead to an amicable discussion of the present state of affairs, we shall receive it, and deal with it in the spirit in which it is made; but if France haughtily tells the Four Powers that she will permit them to do certain things in aid of the Sultan, but will not permit them to do other things, it is manifest

that such a communication can only tend to make all reconciliation impossible. If the things she forbids are things we mean to do, we shall do them all the same, and then France must attack us, and take the consequences. If the things so forbidden are things we do not mean to do, her interdiction may tempt us to do them, and, at all events, we shall be obliged to make a reply in which defiance shall answer threat, and when once we begin a war of words, we shall not be very far off from a war of blows. The King of the French must recollect that our Parliament and his own Chambers will watch with all the keenness of national jealousy every word written by either side, and that, on the one hand, a menace made and not executed, or, on the other hand, a menace received, and not cast back with disdain, would be the overthrow of the Ministers by whom national honour should thus have been degraded. Besides, if we came to this handying of threats, Russia would be sure to say something to France which France would be unable to brook, and would find it difficult effectually to resent. In short, such a course would be neither wise, nor dignified for France, and would lead to a quarrel which, if she intends to bring on, she had much better enter into at once, saying, merely like an Irishman at a fair, that her blood is up, and she must have a fight, and those who stand nearest at hand must be her antagonists.

We do not wish to have a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean.

The Emperor has no desire to send his fleet thither: let not the French compel him to do so.

I hear there are letters in town from Paris attaching importance to the Opera now; I hope Europe is not fallen so low, that its conduct in a great affair is to be influenced by the behaviour of the audience at the Paris Opera house. This, indeed, would be too childish. What a very low opinion Thiers must have of the English nation.

I have seen several letters to-day from various persons, all tending to the belief that the French do not really wish for war, though they wish to make the war cry a means of extorting from us concessions as to our Treaty.

I believe the army in a bad state of equipment as to stores of all kinds, besides being deficient in men, and still more so in horses; I understand the dock-yards are ill provided with stores of all kinds, and especially in masts for large ships. I hear that the Finance Minister is furious with Thiers for his prodigality, and that 193 millions of francs which have been taken from the Savings Banks must be repaid. I am told that for this, and to cover the military and naval expenses already incurred by and the vote, and to defray those still necessary, a loan of something near 20,000,000*l.* sterling will be required. I understand that Thiers has been covering Brough very much, and has suggested to Brough that he might succeed if Thiers went out; and I hear that Brough's language is as violent as that of Thiers. I am told that the King is all for peace, and that the majority of the Council are so too, as well they may be, for what so insane as an unprovoked, causeless, unjustifiable, and hopeless war?

I also have been told that Thiers says he has three agents in this country upon whom he relies—Guizot, Flahaut, and Ellice.

Yours sincerely,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 238

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodge.

(No. 33.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to remain with Sir Robert Stopford, unless when you may have occasion to go to Constantinople to confer with Lord Ponsonby.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON



*M. Thiers to M. Guizot.—(Communicated by M. Guizot, October 10.)*

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 8 Octobre, 1840.

LA grave question qui préoccupe aujourd'hui le monde vient de prendre une face toute nouvelle depuis la réponse que la Porte a faite aux propositions du Vice-Roi d'Egypte. Méhémet Ali en répondant aux nominations du Sultan, a déclaré qu'il se soumettait aux volontés de son Auguste Maître, qu'il acceptait la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte, et qu'il s'en rendait responsable des territoires qu'il occupait actuellement à la magnanimité du Sultan. Nous avons fait connaître au Cabinet Anglais ce qu'il fallait entendre par cette manière de s'exprimer; et bien que Méhémet Ali ne voulut pas déclarer immédiatement toutes les concessions auxquelles il avait été disposé par les vives instances de la France, nous avons pris soin de les faire connaître, et nous avons annoncé, que Méhémet Ali se résignerait au besoin à accepter la possession de l'Egypte héréditaire et de la Syrie vengerie en abandonnant immédiatement Candie, Adana, et les Villes Saintes. Nous ajouterons, que si la Porte avait adhéré à cet arrangement, nous aurions consenti à le garantir de concert avec les Puissances qui s'occupent de régler le sort de l'Empire Ottoman.

Tous les esprits éclairés ont été frappés de la loyauté de la France, qui, bien que tenant une conduite séparée, ne cessait pas d'exercer son influence au profit d'une solution modérée et pacifique de la Question d'Orient. Ils ont aussi été frappés de la sagesse avec laquelle le Vice-Roi écoutait les conseils de la prudence et de la modération.

En réponse à cet acte de sagesse la Porte, qui elle ait agi spontanément, soit qu'elle ait agi par des conseils irréfutables, reçus sur les lieux mêmes, la Porte, avant de pouvoir en référer à ses Alliés, a répondu à la déchéance du Vice-Roi par un acte de déchéance. Une telle conduite, aussi exorbitante qu'inattendue, excède même l'esprit du Traité du 15 Juillet, et dépasse les conséquences les plus extrêmes qu'on pouvait en tirer. Ce traité que la France ne saurait invoquer, car elle n'y adhère point, mais qu'elle rappelle, pour montrer la rapidité avec laquelle on est entraîné déjà à des conséquences dangereuses, ce traité, dans le cas d'un refus absolu du Vice-Roi sur tous les points, laissant à la Porte la faculté de retirer ses premières offres, et d'en agir alors comme elle l'entendrait, suivant ses intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés; mais il supposait deux choses: un refus absolu et péremptoire sur tous les points de la part du Vice-Roi, et le recours aux conseils des Quatre Puissances. Or, rien de tout cela n'a eu lieu. Le Vice-Roi n'a point fait de refus absolu, et la Porte ne s'est pas même donné le temps de concerter une réponse avec ses Alliés. Elle a répondu à des concessions inespérées par la déchéance! Les Quatre Puissances ne sauraient approuver une telle conduite; et nous savons, en effet, que plusieurs d'entre elles l'ont déjà désapprouvée. Lord Palmerston nous a fait déclarer, qu'il ne fallait voir en cela qu'une mesure comminatoire sans conséquence effective et nécessaire. Monsieur le Comte Appony, s'entretenant avec moi sur ce sujet, m'a annoncé la même opinion de la part de son Cabinet. Nous prenons acte volontiers de cette sage manifestation, et nous en prenons aussi occasion d'exprimer à cet égard les intentions de la France.

La France a déclaré qu'elle consacrerait tous ses moyens au maintien de la Paix et de l'équilibre Européen. C'est le cas d'expliquer clairement ce qu'elle a entendu par cette déclaration. En acceptant avec une religieuse fidélité l'état de l'Europe tel qu'il résultait des traités, la France a entendu que pendant la paix générale qui dure heureusement depuis 1815, cet état ne fut point changé, ni au profit, ni au détriment, d'aucune des Puissances existantes. C'est dans cette pensée qu'elle s'est toujours prononcée pour le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman. La race Turque, par ses qualités

nationales, méritait assurément pour elle-même le respect de son indépendance; mais les plus chers intérêts de l'Europe se rattachaient aussi à l'existence de l'Empire Turc. Cet Empire, en succombant, ne pouvait servir qu'à augmenter les Etats voisins, aux dépens de l'équilibre général; sa chute aurait entraîné un tel changement dans la proportion actuelle des Grandes Puissances, que la face du monde en aurait été changée. La France, et toutes les Puissances avec elle, l'ont tellement senti, qu'elles se sont loyalement engagées à maintenir l'Empire Ottoman, quels que fussent leurs intérêts respectifs relativement à sa chute, ou à son maintien.

Mais l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman s'étend des bords de la Mer Noire à ceux de la Mer Rouge. Il importe autant de garantir l'indépendance de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, que l'indépendance du Bosphore et des Dardanelles.

L'un Prince vassal a réussi à créer une administration ferme dans deux provinces, que, depuis longtemps, les Sultans de Constantinople n'avaient pu gouverner. Ce Prince vassal, s'il n'a pas fait régner dans les provinces qu'il régit l'humanité de la civilisation Européenne, quo peut-être ne comportent pas ces provinces des pays qui la démentent, y a fait prévaloir plus d'ordre et de régularité dans aucune partie de l'Empire Turc. Il a su y créer une force publique. Il a vu une Marche à l'égard du peuple Ottoman, et l'a rendu un peu de cette confiance et d'union qui est indispensable pour qu'il puisse défendre son indépendance. Le Prince vassal est devenu, sur cet important point, essentiel et nécessaire de l'Empire Ottoman, s'il est d'autant l'Empire n'acquiescerait pas à ce point de vue, mais il lui a manqué autrefois pour gouverner la Syrie et l'Egypte, et il pourrait n'y réussir en fait maintenant l'une de ses plus grandes forces, à l'égard des Puissances insoumis envers leurs maîtres, et dépendants de toutes les influences étrangères: en un mot, une partie de l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc serait compromise et avec une partie de cette intégrité une partie de l'équilibre général. Dans l'opinion de la France, le Vice-Roi d'Egypte, par les provinces qu'il administre, par les mers sur lesquelles s'exerce son action, est nécessaire pour assurer les proportions actuellement existantes entre les divers Etats du monde.

Dans cette conviction, la France, aussi désintéressée dans la Question d'Orient que les Quatre Puissances qui ont signé le Protocole du 17 Septembre, se croit obligée de déclarer, que la déchéance du Vice-Roi mise à exécution serait à ses yeux une atteinte à l'équilibre général. On a livré aux chances de la guerre actuellement engagée la question des limites qui doivent séparer en Syrie les possessions du Sultan et du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, mais la France ne saurait abandonner à de telles chances l'existence de Méhémet Ali comme Prince vassal de l'Empire. Quelle que soit la limite territoriale qui les séparera par suite des événements de la guerre leur faiblesse existe est nécessaire à l'Europe, et la France ne saurait admettre la suppression de l'un, ou de l'autre. Disposée à prendre part à tout arrangement acceptable qui aurait pour base la double garantie de l'existence du Sultan et du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, elle se borne en ce moment à déclarer, que, pour sa part, elle ne pourrait consentir à la mise à exécution de l'acte de déchéance prononcé à Constantinople.

De reste, les manifestations spontanées de plusieurs des Puissances signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet nous prouvent qu'en cela nous entendons à l'unanimité l'Europe contre ces mesures, et que ce point nous ne le trouverons pas en désaccord avec nous. Nous regretterions ce désaccord que nous ne prévoyons pas, mais nous ne saurions nous départir de cette manière d'entendre et d'assurer le maintien de l'équilibre général.

La France espère qu'on appréciera en Europe le motif qui l'a fait sortir du silence. On peut compter sur son amour de la paix, sentiment constant chez elle, malgré les procédés dont elle a cru avoir à se plaindre. On peut compter sur son désintéressement; car on ne saurait même la soupçonner d'aspirer en Orient à des acquisitions de territoire. Mais

elle aspire à maintenir l'équilibre Européen. Ce soin est remis à toutes les Grandes Puissances. Son maintien doit être leur gloire et leur principale ambition.

(Signed) A. THIERS.

No. 240.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 11.)*

(No. 270.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 8, 1840

I HEARD on Tuesday last, from good authority, that the Cabinet Council had been on that day deliberating on the subject of the Firman which the Sultan had issued by the advice of the Representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople, and by which Mehemet Ali was removed from the post of Governor of Egypt. The Ministers, I was told, were unanimous in deciding that a Note should be addressed to Her Majesty's Government, remonstrating against the execution of this measure, but there had been a difference of opinion in the Council as to the terms of the Note. A majority of the Ministers were in favour of a declaration that the French Government would consider the execution of the Firman as a *casus belli*, whilst four out of the nine who constitute the Cabinet maintained the expediency of the French Government communicating its sentiments in a more moderate and less offensive manner. I had not had the opportunity of seeing M. Thiers since the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 272, in which you state the view taken of this measure by Her Majesty's Government, and considering that it was very important that the French Government should know that Her Majesty's Government looked upon it as a means of coercion, and was of opinion that it did not prejudice the arrangement which the Sultan might be disposed to make in Mehemet Ali's favour, I made a point of seeing M. Thiers as soon as possible, and I have, I think, told you your Lordship's despatch.

I found that M. Guizot's report of his conversation with your Lordship on this matter had been received that evening by M. Thiers, and although I cannot say that he was precise with the tone of your language on the general Turco-Egyptian Question, he did not deny that the explanation you gave to M. Guizot, and that which you had written to me, of your view of the intention with which the Firman was issued by the Sultan, was calculated to diminish the apprehensions of the French Government as to the possible consequences of that measure, and I learnt on the following day that he determined to moderate the tone of the despatch which he proposed writing to the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 241.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 11.)*

(No. 272.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 9, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a \*despatch which has been addressed by the President of the French Council to the French Ambassador in London, to be communicated to your Lordship. This despatch is the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet Council in regard to the Sultan's Firman, by which Mehemet Ali is deposed from the Government of Egypt. M. Thiers in stating to me yesterday his intention to send me in the course of the day a copy of this despatch expressed his hope that it might lead to a better understanding between France and the other Great

Powers of Europe, on the Eastern Question. It is with regret I observe in M. Thiers' despatch, the very partial view taken of the cause, of the conduct, and of the Government of Mehemet Ali, and the misstatements and fallacious arguments with which that view is supported; but I hope it may appear to Her Majesty's Government and to the Allies of Her Majesty, that in the substance of the despatch may be found a basis for the renewal of a concert between them and France in the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question. Your Lordship is, I am sure, of opinion that any settlement of that question will be more satisfactorily and permanently secured, if it be made with the concurrence of France; and that it may be well worth the Sultan's while to make even some sacrifice in the conditions of peace with the Pasha, in order to obtain that concurrence.

It appears by the despatch of which the inclosed is a copy, that France is willing to leave to the chances of the war actually going on in Syria, the question of limits between the possessions of the Sultan and his vassal in that country; and the existence of Mehemet Ali as Governor of Egypt is the only point which France will not abandon to such chances. I see here no retraction of the principle of the Treaty of the 15th of July required, nor anything in this declaration inconsistent with the plan which Lord Beauvale represents in his despatch of the 30th of August, as being that which Prince Metternich proposes for effecting a reunion of the Four Powers with France on the arrangement of the question.

I cannot conclude this despatch without stating my serious apprehensions that if the Four Powers reject the suggestions contained in the French despatch as containing no grounds for the renewal of a concert with France in this matter, that the danger of a general European war will be imminent. The King is anxious for peace, and knowing well all the evils which war may bring upon France, and the hazard to which it will expose the monarchy of France, he will exert his utmost to avert war, but he is in a situation in which his utmost exertions for that object may be ineffectual; if the Porte insists upon carrying into effect the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and expelling him from Egypt. There is no king, there is no Minister who could resist the popular cry here to engage in war with those who undertake the task of expelling him, and the Chambers will join heartily if not unanimously in that cry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 242.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)*

(No. 275.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 9, 1840

I HAVE not seen M. Thiers since I received yesterday your despatch No. 280, but I learn from my Austrian Ambassador that M. Thiers has not done anything in consequence of the opinions expressed by Prince Metternich in the paper therein inclosed. The other plan, proposed by Prince Metternich, and to which Lord Beauvale refers at the end of his despatch No. 119, was discussed in a conversation between Count Appony and M. Thiers; and it seems that to the general principle of that plan for the reunion of France to the Four Powers, in arranging the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, the French Minister did not object, but that he asked for some further explanations respecting it, and the consideration of the plan has not been renewed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.



M. Thiers to M. Guizot.—(Communicated by M. Guizot, October 12)

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 3 Octobre, 1840.

VOUS avez eu connaissance de la dépêche que Lord Palmerston a écrite à M. Bulwer, pour expliquer la conduite du Gouvernement Britannique dans l'importante négociation qui s'est terminée par le Traité du 15 Juillet. Cette dépêche, dont je me plais à reconnaître que le ton est parfaitement convenable et modéré, contient cependant des assertions et des raisonnemens qu'il est impossible au Gouvernement du Roi de laisser établir. Sans doute, pour ne pas aggraver une situation déjà si menaçante, il faudrait mieux laisser le passé dans l'oubli, et ne pas revenir sur des contestations trop souvent renouvelées; mais, outre que Lord Palmerston aurait droit de trouver mauvais que en communication restât sans réponse, il importe de représenter, dans sa vérité, la conduite respective de chaque Cour, pendant cette négociation. La dépêche de Lord Palmerston, communiquée à toutes les légations sous la forme d'exemplaires imprimés, est déjà devenue publique. Il était donc indispensable d'y faire une réponse. Celle que je vous envoie et dont je souhaite que le Cabinet d'Orléans ne soit pas avoir à se justifier, est la seule qui se soit passée entre les divers Cabinets le sens véritable qu'ils nous semblent avoir. Vous voudrez bien en laisser copie au Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Si j'ai bien saisi l'ensemble de l'exposé présenté par Lord Palmerston, on pourrait le résumer comme il suit :

La Grande-Bretagne ne s'opposait point au rétablissement de la Question d'Orient, n'a poursuivi qu'un seul but, c'est l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est ce but qu'elle a poursuivi, et que les autres Cabinets ont toutes adopté, qu'elles ont toutes poursuivi, la France comme les autres. Dans ce but, il fallait réduire à de moindres proportions les prétentions démesurées du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, il fallait éloigner le plus possible du Taurus les possessions et les armées de cet ambitieux rival. Ce qu'il y avait de mieux, c'était de mettre le Désert entre le Sultan et le Pacha, c'était de réduire Méhémet Ali à l'Egypte, et de rendre la Syrie au Sultan Abdoul Medjd. Le désert de Syrie aurait alors servi de barrière entre les deux Etats, et rassuré l'Empire Ottoman, et l'Europe, intéressée au salut de cet Empire, contre l'ambition de la famille Egyptienne.

C'est toujours là ce que l'Angleterre a proclamé à toutes les époques de la négociation. La France, par la Note Collective signée à Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839, par une circulaire adressée le 17 du même mois à toutes les Cours, la France avait sensiblement adhéré au principe commun, en proclamant d'une manière aussi absolue que les autres Cabinets, l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Cependant elle s'est ensuite éloignée de ce principe, en demandant, au profit du Vice-Roi, un démembrement de l'Empire, incompatible avec son existence. Dans le desir de s'assurer le concours de la France, les Quatre Cabinets, Signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet, ont fait auprès d'elle des instances répétées pour l'amener à leurs vues. Ils lui ont même fait des sacrifices considérables, car ils ont ajouté à l'Egypte, héréditairement concédée, le Pachaie d'Acre, moins la place de ce nom, et ensuite ils ont consenti à y joindre la place elle-même, mais tous ces sacrifices sont demeurés inutiles; la France a persisté à s'éloigner du principe que les Cinq Cabinets avaient eu devoir proclamer en commun.

Les autres Cours n'ont pas pu la suivre dans cette voie. Quelque désir qu'elles éprouvassent de s'assurer son concours, elles ont dû enfin se séparer d'elle, et signer un acte qui ne doit pas la surprendre, car elle avait été plus d'une fois avertie que si on ne parvenait pas à s'entendre, il faudrait bien finir par résoudre à quatre la question qu'on ne pouvait résoudre à cinq. Quatre Cabinets étant d'accord sur une question de la plus haute importance, ne pouvant pas indéfiniment accorder à un cinquième le sacrifice de leurs vues et de leurs intentions parfaitement dévouées. En effet, Lord Palmerston avait soigneusement répété à l'Ambassadeur de France, que la proposition con-

tenue depuis dans le Traité du 15 Juillet, était son ultimatum, et que cette proposition refusée, il n'en serait plus d'autre. Il a bien fallu passer outre, et ne pas laisser périr l'Empire Ottoman par de trop longues hésitations. Les Quatre Cours ne sauraient être accusées d'avoir voulu offenser la France en cette occasion.

D'ailleurs, en agissant ainsi, les Quatre Cabinets se rappelaient que la France avait, au mois de Septembre 1839, par l'organe de son Ambassadeur à Londres, proposé un plan d'arrangement fondé, à peu de choses près, sur les mêmes bases que le Traité du 15 Juillet, que plus tard, en combattant le projet présenté par l'Angleterre, elle avait reconnu que, sauf la difficulté et le danger des moyens d'exécution, il serait incontestablement préalable à tout autre qu'enfin, en toute occasion, elle avait manifesté l'intention de ne mettre aucun obstacle à ces moyens d'exécution. Ils devaient donc penser que si, pour des considérations particulières, elle refusait de se joindre à eux pour contraindre Méhémet Ali par la force, elle ne mettrait du moins aucun obstacle à leurs efforts, pour arriver à les soumettre par l'emploi de son influence morale à Alexandrie. Les Quatre Cabinets espèrent encore que, lorsque le Traité du 15 Juillet aura reçu son accomplissement, la France se joindra de nouveau à eux pour assurer d'une manière définitive le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman.

Telle est, si je ne me trompe, l'analyse exacte et rigoureuse de l'exposé que Lord Palmerston et les Quatre Cours en général ne cessent de faire des négociations auxquelles a donné lieu la Question Turco-Egyptienne.

D'après cet exposé, la France aurait été inconsciente.

Elle aurait voulu, et ne voudrait plus, l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman.

Les Quatre Cours auraient fait des sacrifices répétés à ses vues;

Elles auraient fini par lui présenter un ultimatum fondé sur une ancienne proposition de son propre Ambassadeur;

Elles n'auraient passé outre qu'après cet ultimatum refusé;

Elles auraient droit d'être surprises de la manière dont la France a accueilli le Traité du 15 Juillet, car, d'après ses propres déclarations, on aurait dû s'attendre qu'elle donnerait à ce Traité plus qu'une adhésion passive, et au moins son influence morale.

Le récit exact des faits répondra complètement à cette manière de présenter les négociations.

Lorsque la Porte, mal conseillée, renouvela ses hostilités contre le Vice-Roi, et perdit à la fois son armée de terre et sa flotte, lorsqu'à toutes ces pertes se joignit la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, quelle fut la crainte de l'Angleterre et de la France, alors toutes les deux parfaitement unies? Leur crainte fut de voir Ibrahim, victorieux, franchir le Taurus, menacer Constantinople, et amener à l'instant même les Russes dans la Capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Tout ce qu'il y a en Europe d'esprits éclairés s'associa à cette inquiétude.

Quelles furent à ce sujet les propositions de Lord Palmerston? Une première fois, en son nom personnel, une seconde fois, au nom de son Cabinet, il proposa à la France de réunir deux flottes, l'une Anglaise, l'autre Française, de les diriger vers les côtes de la Syrie, d'adresser une sommation aux deux parties belligérantes afin de les obliger à suspendre les hostilités, d'appuyer cette sommation par les moyens maritimes; puis, de réunir les deux flottes, et de passer à la Porte, entre les Dardanelles et le Bosphore, ce célèbre passage, si la lutte entre le Pacha et le Sultan avait amené les Russes à Constantinople.

Ce que l'Angleterre, et, avec elle, tous les politiques prévoyans, entendaient alors par l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, c'était donc de le préserver de la protection exclusive des armées Russes, et, pour prévenir le cas de cette protection, d'empêcher le Vice-Roi de marcher sur Constantinople.

La France entra pleinement dans cette pensée. Elle employa son influence auprès de Méhémet Ali et de son fils pour arrêter l'Armée Egyptienne victorieuse; elle y réussit, et, pour parer au danger plus sérieux de voir les armées Russes à Constantinople, elle pensa qu'avant de forcer les Dardanelles, il convenait de demander à la Porte son consentement à l'entrée des deux flottes, dans le cas où un corps de troupes Russes aurait franchi le Bosphore.

L'Angleterre accéda à ces propositions, et les deux Cabinets furent parfaitement d'accord. Les mots d'indépendance et d'intégrité de l'Empire

Ottoman ne signifiaient pas alors on ne saurait trop le faire remarquer qu'on enlevait à M. Fomet Au. telle ou telle partie des territoires qu'il occupait mais qu'on l'empêcherait de marcher sur la Capitale de l'Empire, et d'assurer par la présence des soldats Egyptiens la présence des soldats Russes.

Le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique, s'entretenant à ce sujet avec M. de Bourqueney, le 25 Mai et le 30 Juin, reconnaissant qu'il y avait en France et en Angleterre une opinion en faveur de la famille Egyptienne; qu'en France cette opinion était beaucoup plus générale; que, par suite, le Gouvernement Français devait être beaucoup plus favorable que le Gouvernement Anglais à Méhémet Ali, que c'était là sans doute une difficulté de la situation, mais que c'était une considération secondaire; qu'une considération supérieure devait dominer toutes les autres: c'était le besoin de sauver l'Empire Ottoman d'une protection exclusive, et tôt ou tard mortelle pour lui, si la France et l'Angleterre ne s'entendaient pas.

La France poursuivait ces vues. Sa politique tendait consciemment à un double but, celui d'arrêter le Vice-Roi, lorsque, de vassal puissant mais soumis, il passerait au rôle de vassal insoumis et menaçant le trône de son Maître, et de substituer, à la protection exclusive d'une Puissance, celle des Cinq Puissances prépondérantes en Europe.

C'est dans ces vues qu'elle signa en commun la Note du 27 Juillet, Note tendant à placer la protection des Cinq Cours entre le Sultan vaincu et le Pacha victorieux; c'est dans ce sens qu'elle adressa, le 17 Juillet, une circulaire à tous les Gouvernements pour provoquer un concours à respecter le respect pour l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est dans ces vues qu'elle proposa la première d'associer l'Autriche, la Prusse, et la Russie elle-même, à toutes les résolutions relatives à la Question Turco-Egyptienne.

Lord Palmerston ne rappellera sans doute qu'il était moins disposé que la France à provoquer un concours général des Cinq Puissances; et le Cabinet Français ne peut que se souvenir avec un vif regret, en comparant le temps d'après au temps d'aujourd'hui, que c'était sur la France surtout que le Cabinet Anglais croyait pouvoir compter pour assurer le salut de l'Empire Turc.

Personne n'était disposé à croire alors que l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman consistât dans la limite qui séparerait en Syrie les possessions du Sultan et du Vice-Roi. Tout le monde la faisait consister dans un double fait: empêcher Ibrahim de menacer la Capitale, et dispenser les Russes de la secourir. La France partageait, avec tous les Cabinets, cette croyance à laquelle elle est restée fidèle.

L'Autriche et la Prusse adhèrent aux vues de la France et de l'Angleterre. La Cour de Russie refusa de prendre part aux conférences qui devaient se tenir à Vienne dans le but de généraliser le protectorat Européen à l'égard du Sultan. Elle approuvait peu l'empressement des Puissances d'Occident à se mêler de la Question Orientale. "L'Empereur", disait M. de Nevelof, dans une dépêche écrite le 6 Août, 1839, à M. de Méder, et communiquée officiellement au Gouvernement Français, "l'Empereur ne désespère nullement du salut de la Porte, pourvu que les Puissances de l'Europe sachent respecter son repos, et que, par une agitation intempestive, elles ne finissent par l'ébranler, tout en voulant le raffermir". La Cour de Russie jugeait donc peu convenable de s'interposer entre le Sultan et le Pacha, croyant qu'il suffisait d'empêcher le Vice-Roi de menacer Constantinople, et semblait regarder un arrangement direct comme la ressource la plus convenable à cette situation. "Du reste," disait encore M. de Nevelof à l'Ambassadeur de France, au commencement d'Août, 1839, "un peu plus, un peu moins de Syrie, donné ou ôté au Pacha, nous touche peu. Notre seule condition, c'est que la Porte soit libre dans le consentement qu'elle donnera."

A cette époque donc, les Quatre Cours, depuis Signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet, les Quatre Cours n'étaient pas, comme on voudrait le faire croire aujourd'hui, unies de vues, en présence de la France seule dissidente, et empêchant tout accord par ses refus perpétuels.

Le danger n'était soigné depuis qu'Ibrahim avait suspendu sa marche victorieuse. Les deux parties belligérantes étaient en présence: le Pacha tout puissant, le Sultan vaincu et sans ressources; mais immobiles tous les deux, grâce à l'intervention de la France. Le Cabinet Britannique proposa d'arracher la flotte Turque des mains de Méhémet Ali. La France s'y refusa, craignant de provoquer de nouvelles hostilités. Alors commença le fâcheux dissentiment

qui a séparé la France de l'Angleterre, et qu'il faut à jamais regretter, dans l'intérêt de la paix et de la civilisation du monde.

Les mauvaises dispositions du Cabinet Britannique contre le Vice-Roi d'Egypte éclatèrent avec beaucoup de vivacité. La France chercha à les tempérer. Le Cabinet Britannique sur les représentations de la France, appréciant le danger d'un acte de vive force tendant à recouvrer la flotte Turque par des moyens violents, cette proposition a été point de suite.

Il était devenu nécessaire de s'expliquer enfin pour savoir de quelle manière se viderait la question territoriale entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi. Les sentiments entre les vues de la France et de l'Angleterre étaient, plus vivement. Lord Palmerston déclara, qu'à ses yeux le Vice-Roi, avant de recevoir l'Egypte héréditairement, nous que pour nous le vice-heréditaire, il devait abandonner immédiatement les Villes Saintes, le district d'Adana, et la Syrie tout entière. Toutefois il modifia un peu ses premières vues, et consentit à nous laisser la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte, la possession héréditaire aussi du Pachalik d'Acre moins la place d'Acre.

La France n'admit point ces propositions. Elle jugea que le Vice-Roi, vainqueur du Sultan à Nizb, sans avoir été l'agresseur, ayant de plus consenti à s'arrêter, quand il pouvait continuer sur l'Empire et renverser le trône du Sultan, méritait plus de ménagements. Elle pensa que, de la part des Puissances qui l'avaient engagé en 1833 à accepter les conditions de Kutahia, il y avait peu d'équité à lui proposer des conditions beaucoup plus rigoureuses, alors qu'il n'avait rien fait pour perdre le bénéfice de cette transaction. Elle crut qu'en lui laissant les Villes Saintes, le district d'Adana, position offensive et qui, restituée à la Porte, lui rendait toute sécurité, on devait lui assurer la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte et de la Syrie. La victoire de Nizb gagnée sans agression de sa part, avait pu se le lui voir reconnaître de ses possessions depuis le Nil jusqu'au Yarmouk. Mais en regard la victoire de Nizb pour non-avancer en lesant acheter à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité au prix d'une partie de ses possessions actuelles, d'Adana, et des Villes Saintes, posée à ne pas lui enlever plus que Candie, Adana, et les Villes Saintes. D'ailleurs la France demandait par quels moyens on s'entendait redonner à Méhémet Ali. Sans doute les Cabinets Européens étaient forts contre lui, lorsqu'il voulait menacer Constantinople, dans ces cas les flottes anglaise, française, et russe, et pour l'arrêter. Mais pour lui ôter la Syrie, quels moyens avait-on? Des moyens peu efficaces contre un blous, peu les flottes, comme des provocations à l'insurrection; très-dangereux, très-contraires au but proposé, comme une armée russe! La France proposa donc, en Septembre, 1839, d'adjuger au Vice-Roi l'hérédité de l'Egypte et l'hérédité de la Syrie. Jamais à aucune époque de la négociation la France n'a proposé autre chose, excepté dans ces derniers temps, lorsqu'elle a conseillé au Vice-Roi de se contenter de la possession viagère de la Syrie. La question des limites actuelles de son administration, et je n'y ai vu nulle part que le Général Sébastiani ait été autorisé à proposer à Constantinople, ou dans le Traité du 15 Juillet, ou quel autre point, nement pris sur lui de la proposer. Je lui ai demandé à lui-même quels étaient ses souvenirs à cet égard, et l'a affirmé qu'il n'avait fait aucune proposition de ce genre. La France donc proposa en 1839 l'attribution au Vice-Roi de l'hérédité de l'Egypte et de l'hérédité de la Syrie. Elle fut malheureusement en dissentiment complet avec l'Angleterre.

Ce dissentiment a jamais regrettable, fut l'entente conclue à l'Entente entière. Tout a soup, et c'est par cet entente a le vider les divergences qui avaient séparé les Quatre Cours, et amena entre elles un subit accord.

L'Autriche qui d'abord avait donné une pleine adhésion à nos propositions, qui s'était portée de tout son poids à leur appui, et qui, sous l'impulsion de cette notification que pour nous donner le temps de nous mettre d'accord avec l'Angleterre, l'Autriche commença à dire, qu'entre la France et l'Angleterre, elle se prononcerait pour celle des Deux Cours qui accorderait la plus grande étendue de territoire au Sultan. Il est vrai qu'alors elle protestait encore contre la pensée de recourir à des moyens coercitifs, dont elle était la première à proscrire l'usage. Mais le 15 Septembre, 1839, le Comte d'Acton, La Russie envoya à Londres, M. de Brunnow, en Septembre, 1839, pour faire ses propositions. La Russie, qui naguère repoussait comme peu convenable l'idée d'une intervention Européenne entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi, et ne semblait voir de ressource que dans un arrangement direct, la Russie adhérait maintenant à











prevails amongst the influential persons about the Emperor; and M. Titow appears clearly to have understood the feelings of his Government in drawing up the Memorandum which he delivered to the Representatives of the Four Powers. Nevertheless, the decision having been taken, the Russian Government will not flinch from acting up to it: on the contrary, the language of those persons with whom I have spoken, is unanimous in its desire that no difference of opinion should appear to exist on this or on any other occasion; and they are resolved to follow implicitly the plans that will be proposed by Her Majesty's Government for any future operations.

Count Nesselrode told me that the squadron,—nine sail of the line and six frigates,—is ready for active service: that all the preparations in the Black Sea were made, and that they were only waiting for the moment to arrive when they can give proof of their readiness to co-operate efficiently for the fulfilment of all the engagements which they had contracted.

I have, &c.,

Signé J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

#### No. 247

Baron Schlenitz to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)

3, Lower Berkeley Street, October 9, 1840.

LE Soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la Note en date d'hier par laquelle son Excellence Monsieur le Viscount Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, en se référant à une conférence qui a eu lieu entre son Excellence et les Barons de Neumann, de Brunnow, et le Soussigné, a eu la bonté de transmettre au Soussigné un Mémoire communiqué par M. le Prince de Metternich à M. le Viscount Palmerston sous la date du 31 Août dernier, et où se trouve consignée la ligne de conduite que d'après l'opinion entretenue à ladite époque par M. le Prince Chancelier, le Cabinet des Tudesques devrait adopter par rapport à la Question Turco-Egyptienne dans l'état des choses alors existant.

En même temps, M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, en prévenant le Soussigné que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique est d'avis qu'il serait utile de proposer ou de suggérer de la part des Quatre Puissances au Gouvernement Français, une ligne de conduite telle qu'elle a été tracée dans le dit Mémoire, a bien voulu exprimer le désir d'être informé si le Soussigné est prêt et autorisé à concourir dans une démarche à faire dans ce sens auprès du Gouvernement Français?

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de déclarer comme il l'a déjà fait verbalement dans la Conférence susmentionnée, que la proposition dont il s'agit n'étant pas prévue par ses instructions, il ne saurait qu'en référer à sa Cour et attendre les ordres dont Sa Majesté le Roi jugera à propos de le faire munir sur cet objet.

En conséquence, le Soussigné s'est empressé de porter le contenu de la Note de M. le Viscount Palmerston à la connaissance de son Gouvernement, et il ne manquera pas de faire part en son temps, à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, de la décision que le Cabinet du Roi son auguste Maître se sera arrêté à cet égard.

Le Soussigné a, &c.,

(Signé) SCHLEINITZ.

#### No. 248

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 13.)

Londres, ce 12 Octobre, 1840.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, en réponse à la Note que son Excellence Monsieur le Viscount Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires Etrangères, a bien voulu lui adresser sous la date du 8 Octobre, croit devoir consigner par écrit les motifs qu'il a déjà eu l'honneur de lui exposer de vive voix, et qui ne lui ont point permis de se joindre à la démarche à laquelle la Note susmentionnée se réfère.

Le Soussigné n'est pas cru autorisé à concourir à cette démarche, parce qu'il n'a pas dépassé ses pouvoirs en s'adressant à un Gouvernement auprès duquel il n'est point accrédité, et en traitant avec lui explicitement sur l'objet d'une transaction à laquelle ce Gouvernement est resté étranger.

De plus, sous des justes égards qu'il doit au Cabinet des Tudesques, le Soussigné ne se serait pas cru en droit de lui suggérer de proclamer son adhésion au but de la Convention du 4 Juillet, au moment où cette transaction rencontre en France une opposition, non motivée sans doute, mais de jour en jour plus forte et plus prononcée.

Il craint en outre de se mettre en contradiction ouverte avec la doctrine des faits, s'il proposait aujourd'hui au Gouvernement Français de faire allusion à l'inefficacité des mesures coercitives et s'il choisissait pour cela précisément le moment où ces mesures ont déjà produit en Syrie un résultat positif, et où le Sultan, à l'aide de ses Alliés, redouble d'efforts pour donner à ces moyens d'action toute l'efficacité nécessaire.

Le Soussigné aurait cru manquer enfin à ses propres convictions, s'il avait suggéré au Gouvernement Français d'admettre la possibilité qu'il résultât de l'emploi de ces moyens un danger quelconque pour l'Empire Ottoman, tandis que le Sultan lui-même invoque et réclame avec instance l'exécution de ces mesures, qu'il regarde comme le moyen le plus sûr pour rétablir le repos de son Empire et pour assurer son indépendance.

Telles sont les considérations qui n'ont point permis au Soussigné de se joindre à la démarche proposée.

Déférant néanmoins aux désirs que son Excellence M. le Viscount Palmerston a bien voulu lui témoigner dans la réunion du 3 Octobre, le Soussigné s'est empressé de porter à la connaissance du Cabinet Impérial l'objet de la communication à laquelle la Note du 8 Octobre se réfère, en sollicitant à cet égard les ordres de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Le Soussigné a, &c.,

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

#### No. 249

Baron Neumann to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 13.)

Londres, le 12 Octobre, 1840

My Lord,

J'ai reçu la Note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser hier par laquelle elle me dit relativement à ce qui a été convenu entre vous, my Lord, le Baron de Brunnow, le Baron de Schlenitz, et moi, le 3 de ce mois, par rapport à une démarche commune à faire auprès du Gouvernement Français, laquelle serait basée sur un Mémoire communiqué par le Prince de Metternich vous a envoyé le 31 Août, de Königswart, renfermant l'exposé d'une opinion émise à cette époque par son Altesse concernant l'attitude qu'il serait désirable que le Gouvernement Français adoptât à l'égard de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, dans l'état présent des affaires, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique pense qu'il serait utile que les Quatre Puissances proposassent ou suggérassent au Gouvernement Français la marche tracée dans le dit Mémoire, et



me demande si je suis autorisé de la part de mon Gouvernement à concourir avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique et mes Collègues à faire une pareille suggestion au Gouvernement Français?

Dans l'entrevue que nous eûmes chez votre Excellence le 3 de ce mois, et où nous examinâmes l'opportunité d'une pareille démarche, basée sur le Mémoire du 10<sup>me</sup> sur l'Altesse M<sup>le</sup> le Prince de Metternich, nous déclarâmes, que, tout en reconnaissant son utilité, nous ne pouvions nous y associer sans l'avoir préalablement soumise à l'approbation de nos Cours respectives; et pour mieux préciser les vœux du Cabinet Britannique relativement à cette démarche, nous vous priâmes, my Lord, de vouloir bien nous remettre un Mémoire qui les renfermerait.

J'ai déjà informé ma Cour de l'objet de notre conférence du 3 de ce mois, et je m'empresse à lui transmettre la Note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser à cet effet.

Je vous prie,  
Veuillez, &c.  
Signé NEUMANN

No. 250.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

No. 190.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 13, 1840.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency the "London Gazette" of this day, announcing that your Excellency had received from the Porte a notification of the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria.

I have at the same time to instruct your Excellency to impress upon the Porte the necessity of maintaining the blockade in question by an adequate force.

With reference, however, to your Excellency's letter to Sir Robert Stophord of the 17th of September, inclosed in your despatch No. 211, stating that you and the Internuncios had consented to the demand of the Porte for the aid of the British and Austrian naval forces in carrying the blockade into execution, I have to call your Excellency's attention to my despatch to Earl Granville, No. 242, of the 14th of August of which a copy was transmitted to you on the same day, in which you will perceive it stated, that "as a commercial blockade is a purely belligerent right, the Four Powers cannot exercise that right of blockade against Mehemet Ali."

Upon the receipt, therefore, of your Excellency's first despatches respecting this blockade, I addressed a letter to the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, in which a copy inclosed, requesting that Sir Robert Stophord might be reminded that Her Majesty's ships of war cannot enforce the commercial blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, nor interfere with or turn back merchant vessels of any country except those of Turkey and Egypt, which may wish to enter, or depart from, Turkish or Egyptian ports.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 251

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received October 15.)*

No. 277.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 12, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 256 inclusive.

I had an interview with M. Thiers this morning. I learnt from him that he had on Thursday last sent to M. Guizot the despatch, of which I forwarded to your Lordship a copy by a messenger on Friday morning,

and that M. Guizot had communicated it to you the day before yesterday, making a slight alteration in that paragraph of it which related to your Lordship's view of the deposition of Mehemet Ali. On my inquiring from him whether you had made any observation on the despatch, he answered that the letter he had received from M. Guizot was quite insignificant ("insignifiante").

M. Thiers did not advert to the objections which the French Government would oppose to the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Egypt, and I therefore did not feel myself called upon to avail myself of arguments on that topic contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 252. I gave him, however, to understand, that the rumours which had prevailed at the beginning of last week, of the intention of the French Government to make a declaration of a *casus belli*, had not escaped your attention; but as they had proved unfounded, it was unnecessary for me to state to him any observations which you had written to me thereupon.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 252

*Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode.*

M. le Comte,

Londres, le 14 Octobre, 1840.

DEPUIS ma dernière expédition, M. Guizot a reçu l'ordre d'adresser au Cabinet Anglais une communication relative à la destitution de Méhémet Ali.

Par cette pièce le Ministère Français, sans se prononcer contre la Convention du 17 Juillet en tant qu'elle concerne la Syrie, expose les raisons qui le décident à regarder une attaque dirigée contre l'Egypte, comme une mesure dangereuse pour la conservation de la paix générale, ainsi que pour le maintien de l'équilibre européen.

Les considérations que M. Thiers développe à l'appui de cette thèse, sont inadmissibles de fait et de principe; car elles ne tendent à rien moins qu'à contester à la Porte la faculté de déposer un Pacha rebelle.

Le Cabinet Anglais repousse cette communication par une dépêche que Lord Palmerston adressera à Lord Granville. Elle aura pour objet de soutenir les droits en vertu desquels le Sultan est libre de retirer l'administration du Pacha d'Egypte des mains de Méhémet Ali, et récusera toute prétention qu'une Puissance tierce pourrait élever contre une semblable disposition, inhérente aux droits de souveraineté et d'indépendance de la Porte.

Si cette réponse est conçue dans le sens que Lord Palmerston nous a indiqué ce matin, elle sera forte de raisonnement, et réfutera d'une manière victorieuse les assertions perfides ainsi que les injustes prétentions de la France.

Pendant, tout en se prononçant ainsi en faveur du droit incontestable sur lequel se fonde la déchéance de Méhémet Ali, le Gouvernement Anglais ne s'est point dissimulé les difficultés que le Sultan aura à vaincre pour mettre ce puissant vassal hors de possession de l'Egypte.

Ces difficultés ont paru si graves aux yeux du Cabinet de Londres, que Lord Palmerston a envisagé la destitution de Méhémet Ali non comme une mesure exécutable en pratique, mais uniquement comme un moyen combinatoire destiné à agir sur le Sultan, et à l'engager à souscrire l'arrangement territorial qui résulte de notre Convention.

C'est dans ce sens que le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat s'était déjà expliqué envers Lord Granville sous la date du 2 de ce mois, ainsi que votre Excellence l'aura observé par la lecture de mon Rapport No. 2.

Dans l'espoir que cette manière d'envisager et d'interpréter la destitution de Méhémet Ali peut conduire à une solution satisfaisante de la crise actuelle, le Cabinet Britannique chargera Lord Ponsonby d'émettre cette opinion envers la Porte et de lui suggérer d'ouvrir à Méhémet Ali la voie du repentir, en lui faisant entrevoir la perspective de conserver la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte, pourvu qu'il se résigne sur le champ à abandonner la Syrie toute entière y compris St. Jean d'Acre, Candie, les Villes Saintes, et à restituer en même temps la B. de l'Ottomane.

Néanmoins, Lord Ponsonby recevra l'injonction de n'adresser ces conseils à la Porte que lorsque les autres Représentants Aliés auront été munis d'instructions analogues de la part de leurs Cours.

Lord Granville sera instruit de la teneur des directions que recevra Lord Ponsonby. Il sera aussi mis à même de prévenir le Cabinet Français des moyens dont Méhémet Ali dispose encore pour obtenir du Sultan des conditions équitables. Mais Lord Granville ne sera point chargé de réclamer à cet effet l'appui de la France, afin de ne point mettre celle-ci dans le cas d'attacher des conditions à son appui, ni de marchandier sur les termes de l'arrangement territorial tel qu'il a été défini par notre Convention, notamment, par le § 2 de l'Acte Séparé.

L'ensemble des déterminations que je viens de résumer ici, est le résultat d'un Conseil de Cabinet tenu avant hier, ainsi que de deux entretiens que Lord Palmerston a eu avec ses collègues d'Autriche, de Prusse, et moi, dans les journées d'hier et d'aujourd'hui.

Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat va s'occuper de la réaction des ordres à transmettre en conséquence aux Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre à Constantinople et à Paris.

Si la teneur de ces instructions répond entièrement aux idées que nous avons échangées ce soir et matin, j'ose espérer que l'on rencontrera l'assentiment et le suffrage du Cabinet Impérial.

Pour ma part, M. le Comte, je me suis fait un devoir de régler ma conduite et mon langage de manière à ne préjuger en rien les déterminations de notre Auguste Maître. D'après cela, je n'ai pas voulu prendre sur moi d'écrire d'ici à notre Ambassadeur à Paris, ni à notre Charge d'Affaires à Constantinople, attendu que je ne me crois nullement autorisé à prendre envers eux l'initiative sur des questions d'une si grande importance, dont l'Empereur est seul le maître de décider. Mon devoir consistant uniquement à employer tous mes efforts auprès du Cabinet Britannique, afin que ses déterminations fussent de nature à s'accorder autant que possible avec les principes et les intentions bienveillantes de notre Auguste Maître.

Je me féliciterais vivement si ce but pouvait être atteint par les instructions que l'Etat d'Israël et l'Etat d'Israël ont reçues.

Dès qu'elles m'auront été communiquées, je les soumettrai à votre Excellence pour qu'elle y veuille alors de rendre compte au Cabinet Impérial, avec plus de détails, d'une délibération dont je veux de résumer sommairement ici la substance.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 253

*Viscount Pourandy to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received October 16)

No. 215.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 22, 1840.

[illegible]

I will only add here, that a limited ~~use~~ of Syraw fact have a hundredth part of the effect of a real efficient blockade; for it will leave

in Mehmet Ali's power the means of supplying his partisans with money and other things, which ships cannot be prevented from conveying, and it will leave in Mehmet's power the means of converting all his cotton and other goods into money, &c. It is to be remembered that Mehmet is, in fact, a merchant trading upon an immense scale. He is, himself, the monopolizer of the whole trade of Egypt, and his funds are chiefly drawn from the profits of his trading, all of which can be carried on in foreign nations, to the vast detriment of the Sultan's cause. An instance of the inefficiency of a partial blockade is found in another material point and shown by the following fact. A vessel, under Tuscan colours, sailed into Alexandria under the guns of British ships of war and brought 40 Druse prisoners, who had been active in the insurrection and who were thrown into dungeons, or sent into Soudan by Mehmet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

No. 254.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received October 16.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

Tacoma, September 28, 1840

My Lord,  
 LIEUTENANT LYNCH, who commands the steamer on the Euphrates, arrived here the other day on his way to London; and knowing him to be particularly well informed of all Arabian matters, I asked him the number of troops employed by Mehemet Ali in that country, in order to clear up the strong doubts I had as to the amount of force stated to be obtained by the recall of Kourachid Pasha to Egypt. I inclose the statement made by Lieutenant Lynch in writing. Your Lordship will recollect that the accounts from Egypt, of the military power of the Pasha, rated the Arabian army at many thousands, some saying 10,000, others even more, and none making it less than seven. Lieutenant Lynch's account is indubitably correct, for he took pains to enter on the spot, and had the best means to do so. It is also corroborated by Mr. Alison's report, that he could never learn whilst in Egypt that more than a few hundred men of the Arabian army had actually reached Cairo. I suspect it will be found that Mehemet Ali's vaunted army in Egypt is really most contemptible.

I remain without any sort of intelligence from Syria, which is very distressing to me, and cannot but be disadvantageous to the service. I am sure Mr. Wood would not neglect to write if any body would furnish him the means of sending me his letters.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY.

Inlosure in No. 254

Memorandum by Lieutenant Lynch

Constantinople, September 20, 1840.

THE force under Kourschid Pasha in central Arabia, lately withdrawn to Cairo, or on its way to that city, had been latterly not above 2,500 men of all arms, regular and irregular. A large portion of this force has been dispersed, and the remainder among the regular infantry which it contained. I am quite sure that 1,000 effective men (regulars) cannot have been obtained from it at Cairo.

(Signed) H. BLOSSE LYNCH.



No. 255

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)*

No. 217)

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 23, 1840.*

I INCLOSE copy of the communication made by the Sublime Porte on the subject of the blockade, and which will be officially sent to-morrow to the Foreign Mission. I received it from Rechid Pasha certified, so that your Lordship may consider it as official. I will, however, send the more formal document by the messenger.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure in No. 255

*Notification of the Blockade by the Sublime Porte.*

LA Sublime Porte ayant été informée du désir qui a été manifesté de connaître avec précision, et de manière à éviter toute contestation, le jour où devra commencer le blocus des ports et des côtes de l'Égypte et de la Syrie, conformément à sa notification du 18 du présent mois de Rejeb (14 Septembre), fait savoir ici qu'on fixe l'époque de la mise en vigueur de ce blocus au 18 du prochain mois de Chaban (13 Octobre), c'est-à-dire, à un mois de terme à partir de la date de la précédente notification.

No. 256.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)*

(No. 219.)

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 26, 1840.*

YESTERDAY I received a letter from Mr. Wood, dated 30th August, and I sent to Rechid Pasha early this morning extracts from it, by M. Etienne Pisani, with instructions what to say to the Pasha. I have the honour to inclose M. Pisani's report to me, and am very happy that I have this additional proof to lay before your Lordship of the zeal and ability with which that gentleman performs his duty, and the success that crowns his exertions.

Your Lordship will see that Rechid Pasha has approved of everything I proposed to him. I hope your Lordship will approve of the nomination I ventured to make of Mr. Wood, to be Vice-Consul at Beyrout. Of course it is done only to meet the exigency of the moment.

I beg leave to inclose copy of my letter to Mr. Consul Moore.

Inclosure 1 in No. 256.

*M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby*

My Lord,

*Therapia, le 26 Septembre, 1840.*

CONFORMEMENT à vos instructions, je me suis rendu ce matin chez Rechid Pacha pour lui présenter la lettre de Mr. Wood, et l'engager à accélérer l'envoi des troupes en Syrie, et à faire partir Ibrahim Bey, un moment plus tôt, pour décider les Albanais à se ranger sous le drapeau de leur Souverain légitime.

J'ai prouvé à son Excellence que tout ce qu'on promettrait à Ibrahim

Bey pour l'engager à effectuer ce dont il s'agit, ne serait jamais aussi dispensable que de s'engager dans une guerre. Son Excellence m'a chargé de vous dire, my Lord, qu'il a eu une entrevue, il y a quelques jours, avec le Chef des Albanais à ce sujet, et que ce n'est parfaitement soumis à la volonté de la Porte; que déjà il a eu une somme d'argent assez considérable que la Porte lui a avancée, et qu'il se prépare à partir sous peu pour réaliser ses promesses. Quant aux troupes, m'a dit son Excellence on est après à s'occuper de leur expédition, et le Pacha se flatte qu'elles pourront partir incessamment.

Le Pacha a parfaitement approuvé tout ce qui a été fait par Mr. Wood, jusqu'ici, et il promet de réaliser les promesses faites à Hassan Pacha et aux officiers Égyptiens. J'ai saisi cette occasion pour observer à Rechid Pacha, que c'était réellement dommage que Mr. Wood, n'ayant pas de caractère officiel, on ne voulait pas lui montrer cette confiance si nécessaire dans les circonstances actuelles. Aussi, ai-je ajouté, pour lui donner plus de poids, my Lord vient de le nommer Vice-Consul à Beyrout, et je suis chargé de demander à la Porte le firman de son installation; que je croyais que si la Porte voulait envoyer une lettre officielle à Mr. Wood, par laquelle elle le nommerait son Agent temporaire pour agir le cas échéant, il est certain qu'on mettrait plus de confiance en ses promesses, et son autorité serait incontestable; ce qui maintenant ne l'est pas, et conséquemment sa position devient incertaine.

Le Pacha ayant été parfaitement de mon avis, m'a prié de lui donner un mémorandum de ce que je venais de lui observer, et un extrait des principaux points de la lettre de Mr. Wood, pour être communiqué aux Ministres de la Sublime Porte. J'ai cru devoir composer au Pacha, le du Pacha, malgré que je n'en avais pas l'autorisation. Le Pacha m'a promis qu'il allait incessamment s'occuper de la rédaction du firman Vice-Consulaire ainsi que de la lettre pour Mr. Wood.

J'ai dit au Pacha et je prendrai la liberté de lui écrire à même objet à votre Excellence, que je suis tout à fait convaincu que le Pacha qui veut être agréé par la Porte sera tenu de lui rendre compte de l'usage de son Trésor. D'abord, la disette des Cocons, le coton, etc., de l'Arabie Égyptienne, est l'effet produit par l'argent; et en second lieu la Porte se trouve en fonds, ce qui n'est pas le cas dans le moment actuel, pourrait donner l'argent au Pacha d'Égypte à se ranger sous l'autorité du Sultan, sans compensation, car cela n'est que d'un grand réconfortement tant parmi les chefs que les soldats, car se des arrangements, et ils sont las de servir sous un chef qui les maltraite et qui ne les paye pas.

Le Pacha m'a annoncé que les contrats de l'emprunt vont être signés et échangés ce soir, et son Excellence se flatte qu'il n'y aura pas de difficulté à Londres, pour leur ratification.

J'ai l'honneur &c.,  
(Signed) **ET. PISANI**

Inclosure 2 in No. 256

*Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Consul Moore.*

Sir,

*Therapia, September 25, 1840.*

I HAVE to instruct you to appoint Richard Wood, Esq., Vice-Consul for your Consular district; I inclose a firman from the Sublime Porte, authorizing him to enjoy the privileges and perform the duties of that post. And I have further to request and enjoin you to notify his appointment to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's squadron, and to Colonel Sir Charles Smith.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)*

No. 220.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 27, 1840.*

THE *Phoenix* arrived here yesterday about 4 o'clock, and brought me despatches from the Admiral and letters from General Jochmus, Captain Walker and Mr. Wood, copies of which I have the honour to inclose.

I immediately sent Mr. Alison with instructions to propose certain measures to Rechid Pasha; and your Lordship will see in that gentleman's report, which I enclose, that the measures I proposed have been all adopted by the Ministers, and are ordered to be carried into execution.

Money will be sent provisions and ammunition, &c., &c. There are three steamers, and the Ottoman Government hopes to have a fourth hired from the Austrian Company, and all will be despatched about the 30th inst. with 3,000 men. The *Sen Pervaz* steamer will also be employed, as she returned this day, in carrying men.

Tahir Bey, one of the Turks who was exhibited at Wexham, and the other Anglo-Turks who can be got, will be attached to General Jochmus, whom the Porte has appointed Chef d'Etat-Major to Izzet Pasha, and given him authority to direct the motions of that Chief.

Hadir Bey, the Albanian who was employed by Mehmet Ali to recruit for his army, and sent, I hear, by Sir Howard Douglas, has taken service with the Porte, and goes to Syria in the *Phoenix*, and being a man of great power amongst his countrymen, he will bring over the Albanians, it is believed, in numbers, to the Sultan's standard.

The Porte has also agreed to ratify all the terms granted by our Agents in Syria to the officers and men who will return to their duty and join the Sultan.

The steamer "*Phoenix*" brought Sir Charles Smith, who has been extremely ill. I have not yet seen him, but I am happy to say he is much better than he was. The "*Phoenix*" is forced to stay here till the 30th, or till the 1st October, on account of the derangement of the machinery.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 257

*Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(Private)

*Turkish Camp.*

My Lord,

*Mount Lebanon, September 13, 1840.*

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 2nd, accompanying the Sultan's Firman to Emir Beehir El-Kasim, and a parcel containing an Arabic version of the Convention, to be distributed amongst the people, delivered to me by General Jochmus, who arrived on the 8th. On the 10th of September, a feigned demonstration was made of landing near Beyrut, when I drew out of the harbour of the town the Egyptian forces to the number of about 10,000 men, when a brisk fire of shells was opened upon them from the fleet, which was continued throughout the day. Notwithstanding I cannot state the precise number of men killed, but I estimate the loss at 500, as the deserters from the Egyptian Army will have it. It is, however, known, that many superior officers were killed. After this version, part of the fleet having on board the Turkish troops, sailed for Hama, where we landed without opposition, and possessed ourselves of the heights of Zouk Michael, extending our right flank four miles towards Beyrut, by which we possessed ourselves of the strong pass of the Dog River. On the following day a flag of truce was sent by the Admiral to

Solyman Pasha, to deliver up the town. His insolent reply provoked Sir R. Stopford and the Austrian Admiral to fire on the town. The castles were immediately destroyed, the fire from so many ships of the line, anchored close to the place, was terrific and I availed myself of the impression that it was calculated to produce in the mountaineers within view of it, to march up to Gazir with 200 Turks and 100 Marines, to the small town of Gazir on the first declivities of Lebanon where I resided formerly, to free the inhabitants from the presence of the troops of the Emir Beehir, whom I led as soon as I took possession of its outskirts. It was very gratifying to see the gratitude of the poor people who came to meet us. Nothing could keep them away. They accompanied and backed our ranks, offering prayers to the Almighty for our success. The enthusiasm which they evinced induced me at once to arm them and send them after the Emir's troops, whom they dispersed in an hour or two. The small force I had with me rendered it imprudent for me to penetrate farther into the mountains, and the next morning I returned, after having perfectly succeeded in creating a great sensation, and opening the road for the mountaineers to come to the camp, to receive their arms, which they have done in great numbers from the province of Kesrowan. The Sultan's Gazir took some troops on the following day, and assembled the mountaineers and forced them to open the communication between the city and the villages. They have not as yet returned, a sign of the success they have met with, and the heavy opposition the Prince's troops are induced to offer to his advance.

Yesterday three ships of war and the Marines, and armed peasantry were sent to invest the small town of Deraul to the north of our position. This place has a garrison of Albanians; they were driven out of the town which they occupied immediately surrounding them at the same time in a manner to preclude the possibility of their escaping; we expect the garrison brought in hourly prisoners of war, with a large sum of money, which was sent from Aleppo to Ibrahim Pasha.

The Egyptians are but nominally in possession of Beyrut, that is, they possess it because we have not a sufficient number of troops to occupy it ourselves, and carry on our other operations at the same time along the coast of Syria, with a view to arm the mountaineers; but Captain Walker landed in the town yesterday, and hoisted the Sultan's flag, whilst the Austrians did the same at the lazaretto, and took 260 of the Turkish troops that went to Alexandria, and were transferred afterwards to this place. I hear, also, that the town is abandoned, and the troops are now behind it beyond the range of our guns. The fleet is now anchored at this moment. The position we occupy at present is very strong, and has been rendered doubly so by the throwing up works, and by two rows of entrenchment. I do not think it possible that the Egyptians can bring any against it, as the road through which they will have to pass to attack us, is very steep and rugged.

The Egyptians are within three hours of our advanced position, occupied by Ibrahim Pasha, and we naturally expect an engagement to-morrow. They were about 10,000 strong; but I feel confident that by landing 1,000 of our sailors to support the 1,500 of our Marines that are already on shore, we shall beat them back, should even the Turkish troops give way, which, from the spirit that reigns among them, I do not anticipate in the least. I never, my Lord, felt so much excitement before, and I believe every one is animated by the same spirit. It is a momentous time for us, and we are victorious in the first onset, Syria is ours, and Mehmet Ali is ruined.

I have been distributing as widely as possible the printed Arabic version of the Convention, which your Lordship sent me with other papers, which I have a pleasure in stating have had a wonderful effect.

The mountaineers come down freely to take their arms, and, indeed, I am obliged to send them away as fast as they come, so anxious are they to have them; but I do not consider it prudent to give them away indiscriminately without first establishing some regulations which will enable us to have a body of them (not less than 10,000) at our disposal, that is, forming part of our camp, since Selim Pasha and Captain



Walker have consented to provision them from the stores we captured, and which we have given up to them with the condition that the Porte will pay the proportion at the close of the war.

Selim Pasha does nothing without consulting others, and allows himself to be governed by their advice. His ignorance of the language, too, makes him more dependent on me, by which I have an opportunity of knowing all he does; and I am happy in being able to state that he displays great zeal in all that regards his duties,—a pleasing circumstance, inasmuch as it shows no inclination on his part to return to his old master, Mehmet Ali. The means which the Porte have furnished him with are not adequate to the object proposed. He complains of this, and begs your Lordship will suggest to the Porte the necessity of sending a few thousand more troops with provisions and money.

He cannot write himself, as he is busy watching the movements of the enemy, but requests the contents of the present letter may be communicated to his secretaries. I give them the assistance I can by writing to the Secretaries in his name by issuing proclamations, and by furnishing him with every kind of information regarding the enemy and his doings. I even visit him at the outposts with him, not merely to give him confidence and to interpret for the English officers. I do not think I shall be able to bear much longer the fatigue, but I have set so much my heart on this affair, that I cannot prevail upon myself to take any rest, lest something may require my assistance or presence. I cannot express to your Lordship the excitement that I feel, so much so that though I never sleep at least I have not done so for the last three nights, or take any regular meals, yet I do not expect any inconvenience, though I am told I have felt very much. We must wait before the French interfere and advise I am anxious to give Ibrahim Pasha sufficient occupation in Syria to prevent his advance, and therefore render superfluous the presence of any foreign force at Constantinople. There is not the slightest chance of Ibrahim's advancing on the present moment, if ever I will write in an official form as soon as I have time, when I will transmit some official documents throwing more light on the occurrences in Syria. In the mean time, I am sure your Lordship will excuse the scrawls of,

My Lord, &c.  
(Signed) RICHARD WOOD

P.S.—I have taken upon myself to send a special Tatar with the news of our last success, namely the capture of Beyrut, the fall of our forces, the raising of the siege, and the capture of the Citadel, and of which we have accomplished in three days, besides the destruction by shells of a great number of the Egyptian troops. I feel confident the news will give pleasure to your Lordship, to the Porte, and to Her Majesty's Government. The Porte may be induced to greater exertions, which I trust however will not make Lord Palmerston relax in his, for we have need of his Lordship's assistance and support. His Lordship may rest assured that with another sacrifice, such as an expedition of 3,000 British troops, we will fully accomplish the views of his Government before France decides whether she will support the Viceroy or not. It is worthy of consideration, for by its execution (the sending of British troops in Syria) Ibrahim Pasha will never have an opportunity of marching on the capital, and one of the Four Great Powers have occasion to protect it with troops.

The message your Lordship sent me with General Jochmus was very flattering, and more than I deserve; but your Lordship is pleased to view my feeble exertions with indulgence. I have authorized our Vice-Consul at Cyprus to draw on the Embassy for any money he may advance the Tatar, and apprise Mr Doyle of it, making known at the same time the arrangement he may enter into with the Tatar.

Inclosure 2 in No. 257.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

Her Majesty's Ship "Powerful,"  
Djounie Bay, September 16, 1840.

My Lord,

I AM this moment honoured with your Excellency's despatch of the 6th of September, inclosing a list of Pashas who have been appointed by the Sublime Porte to be Governors of the Provinces of Syria and I am to observe, that whatever communication I may have with the late Governor of the province in which I reside is to be such as I may have with a person who might be illegally a possessor of authority, the lawful Governor of my district being the Pasha appointed to that post by the Sublime Porte.

I am also directed to send a copy of your Lordship's letter to all the British Consuls with whom I can communicate, in order that they may consider it as an instruction to govern the conduct of all of them within their respective districts.

I beg to acquaint your Excellency with the arrival at Beyrut of Admiral Sir R. Stopford, and of the Turkish expedition under the command of Admiral Walker, on the 8th instant. I retired from Beyrut on the night of the 7th instant, and the bombardment of that town by the ships of Her Majesty's fleet commenced on the 9th.

The firing was kept up at intervals for three successive days, when the place was evacuated, and the Turkish flag hoisted on one of the batteries. According to information received from deserters, the effect of the fire on the town was tremendous. They state that about 1,000 men were killed by the shot and shells, whose bodies were left in the streets when the troops retired. The forts are destroyed, and considerable damage has been done to the town, which is not yet occupied by the Turkish forces. The Egyptian camp is close to the walls outside, and the town is commanded by eminences on every side.

Nothing can exceed the enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Lebanon in favour of the Sultan. The peasants daily flock to the camp to render aid for arms, and about 1,000 stand arms already were distributed amongst them. Yesterday the Emir Abdallah nephew of Emir Bechir, Governor of the Province of Hama, accompanied by two of his sons arrived at the Turkish camp at Djounie, a very strong position, about four hours from Beyrut, which is a most important place.

The Turkish troops have advanced to the village of Azzar, two hours distant up Lebanon, and whenever they appear, are received with open arms, the women even meeting them with water under their hands.

Notwithstanding the efforts made by the Egyptians to prevent the penetration from passing the camp, they still look in. The late Pasha with about 1,000 men took this morning four engines of heavy cannon. Batteries were opened to us.

I have just had accounts from Caiffa, that the Nablousians are waiting with the utmost impatience the arrival of arms, and let to occur only for the Sultan.

The Emir Bechir still remains apparently attached to the Egyptian cause, but to-day his decision is expected in reply to a final summons to return to his allegiance to the Sultan. I am not without hopes he will see the wisdom of complying therewith.

All communication with the interior is interrupted; and I have had no accounts from Damascus for the last eight days, when all was quiet. Public attention there was directed to this quarter; and little doubt can be entertained that the events which are now occurring in this neighbourhood will have the effect of raising that city in the Sultan's favour. Such I feel persuaded will also be the case at Aleppo and elsewhere.

I beg to offer my apologies to your Excellency for the extreme haste in which I write; I fear to be too late for this opportunity.

There is really nothing to desire as far as the feeling of the inhabit-

ants of Lebanon, indeed of Syria generally, is concerned, who are unanimously in favour of the Sultan.

The French are doing all they can to regain their lost influence in Lebanon, but without effect.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. MOORE.

**P. S.**—Commodore Napier, finding I am writing to your Lordship, begs me to say that on account of the extreme importance that more troops should be sent in this point, I beg to say that I entirely agree it is also that of all the military men here. Both the Turks and Egyptians did desert. Two days ago the whole host from the Bazarret, about sixty men, with two officers, with their arms and ammunition, came over, and several Turks have swam off to the ships.

Inclosure 3 in No. 257

Admiral Sir Robert Stephenson to Viscount Ponsonby

"Princess Charlotte," *Dynnie*.  
September 17, 1840.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letters of the 2nd and 6th instant, and have now to acquaint you that the expedition has thus far succeeded. The Turkish troops, 5,300 in number, and the whole Marines of the squadron (above 1,200,) having landed at this place on the 10th instant, under the direction of Commodore Napier, on a point previously selected by him and Lieutenant Aldrich of the Royal Engineers, supported by a part of the squadron; while the army under Solyman Pasha, which was in arms ready to oppose a landing at Beyrout, were kept in check by the fire opened upon them by the rest of the squadron. They were expelled their camp on the land side of the town, and the road from thence to our position being commanded by the fire of the Austrian frigate "Queridos," and corvette "Lipsia," and Her Majesty's ship "Zebra," anchored in St. George's Bay, and protected that point.

No attack has yet been made upon our works, which are strengthening every day by the most efficient experiments and may now be said to be in a tolerable state of defence, where neither Cavalry nor Artillery can be brought against them.

About 3,000 mountaineers have come in and received arms with due caution. The Emir Abdallah El-Kasim, with about 200 followers, arrived yesterday, and more of his people are following.

Partial desertions begin to take place from the Albanian corps of Ibrahim's army; but it is difficult to surmount the precautions taken to prevent it, though I understand there is a similar disposition throughout that corps.

At an attack upon the fort of Djebail, on the 14th, we suffered some loss in killed and wounded, which I lament, but the place was ultimately evacuated, and it is now with the Sultan.

Yesterday the mountaineers, about 250 in number, volunteered to take by catboats of bamboo about 400 tons along the coast towards Tientsin, it is reported by the Chinese and English, who was actively checked and speedily arrested by the Chinese ships, followed up by the mountaineers, one of whom only was wounded.

I have detached the "Castor," "Pique," and a Turkish frigate, to make a demonstration at Caiffa, Tyre and Sidon, in order to give countenance to the country and to the army, and am now despatching the "Bow" and "Zebra" to Tripoli, the inhabitants of which have been very much alarmed by the word of the Sultan.

But with all this, your Lordship must be aware of the precarious state of a Squadron on this coast as soon as the season advances, when I

shall be under the necessity of withdrawing the ships for their better security.

I have sincerely to lament that the severe illness of Colonel Sir Charles Smith has entirely prevented him from taking any active part in the operations on shore, as well as from entering into any details

As there is no appearance of any immediate amendment, he has offered his services to go to your Lordship, and gave his opinion with respect to our further proceedings.

(Signed) I have, &c.,  
ROBERT STOPFORD.  
Admiral

Inclosure 4 is No. 257

*Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby.*

Ottoman ship of war "Mookaddimié,"  
Dhonné, September 19, 1840

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Turkish forces under my command arrived at Beyrout at noon, on the 9th instant. On approaching the town, the Egyptian troops under the command of Solymán Pasha, were drawn up on the point to the westward, ready to repel any attempt that might be made. One of the British steamers at this time opened her fire on the enemy, and thus hostilities commenced.

It had been previously arranged between Commodore Napier and myself, to effect a landing at Djounie, a strong position, about ten miles north-east of Beyrout; and with the concurrence of the British and Austrian Admirals, who had just arrived from Alexandria, the troops from the Turkish transports and the *Marines of the British Squadron* were removed in the evening to the English steamers. On the following morning we proceeded with the troops and a small British squadron, and *made* *about* *ten* *miles* off the point to the westward; this stratagem succeeded in drawing the troops out of the town, and enabled the ships to open a gallant fire, with loss to the enemy of a great number of men. During the time the ships were firing, we proceeded into Djounie and effected a landing of all the troops, Marines and Artillery, without the slightest opposition.

On the 11th a flag of truce was despatched to Solyman Pasha to summon him in the name of the Sultan to surrender the town, but returning an evasive answer, the English Admiral ordered the destruction of the castles and kirts to the right and left of the town.

The ships have taken up good positions, and command the whole of the coast from Beyrout to Jabbel, having two ships of the Line of Alexandria, and ships are now on their way to bombard Sidsa and Trachis.

their position. Provisions, as good as new, were immediately thrown up and are now assisted by different strengths of resistance of the enemy. We have upwards of 400 men from the enemy who have deserted. They are now being organized into battalions, and will be an opportunity of entering the city again in the future. Many streets of the city have been opened, the work of Mehmet Ali and his army receive arms for the defence of the Turkish bay, the distribution amounting already to upwards of 8,000.

During the recent bombardment of Beyrouth, the loss to the enemy is estimated at several hundred, but it is impossible to obtain any very accurate account.

On the 12th, a small squadron under the command of Captain Martin of Her Majesty's ship "Carysfort," "Dido," and "Cyclops" steamer, bombarded the town of Djebail. After a cannonade of some hours, a force, consisting of 200 mountaineers and 200 English Marines, under the command of Captain Austin, of the "Cyclops," and 300 of the Marines, landed to take possession of the town; and in effecting



this, I regret to inform your Lordship, that we sustained a loss of five killed and nineteen wounded. We are now in possession of the place, which is held entirely by the mountaineers.

Ibrahim Pasha arrived at Beyrout on the 11th, and is supposed to be now with the troops on the heights, about four hours march from our position. Emir Abdallah, grandson of the Prince, and Governor of the district of Kesrowan, has embraced the cause of the Sultan, who, it is hoped, will contribute materially to our assistance.

I conceive our position to be strong, and might be retained. I am aware my Lord, of the various opinions existing as to the practicality of holding it during the winter, but I feel confident your Lordship will agree with me, that it would be impolitic to forsake a place; the evil result of such a step would be, a certain sacrifice of the loyal men we have armed, and the greatest injury to the cause of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Permit me, therefore, to impress upon your Lordship, the necessity of immediate reinforcements and supplies of every description, without which, I feel, we cannot ensure the success so sanguinely anticipated.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) B. W. WALKER.

Inclosure 5 in No. 257

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Private.)

My Lord,

Heights of Djounia, September 19, 1840.

MEHMET PASHA has just arrived and will take the command. I have gone on very well to meet with Sevan Pasha in command of the Turkish division, and when I saw your Admiral Sir Charles Smith leaving for a fit of apoplexy, has been so unwell, that he has not been able to do anything, and goes to Constantinople.

I have read to Commodore Napier and Mr. Wood the letter I wrote to you today, and they only agree with me in every point we want money, provisions, and plenty of ammunition. I have promised to your Lordship to tell the truth, and I am bound therefore to say, that except I am appointed Chief of the Staff of the Turkish Forces in Syria, I cannot come, you will never have any proper management of the Turkish troops, and I make them act in accordance with Commodore Napier or whoever commands in chief. Commodore Napier is going to ask the Admiral to appoint me provisionally, but I must request your Lordship to have me regularly appointed at Constantinople, under Izet Mehemmed Pasha, my appointment being that of a General of Division.

Working as Chief of the Staff, this gives me no direct command, but even extending partially to Ismet Mehemmed Pasha and Sevan Pasha, who will be my senior officers, but in fact I shall *de facto* be the executive command of the Admiral and of the Commodore Napier, or of the officer who will replace Sir Charles Smith. Your Lordship knows me enough that there shall be no point of etiquette, &c. All I want is the success of the cause; and I moreover offer the Turkish Government, that the moment the Syrian campaign is finished, I will again leave the Turkish service, so that no jealousy is created for the future; I only want the good of the present.

If your Lordship gets me the appointment and the insignia, I beg you will also send down here without delay, Captain Köpke, the (Prussian) officer hitherto at the Dardanelles, whom M. Pisani knows, and Captain Biddle, or another officer who speaks Turkish. Both speak Turkish and know military expressions and matters, whilst our Dragomans here make the greatest confusion, not knowing military terms.

Fortunately I make a shift, speaking Greek, and I have some Turkish soldiers (Albanians) who know Greek and Turkish, who act as Orderlies; but your Lordship is aware that such men cannot be entrusted

with any important message or order, in action, to a distant point, and yet upon the execution of such orders depend victory or defeat. I have been so overwhelmed with business and anxiety these last days, that I have not slept, I believe, twelve hours during the whole time, and your Lordship must, therefore, excuse the haste and confusion of my letters.

I have, &c.,  
Signed A. JOCHMUS.

(Confidential.)

P.S.—6 o'clock P.M. Caffa is taken by some of the ships. I do not know what report Sir C. Smith is going to make to you, but Commodore Napier requests you, and so do I, not to interpose any proposition to make us quit our position and abandon the Syrian coast for the winter, let the Turkish Government be firm and send us ample means, and the Commodore says he will do as he did in Portugal, and I am sure he will if he is not interfered with.

Inclosure 6 in No. 257

Mr Wood to Viscount Ponsonby

Turkish Camp, Mount Lebanon,  
September 19, 1840.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's letter of the 6th instant, by the Austrian steamer, the instructions contained in which I will punctually follow.

The steamer has returned to Cyprus to bring the Pashas; and the moment they arrive I will put myself in communication with them, and give them all the assistance in my power, both to circulate the Sultan's Proclamations, and to open a correspondence with the most powerful and influential malcontents in the different towns and districts to which they are appointed.

I feel confident their nomination will greatly encourage the Syrians, inasmuch as it will prove to them that the Sultan and his Vassals are determined to carry through the provisions of the Convention.

The Syrians have no doubt heard of the neutrality of France, but France has convinced them of the truth of this statement, that she would not go to war with the four Great Powers on the side of Mehmet Ali, and at present I never hear France interfere by any of them. Nevertheless, there are French emissaries on the mountains, and I know from good authority that the Marabout Patriarch has been appealed to by them. But he is perfectly well understood with me, and only yesterday the 14th instant the principal clergy of the province of Kesrowan came to the camp, and were presented by me to his Excellency Sevan Pasha, who received them well, and urged them to exhort the people to take up arms in defence. As a present and submission, and as an acknowledgment to the people they nominated the day evening of the 15th instant, and the consequence has been the situation of about 2000 and of arms in Kesrowan and the district of Duple.

On the 15th instant I received a letter from the Emir Abdallah, apprising me of his intention to join the Turkish army. I immediately went to meet him, and conducted him to a tent where I presented him to Sir R. Stopford, to Captain Walker, as the Sultan's Admiral, and to Sevan Pasha, whom I advised to confirm the Emir in his government of Kesrowan. They will be very likely to be brought into the army with him. He is one of the Emir Bechir's nephews, and his return to his allegiance to the Sultan has had an excellent effect.

Although the enemy is closing on every side, I scarcely believe they will be able to attack us from our strong position. Ibrahim Pasha, with Emir Halil, are endeavouring to enter the province of Kesrowan in our rear, with the object of cutting off the means of our communication, by burning their villages, and destroying their property, unless,

according to Ibrahim's proclamation, they deliver them up or join him again us.

I have not heard of the effect of this proclamation, but I received intelligence yesterday that they had engaged with the Egyptian advance guard, and I had driven them back in the morning but were themselves obliged to retreat to their own position by superior force towards the evening.

The number of arms distributed in the province of Kesrowan and the district of Djebel Marj is about 10,000. As the peasantry are extremely poor they cannot desert themselves long from their families, and we are therefore deprived of their services. I have proposed in consequence that a body of not less than 2,000 should be formed into an auxiliary corps attached to the Turkish army, and each recruit a pay of two piastres a day with the same allowance of the Government paid in advance, which will enable them to subsist during their absence.

The Emir Bechir has two sons, Selim Pasha, who is very able and a capable man, and his son, who is no more. I have addressed my letter to Sir R. Stopford at I have confidence that he will assist me to the utmost of his power. Such an arrangement will no doubt be attended with the happiest result. Four Albanian regiments are sent, and a strong force of men and to procure the money three *Seyids* have been already appointed to lead these men, who are to march in three columns, by three different routes, and endeavour to drive back the Egyptians from this part of Mount Lebanon.

Mehemet Ali has established in Syria the "Ferdeh," or Capitation Tax, which is levied in no other part of the Turkish dominions.

As an inducement to the Syrians not to join us, he has promised to remit this tax for three years, and in order to increase the effect of this promise may have, I shall propose to the Pashas newly appointed, to remit this tax altogether, by which the Sultan will gain in a permanent without any sacrifice, for the levying of the Ferdeh is contrary to the provisions of the Hatti Sheriff, as well as the promise made to the mountaineers that their ancient rights and privileges should be restored.

The Egyptian Government levy many other arbitrary and illegal imposts; and if the Porte could be induced to name at once the taxes that it would impose, and remit all the others, which it will be obliged to do soon or later, I doubt not but that this timely concession will have a most beneficial effect in the country, and will withdraw from Mehemet Ali even those who are most attached to him.

I am afraid from the conduct of the old Emir Bechir, that he does not intend to abandon the cause of Mehemet Ali. His nephew, Emir Abdallah, has assured me that he would not; but I have not yet despaired of succeeding, and am still making use of all the means in my power to induce him to return to his allegiance. Yesterday he sent for a copy of the *Vucrial* letter, which I forwarded to him. In the interval, however, I put myself in communication with Emir Bechir El-Kasim, who has sent to tell me that he is ready to join us with 10,000 men the moment the roads are opened. I am waiting the return of my messenger, when I will endeavour to procure the means from the Admiral of going to the south, and arm the mountaineers in the rear of the Egyptian army. By this measure I hope they will be forced to retire beyond the mountains, leaving us in possession of the sea coast.

Hatroun has been taken, and the people armed, and are to march to Tripoli to assist us in our operations there. Means have also been taken to arm the Naplousians, and all the mountaineers to the south of St. Jean d'Acre as far as Jaffa. There are but very few troops now in Beyrout, which would have been in our possession long since had we troops to occupy and maintain it.

I continue to enjoy the entire confidence of Selim Pasha; he consults me in everything, and submits to me all the papers he writes. He is full of zeal, and appears very anxious for the success of the expedition.

I have been writing to your Excellency on the 11th inst. by way of Cyprus, giving a detailed account of the progress we had made here towards the fulfilment of the views of Her Majesty's Government. A

Consul Vondiziano was requested by me to forward my letter by a Tatar, if no other speedy conveyance presented itself.

I am happy in being able to state that I have this instant received intelligence of the success of the mountaineers against Ibrahim Pasha, whom they drove back half an hour. So long as they harass his flanks he will never be able to advance; and I am to proceed myself to-night to the south, to arm the people, in which undertaking should I be successful, he will be cut off from his supplies, and obliged to fall back on Balbec.

The extensive desertion of the Egyptians is a proof of the discontent that reigns in Ibrahim's army.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

P.S.—Sir R. Stopford has accommodated Selim Pasha with 2,500 dollars, to enable him to put into effect the project of regularly paying the mountaineers who are to be attached to the Turkish army.

Inclosure 7 in No. 257

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby

(Private.)

My Lord,

Camp of the Heights of Djounis,  
September 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that the fleet of Admiral Stopford and the forces under Rear-Admiral Walker, together with the troops under Selim Pasha, began hostilities before Beyrout on the 9th instant, by firing some shells on the troops near the town. On the 10th September, at 1 o'clock, P.M., the Turkish troops and the British Marines, effected a landing at the Killau (10 miles), and at the village of Djounis (thirteen and a half miles) north of Beyrout. On the 11th of September a position was occupied on the heights, the right of the Killau, and the position of Djounis. The whole of the troops being eight battalions of Turks, total, 5,000 men rank and file, and 1,500 Marines, being disposed in a semi-circle, offering three excellent and very strong positions.

Selim Pasha had made his disposition against an attack to the south of Beyrout and the troops landed in consequence, with a disposition at Kesrowan and Djounis. A communication was immediately established with some of the Mountaineer Chiefs, and of the very 5,000 to 6,000 muskets have been distributed, principally through the means of Sheik Francis, and Abdallah Emir, a nephew of Emir Bechir.

Two small forts north of this camp have also surrendered; and, according to Admiral Walker's returns, he is now rationing 400 Egyptians, or Albanian deserters and troops surrendered. Ever since the 10th of September Ibrahim Pasha has been making every effort against this corps. On that day he was fifteen hours east-south-east from Beyrout; on the 12th September, he was at Hannes, four hours from our extreme left, but having reconnoitred it, and found it equally unattackable from the new position taken up by this force, in consequence of his movements, Ibrahim Pasha withdrew to Merouba, two hours from Gatigos, due east, being thus to-day six hours from our position. Some skirmishes have taken place between the new advanced guard and the advanced guard of Ibrahim, in which the latter ideas have been to evacuate. Sheik Francis was on two occasions supported by a battalion of regular Turkish Infantry, who have been sent into the interior of the country. The forces with Ibrahim Pasha in person are reported to consist of about—

4,000 Egyptian Infantry,  
1,200 Albanians,  
2,500 Egyptians under Ottoman Pasha, come from Balbec.  
7,700

4 D 2



Besides there were about 7,000 men, of which 4,000 Cairo Militia, under Solyman Pasha, at and near Beyrout.

The loss of the latter division since the opening of the campaign, is said to have been 1,000 men killed and wounded by the fire of the ships before Beyrout. From all information that I can collect Ibrahim Pasha seems for the present to have abandoned all idea of marching on Constantinople. Himself and his principal officers are all in the neighbourhood; and several corps from the northern parts of Syria have been moved in a southerly direction.

All reports agree, that the following distribution may be considered as tolerably correct.

	September 19, 1840
With Ibrahim Pasha at Merouba	- 7,700 Men.
With Solyman Pasha at Beyrout	- 7,000 "
At Balbec, a regiment of Turks forced into the service	- 3,000 "
At Acre and Saida	- 12,000 "
At Tripoli	- 4,000 "
In small forts on the coast, about	- 1,300 "
	<hr/> 35,000 "

If the whole effective army of Ibrahim in Syria, from the Egyptian frontiers to Ardana, is estimated at 60,000, I believe that the mark is tolerably correct, my estimate from various sources being—

Twenty-five regiments of Infantry at 2,000 each, effective 50,000	
Eleven regiments of Cavalry, 1,500 each	- 16,500
Albanians and Artillery, &c., &c.	- 6,800

	7,000
Deduct non-combatants, sick, &c.	- 11,000

60,000

Taking from this amount of 60,000 the above 35,000, there remain 25,000, from which guns &c. must be furnished to a great number of places not in the above list, besides the garrisons of the lines of the Taurus.

For the present, Ibrahim cannot think of moving on towards Asia Minor and Constantinople; and this much becomes the less possible, as the season is advancing, and the Taurus will be covered with snow.

The troops of the Sultan, which hitherto covered Constantinople against such a movement, become therefore disposable and ought to reinforce us here. There is no possibility of conquering Syria with 4,000 Turks, and in order to rectify the misapprehension against Mehmet Ali more general and formidable, we must be able to advance deeper into the mountains, as the Emir Bechir and Ibrahim, by occupying the passes in a semicircle round us, prevent the peasants in many parts from joining us. But I must, before to your Lordship, to the essential movement must be made in the direction of the Turkish division of troops. The greatest confusion prevails in every department: there is no Staff, no Commissariat, no arrangement of any kind; nor can there be any, because there is not a single officer who understands to prepare and execute a movement of any consequence on a large scale.

By the desire of the Commodore Napier I have taken with Selim Pasha's consent, the command of the seven battalions; but I can assure your Lordship, that if I had been attacked during the first two or three days, the troops could not have held their position, merely for want of proper arrangement, as I remained without ammunition, without intrenching tools; and yet we had everything required, only want of management; and this want of management will continue, except there is a Chief of the Staff appointed, who understands military operations on a large scale, because the best chronometer won't go, if, by neglect, a screw is wanting.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 257

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Camp of Djounie, September 20, 1840.

ONE of the Mountaineer Chiefs has just come over to us with 300 men to receive arms, and we are sending 200 stand of arms here to Damour this moment (three miles south of Beyrout).

The "Cyclops" is to protect the operation and the mountaineers who come to receive them.

From my advanced posts, I am in communication with the Albanian Chief in front of the lines. He has with him 200 Albanians and 300 Egyptians, and I am in hopes to get him over to us. He promised me a decisive answer to-day.

The public spirit is much in our favour in this part of the country. We have excellent information of all the movements of the enemy; and our armed mountaineers begin to hover on their flanks and rear, attacking small parties, caravans &c. whilst we send a strong force, provisions &c., with escorts of four or five men, two and three hours into the country.

We must organize a Guerilla warfare, which will destroy Ibrahim's corps, if he once suffers a defeat in these mountains, which I hope he will, if he attacks us; but he, as well as his troops, seem to be cowed, since the heavy loss of men from the fire of the ships at Beyrout. Although we know he has with him 7,700 men, and that 7,000 are in Beyrout, yet with this superiority of force he has not ventured to attack us.

He also begins to loose his hold on the mind of the country people. They had been forced, under pain of death, to leave the villages occupied by us; but they now begin to return in great numbers,—men and women,—and a regular fair is opened in one of the villages. Our soldiers behave very well, and do not rob or annoy the peasantry. There are no desertions, but our wants for further success are strong reinforcements of troops, and plenty of money, provisions, and ammunition.

Commodore Napier, who read my letters of to-day and yesterday, begs to say, that the opinions therein expressed are also his own, but that he has no time to-day to write to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS

Inclosure 9 in No. 257

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Therapia, September 27, 1840

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I went to Rechid Pasha's last night and communicated to him the letters from the squadron, &c., containing the account of the proceedings subsequent to the commencement of hostilities on the 20<sup>th</sup> instant. The Pasha evinced the most unbounded regret at what had been done. Ali Effendi and myself were occupied for upwards of three hours in preparing translations to be laid before the Council to-day.

Rechid Pasha pledged himself to make every possible exertion for carrying into immediate execution all the measures suggested by your Excellency, and these promised in the several letters communicated to him. Three thousand troops, with provisions and ammunition, will be forthwith embarked at Sidon, to reinforce the corps at Djounie, and others will follow in sailing vessels. Every exertion is to be made to raise and send a supply of money. General Jochmus is to receive the appointment he desires, and Tahir Bey, with several other officers educated in England, are to be sent out to him. Instructions are to be sent to Djounie,

by which the Porte engages to pay up the arrears of the Albanian and Egyptian troops and officers who come over to the Sultan: the officers are to retain their rank in the Sultan's Army. The Albanian emissary, Ibrahim Bey, will be employed to gain over his countrymen.

Rechid Pasha laid great stress on the necessity of not losing the advantage so happily gained; and he suggested the expediency of keeping back from the Council that part of Admiral Sturford's despatch relative to the withdrawal of the ships, which, he said, would have a very disheartening effect on that body, constituted as it is.

I saw Rechid Pasha again early this morning, and delivered your Lordship's message, assuring the Late Minister Pasha continuing to be temporarily employed in waiting at the same time your Excellency's opinion of him. Ahmed Fethi and Saib Pashas, the Ministers of Commerce and Finance, came in, and were overjoyed on learning the news from Syria. The measures proposed met with their fullest approbation, and the execution of them was largely discussed. The only difficulty that occurred was that of raising £100,000 to pay interest. Rechid Pasha said that he would not grudge paying a high interest to meet the immediate necessity.

It was felt from the language and alacrity shown by the Ministers, that they would make all sacrifice to ensure the successful continuation of the operations so happily commenced.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) C. ALISON

No. 259

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)*

(No. 221)

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 27, 1840.*

1 COMMUNICATED to Her Majesty's Government by Sir Robert St. John's despatch to me from Djounie, dated 17th September, 1840. The Pasha observed with great pain that part of it where the Admiral expresses his intention to remove from the Syrian coast. And I have since learnt that the Porte has received a despatch from Selim Pasha, reporting a communication made to him by the Admiral, which is said to contain the announcement of the abandonment of operations in Syria. There are other reports with which my Colleagues and myself have been made acquainted; and we have also been informed of the extreme dismay and dissatisfaction which the intelligence has created at the Porte. I cannot take upon myself to say what are the intentions of the Admiral; but it is my duty to acquaint your Lordship that I am authorized by my Colleagues to express our common opinion, that the abandonment of Syria by the British, will be in manifest and direct contravention to the spirit and meaning of the late Treaty of 15th July. That it will be a breach of that confidence which the British and the Allies have solicited and received from numerous bodies of Syrians, and a betrayal of those confiding and innocent men, delivering them up without defence, to the vengeance of Ibrahim Pasha, and casting eternal disgrace upon those who sanction the act. That in consequence of these opinions, I have undertaken, with the advice of my Colleagues, to request Admiral Sir Robert Stopford not to remove from the coast of Syria until he shall have received orders from Her Majesty's Government upon that subject after this despatch shall have reached your Lordship.

In execution of the above-mentioned engagement, I will forward to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford a copy of this despatch to your Lordship.

Our ignorance of the precise intentions of the Admiral, and our earnest hope that much or most of what we have heard of their nature is untrue, induces me not to state the judgment we all have formed of the plans attributed to Sir Robert Stopford; and, therefore, I confine myself to

making known to your Lordship the extreme dissatisfaction and disapproval with which the plans attributed to the Admiral have been received here by the Sublime Porte and the Ministers of the Allied Powers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

No. 259.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 15.)

(Separate and Confidential)

My Lord!

Therapia, September 27, 1840

THE despatch of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford concludes with paragraphs indicating his intention to withdraw from Syria, and this has today arrived a despatch from Selim Pasha to the Sublime Porte, in which, as I am informed, the Admiral's resolution is strongly stated; and I enclose translation of a letter addressed by Admiral Robert to the Emperor, which, as you doubtless perceive, is quite in accordance with his views. I have but a few words to say, namely, that I concur entirely in the opinion of Admiral Baudiera. I consider the abandonment of Syria as the most disgraceful and mischievous thing that could be done.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure in No. 259

Admiral Don Juan to Baron Steiner.

(Translation.)

*Diouise, September 18, 1840*

I HAVE this moment had a long conference with Sir Robert Stephenson, to prove to me the impossibility of doing any longer the carriage road to the Westman, particularly as no word be done, by widening the road, which would only have increased it, owing to the extreme danger of the station under the water-gate.

Admiral Stropford told me that his instructions provided to him the opportunity to participate in such a mission as would enable him to arm the marauders, but his eyesight had become so bad that he had not already been armed and that the Japanese ships continued to harass him along the coast from California to Japan.

The first motions of the Camp of K. now command me to be careful of our  
Admiral's health, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish  
camp lately, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
winter, forbid his remaining any longer in that position with his ships and forces;  
that he will embark his Marines in camp on the 28th instant, and set sail with  
the whole squadron. That he offered to leave the entrenched camp of K. now  
to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
not only that he would take the whole of the winter, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
time as the first of the winter, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
Candia, and would not be at sea, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
to reduce that fort was that we were only in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
the forts, &c. That if the Turkish forces were to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
would then be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
the approach of winter. If the Turkish  
did not attempt the reduction of Candia, and  
was in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp, and to be in a Turkish camp,  
at Cyprus, Admiral Stopford would then take measures  
for the Anglo-Austrian squadron. The nearest  
safe ports to Syria are Mieri, Marmorata, or Carageet, upon the coast of  
Syria, and of which we shall probably pass the winter.

Alexandria and another off the coast of Syria.



Your Excellency cannot but see the fatal moral effect the abandonment of the camp of Kesrowan will have for the Sultan's cause, and the overbearing tone which the Egyptians will assume in trying to make it appear that they had defeated the Anglo-Turk troops. Besides, the abandonment of Syria at this period would expose all the poor Maronites who came to our camp for arms, to the full vengeance of Ibrahim Pasha. But even these have behaved ill towards us; for 8,000 men who were armed by us, returned to their own homes, and there remains with us only about 100, who occupy the villages of Djailbeki and Putrum.

I observed to Admiral Stupford that it would have been much better not to occupy Kiarwan at all, if it were to be thus quickly abandoned. He agreed with me, but assured me, that he acted strictly according to his instructions, and he had nothing to reproach himself with.

Ibrahim Pasha, at three hours distance from us, is continually concentrating fresh troops, which will amount to about 16,000 men, and with which he proposes to attack our camp in two directions. If this assault should be made at night, as is probable, the camp of Kesrowan will hardly be sufficiently strong to resist a simultaneous attack from two points at once. The fire from our ships in a dark night will hit the enemy with difficulty, and thus be of little effect.

The bravery of the Afghan-Australian troops who defended the camp was rewarded with a promotion to sergeant and a commission to be made in the rest of the 4th train by the 1st and 2nd Afghan-Australian battalions.

The 1000 Turks who face the advance of the 100000 British are to keep the enemy in check for a time during their retrograde movement upon the camp.

Four large English steamers, with eighty-four-pounder shot, hold a position which will enable them to sweep the sea, keeping under the protection of the camp.

I have, &c.  
Jas. C. LANDIERA

No. 240.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

(No. 195.)

My Lord,

Erreichte am 1. Oktober 1910

[illegible]

That in this view, and in order to make the recent exercise of the sovereignty of the Sultan useful towards effecting an early and satisfactory settlement of pending questions, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that it would be expedient that the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople should be instructed to proceed to the Turkish Minister, and to state to him that their respective Governments, in pursuance of the stipulations of the 7th Article of the Separate Act annexed to the Treaty of 15th of July, beg strongly to recommend to the Sultan, that if Mehmet Ali should at an early period make his submission to the Sultan, and should agree to restore the Turkish Fleet, and to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan should not only reinstate

Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt, but should also give him an hereditary tenure in that Pashalik, according to the conditions specified in the Treaty of 1833, but liable, of course, to forfeiture by any infraction of those conditions on the part of Mehemet Ali or his successors.

Her Majesty's Government have reason to hope that this suggestion will meet the concurrence of the Governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and your Excellency will accordingly take the steps pointed out in this despatch, as soon as your Excellency shall have received a corresponding intimation.

If the Sultan should, as Her Majesty's Government and I do, consent to act upon this advice when tendered by his Lordship, it would be expected that he should take such steps for making his Majesty's intentions, in this respect, known, to Mr. Metaxas, and that I should convey to Sir Robert Stewart should the Turkish Government may feel it what it may require for this purpose.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PAINE & SONS

No. 261

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 251.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1940

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, to be communicated to the  
 information of the French Government, a copy of a despatch which I received  
 on the 15th instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; and I have  
 to instruct your Excellency at the same time, to say, that Her Majesty's Govern-  
 ment cannot make to the Government of France this communication upon the  
 affairs of Turkey without again expressing the regret which they feel, that  
 France is not as yet to the France which has been formed a part of the  
 Sultan; and without saying how glad Her Majesty's Government would be if  
 circumstances should enable France again to take her proper and natural place  
 in an alliance which has for its only object the maintenance of the integrity and  
 independence of the Turkish Empire as an essential element in the general  
 balance of power.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 262

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

Vol. 202 )

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I approve of your having appointed Mr. Wood to be Vice Consul at Beyrout, as reported in your despatch No. 213.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 263

*Account Palmerston to Viscount Palmerston*

No. 205.

Mr Lord

*Foreign Office, October 19, 1840.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 221, of the 27th of September, stating that the Turkish General, Izzet Pasha, had been reported to have announced his intention to abandon operations in Syria, I have to state to you





in June and July last, between them and France, thought it, nevertheless, incumbent upon them, with reference to the general interests of Europe, and for the maintenance of the balance of power, to conclude the Treaty of the 15th of July, nothing, surely, has happened since that Treaty was concluded, which can be calculated to shake their confidence in the justness of their own opinions; nor can the continued existence of a difference of opinion between themselves and the French Government, however much and sincerely that difference may be regretted by them, afford them a sufficient reason for retracing steps taken by them deliberately and upon full consideration.

M. Thiers cannot but see, that the threatening armaments which France, without any apparent cause, has already made, have increased, instead of diminishing, the difficulties to be surmounted, and if the course indicated by M. Thiers should be pursued, and if still more extensive armaments should be made by France, it will be impossible that Europe should not believe, that whatever may be the reason put forward as an excuse for such armaments, the real intentions and designs of France are similar to those which, during the Republic and the Empire, arrayed Europe in combined resistance to her aggressions; and thence will follow a conviction that it will be necessary to meet these designs by the same combination of defensive means which were then employed to protect the liberties of Europe.

Animated, as Her Majesty's Government is, by the sincerest love of peace, and anxious as it feels to cultivate the most friendly relations with France, not only because it wishes well to France, but also because it feels that a good understanding between France and England affords a strong security for the peace of Europe, such a state of things as that which I have just described would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government with the deepest sorrow.

But Her Majesty's Government still cherishes the hope that better counsels will prevail at Paris, and that a more peaceful spirit will direct the policy of France; and Her Majesty's Government cannot abandon the hope that M. Thiers and his Colleagues will, upon reflection, see that there is more honour to be acquired by maintaining peace, than by involving Europe, unjustly and without provocation, in the calamities of a general war.

Your Excellency will read this despatch to M. Thiers, and will give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 267.

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, October 10, 1840.*

I HAVE learnt from a source on which I can rely, that according to the last accounts from Sevastopol, notwithstanding the boasted preparations of the Russians to march to the protection of Constantinople, they had only 10,000 men of the 5th corps, commanded by General Liders, ready for embarkation. The 13th division had returned from the Caucasus in a deplorable condition, having suffered dreadfully from sickness, and I am informed that this corps has only left a skeleton of the original number of the different battalions.

In fact, the expedition has completely failed in producing the important results anticipated at the beginning of this year.

I have been informed that an opinion prevails amongst several officers belonging to the Army of the Crimea, that the expedition to Turkey would take the direction of Trebizond. I do not believe that there is at present any reason for supposing such an intention on the part of the Imperial Government; but reports having reached me from different quarters of the existence of a similar project, I mention it to your Lordship, as one that may be

attempted at some future and more favourable period, for no doubt can exist of the immense advantage of such an acquisition to Russia, both in a military and commercial point of view.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 268.

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, October 10, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 63 inclusive, were delivered to me by the messenger Barnard, on the 8th instant.

According to the instructions, I have communicated your Lordship's despatch No. 57 to Count Nesselrode and requested his Excellency to convey the thanks of Her Majesty's Government to the Emperor of Russia, for the arrangement which His Majesty has made for placing a squadron at the disposal of Great Britain.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that this squadron is now at Reval.

The Emperor mentioned the subject to me at Czarskoe-Selo a few days ago, observing that, if the winter were not unusually severe, it could be despatched at any moment that Her Majesty's Government might desire.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

No. 269.

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 82.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, October 10, 1840.*

At my last interview with Count Nesselrode his Excellency told me, that owing to the serious turn the Eastern Question had taken, he had thought it advisable to address a Circular to the Russian Legations in Europe, transmitting to them a copy of the Convention of the 15th of July. He said this had almost become an imperative duty, in consequence of the endeavours of France at some of the Courts of Germany, particularly at Stuttgart and Munich, to destroy the confidence of those Powers in the objects of the alliance.

Count Nesselrode gave me a copy of this circular, which I have the honour to inclose herewith, and told me that it would be despatched to the different Courts this day.

The most important feature in this circular is the question of the Dardanelles.

The exceptional cases in which men-of-war will be allowed to pass those straits are stated; and there is a declaration of the absence of all selfish motives on the part of Russia, which is apparently done with the view of removing the impression that she any longer arrogates to herself the right of exclusive protection of the Turkish capital.

The regret of the Imperial Government at the position in which France has placed herself, by refusing to join in the Convention is expressed in the same tone as your Lordship's Notes on this subject to M. Guizot.

The 2nd paragraph of the circular states that the chief object of the Convention is the maintenance of peace; and it conveys the hope that the smaller Courts will not refuse to give their moral support to the alliance.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD





This is also the general feeling here on this subject.  
Count Nesselrode had not yesterday received any later accounts from Constantinople than those reported in my No. 76, viz., the 22nd of September.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

No. 271.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 20)

No. 50.)

My Lord,

Berlin, October 14, 1840

THE policy of the Prussian Cabinet, after fluctuating about as circumstances arose and events operated on their hopes or fears, has settled down in the following resolutions:—1. To give all moral support to the Convention of July, so long as the British Cabinet remains within its limits.

2. To refuse all material support.

3. To allow the British Cabinet to take the lead in the execution of the Treaty, and the adoption of language to be held to the French Government.

4. To ask from France no explanation, and to give to France no explanation of armaments, acts, &c.

5. To remain passive as long as consistent with safety.

6. To be prepared to act on the defensive with all the energy of the nation, and to call to its aid all the force of Germany whenever attacked by France.

I shall endeavour to keep the Prussian Cabinet firm to this line traced out by themselves, which, if not enthusiastic, is as much as we can expect from a Government writhing under the threats of France, the frontier exposed to invasion, and the people demanding the Constitution promised them as a recompense for the efforts they made to expel the French from their territory in 1814.

Should the Prussian Cabinet find the policy they have adopted, onerous or dangerous, they would probably seek a refuge in putting their own interpretation on the execution of the Treaty—for instance, it was thought that the Convention of July would have used the decree of the Sultan for the forfeiture of Mehmet Ali to the Government of Egypt, as an opportunity of asking the Pasha to leave and declaring war against England. Should the British Cabinet approve of a Sultan's act, the Prussian Cabinet was immediately prepared to give this act the interpretation supposed to be put upon it by the French Government, and to require from your Lordship that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be sacrificed to appease the wrath of France.

Mr. Metternich's Minister arrived here and blew the coals by order of Prince Metternich. It was conversation but yesterday despatches from Paris informed us that the French Cabinet had accepted your Lordship's view of this question, and was satisfied to look upon the Sultan's decree as an act of moral coercion, suited to the habits of Orientals, and by no means impeding the means of negotiating. The Prussian Cabinet recovered its calm, and adopted also your Lordship's view.

The Minister of France at this Court has been incessant in his endeavours to get the Prussian Cabinet to propose its mediation; but I told Baron Werther that, being a party to the Treaty, no mediation could come from Prussia, without giving the alliance the appearance of weakness; and I told Count Bérson that the initiative should be taken by France; that they should advise Mehmet Ali to accept the Treaty, and throw himself on the generosity of his Sovereign, that if the French Government neglected to do this, we should proceed from act to act in the East, until we destroyed the power of the Pasha.

He thought my opinion good, and wrote to M. Thiers to recommend the adoption of it.

The Prussian Cabinet loudly censures Baron Brunnow for having objected to certain proposals your Lordship was advised to make to the French Government.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 272

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21)

No. 290.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 19, 1840

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 292 inclusive.

The two last numbers reached my hands this evening.

I shall lose no time in communicating to M. Thiers your Lordship's despatch. Lord Ponsonby of the 10th inst. has just been back at by which the Sultan removed Mehmet Ali from the Government of Egypt.

M. Thiers, when I saw him on Saturday last, again expressed his conviction that Her Majesty's fleet on the coast of Syria, and the Turkish troops which had taken a position on shore, would fail in their endeavours to expel the Egyptian army from the interior of the country; he said that his last reports from Alexandria, of the 3rd, stated positively that the mountaineers of Lebanon were not in insurrection.

I have heard that the accounts received by the French Government vary very much from the day to another, and regard to the health and state of Mehmet Ali. He appears it is said, at one moment to be in a very languid and even of sickness, and at another sitting up by his hearth, depressed, and complaining of the French Government not affording the assistance which it had led him to expect.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 273.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 23.)

No. 222.)

My Lord,

Thessalon, September 24, 1840

IN compliance with the demands from Syria for succour, which I have just reported, your Lordship's despatch of the 10th inst. has been received. The Sultan's decree has ordered 1000 men for Syria and 1000 more men than in steamers in three or four days, and the rest will follow without delay.

Ammunition, provisions, tents &c., &c., will be sent in the quantity Sir Charles Stansfeld desires.

The Porte has named Salami Effendi to be Mustashar to Izet Pasha, that is, a Counsellor-General. Salami Effendi is a man possessing much influence over Izet Pasha, and is ordered to keep that Pasha in the right road.

The Porte sends at the same time with Salami Effendi in the steamers, 15,000/ in cash.

The Porte has engaged to pay all arrears due by the Egyptian Government to such officers and soldiers of Mehmet Ali's army as shall return to fidelity to the Sultan.

Isa Bey, the man sent here by Sir Howard Douglas for having been caught red-handed in the Albanian or Mehmet Ali's service, is now in the service of the Porte, and has undertaken to bring over to the Sultan most, if not all of the Albanians now in the service of Ibrahim Pasha, upon the assurance that they shall have their arrears of pay discharged; and Rechid Pasha this morning, in the presence of M. Etienne Prandi, solemnly promised

Ibrahim Bey that it should be done; and, further, that if Ibrahim Bey succeeded, he should have rank given him in the Ottoman army, a Nishan, and money. Ibrahim is delighted, and says he is sure of success. There is reason to believe ~~him~~ for he enjoys very great influence with those Albanians, and they are avowedly mercenaries.

The Porte has given the rank of Ferik to General Jochmus, who is to be Chef d'Etat-Major to Izet Pasha, but he is to be entirely under the orders of Sir Charles Smith.

Authority has been sent to the proper persons to do what is necessary to be done about Soliman Pasha. I received your Lordship's letter to me, sent home by the last messenger. I think success is very probable, for a Pashalik is added.

Yesterday evening the Chief Ministers, being together, repeated to his Excellency the Internuncio the engagement previously made with me that Sir Charles Smith is to have the entire direction of the Ottoman troops. The Internuncio was so good as to bring his matter forward again in order to prevent any possible mistake. The Ministers, at the same time, offered to give Sir Charles rank in the Ottoman army, and the Internuncio took the trouble of informing me of it. I was of opinion that as the Porte cannot give Sir Charles the rank of Pasha of three tails, and as it cannot recall Izzet Pasha at present, it would be wrong for Sir Charles Smith to hold military rank in the Ottoman army, which must be inferior to the rank of Izzet Pasha, and thereby become subject to the Pasha's authority, instead of being, as he will be, if he remains only a British officer, authorized to command the Pasha. Baron Sömmerring agreed with me on this point, and Sir Charles Smith has also concurred in it.

I will venture to lay before your Lordship, a <sup>sup</sup> suggestion which I hope may meet with your approbation; it is to move Her Majesty to confer upon Sir Charles Smith the rank of a General in Syria. I see that Sir Charles is so high in the scale of felicity that he must probably, ere long, be a General, and I recollect that Colonel Considine had the rank conferred upon him at Tunis upon an occasion which, at the highest estimation of it, is not of the tem-  
plum of a part of the importance that which Sir Charles now directs.

I try to be pardoned for speaking upon matters out of my sphere, but it appears to me extremely necessary to place Sir Charles in a rank that will give him command over Post-Captains, who will certainly otherwise interfere with his operations with the Marines, when ashore.

Sir Charles tells me he shall have need of some four or five British officers, and has given me a list (enclosed) of men who he thinks well adapted for his purpose. I have undertaken to ask your Lordship to get them sent out as soon as possible; there is no doubt of the necessity for such assistance to Sir Charles Smith.

I think it would be very useful to issue Her Majesty's orders, defining the authority given to Sir Charles Smith, so that what is to be done by him and the Admiral may be clearly understood by all parties. As matters stand now, it would seem that the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith have a joint responsibility for everything, but as I have asked Sir Charles Smith to give me his notions on this point, I will not trouble your Lordship with anything more from myself.

The Porte has appointed Tahir Bey and Selim Bey to accompany Sir Charles. They are two of the young Turks educated at Woolwich, and so highly esteemed by Colonel Dundas.

The latter name was despatched and I of course fully complied with his wishes, but I earnestly proposed to Sir Charles, a few days young Austrian officer, to have a dinner at his house, and I thought I should be able to get a fairly correct idea of the character of the Austrian army. Sir Charles agreed to it.

to act in that capacity with Sir Carruthers. I think Mr Wood may be extremely useful.

Sir Charles has been waited upon by Tahir Bey and Selim Bey by order of the Porte, to learn from him what his wishes may be upon every matter connected with the service.

It will be for Sir Charles to direct what troops the Porte shall send; I will report further upon the facts to your Lordship.

The Porte will officially engage to make a remission of taxes in Syria, upon the principle stated in Mr. Wood's letter, already before your Lordship. I have the particular pleasure in stating that this wise measure was being forwarded again by his Excellency the late Pasha to a late interview with the Ottoman Ministers, and was again ratified and ordered to be carried immediately into effect by a public act.

I beg leave to state to your Lordship that the cause which we are zealously employed in supporting, is most essentially indebted to the active and able exertions of the Internuncio.

The Porte has been pleased to appoint Mr. Wood to be its agent for purposes mentioned in the above document. I thought it necessary to give Mr. Wood the right to speak in the name of the Porte in his communications with the subjects of the Sultan on certain topics.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure 1 is No. 273

*Memorandum submitted to Viscount Ponsonby by Sir Charles Smith*

*Therapia, September 29, 1840.*

THE equivocal position in which I stood in the force serving on the coast of Syria, according to the interpretation there given to the several orders and instructions received, formed one, and by no means an inconsiderable reason for my being dispatched to Constantinople, where from the interview I have had the honor of holding with Your Excellency, I learn that I should be so as I have I intended, a more efficient and officer, to command and to report to an importance to have the very command of the water which I have the opportunity well to command being well held for a more satisfactory result. Inasmuch, however as the trial of power falls far short of the past, it would be a matter, with the same, if not greater, it becomes a matter of course, that it is not the service and to the individual charged with the service, that the instructions and instructions which authorize and stem from the service, should be furnished as a rule upon all absolute points and to serve as a guide, to the service and to the individual charged with the service, and as it is not at all possible to be so fitting as the present for seeking such a condition, and for so to a service as is required under any other service, that can possibly arise, the following observations are most respectfully submitted.

I have to say I don't hold some document from the Turkish Government to be produced only in a case of urgency, and to show that in no part is it a self-assumed.

2. The real character of my nation ought to be made known to Sir Robert Stople and his own determination and to be explained by him to such persons as under his orders may be affected thereby.

3. The Turkish Admiral, in the absence of the Commander of the fleet, should be authorized to attend to all requirements for the conveyance of troops, stores, &c.

4. An efficient commissariat must be established under the responsibility of a Field Marshal, who must be restricted to his issues of money and stores by the approving signature of the officer acting in the situation now assigned to me.

5. An intelligent interpreter to be attached to myself.

Q. Whether as regards the regularity necessary to be observed in military office details, with the several public departments, or the advantage, on taking the field, of posting detached officers to a particular service, or of leaving I look upon the assistance of five or six British officers to be of paramount importance.

7. Should the foregoing remark be concurred in, I venture to state that four all of whom I know & on whom you are for the dates, have already



tendered to me services which I had not till this moment a pretext for recommending. They are, Captain Bagot, 60th Rifles, Military Secretary at Gibraltar, Lieutenant-Colonel Br. ~~Gerrard~~ H. P. lately filling the same appointment, Major Garrett, 4th Reg. ~~ment~~, and Captain John Pyre, R.A.

8. The Astrakhan officer will be of great use as a courier ~~connecting~~ link with the force employed by that Power, and the young Turks educated at Woolwich, I should think, might be posted with great advantage.

9. I foresee difficulty in procuring money for the Ordnance detachments already serving in Syria.

10. If Acre is to be taken regularly, I apprehend considerable reinforcements of artillery, engineers, stores, &c., must be supplied from England.

11. The question of expediting many more troops from hence can only be answered by the means we possess on the coast for providing for them; and these must depend on the possession of a base of operations which we had not when I left it, as fully explained in a separate official notice.

(Signed) C. G. SMITH,  
Colonel.

Inclosure 2 in No. 273.

*The Grand Vizier to Mr. Richard Wood.*

Translation.

THE Ministers of the Sublime Porte have been made acquainted with the zeal and activity which you have displayed in promoting the interests of the Porte in that quarter (Syria), which is so much in accordance with your character of a faithful agent of its sincerely the British Government, which has always afforded it its best services under the most important circumstances. Your perfect knowledge of the state of the affairs in that country, and your recent appointment to the Consulate of Beyrouth, makes us hope that you will still continue to exert yourself for the regulation and settlement of the actual affairs of the Porte in that quarter, and the present document is therefore sent to you, authorizing you on the part of the Sublime Porte to do so henceforward.

We address you in the confidence that you will still continue to exert the same zeal and ability for the performance of this object.

3 Shaban, 1258 (29 September, 1840).

(Signed) HAOUP.

No. 274.

*Vicount Ponsonby to Vicount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)*

(Private.)

My dear Palmerston,

September 30, 1840.

I SEND you a translation of the Imperial Order I have obtained from the Sultan, constituting Sir Charles Smith the virtual Commander of the troops in Syria. It is as full as need be, and I hope you will be pleased with it.

Yours sincerely,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 274.

*Imperial Firman appointing Sir Charles Smith Commander of the Troops in Syria*

(Translation.)

ABDUL MEDJID KHAN, &c. &c. &c.

To my Vizier Ismet Mohomet Pasha, Valce of Acre and Dependencies; to the Ferik Selim Pasha; to the Minliha Caled Pasha; and to all the Minlihas and other Officers of my Imperial Army.

On being made acquainted with this Imperial Order, be it known unto you, that Sir Charles Smith, the most illustrious among the noble followers of the Messiah, and the most distinguished among the officers of Great Britain, may his rank never decrease! now with the Royal Army in Syria, being a man of the most eminent abilities and distinguished military reputation, it is most necessary and advantageous that ye should act, under all circumstances, according to his opinion and judgment.

You, therefore, the above extolled Seraskier, Ferik, and others, shall act in all matters relating to military movements, and in all the necessary measures relating to the Imperial Army, according to the opinion and judgment of Sir Charles Smith, and you shall not deviate from the path of his instruction, but you shall exert yourselves to the utmost for the performance of your duties with unanimity, courage, zeal, and attention. As you will be held responsible for the execution of any action contrary to the advice and opinion of Sir Charles Smith, it is my Royal Will that ye should conform to it with the strictest attention and perfect obedience, whatever be the present Imperial Order issued as a warning unto you.

On becoming acquainted, therefore, with the same, you shall, in all matters relating to the Army, and most especially in those relating to military movements, act conformably to the advice and judgment of Sir Charles Smith, and in rendering yourselves worthy of the continuation of my royal favour by your zeal, unanimity, and valour in the performance of your duties beware of acting contrary thereto in contravention of this express Imperial Order.

Conform you, therefore, scrupulously to all that is above written, and give due credence to the Imperial Cypher.

Beginning of the month of Shaban, 1258 (September 30, 1840).

No. 275.

*Vicount Ponsonby to Vicount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)*

(No. 223.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 4, 1840.

Mr. HAY arrived here last night and brought despatches and letters from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford and General Jochmus, of which I have the honour to inclose copies.

Your Lordship will I hope find that the state of things in Syria is even more favourable than what I have been expecting.

Sir Charles Smith left Constantinople yesterday evening in the "Plinius." On the 2nd of this month he left our port for Beyrouth, having 600 troops on board and money and other things, for the supply of the wants of the Army.

The Porte will dispatch more troops with all delay to the amount that may be required in the present and future operations.

It appears from the account of Mr. Hay that the Turkish troops have shown the most perfect disposition and great courage in Syria, that the desertion from the Egyptian Copts is extremely great, that the people of the

country are everywhere hostile to these Chiefs, and where arms have been distributed, are using them with energy against the Egyptians; that Soliman Pasha is cut off by them from supplies, and likely to be reduced to great extremities; that the Army of Ibrahim is harassed severely, that his soldiers are dismayed; and that his officers as well as men have deserted him in large numbers.

I have desired Mr. Hay to draw up a report, which I will inclose.

With relation to Egypt, Mr. Hay says that Mehemet Ali is very ill, and so weak as to be unable to get out of bed without assistance; that there is universal disaffection there to his government and his person amongst his troops. Mehemet Ali seems to be supported by nobody except by the merchants, and chiefly by English merchants, who have in most cases made no scruple to be the adversaries of the cause of England and of the enslaved miserable people of Egypt.

I am certain a French steamer off the coast of Syria when it was evident that the power of Syria must be taken by the Turks, Austrian, and English countries, and the French Government therefore will probably have news before your Excellency of the state of Egyptian affairs in that country, and may try to get some report in to induce the Allies to give terms to Mehemet Ali that will save him from destruction. I venture to express my decided conviction of the impolicy of leaving him in possession of any remnant of his power, and to say decidedly that it will be only giving to the French means to continue their intrigues, and to preserve the elements of disorder in Turkey, and prevent a solid settlement of affairs.

Mr. Hay says the Austrians have acted with the greatest courage and zeal; that our own troops, or rather Marines, have shown their wonted courage and devotion to the cause of England; that the ships of war have been employed, and given proof of the skill of their officers and crews, and the success contributed in the highest degree to the successes that have been obtained, and their officers and men distinguished themselves by their display of ability, courage, and activity. It appears that all Her Majesty's officers and men have acted in the most meritorious manner: a handful of brave and undaunted men, and a few ships, have put to flight a multitude from the greatest misery to which execrable tyranny can condemn a people.

I have, &c.  
Signed, **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 275.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

"Princess Charlotte," *Dynia*, September 26, 1840.

REFERRING to my letter of the 17th instant, by Colonel Sir C. Smith, I take the opportunity of the Austrian steamer "Fernando I." just arrived from Alexandria, and bringing Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, Lieutenant Colonel Hodges, and the Consul of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to acquaint your Lordship that we are pursuing the most active and energetic measures which are possible to be taken in aid of the faithful subjects of the Porte against the forces of Mehemet Ali.

The ships of the squadron have been spread along the coast from Caiffa to Latakia, and are now extended to Alexandretta, where I have ordered Captain Seymour to be in command, to put in communication with Mr. Hay, the Vice-Consul and give all the encouragement to the people of the country, and all the protection in his power to the Consul and British Consul, as well as to those of our Allies who may require it.

An attempt was made to burn the fort and camp at Tadmor, but the attempt was frustrated to produce the desired effect from the fact, the powder was not exploded by about 1000 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 100 artillery, and the attempt was made to come to the spot, and the "Deubow" moved to the northward towards Latakia; since which I have had no report.

On the other extremity at Caiffa, the "Castor" had all the success that could be expected against the port. The Ottoman flag was pulled on the water about 200 yards, and the ship was set on fire, and the guns on the ramparts spiked, the batteries burnt, and 3000 muskets taken off and put on board the Ottoman frigate "Dewan," which did her part well in this gallant enterprise.

With all this, the Emirs and people of Naplouse, though said to be well disposed, are afraid to expose themselves without a stronger security of a protecting force, being so near the centre of the Egyptian power at Acre.

I have sent Lieutenant Aldrich, of the Engineers, with Rear-Admiral Walker, to make a military inspection of Tadmor, for a point of security and shelter for the Turkish troops, on the setting in of bad weather, and Commodore Napier is now on an expedition with troops for expelling the Egyptians from Sidon, and clearing away the fortifications to destroy the city.

Our camp is more and more protected, and no immediate attack seems threatened. Ibrahim Pasha, with 9,000 troops, is said to be about nine hours off Sidon, and is expected to appear there to-morrow night. He is not taken, but cannot be kept possession of with a small force, having a long line of coast to be guarded, and he cannot be kept in the country, as he would be exposed to the power of the sea.

A vessel of war, about 1000 tons, was captured by the crew of a ship over our station, which was gallantly attacked and carried the day before yesterday, by General Jochims and the Turks, with the loss of two killed and one officer wounded. Commodore Napier, who witnessed this affair, says the Turks behaved with great spirit and bravery. About 300 of the defeated army came over in the evening with their arms and accoutrements.

Our English arms, 12,500, are almost all distributed, and at the different points a great rush is made for more. Those furnished by the Porte, I am sorry to say, are of a very inferior quality, if not even dangerous in firing, and the inhabitants are too well acquainted with the distinction.

There seems to be a kind of prestige about Ismet's name among the country people, and yesterday there arrived here, with the parade of 100 horsemen, seven principal Sheiks of the family Hamadi of Mutama, from the plain of Anti-Latakia, and they declared they would follow the Sultan to the place of the same religion.

I trust the Sultan has authorized the payment of arrears to deserters, having put my name to the Pasha's proclamation to that effect; but, in my opinion, the most effective means of turning over the troops, would be a supply of ready money, as they are not to be paid at present.

I have your Lordship's communication of the blockade, and give the necessary orders, but as the Porte has notified this to be *travaux*, requiring your Lordship to be so good as to inform me whether ships of war as well as merchant ships are intended to be included in it, in which case I should be placed in a position which I am particularly desirous to avert, by the orders of the Government.

27th.—I have just received a despatch from Commodore Napier, acquainting me that the fort of Sidon was taken by force and captured 1000 men, all the guns between 1,500 and 2,000 men. This has not been done without some loss, but I have not yet received the particulars.

The small party of Ismet was taken possession of by Commodore Napier's little squadron, after the affair of Caiffa; and I have received Lieutenant Aldrich's report as to its fitness for the purpose in view, of securing the Turkish troops during the necessary absence of the shipping, a copy of which I transmit herewith, and which your Lordship will observe, leaves us in the same uncertainty as to the result of the operations of the Turkish troops against the superior forces of Ibrahim Pasha.

I am just now informed that Ibrahim had left his camp with half his army; and sixty sergeants and seventy privates have deserted and joined Ismet Pasha at head-quarters here.

28th.—Another message has been sent me by the Pasha, that he has good information Ibrahim marched to the right of our post with 7,000 men, to attempt an attack in the night, for which we shall take all possible care to be prepared.

It is gratifying to me to have received from the officers conducting the



enterprises, the highest encomiums on the spirit and bravery manifested by the officers and men, Austrian, Turkish, and English, who have all gallantly distinguished themselves on every occasion.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,  
Admiral.

Inclosure 2 in No. 275.

*Lieutenant Aldrich to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

Sir,

Taour, September 26, 1840.

AGREEABLY to your Excellency's orders contained in your letter to me of the 24th and 25th instant I have the honour to report to you, that I consider Taour does not afford sufficient shelter as a winter cantonment for the Turkish Army of 6,000 men; that the works upon it do not offer any considerable assistance to such a force placed in a defensive position, and not supported by the fire from shipping on the north and south sides; and that if the Turkish Army, shut up in Taour, was obliged to yield to a superior force, having no shipping to retire with, not a man could escape from the enemy.

There are military communications from this position to Beyrout, Damascus, and Acre, consequently from these ports troops could collect simultaneously in a large force to attack it.

The supply of water depends upon a well inside of an old tower, ninety-eight yards on the east side of the town. In a report I have forwarded your Excellency some of the particulars of this old tower, there is another tower with a well by the side of it; the water obtained from it is very bad, and is not used by the inhabitants, who number 300.

The land defence of the town must be considered mainly to depend upon a trace on its east front, in connexion with the two old towers, and running across the isthmus to an extent of 475 yards.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) EDWARD ALDRICH,  
Lieutenant Engineer.

Inclosure 3 in No. 275.

*General Jochmus to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

General & C. of the Army of Lebanon  
Camp of Djounie, September 26, 1840  
12 o'clock A.M.

Sir,

IN the absence of Commodore Napier, and by his orders, I have the honour of informing your Excellency, that, according to the reports from the country people received in the course of yesterday, Ibrahim Pasha had ordered means of transport to be collected in the villages round Merouba and Guastashos. To-day this news is confirmed from the head-quarters of Sheikh Francis, who, with 2,000 armed mountaineers, observes Ibrahim Pasha in front of Raufan and Fentroun (the Pasha's head-quarters being at Merouba); and he adds, that Ibrahim has given orders to all his partisans in that part of the country to prepare to quit.

The Turkish troops with the Pasha, are deserting in strong numbers, and small detachments are sent into the country to collect them.

Emir Massoud, who commanded the advanced guard of Ibrahim Pasha, being the force opposed to us on the height of Ardali, on the 24th instant, has withdrawn to Tubeddin, six hours from Ardali. His force consisted of—

Four companies of regular Infantry	-	-	400 Men.
A band	-	-	200 „
Drummers under Emir Massoud, grandson of Emir	-	-	-
Bechur	-	-	400 „
Total	-	-	1,000 „

The four companies are all taken prisoners; the Albanians fled with Emir Massoud, and the Drummers dispersed to their houses. On the 25th instant, neither my projects, nor the armed detachments of peasantry, could find any entry at three hours distance from Ardali. The consequence is, that the mountaineers are coming in from the warlike province of Kata in great numbers. There are in this moment distributing 400 stand of Turkish arms to the people of that district, principally to men of Beckfuya, which place was the focus of insurrection some months ago; 1,000 stand of arms were distributed on the 24th and 25th instant.

The principal object of Ibrahim Pasha is keeping his advanced guard at Ardali was, to prevent the communication of this camp with Beckfuya, and to keep up his own communications with Beyrout.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 275.

*General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.*

Camp of Djounie, September 26, 1840.  
8 o'clock, P.M.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the 23rd at night, five battalions of Turkish troops, one battalion of Royal Marines, and two companies of Austrian troops, were left to cover the camp of Djounie.

The remaining forces of this army, consisting of four battalions of Turkish Infantry, one battalion of Royal Marines, and two detachments of Austrian Rocketers were ordered to support position of this camp, with the view to attack at day-break of the 24th, the advanced guard of Ibrahim Pasha of 1,000 men, under Emir Massoud, entrenched at Ardali in a very strong mountainous position, in order to maintain the Pasha's communication from his head-quarters at Merouba with Beyrout.

After a fatiguing march of five hours over very precipitous ground, and having found the Kist River Commander Napier, commanding the whole of the above force, engaged the enemy's position in front with the battalions of Marines and a Turkish battalion, whilst he ordered me, with the remaining third battalion of Selim Pasha's division, to turn the enemy's right flank; which movement I executed without delay, succeeding by the rapidity of the movement, to cut off the enemy's retreat to the Pasha's head-quarters, and thus to make 400 prisoners, and to disperse the remaining force by 11 A.M.

Our troops bivouacked on the field of battle, and in the neighbouring villages on the 25th, and 26th of September.

At night-fall of the Saturday, the troops had returned into our camp, with the exception of one battalion, which remained on the left bank of the Kist, in order to maintain the now open communication of Djounie with the mountaineers of the province of Kata.

This successful affair is the more important, as it is the first victory of the Turks over the Egyptians since many years, although the loss of life is small.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS.

P.S.—I beg also to inclose my appointment as Chief of the land forces in Syria.

Inclosure 5 in No. 273.

Commodore Napier to General Jochnus.

Head-Quarters of the Army of Lebanon,  
Djounne, September 28, 1840.

AGREEABLY to orders from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B.,  
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces by land and sea, on the coast of  
Syria, General Jochnus is appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of Lebanon.  
Signed  
CHARLES NAPIER  
Commodore

Inclosure 6 in No. 273.

Mr. Hay to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Therapia, October 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I left Alexandria on  
the 23rd of September, in company with the Consuls of the Four Powers.

The greatest discontent prevailed among the troops and inhabitants in  
and about Alexandria. Great regret was clearly manifested by them at a report  
which Mehmet Ali had promulgated, of the failure of the combined forces on  
the coast of Syria, and of the defeat of the British Marines, a large body of  
whom he stated were marching prisoners overland for Alexandria.

A body of the National Guard, a body amounting to about 6,000 men, was manifested a few days  
previous to our departure in the great square of Alexandria, where they had  
been assembled. On the 2nd of October they fired a volley of firing, accompanied with cries which were reported to me to be in these  
words "Shame on the English who, after their promises to free us from our  
tyranny, have now abandoned us." At a stop to the tumult, I observed some of the soldiers even threaten to use their  
bayonets against them.

Mehmet Ali, it would seem, has endeavoured to impress on the minds of  
the inhabitants of the interior, that should hostilities take place, it will be a war  
against the Christians, to whom the Sultan is compelled to yield, and that Egypt  
and Syria will become a prey to the Christians.

The appearance of a Turkish vessel of war off Alexandria will tend greatly  
to prove the falsehood of Mehmet Ali's assertions.

The Pasha was reported to be in a very bad state of health, so much so,  
that he was unable to leave his bed. He was, however, informed of the  
movements of the British ships, and he was said to have ordered several  
times to be informed, as he was said to have ordered several times a day, no doubt, and  
greatly to his illness: many think his constitution is fast breaking up.

On the morning of the 26th instant we met a squadron consisting of a  
British ship of the line and brig, an Austrian frigate, a Turkish corvette, and  
two British steamers, on their way to bombard Saida.

About 9 a.m., we passed Beyrout, a British ship of the line and a French  
corvette were lying off the town. The walls and towers appeared to be nearly  
ruined to the ground. Two ships of the line lay off the River Kilsu to cut off  
any troops that might be sent to reinforce Solymen Pasha. We arrived at  
Djounne Bay about 12 o'clock a.m.

I went on shore, and visited the camp. Every measure would appear to  
have been taken in their power to make good their position.

The troops of the combined force were in the highest spirits, and all seemed  
confident of success, even if attacked by superior numbers.

Large bodies of mountaineers were flocking in from the country around,  
some of whom belonged to tribes dwelling three days' journey from the camp.  
There was a great demand for arms: 19,000 have already been distributed.

The British muskets were much sought for, as the Turkish were found generally  
to be of very bad quality, and even dangerous to be fired.

On conversing with these mountaineers they expressed their confidence  
that Ibrahim Pasha would soon be driven out of Syria, or else his whole force  
would be destroyed or taken prisoners. The mountaineers have hardly had  
time to form, yet much has already been done by their assistance, consequently  
further and greater aid in their cooperation may be expected. They were  
most anxious that the fleet should remain some weeks longer, and asserted that  
for at least three or four weeks there was no immediate danger of bad weather.

Emir Bektash was said to have played a fine part in his expedition,  
was said to have been to visit great houses. It was expected that the Druses and  
Mutawies in the state of affairs would soon be over.

The Turkish, Austrian, and British troops have all displayed the greatest  
courage in every rencontre with the Egyptians.

Deserters from Ibrahim and Osman Pasha were hourly coming into the  
camp.

On the morning of the 27th, the "Hydra" came in with 500 Egyptian  
prisoners on board, at 11 a.m. the intelligence of the capture of Saida, and of its  
garrison consisting of 2,000 troops who, on the bombardment, were prevented  
from escaping by being drawn to the island side of the town from  
our vessels. The "Hydra" has also been taken possession of in the latter  
place, provisions for the garrison consisting of 500,000, for four months were  
found, ammunition also in a considerable quantity. The possession of these  
towns will open to the combined forces communication at all points of the coast,  
Solymen Pasha's army is now completely isolated on all sides.

In the course of the day the "Comus" and "Stratford" came in  
with the remainder of the prisoners, and 2,000 stand of arms. The  
"Stratford" also carried 100,000 for the British and 750 Marines  
she had on board to assist in the assault of Saida. A gunboat is stationed off  
Gehaly, and is landing arms.

Izzet Pasha is stated to be unwell, and up to the present moment has not,  
I understand, been in active operation. There did not seem to be entertained a  
very high opinion of his abilities.

In the evening of the 27th it was reported that Ibrahim Pasha intended to  
attack the camp and fleet with 6,000 troops, but the truth of such a hazardous  
undertaking was not admitted. Should the attack not be made, I understand  
that a body of Turkish troops and a battalion of Marines would be sent to  
attack Osman Pasha, who had about 2,000 troops in a fort or monastery, some  
seven hours' march from the camp. Of the success of this expedition all  
seemed to be confident.

At 10 a.m. we left Djounne Bay. A Turkish steamer and two  
Captains met us. Reports had arrived that Ibrahim Pasha had been  
driven from Saida.

On the 1st instant we touched at Rhodes. On the 2nd we met the  
Turkish steamer "Tahir Al Bahary," with 500 troops for Syria. We com-  
municated to the Commander, Captain Ford, the news from Syria.

I beg your Lordship to pardon the haste with which this report is written.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY

P.S.—On the morning of the day of our departure, I was informed it was  
the intention of the Admiral to send three British ships of the line and a  
Turkish corvette to enforce the blockade off Alexandria.



No 276

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)*

(No. 225)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I have addressed to General Jellinek communicating his appointment by the Porte to the rank of Ferik, on the conditions therein mentioned.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 276.

*Viscount Ponsonby to General Jochims.*

Sir,

Therapia, September 30, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, at my solicitation, has been graciously pleased to confer upon you the rank of Ferik in the Ottoman Army, and that this rank is given upon the condition of your obeying the orders of Colonel Sir Charles Smith. I have sent copy of this letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 277.

*Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)*

(No. 144)

My Lord,

Vienna, October 14, 1840.

RECHID PASHA has applied to Prince Metternich for advice, as to an overture to be made by the Porte to the French Government as to the eventual restoration of Mehemet Ali to the Pashalik of Egypt. This idea seems to have been first suggested to the Porte by M. Cor and other Frenchmen who attended the Turkish Authorities and it made on the terms they had prepared, would almost have amounted to a recourse to France against the Four Powers.

Prince Metternich approves the idea, but in order to guard against mistake in the mode of execution, he proposes that the overture shall be made by Cheikib Effendi in a Note to M. Guizot, the redaction of which shall have been first approved by the Conference of London. The Prince will to-morrow despatch a courier to Baron Neumann, bearing instructions on this subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 278.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 294)

My Lord,

Paris, October 22, 1840.

ON Tuesday last the President of the Council and the Minister of the Interior submitted to the King the project of the speech which they proposed that His Majesty should deliver to the Chambers at the opening of the Session on Wednesday next.

The King objected to two parts of this project, the one regarding the necessity of a further augmentation of the army by calling out the contingent for 1840, and the other expressing the same opinion as is expressed in the despatch of M. Thiers to M. Guizot, of the 8th of October, relative to Mehemet Ali being maintained in the government of Egypt, as an element of the general balance of Europe.

Those objections of the King were, yesterday morning, considered at a meeting of the Cabinet Council, and, in the evening, the Council assembled at St. Cloud, when the Ministers expressed to His Majesty the necessity of their tendering their resignations if His Majesty persevered in omitting those parts of the speech to which he had made objection.

The King, in consequence, sent this day for Marshal Soult; and I understand that the Marshal has undertaken to form a Ministry. He accepts the office of Minister of War, with the Presidency of the Council. A telegraphic despatch has been sent to M. Guizot, offering him the Portefeuille des Affaires Etrangères; and the other offices will be filled by the former Colleagues of the Marshal in the Ministry of the 12th of May.

The vehemence of the press against this change of Ministers will create a very great excitement in Paris, and apprehension is felt of its leading to a disturbance of the general peace. It is impossible to form a conjecture as to the support the new Ministry will obtain in the Chamber of Deputies.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No 279.

*Mr Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)*

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 17, 1840.

YOUR Lordship will have learnt from my late despatches that the Emperor and the Russian Government did not approve of the edict issued by the Sultan depriving Mehemet Ali of the Pashalik of Egypt.

Under these circumstances I mentioned to Count Newelrode your Lordship's opinion of this measure, as stated in your No. 272 to Earl Granville, namely:—That Her Majesty's Government look upon this measure as a means of coercion employed by the Sultan in order to obtain the acquiescence of Mehemet Ali on the terms proposed to him; and it does not appear to Her Majesty's Government that this edict prejudices the arrangement which the Sultan might be disposed to make in Mehemet Ali's favour, if the Pasha should at a nearly moment withdraw his refusal and accept the conditions of the

Treaty. And I have now the satisfaction to inform you, that the Emperor has become quite reconciled to the Sultan's edict, since His Imperial Majesty has learnt your Lordship's view of the measure.

In mentioning this change in the Emperor's opinions, Count Nesselrode observed that our Lordship had discovered a most happy mode of explaining the object of this edict, which he thought would have a good effect at Paris and Vienna.

I reported in my No. 83, that Count Nesselrode had evinced a feeling of irritation against Prince Metternich. This is beginning to subside; but I had a general conversation here at this moment to cry down Austria and Prussia as weak enemies, and as likely to fail in their support of the alliance, in the event of difficulties and complications arising—whereas the assumed expression of confidence in Her Majesty's Government is very striking when compared with the feelings that existed a few months ago.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 280.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 17, 1840.

M. DE LIEBERMANN, the Prussian Minister, called on me a few days ago, and read a despatch from M. de Schadowitz dated London—October 2 which had been forwarded to him by the Government.

This despatch contained a report of an interview which your Lordship had and with the Representatives of the Three Powers, upon the subject of making a collective venture to the French Government based to a certain degree, on the basis of your Lordship's letter to the King of the Belgians of the 2nd of September.

M. de Schadowitz's reply to your Lordship was of exactly the same tenor as that of Baron Neumann, and conveyed the more expression of his disappointment at this proposal.

The Prussian Government having always been desirous to come to any arrangement by which war can be avoided, it is well pleased with the communication of your Lordship, and the object of M. de Liebermann's visit to me was to express his desire to support her, and hold the same language as your Lordship, to urge the Imperial Government well to consider the proposals that were expected from London.

The Prussian Minister has since been at Charskoe Feld, and tells me that he is not at all disposed to make any overtures to France, stating that the Three Powers could not consent to any such step, that France must make the first proposal. M. de Liebermann said that he found as much repugnance as ever on the part of the Emperor to act with France.

I told the Prussian Minister that I had not received any instructions from your Lordship, but that I should see Count Nesselrode after the arrival of the Lubek steam-boat, and might possibly learn something from him on the subject.

I called yesterday on the Vice-Chancellor, and the first question he asked was, if I had brought him the Memorandum which your Lordship had intended drawing up for communication to the Three Powers.

I replied that I had not received anything of the kind, and proceeded to inquire whether the proposal, of which I had indirectly heard, was likely to be favourably received by the Imperial Government?

His Excellency said that he could not give any opinion on the subject at present, that when the Memorandum arrived, he would take the question into consideration.

I am confident that Count Nesselrode is disposed to make any fair concession of opinion on this point, with the view of preventing an European war, but his Excellency well knows all the difficulties he will have to combat when the Emperor's consent is sought for.

In speaking of Prince Metternich's letter, Count Nesselrode said, that circumstances had now assumed an aspect very different from that which existed when his Highness wrote to the King of the Belgians, and that many modifications must be introduced.

Count Nesselrode read me a letter from Baron Brunnow, detailing your Lordship's last interview with M. Guizot. This report coincides entirely with your Lordship's despatch, No. 275, to Earl Granville.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 291.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 227.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, October 7, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that Salami Bey sails this night in "l'Etoile Polaire," Russian steamer, for Beyrout. He takes with him two millions and a-half of piastres. This sum is in addition to the 15,000 men mentioned before. I have written to Sir Charles Smith to notify the fact to him, and to tell him the money is to be expended under his (Sir Charles Smith's) control.

The "Talbot" frigate will take troops to Beyrout. The Porte will send 15,000 men: they are good troops.

The spirit of the Turkish soldiers has been shown in Syria: they will follow when they have confidence in those who lead them. Our officers know how to inspire that confidence.

No. 292.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 228.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 7, 1840.

COUNT WALEWSKI paid a visit yesterday to Rechid Pasha to take leave. He said, that France had engaged Mehemet Ali to restore to the Sublime Porte, the district of Adana, the Isle of Candia, and the Holy Cities; that Mehemet Ali had shown himself ready to comply with these wishes of France, and was even ready to desert from his demand of the hereditary government of Syria; and therefore France was under a tacit engagement to act, if these intentions were opposed; and that there were in France very warlike dispositions, that great preparations were making there, great armaments, &c.; that Mehemet Ali is old and will live only a few years; that the Porte will therefore have but little to give to him, or to his children, in granting the administration for life of some provinces in Syria; and, finally, that France is much disposed to be of use to Turkey; and that it was exactly for that end M. Thiers had ordered him (Count Walewski) to hold this language to the Pasha. Rechid answered, that the Sublime Porte would not, and could not, deviate from the Convention of the 15th of July.

4 L 2



The foregoing is taken from a report made by Baron H. Testa to the Internuncio, which his Excellency communicated to me.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY

No. 283

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26)

(No. 229)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 7, 1840.

I HAVE received from his Excellency the Internuncio the following information: That whilst Baron Testa was with Rechid Pasha yesterday, a letter was brought him, written by Mehmet Ali to the Grand Vizier, and which arrived by the French packet the day before yesterday, the 5th instant, and which is dated the last days of September. The Pasha allowed M. Testa to read the letter, although it had not been submitted to the Sultan.

Mehmet Ali therein announces, that France having remained neuter, he had asked for her mediation, and that France had well received his request. This communication is preceded and followed by every sort of protestation of zeal and devotion to the interests of the country and religion. The Pasha intends to send a copy of this letter to the Four Representatives.

Count Walewski had an interview subsequently with the Pasha, and he said nothing of the above-mentioned letter.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY.

No. 284.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

No. 232)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 7, 1840.

IN compliance with the desire of the Sublime Porte, and in concurrence with my Colleagues, I have recalled Colonel Hodges to Constantinople, and requested him to come here with the other Consuls of the Three Allied Powers. I inclose copy of my letter to the Colonel.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY.

Inclosure in No. 284.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges

Sir,

Therapia, October 4, 1840

I HAVE to inform you, that the Representatives of the Four Powers acting in concert, and the declared wish of the Sublime Porte, have resolved to recall the Consuls General of the Allied Powers from Syria, and to request them to come to Constantinople. I have therefore instructed you to make Syria without delay, and also to inform you that the Russian Minister has sent the "Imar Sarr," a Russian steamer, to be ready to take Count M... and has been so good as to offer a passage in that vessel for your convenience.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY

No. 285.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26)

(No. 233.)

My Lord.

Therapia, October 8, 1840

I HAVE this day received an Official Note from his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, despatching that the Sublime Porte has ordered the Commander of the Turkish squadron charged with the blockade of Alexandria, &c., to subject ships of war to the said blockade, and requesting me to give instructions to the same effect to Her Majesty's Admiral.

A similar communication of the orders given by the Sublime Porte has been made to all the Ministers of the Four Powers, and the same request has been made to the Internuncio, to make the Austrian Admiral acquainted with the order of the Porte.

The Ministers of the Four Powers were previously made acquainted with the intention of the Porte, and had agreed that the Internuncio and myself should comply with the requests of the Sublime Porte.

I enclose copy of my despatch to Admiral Sir R. Stopford, in which I also reply to questions put to me by the Admiral.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 285.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Balta Laman, le 8 Octobre, 1840.

LA Sublime Porte considérant que le blocus des ports et échelles de l'Egypte et de la Syrie n'atteindrait qu'incomplètement son but si les bâtimens de guerre étrangers en él et en qu'ils vent l'annoncer au commandant de la flotille Ottomane chargée de ce blocus d'y soumettre également les dits bâtimens de guerre.

En informant votre Excellence de cette décision, je la prie de vouloir bien faire parvenir des instructions analogues à Monsieur l'Amiral des forces navales Britanniques.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) RECHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 285

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir,

Therapia, October 8, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, a communication I have just received from the Sublime Porte upon the subject of the blockade.

It appears to me, that the Porte intends to exclude the French steamers, on account of the fact, that they are the means whereby intrigues of a very dangerous nature are kept up in this capital.

The French steamers are ships of war.

There can be no doubt that the blockade ordered by the Sultan is a blockade that excludes every ship, of every sort and kind, from the blockaded ports, and is to be observed according to the regulations of the Law of Nations. It is for you to decide, whether or not you will carry it into execution; and the blockade, as it has hitherto been existing, to which you refer, as if it were all that is to be done, appears to have been one of a different nature, inasmuch as its effect has been to exclude English and Austrian ships having certain cargoes,

and to admit ships into Alexandria, under Belgian or other flags, having cargoes of the same kind as the British ships excluded from that port.

The blockade ordered by the Sultan is a strict universal blockade which puts an end to all intercourse, excepting what may be allowed by international law or what mitigation may be accorded by the Sultan, in such cases as the Sublime Porte shall judge to be advisable.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 286

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 234)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 9, 1840.

THE Sultan has given from his Civil List five millions of piastres, half the sum was sent with Selami Bey to Syria, half is kept in reserve here for the same service.

Ten transports are now leaving the harbour for Beyrout with 8,000 troops (good troops) and 5,000 muskets. More troops will follow and more muskets.

The exertions of the Ottoman Ministers are worthy of all praise. They will be amply rewarded by entire success, if they be not thwarted by the abandonment, on the part of others, of the policy into which the Porte has been directed by the Allies of the Sultan.

Your Lordship will be pleased to see the reports with which measures have been taken here and the success which has followed promptitude and vigour in Syria.

Your Lordship will see in the facts I have reported in previous despatches that Mehmet Ali is at his last gasp in Alexandria itself, and will only escape destruction by want of moral courage on the part of those who oppose him. It will also be agreeable to your Lordship to have seen the courageous and energetic conduct of Captain Walker and the Turkish Captain, Mustafa Bey, and that you will not attach great weight to the opinion of a skilful and able agent as Captain Walker respecting the great facility with which St. Jean d'Acre may be taken.

We have nothing to fear from Mehmet Ali's power, nothing from Ibrahim, unless on the accounts that reach this place from Syria are in a high degree erroneous or unless there should be some in Syria with extraordinary imprudence, or with most unpardonable weakness. No man who knows our countrymen can fear the latter, and I believe the first is highly improbable.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 287

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 235)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 9, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter from Mehmet Ali to the Grand Vicer. It came by the last French steamer, and the efforts of the French were renewed on the occasion to induce Rechid Pasha to make an arrangement with Mehmet Ali; Count Walewski urged it; he is the agent of M. Thiers. The Pasha replied, that the Porte would not devote a hair's breadth from the policy it had entered into with the Four Powers. Count Walewski is gone to Alexandria; it is reported M. de Bunsen is gone with him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

Inclosure in No. 287

Mehmet Ali to the Grand Vicer.—Bad of September, 1840.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Altesse a bien voulu m'adresser pour m'annoncer qu'on a jugé à propos de me décharger des fonctions de Gouverneur d'Égypte. Puisse le Très-Haut préserver Sa Hauteesse votre auguste et éminent souverain de toutes les vicissitudes humaines et garantir ses états de tout malheur et de toute calamité! Sous les auspices de Sa Hauteesse et en travaillant nuit et jour, j'ai réussi à acquiescer contre les mal-intentionnés des moyens de défense destinés à être employés exclusivement au maintien de l'Empire Ottoman et à la consolidation de la religion et du Gouvernement de Sa Hauteesse. En me confiant donc dans le secours et dans la grâce de Dieu et dans l'assistance spirituelle de notre Saint Prophète, je m'apprete à tenir tête aux ennemis et outrages que les ennemis se permettent à présent de tous côtés. Dans ce cas, mon dévouement et ma religion ne me permettent pas de me laisser vaincre par les artifices de quelques hommes méprisables et trompés par leur puissance à faucher à l'ennemi la réussite de ses projets en ayant les forces militaires de Sa Hauteesse qui se trouvent auprès de moi. De l'autre côté, je suis prêt à faire toutes les efforts possibles pour maintenir la paix générale et confirmer mon dévouement à mon souverain. Par conséquent, j'ai prié le Gouvernement Français qui est resté neutre dans cette affaire et qui s'est tenu à l'écart de la bien-aimée de la Sublime Porte d'interposer ses bons offices et de faire que le Gouvernement se montre, avec plaisir, prêt à accueillir une demande. Je n'abandonnerai point à l'espérance que les bonnes idées et éclaircies parmi les Ministres de la Sublime Porte approfondiront et approfondiront au juste le véritable motif de la conjonction actuelle et travailleront à détourner les dangers présents et à venir, qu'en permettant ainsi l'intervention amicale du Gouvernement Français et en ayant la bonté de la faire agréer aussi aux puissances Alliées, la paix sera fermement dans nos efforts pour la cause de la Sublime Porte et le salut de la Nation Musulmane et arriveront au but désiré au port du salut, bien, comme je le souhaite que dans l'autre. Votre Altesse ce que je prends la liberté de vous exposer, d'après mes connaissances et mon faible jugement. Il ne peut être d'ailleurs de votre Altesse de prendre telle décision qui lui paraîtra convenable.

No. 288

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(Confidential)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 7, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose extract from the Syrian journal of Mr. Redhouse, a gentleman who lives in the Frank quarter and is a man of sense. This extract is not mentioned in other reports, and states facts worth being submitted to your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

Inclosure in No. 288

Extract from Mr. Redhouse's Journal.

Sunday, 27th, 6 A.M.

CAPTAIN WALKER came on board to see me. He had been down to inspect Tyre, to see if it could be made quarters for the army in winter, and on his arrival there, on board the "Hydra," he found the "Kaywan" and the two



English frigates had already taken possession of the place, and found in it four months' provisions of corn, &c. These three vessels had also attacked Caffa, and although within sight of the whole garrison of Acre, and about 1,500 troops, its own garrison, who had evacuated the place on the approach of the squadron, they took all the brass guns and the mortars and about a thousand stand of arms and cartouches, accoutrements, &c. blew up the citadel, and then leaving the place, had gone to Tyre, which had also been evacuated on their approach. Captain Walker, finding matters in this condition and having ascertained, together with Captain Aldrich, Royal Engineers that Tyre was too small for winter quarters, immediately returned towards Dyonis Bay to report, and to send some merchant vessels down to carry off the corn and other provisions. On his way back, the "Hydra" fell in with the squadron sent to attack Saida, and immediately joined it. Another steam-vessel, the "Stromboli" on her passage direct from England, with 350 Marines on board to join the fleet, happened to be in the bay, and received orders to join it, so that instead of two, four large steamers attacked the place. Captain Walker headed the Turks in the assault that was given after a breach was made, Napier and Aldrich the English, and the Archduke the Austrians. The assault was made in three places, under the fire of the ships; and to prevent the garrison from running away, the steamers kept sending bombs away beyond the town, and so kept them in; the Egyptian troops fought well from the houses, but were turned out, and driven back to the barracks, where, at last they were obliged to lay down their arms about sunset; the number was estimated to be about 2,000, of which 500 were immediately embarked on board the "Hydra," and Captains Walker and Aldrich returned with them to Dyonis Bay.

I went with Captain Walker to see Sir Robert Stopford, who then told me he could not send me to Candia; that Izet Pasha had been on board the previous day, and they had decided that the matter could very well be postponed, and they had no more ships than they were absolutely in need of. During breakfast, the "Stromboli" arrived, and I received the Admiral's despatches, in which he was ordered to enforce the blockade of Alexandria, and in consequence, he determined to send down three more sail of the line and the "Aou lah," to reinforce the vessels already there.

Leaving Sir Robert, I accompanied Captain Walker to see Izet Pasha, who was on board the "Hydra." After a short conversation, the events which had taken place to the southward, Captain Walker declared it to be his opinion that an attack on Acre would be not only successful, but seeing the mental and bodily state of the Egyptians, it would not occupy one hour. Izet Pasha said he was perfectly willing to make the attempt, if the Admiral would, —that it was necessary to strike some such decisive blow, either to take Acre, or to attack the camp of Ibrahim Pasha, as it would be madness to remain where they were, when the fleet went away, as they would be forced to do when the winter came on; he said that if he had 25,000 men under him, he could then be actively employed; whereas now if he were to attempt merely to surround the place, he should not have a soldier left, but it would be necessary to have a large force in his present quarters if the fleet left him, and that he would not leave his troops so, and finally he suggested that Captain Walker should propose to the Admiral the attack of Acre, and also to remove the ships a short distance to the south to bring down a corps of 550 good troops stationed there, and another to Cyprus to fetch the regiment of Sicily garrisoned there. The Admiral flatly refused his assent to attacking Acre, alleging, in the first place, his want of instructions; next, on account of being ordered to send some ships down to Alexandria, his present position, and thirdly, the necessity he was under of preserving his whole force in an efficient state for service, in order to be able to cope with the French fleet in case hostilities should commence between England and France. As to the steamers, he said he would decide on that matter when Commodore Napier returned from Saida. Another subject the Pasha wished was to send thirty-eight Egyptian officers, prisoners, and refugees, to Constantinople on board our steamer, and Admiral Handiera, coming on board the "Princess Charlotte" about this time, the thing was proposed to him, but he refused to allow more than eight to be taken on board; he also objected strongly to the attacking of Acre. However, Captain Walker and Colonel Hodges, with Count Medem and Captain Aldrich, agreed among themselves to wait for the return of Commodore Napier,

and then gaining him over to their views, to make a combined attack on the Admiral, and persuade him to undertake that measure, four or five in the afternoon was fixed upon as the time for our steamer to start.

No. 289.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 214.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 27, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to No. 236 inclusive.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte that the language of Count Walewski reported in your despatch No. 238, was only meant to enable us to estimate, and to understand, France whether she would support to M. de Montebello what she would do, so, because, by so doing she would place herself in closer connection with the Porte, and act in her army not her navy, as it might be said, in a common cause. By sea, France is greatly inferior to England, but much more so to England and Russia united. By land she has not with all her recent armaments more than her full peace establishment of 150,000 men, and of that force she is going to keep 100,000 men. As regards her fleet, she has not, and could not, for many months to come, have a single ship of war, and she is at present at war with Germany and Russia. But the conference of M. de Montebello and his colleagues to an effect, is a sure pledge to Europe that France is not going to make war in defence of Mehemet Ali.

All these considerations, however, ought only to be additional motives with the Porte for making the best use of the time present, and for employing every means for bringing the war in Syria to a speedy and successful termination. Her Majesty's Government have had no objection to the exertions which the Porte is making to send to Syria, troops, money, and arms, and I have to signify to you, the full approbation of Her Majesty's Government, of the zeal and ability with which you have urged the Turkish Government to make those exertions.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 290.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 215.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 27, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 233, I have to state to your Excellency, that it is to be presumed, that the blockade will be raised with respect to Syrian ports occupied by the Turkish troops.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 291.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 27, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 233, respecting the extension to ships of war of the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, established by the Porte, I have to observe to your Excellency, that such extension is, in

fact, only giving to the blockade its usual and natural scope; because ships of war are by international law, as much excluded as merchants ships from blockaded ports.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 292.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 295.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 23, 1840.

ON Tuesday last, I read to M. Thiers your Lordship's despatch to Lord Pimbury, No. 295, of the 15th October, and received a copy of it to his Excellency, accompanied by a Note containing all that your Lordship instructed me to say to the French Minister at the time that I communicated your despatch.

When I had finished reading these papers M. Thiers said that although he was not prepared to give me an official answer to my communication, he would not delay expressing the satisfaction with which he had heard the friendly language of Her Majesty's Government, he wished that he could perceive in the substance of the communication, some approach towards the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, but he did not see how your Lordship's despatch to Lord Pimbury would advance that object. Mehmet Ali, he said, being in possession of the whole of Syria, with the exception of some insignificant places ("des bicoques") on the coast, could not be expected to submit to the conditions on which alone, according to the suggestion of the Allied Powers to the Porte, the Sultan should reinstate him in his Pashalik. Had his acceptance of the territorial arrangement of the Treaty of July been made the condition of his reinstatement, Mehmet Ali trusting to the generosity of the Sultan to bestow an additional Pashalik on one of his sons, might perhaps have been induced to agree to it.

M. Thiers then spoke to me of despatches he had received from Count Brunsen which stated that the Prussian Government purpose making some propositions to the other Powers to the Treaty of July, connected to bring about an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali, in which the French Government might concur. I asked M. Thiers if Count Brunsen had stated what were the conditions of this arrangement, he answered that they were such as he had just stated might, perhaps, be accepted by the Pasha.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 293.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

No. 297.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 23, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 300 inclusive. I have not seen M. Thiers since the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No. 295, a copy of which you direct me to give him, after reading it to his Excellency.

M. Thiers, however, having resigned his office, and the King having accepted his resignation, I will as it is usual after such circumstances, I imagine, entering with me upon public business, excepting matters of mere routine and which could not be deferred without inconvenience.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 294.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 304.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 27, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 297 of the 23rd instant, from which it appears, that your Excellency has not, in compliance with your instructions, furnished the French Government with a copy of my despatch, No. 295, of the 20th instant.

I have to observe to your Excellency in reply, that if you had not an opportunity of seeing M. Thiers, you ought to have sent him a copy of the despatch in question, and I have now again to instruct your Excellency to transmit without delay, a copy of that despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 295.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 306.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 27, 1840.

M. GUIZOT called on me on Saturday afternoon, before he left London for Paris. He informed me that he had received a summons from the King and from M. Thiers, and that the letter from the King expressed a desire that he should take office. He said, that if a Government could be formed consisting of persons with whom it would suit him to act, and he mentioned particularly Marshal Soult and M. Duchâtel, he should feel it his duty to place his services at the King's disposal, and that one of the great objects in taking office would be, to bring about a good understanding between France and England, not only upon Turkish Affairs, but upon all other questions. He said, however, that Turkish Affairs were the subject of the day which pressed the most, and upon which it is of the most importance that the two countries should come to an agreement, and he said, he spoke specially of an agreement between England and France, because he was convinced, that if our two Governments could come to an understanding on these matters, there would be little difficulty in prevailing upon the other Powers to fall into our views. He said, that if these matters were satisfactorily settled, the military and naval armaments of France would soon be placed upon such a footing as to give no just cause of uneasiness to other countries, but he said, that the English Government must come to the assistance of that of France in this matter, by agreeing to some arrangement consistent with the honour and feelings of all parties.

I said, that Her Majesty's Government are most sincerely anxious to see a good understanding re-established between England and France, and that their wish upon this point must be doubly strong, if he is to be charged with the conduct of the Foreign relations of France. And I added, that it did not seem to me to be difficult to arrive at such an understanding between the two Governments, even upon the Turkish Question, which being the practical and most important matter of the day, must be the foundation for everything else; for, I observed, the course of events seems already to have pointed out the means of arrangement. France has said, that there is one thing to which she attaches much importance (why she does so I could not imagine, according to the principles which she has laid down), and that is, that Mehmet Ali should be allowed to continue Governor of Egypt; on the other hand the Four Powers attach great importance to another thing, and that is, that the Sultan should re-establish his direct authority in the whole of Syria. I said, that these two things seem to be perfectly compatible; that the latter is on



the point of being accomplished by the rapid success of the operations of the Allies in Syria; and that the Four Powers have no wish to see Mehemet Ali deprived of Egypt, if by a prompt submission to the Sultan, he should entitle himself to the favour of his Sovereign. Here then, I said, are the elements of an arrangement which the course of events appears to be upon the eve of bringing about.

M. Guizot did not seem, however, disposed to acquiesce entirely in this plan; he said that France and the Four Powers are not, in regard to these matters, upon an equal footing. That France has always been for maintaining the *status quo* of Kutaya; and that the Four Powers were for it also till not long ago, and that it is only of late that they have changed their mind, and thought it necessary to restore Syria to the Sultan. That France cannot be expected to sacrifice her opinions and *amour-propre* merely because the other Powers have altered their views; and that the Four Powers ought to modify the arrangement of the Treaty, in order to assist the King of the French in maintaining peace.

I said, that the Four Powers had felt it necessary to undo the arrangement of Kutaya, because experience had shown that arrangement to be incompatible with the maintenance of peace in the Ottoman Empire. That certainly France and the Four Powers are not upon an equal footing in these matters, though for a different reason from that which he had assigned. For France stands out upon her *amour-propre*, and adheres to opinions merely because she entertained them at a former period. While the Four Powers stand out upon their opinion, because they are convinced that its execution is essential to the peace of Europe, and to the preservation of the balance of power. I said, that regard for *amour-propre* was not a ground upon which the great affairs of Europe could be placed; and that the considerations which influence the Four Powers seemed to me to be the true guide of Governments.

M. Guizot said, that this conversation was merely preliminary, because he could not, till he arrived at Paris, know whether such a Government could be formed as he would like to belong to; but that if he should take office, he would then, from Paris, make his communication to the English Government.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 296.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 26, 1840.

THE King did me the honour this day to converse with me confidentially on the circumstances which caused the resignation of M. Thiers and his Colleagues, and on the steps taken for the formation of a new Ministry. The King told me that he had made three objections to the King's speech which M. Thiers proposed that His Majesty should deliver at the opening of the session.

In the first place, His Majesty objected to all mention of the Treaty of the 15th of July. It was unusual, he said, for Sovereigns to refer in a speech from the throne to treaties concluded between other Powers to which his Government was not a party; and the mention of the Treaty in the speech was an invitation to the Chambers to express an opinion regarding the Treaty in their address. His Majesty also objected to expressing in the speech in terms as plain, if not plainer, than those used in M. Thiers' Note of the 8th of October, the determination of France to uphold Mehemet Ali in the possession of Egypt. And, thirdly, His Majesty had an insurmountable objection to call upon the Chamber to vote an augmentation of 150,000 men to the army, which already amounts to more than 440,000 men.

On the two first points it might have been possible, said His Majesty, for him to have come to some compromise with his Ministers, but on the latter point there seemed no chance of an agreement. The armament made by France he con-

sidered as an "armement de précaution," whilst that proposed by his Ministers must be considered as an "armement de guerre."

That the Allies had hitherto abstained from arming, but if the French army were augmented to the amount proposed by M. Thiers, how could it be expected that the other Powers of Europe would not arm; and when all were prepared for war, the danger of it could not but be imminent.

The King, after thus explaining to me the grounds of his difference with his Ministers, said, that having accepted the resignation of M. Thiers and of his Colleagues, he had sent for Marshal Soult, who was prepared to undertake the formation of a new Ministry; he had also sent for M. Guizot from London, to whom Marshal Soult was willing to propose the Portefeuille of Foreign Affairs, and that the Marshal proposed to fill up the other Cabinet offices with members of the Ministry of the 12th of May.

M. Passy had, however, made some difficulty about entering into office with M. Guizot, but he hoped it would not prevent his accepting the office of Minister of Finance.

His Majesty said he had, with the concurrence of M. Thiers and of Marshal Soult, adjourned the meeting of the Chambers till the 5th of November, to give time previous to the opening of the session for the formation of the new Ministry, and for their coming to an understanding on the principles and policy of their Government.

The King said, that in the present excited state of the country, he exposed himself to much unpopularity by the step he had taken; that the Duc de Broglie, on whose opinion he set the highest value, as well as other well-judging persons, had represented to him the danger of separating himself from his Ministers on a question in regard to which the current of popular feeling was likely to run very strongly in favour of their opinion. He was not, however, to be intimidated or deterred from doing what he thought to be his duty, by the abuse of the press or by public clamour; but he thought he had some right to expect that when he made sacrifices with a view to the maintenance of the peace of the world, other Powers should assist him in his endeavours to effect that object; and His Majesty, then adverting to the conditions of a pacific arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha, spoke of the possibility of those conditions being such as were imposed by the Treaty of the 15th of July; but that the giving a Pashalic in addition to the son of Mehemet Ali would not be incompatible with the Articles of that Treaty.

I mentioned to the King, that by the last accounts from Syria it appeared that the success of the Allies had been more rapid than could have been expected; and that there was reason to believe that the Egyptians would be soon driven out of Syria; and that if the inhabitants, with the inconsiderable assistance afforded by the Allies of the Sultan, could relieve themselves from the Egyptian yoke, it seemed to be out of the question that that yoke should be again imposed upon them by an arrangement concluded between the European Powers.

The King answered, that Admiral Roussin had this morning told him that he had just received letters from Admiral Hugon which stated that the force of the Allies was still confined to the coast, and that Ibrahim had nothing to apprehend from the insurrection in the interior.

This is the substance of the King's conversation.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 297.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 1)

(No. 303.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 30, 1840.

The "Moniteur" of this morning contains the Royal Ordinances which I stated in my despatch of last night to your Lordship, had been signed yesterday by the King.

M. Dufaure and M. Passy, who were members of the Soult Ministry, and



who, it was expected, would accept the offices which were on this occasion offered to them by Marshal Soult, have declined to belong to an administration in which the two most important offices of the Government, the Foreign Affairs and the Interior, were to be in the hands of the Doctrinaire party.

This refusal will, probably, alienate nearly all the Centre Gauche party from the Government, and the whole of the Parisian press, with the exception of the "Journal des Débats," will be in opposition to it. The friends of the new Ministry, notwithstanding, have sanguine hopes that it will obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies; and M. Guizot, who did me the honour to call upon me to-day, even before I had received the official notification of his appointment, talked with confidence of the strength of the Government. His Excellency expressed great impatience for an early discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on the Address, and on the vote of credit which will be demanded to make good the expenses incurred by the military and naval appointments. And I rather collected from his conversation, that there is an intention to adjourn the Chamber after these debates are over, in case any negotiation should be on foot between France and the Four Powers on the affairs of the East. M. Guizot said, that any such negotiation must depend upon the result of the operations of the Allied Powers in Syria, which result must, in the course of three or four weeks, be known. If Mehmet Ali were disposed to yield to the demands of the Sultan, or if the Egyptian Army were compelled to evacuate Syria, the question of a pacific arrangement would be much simplified; but if the Turks and their Allies were obliged to abandon the coast of Syria, or if, notwithstanding their continued occupation of it, the Egyptians remained masters of the interior of the country, there would be new phases in the Eastern Question, in which a new negotiation would probably arise. If, in consequence of maritime operations on the coast being found insufficient to obtain the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, any idea should be entertained of employing a large European army to effect that object, M. Guizot added, it would be matter of grave consideration with the French Government, what course they might feel themselves under such circumstances compelled to adopt.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 298.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 1.)*

(No. 305.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 30, 1840.

IMMEDIATELY upon the receipt yesterday of your Lordship's despatch No. 304, I transmitted to M. Thiers a copy of your despatch of the 20th ultimo, No. 295.

With reference to your Lordship's observation, that I ought, in compliance with the instructions contained in that despatch, to have sent to M. Thiers a copy of it, at the time it reached my hands, I have to express the regret and pain with which I learn your disapprobation of my conduct; but I cannot take any blame to myself for not having deviated from the practice which has usually, if not invariably, prevailed under similar circumstances.

Before I received your Lordship's despatch, M. Thiers had resigned his office, and his resignation had been accepted by the King; he held, as he said himself, the Portefeuille of the Foreign Affairs, only for the purpose of expediting routine business, which could not, without inconvenience, be delayed till the appointment of his successor, and he considered himself, as his predecessors in a similar position have always done, not competent to make or receive official communications on other matters. During the long ministerial interregnum which succeeded the resignation of Count Molé, an interval of six weeks, Count Molé transacted no business of a political nature, and I was not instructed by your Lordship to urge such business on his attention; and as you wrote to me your despatch No. 295, under the impression that M. Thiers would be in office

at the time I received it, it never occurred to me that in not sending the despatch to a Minister who had resigned, I was contravening your Lordship's intentions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

P. S.—Since I wrote the above, M. Guizot told me that he had received your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 295, which I transmitted yesterday to the address of M. Thiers; that your Lordship had shown it to him previous to his departure from London, and that as it seemed to have reference chiefly to arguments used by M. Thiers in his conversation with me, he should not write any note or despatch in reply, but that if any parts of it required an answer, the answer would be found in the King's speech at the opening of the session.

No. 299.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 319.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1840.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch, No. 305, in which your Excellency explains your reasons for not having communicated to M. Thiers a copy of my despatch, No. 295, of the 20th instant, as therein directed.

I have to observe to your Excellency, in reply, that no doubt a Minister who has resigned, and who is only continuing to act until his successor is appointed, cannot with propriety enter upon any new matter of business, or receive or make official communications which tend to future measures; because, on the one hand, having divested himself of future responsibility, he could not properly pledge or engage the Crown, whose servant he is, as to future measures; and, on the other hand, it would be a waste of time for him to discuss with any Foreign Minister, measures or proceedings over the conduct of which he would not have any controul. But as long as such a Minister retains the legal powers of his office, he could not well refuse to receive and to place on record in the archives of that office, the reply of a Foreign Government to a communication which he himself had made.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 300.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 312.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 2, 1840.

THE despatch of the 8th October, from M. Thiers to M. Guizot, which was officially communicated to Her Majesty's Government by M. Guizot, on the 10th October, afforded to Her Majesty's Government the liveliest satisfaction by the renewed assurances which it contained, that love of peace is a constant sentiment of the French Government; that Europe may reckon upon the disinterestedness of France, in regard to the affairs of the Levant; that France considers the existence of the Turkish Empire, in its integrity and independence, essential for the dearest interests of Europe, because the fall of that Empire would increase the power of neighbouring States, at the expense of the general equilibrium; and that France will devote all her means to the maintenance of peace, and to the upholding of the balance of power in Europe.

These assurances, indeed, are in strict accordance with all the previous diplomatic communications which Her Majesty's Government has received from that of France during the progress of these negotiations; and they are of



high value in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government as pledges, that, notwithstanding some differences of opinion between the Powers of Europe as to particular matters of detail, the general agreement of all the Great Powers upon the fundamental principles which ought to regulate their conduct in these affairs, will prevent any interruption of peace.

The main subject of M. Thiers' despatch is the Edict of the Sultan depriving Mehemet Ali of his Government of Egypt; and my despatches to your Excellency, No. 291 of the 17th ultimo, and to Lord Ponsonby, No. 195 of the 15th ultimo, which have been communicated to the French Government, contain so full a statement of the view which has been taken by Her Majesty's Government of that measure, that it is unnecessary for me on the present occasion to add anything further upon that point. But there are some remarks which have suggested themselves to Her Majesty's Government upon some passages of M. Thiers' despatch, which your Excellency is instructed to submit for the consideration of the French Cabinet.

M. Thiers says, that France, in accepting with a religious fidelity, the state of Europe, such as it resulted from Treaties (by which it is presumed are meant the Treaties of 1815), has understood that this state should not be changed, either for the benefit or to the detriment of any existing Power. In this understanding Her Majesty's Government entirely agrees; and Her Majesty's Government conceives that an arrangement which has for its object to prevent Egypt and Syria from being severed from the Turkish Empire, is in strict conformity with this understanding, and in accordance both with its letter, and with its spirit.

M. Thiers states, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire embraces the shores of the Black Sea and those of the Red Sea, and that it is as important to maintain the independence of Egypt and Syria as that of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. But Her Majesty's Government presumes that what is meant to be expressed in this passage, is not that the particular portions of the Turkish Empire therein mentioned should be made separately independent, because that would be a dissolution of the Turkish Empire; but that the Sovereign Power which rules the whole of the Turkish Empire, should be able to exert its paramount authority with entire independence of foreign control, as fully and completely on the shore of the Red Sea as on that of the Black Sea; in Egypt and in Syria, as on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In this opinion Her Majesty's Government concurs, and the measures which are now in course of execution by the Four Powers, in regard to Syria, appear to Her Majesty's Government to be strictly in furtherance of these views.

So far Her Majesty's Government is glad to find itself concurring in the positions laid down in M. Thiers' despatch; but Her Majesty's Government cannot equally agree in the opinion expressed therein, that the present condition of the Pasha of Egypt is an essential element of the balance of power in Europe.

The whole of M. Thiers' argument on this point seems to rest on the assumption, that the continued existence of Mehemet Ali in his present condition as Pasha of Egypt, is a source of strength to the Sultan, and tends to enable the Sultan the better to defend himself against foreign and domestic danger; because if it is admitted that Mehemet Ali is a Governor, using against his Sovereign an authority which has been confided to him for the benefit of that Sovereign, and employing in hostility against the Supreme Power of the State, the resources, military, naval, and financial, of an important portion of the empire itself; if, in short, he is, to use the words of the despatch, "a Pasha disobedient towards his Master, and depending upon all sorts of foreign influences," it is manifest that the continued existence of a subject in such a state of insubordination and enmity towards his Sovereign, must be a source of weakness, and not of strength to that Sovereign, and must render him less, instead of more able to defend himself against either foreign or domestic danger, and must therefore, according to the principles of M. Thiers' despatch, impair the balance of power.

But the opinion of the Turkish Government, which may be allowed to be a competent judge on this matter, has for some time been, that the continued existence of Mehemet Ali in his present state of military power, and with his hostile intentions towards the Sultan, is incompatible with the internal peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and destructive of the independence of

the Sultan as regards his relations with Foreign Powers: and, undoubtedly, the experience of the last few years has too fully shown that this opinion is not unfounded.

The extent of the limits within which it may be necessary to confine the delegated authority of Mehemet Ali, in order to make it probable that for the future he may be an obedient instead of a disobedient subject, and may, therefore, become a source of strength, instead of being a cause of weakness to the Ottoman Empire, is a point upon which opinions may differ; and that question it is not requisite for me now to discuss. But Her Majesty's Government conceives that whatever may be the opinions entertained on this point by Foreign Powers, such opinions can only serve to regulate the advice which those Powers may tender to the Sultan, or to determine the extent of the assistance which they may be disposed to afford him; but that it rests with the Sultan, as Sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his subjects shall be appointed by him to govern particular portions of his own dominions, and that no Foreign Power has a right to control the Sultan in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and essential attributes of independent sovereignty.

The question of principle which I have thus adverted to, may probably not have any practical bearing upon events now in progress, but Her Majesty's Government has felt anxious that it should not, by silence on this matter, leave its opinions liable to be misunderstood.

Your Excellency will give a copy of this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

No.

**CORRESPONDENCE**

RELATIVE TO THE

**AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.**

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**PART II.**

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*Foreign Office, December, 1840.*